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CHAPTER ONE: Modernism, Modernization, and Political Opposition in Turkey  
 
Keskin sirke küpüne zarar verir. 
Strong vinegar eats up its own dish. 
Turkish proverb 
 
The idea of opposition politics in Turkey has always been something of a cynical proposition. For 
the first twenty-two years of the republic only two sanctioned opposition parties existed, and both 
met unceremonious ends before they could mount any serious pressure in parliament or the 
cabinet. Following the establishment of the Democrat Party in January 1946 and their victory in 
parliament in 1950, the “main” opposition party has been a position consistently held by the 
Republican People’s Party, the party Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) established and the party who, 
despite their relatively stagnant performances at the polls, continues to most closely represent the 
ethos of the founding ideology of the republic, Kemalism. In that time, parties representing a 
wide swath of ideology, ranging from Islamist to ultranationalist to socialist and communist have 
vied for power, occasionally leading to street violence and vindictive reprisal at the hands of 
whichever representative faction finds themselves in power. Few are the moments in Turkish 
republican history when all forms of political dissent have been unequivocally tolerated by a 
ruling party. Yet, such dissent has remained a vital feature of Turkish politics, and has imparted 
on Turkish political culture a vituperative spirit that, even in moments of severe repression, has 
given hope to many of the possible democratic futures that lay in front of it. The following 
dissertation is aimed at recovering the origins of the politics of dissent in the founding years of 
the republic from a history that has often been myopically focused on the regime, its cadres, and, 
most of all, its leader. 
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 Indeed, the figure of Atatürk looms so large over the scholarship of the Turkish republic 
that his own innate political savvy and pragmatic intuition have become prisms through which 
that vituperative political spirit is viewed. In the most rigorous studies, narratives of Atatürk’s 
political pragmatism have largely pushed the question of ideology – both the content of 
Kemalism and the ideological universe in which it existed – to the side.1 Such works emphasize 
Atatürk’s pragmatic alliances with religious, leftist, and liberal factions to cobble together a polity 
that had enough force to overturn segments of the European-controlled mandate regime and unite 
Anatolia under the banner of an egalitarian republic, and then transition the liberal republican 
spirit of the political core that had ousted the authoritarian Abdülhamid II in 1908 into a modern, 
secular, state-driven democracy under the tutelage of its leader’s well-intentioned, paternal hand. 
While these works are invaluable for their expert uncovering of the life of a world-changing 
individual, the intense focus on the figure of Atatürk obscures the wider intellectual and political 
trends that account for his present-day appearance as an ideological shape-shifter. Put simply, we 
have a difficult time finding the proper ideological category for Atatürk (and his attendant 
political tradition, Kemalism) not because he was himself willing to flit between political camps, 
as he did with verve, but because the very rigid ideological categories we hope to pin on him 
were themselves inchoate during the span of his career, and barely perceptible to the highest 
orders of Turkish intellectuals, let alone the general polity. 
The work of this dissertation is an attempt to unravel the history of the formation of these 
ideological categories in the Turkish republic. Kemalism came into being alongside the 
competing ideologies and modernist subjectivities that it is so often defined against, but we 
                                                           
1 This trend is perhaps as old as scholarship on the Turkish republic itself, going back to Bernard 
Lewis’ Emergence of Modern Turkey (New York: Oxford, 1961) and Niyazi Berkes’ The 
Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), and has more 
recently manifested itself, in ever more acerbic tones, in M. Şükrü Hanioğlu’s Atatürk: An 
Intellectual Biography (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
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consistently forget that these ideologies were developed in tandem with and in response to each 
other. They offered unique visions of a Turkish democratic polity informed by transnational 
trends and movements, but ultimately autonomous and, at bottom, committed to the higher ideals 
of the republic, if not the policies and regimes it begat. Figuring out how the ideological 
categories of our contemporary political life came into being in the Turkish republic requires an 
investigation into Turkish intellectual, cultural and political history that pays primary attention to 
the way global trends of thought worked their way into the Turkish vocabulary, and ascertaining 
who claimed what kind of language, and for what ends. When we ask this question, the political 
and intellectual history of the republic then shifts its focus more towards the political margins of 
the single-party period, towards figures who were principally opposed to much of the Kemalist 
platform. By doing so, we might be able to more clearly assess Kemalism as an ideology. 
Political flexibility was a trademark of all the great interwar period ideological leaders – focusing 
on Atatürk’s life and political maneuvers often runs the risks of proposing his flexibility as an 
ideology when in fact they may have more so been sideways or backwards moves made with the 
intent of fulfilling the ideology that underpins his thought. In this way, the following dissertation 
is an attempt to find the ideological limits of Kemalism, to provide an ersatz, negative definition 
of a term whose positive definition is still an unsettled question. 
While many of the figures discussed in this dissertation were politically marginalized, 
they were, and have been, popular. Whether socialist or communist or fascist or conservative, the 
thinkers, writers, and journalists who populate the following narrative were by no means minor 
figures in their time, and to a greater or lesser extent have legacies and memories that have long 
outlasted their own lifetimes, a few of which were ended in exile or at the hands of their own 
government. They published newspapers that circulated in the tens of thousands, they wrote 
poems and novels that are widely regarded as being among the best in the modern Turkish 
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language, their paintings still hang in galleries across the country, and when they contested each 
other or the regime in public, their ideas were taken up in parliament, were often met with 
repression at the hands of the Interior Ministry, the Martial Law Administration, or the 
Presidency itself. In the simplest of terms, Kemalism was an ideology shaped in relation to its 
dissenters, and what is unique about Turkish leftism, conservatism, fascism, and religious politics 
is the way they were shaped by their relationship with Kemalism. The absence of regular electoral 
contestation in the single party era meant that for dissenters of the regime there was no viable 
way forward without negotiating with Kemalism, and likewise, no path forward for the Kemalist 
vision of tutelary democracy without a willing participation in that negotiation. Insofar as this 
dissertation represents aspects of that negotiation, it seeks to demonstrate both the promise and 
the peril of the oft-celebrated project of Kemalist modernization. 
The following sections of this introduction will provide a reflection on the subjectivity of 
regime opponents, and the role of opposition in defining who intellectuals in Turkey are, and how 
they are represented – the theoretical framework of what I call “the republic of others.” 
Additionally, it provides readers with sections detailing the broader scholarship on the early 
Turkish republic and the interventions I sought to make in preparing this text. Lastly, I provide an 
overview of each of the six chapters of this dissertation, a summary of their arguments and a 
precis of their sources.  
The Republic of Others: Representing Intellectuals in Turkish History 
“Intellectuals have been the fathers and mothers of movements, and of course sons and 
daughters, even nephews and nieces.” 
Edward Said, Representations of the Intellectual2 
 
                                                           
2 Edward Said, Representations of the Intellectual (New York: Vintage, 1994) 10-11 
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“We were discussing the history of different political institutions and forms. One of the professors 
suddenly said, to everyone’s astonishment, ‘Well the father of democracy in Turkey is Adnan 
Menderes.’ The others looked around in bewilderment. They said, ‘Adnan Menderes, the father of 
Turkish democracy? What do you mean?’ ‘Well’, said this professor, ‘he screwed the mother of 
democracy.’” 
Bernard Lewis, Notes on a Century: Reflections of a Middle East historian3 
 
 Often lost in the decades long squabble between Edward Said and Bernard Lewis is how 
the fundamental differences between their divergent worldviews were heavily characterized by 
both their personal history and the scholastic fields from which they entered into debate. Said’s 
position first as a citizen of a (post)-colonial entity and second as a public intellectual whose 
mission was to dissent from the wisdom received by the colonial order meant that the ongoing 
debate was to be played out on his territory – centered on the prismatic effect of Israeli settler 
colonialism on history, literature, and society, rather than Arabic philology, Ottoman and Turkish 
history, Lewis’ specialties. This was particularly true after the division between the two men 
more or less split the institutions that make up the field of Middle East Studies into two unequal 
halves. Said recognized this in the process of leveling a rather vicious barb against Lewis during 
the height of the latter’s influence over American imperial policy in the Middle East, telling the 
audience of a 2003 roundtable at Al-Ahram, “Bernard Lewis hasn’t set foot in the Middle East in 
40 years. He knows something about Turkey, I’m told, but he knows nothing about the Arab 
world.”4 The recognition by Said himself of the division between the Arab and Turkish world – 
ostensibly extended back into the shared histories of the two under Ottoman rule – has been 
mirrored in scholarship on the Turkish republic for decades. Since Turkey was never colonized, 
                                                           
3 Bernard Lewis, Notes on a Century: Reflections of a Middle East Historian (New York: Viking, 
2012), 99 
4 Amina Elbendary, “Resources of Hope” Al-Ahram Weekly Online Issue 631 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/archive/2003/631/focus.htm (Accessed August 7, 2017) 
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the conventional wisdom goes, post-colonial theory – including, but by no means limited to Said 
– must not apply.  
 While this dissertation is not concerned with a wholesale defense of the applicability of 
any one or set of post-colonial theories to the Turkish case, it must be pointed out, for the 
purposes of delineating what I describe as “The Republic of Others”, that critical constitutive 
parts of what would become the Turkish republic were indeed colonized, though briefly, in the 
five years following the Armistice of Mudros in October 1918 and the formation of the republic 
in the fall of 1923. There is much validity to the critique of applications of post-colonial theories, 
including Said’s Orientalism, to the Turkish case, but there is also no denying that in this period 
Istanbul was occupied by a European colonial regime intent on governing the former Ottoman 
capital in perpetuity, nor that the same regime supported a Greek invasion of Izmir and western 
Anatolia in May 1919, nor that the 1920 Treaty of Sevres supported the formation of an 
American-backed Armenian mandate in Eastern Anatolia.5 Though Mustafa Kemal’s success 
meant that the resulting state was not yoked with the weight of the post-colonial condition in the 
way the formerly Ottoman Arab provinces would be, his war for Turkish independence was 
undoubtedly an anti-colonial one. And so, one question I ask in this dissertation of the people 
who populate it, how did Mustafa Kemal’s paradoxical position as a westernizer opposed to 
western imperialism and colonialism affect their relationship with the west? For the cast of 
characters in this dissertation, opposing Kemalism meant hewing closely to one or the other end 
of the Kemalist paradox. Many of the leftist writers that appear in this dissertation adopted 
western culture even more radically than the Kemalist norms did, taking a stance that reforms to 
dress, the civil code, or Turkey’s democratic structure did not go far enough towards bringing a 
western democratic life to Turkey. Pan-Turkists, on the other hand, rejected western civilization 
                                                           
5 This is to say nothing of the incredible economic sway European powers, primarily Britain, held 
over the Ottoman Empire from the middle of the 19th century until its collapse.   
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altogether in order to articulate a racist Turkish supremacist politics that painted Mustafa Kemal 
as a race-imposter for falling in love with western culture. There were many shades in-between, 
but the process of ideological contestation in the single party era would serve both to set up 
Kemalist political and cultural norms, and single out many of Kemalism’s opponents as grave 
threats to the regime, and the nation. The people that make up this dissertation largely believed in 
the project of the Turkish republic, but that belief, and in many senses their very membership in 
the Turkish nation, went unrecognized. This is the way in which I mean to describe these 
intellectuals as a “Republic of Others” – a group with wide disagreements, various intellectual 
backgrounds, and diverse cultural heritages who nonetheless grappled with similar problems of 
belonging in a state that tried to awkwardly balance nationalism and liberal society. 
 Here, it is critical here to bring Said’s analysis back onto Lewis’ territory – in a way, to 
ask the questions of Lewis’ work that Said never bothered to ask. In order to do this, we must first 
necessarily consider the nature of Lewis’ seminal work, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 
alongside a few of his observations of the convulsions of Turkish democracy in the years leading 
up to that book’s initial publication in 1961. Lewis’ first major work appeared just a year after a 
military coup ousted the government led by the first successful opposition party in Turkish 
history – a party’s whose success in the 1950 election Lewis had praised with minimal 
equivocation. In The Emergence of Modern Turkey, the kind of brazen orientalism of which 
Lewis was accused, and often guilty, is non-existent, but in its place, is a subtler, and supple form 
than anyone more familiar with his later, more polemical works may expect. In his introduction, 
Lewis lays out three distinct “sources” of Turkish civilization: the “local”, the Turkish, and the 
Islamic. The first of these is meant to represent an odd hybrid of culture and politics that is 
bounded by the territory of Anatolia and the imperial powers that held sway over what is now the 
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Turkish republic since ancient times.6 The second presents itself mainly in linguistic form, since 
Lewis concludes that despite the resiliency of certain nomadic cultures, “the old Turkish 
civilizations were too thoroughly obliterated by Islam for any real revival of ancient Turkish 
culture to be possible.”7 The last, Islam, attempts to define an Islamic culture that is distinctly 
Turkish – a frontier faith, greater emphasis on folk traditions, the influence of the unique Ottoman 
religious hierarchy, and tolerance of non-Muslims – but still a subset of a wider Oriental one.8     
 From its first edition in 1961 and for many years after, The Emergence of Modern 
Turkey, was considered the authoritative text on the late Ottoman and Republican period up to the 
election of the Democrat Party in 1950. The book covers a wide terrain of intellectual, cultural, 
social, and economic history, like a proper textbook should, but to study closely Lewis’ 
arguments, and personal history with the Turkish republic, is to come to understand the text 
primarily as a history of the ideas of democracy and Western civilization in Turkey. Moreover, 
the sections pertaining to the republican era are largely a recapitulation of official accounts, 
memoirs of men of state, and of journals and reminiscences of the intellectuals of the regime. The 
ideas of opposition intellectuals, criticism of the regime, and any deviation from the steady, 
forward march of pro-western democratic ideals are minimized or dismissed in Lewis’ telling. 
This is most obvious in Lewis’ recounting of the 1940s, where the infamous Wealth Tax, through 
which the regime targeted non-Muslim citizens and businesses for appropriation, is recognized 
for its deleterious consequences, but ultimately rationalized in comparison to the German 
holocaust. Lewis writes, “In a Europe dominated by Hitler’s Germany, Republican Turkey’s one 
essay in persecution was a mild and gentle affair.”9 The destruction of Tan Press in December 
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1945 by a nationalist mob, the subject of Chapter Five of this dissertation, along with widespread 
suppression of leftist parties and journalists is actually regarded as a failed attempt “to restrict the 
freedom of the press… in the face of the new and potent force of public opinion.”10 Ultimately, 
the idea of liberal democracy, in Lewis’ eyes, was the essential contribution of Kemalism to 
Turkish society. Despite much evidence to the contrary, Lewis holds up a westernized, 
democratic, Kemalist youth as the emblem of the,  
…pro-Western, and therefore pro-democratic trend running much deeper than the 
temporary alignments of international relations. At the lowest level, it expressed itself in 
the prevalence of chewing-gum and leopard-skin shirts on the beaches of the Bosphorus 
and the streets of Istanbul; at the highest, in the study of the English language and of 
English and American literature and history, in the university, the school and the home, 
and in a self-criticism that verged at times on the morbid.  
Many different factors contributed to the growth of pro-Western, pro-democratic 
feeling… In the Kemalist Republic a new generation had grown to maturity, for whom 
the main objectives of the nationalist creed had already been accomplished, and 
nationalism alone was no longer enough. Brought up in an age of intensive 
Westernization, they were deeply attracted by the Western liberal tradition, and saw in 
democracy not just a matter of fashion or diplomacy, but the means of achieving the final 
integration of Turkey, on a footing of equality and mutual respect, in the free Western 
world.11  
Knowing Lewis’ story with the Turkish Republic is also critical to understanding how he 
came to these conclusions, and reveals how much of his sense of Turkish politics – which was 
astute – and culture – which was blinkered by a commitment to modernization theory and limited 
experience travelling outside of Istanbul and Ankara – was informed by the prominent Turkish 
intellectuals with which he most often kept company. In this context, while we might stop short 
of calling The Emergence of Modern Turkey an intellectual history of the Turkish republic, it is 
clear from the thrust of its argument, and the history of its author, that the book is a product of the 
intellectual history of the republican era. It is well known that Lewis was employed by the British 
Foreign Office as an expert on Middle Eastern and Turkish affairs and as an intelligence officer 
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during World War II, but less well known is that while Lewis was studying in Paris under Louis 
Massignon in 1936-37, he began studying Turkish under the tutorship of Adnan Adıvar – a 
former Ottoman statesman and husband to the famous novelist Halide Edib, who had been exiled 
from Turkey in 1925.12 His first lessons in Turkish diplomatic history were are in part credited to 
time spent with Tevfik Rüştü Aras while Aras was serving as Ambassador to the United 
Kingdom.13 These relationships with figures who had, or would come to have, a serious conflict 
with Kemalism, and who themselves were more liberal in orientation than Mustafa Kemal, likely 
influenced the ebullient optimism and admiration Lewis maintained for the seeming miracle of 
liberalism that was the 1950 elections.  
In this sense, The Emergence of Modern Turkey does for his favored intellectuals 
precisely what Edward Said thought was deficient in most accounts of intellectuals, “there has 
been far too much defining of the intellectual, and not enough stock taken of the image, the 
signature, the actual intervention and performance, all of which taken together constitute the very 
lifeblood of every real intellectual.”14 By setting Mustafa Kemal up has a singular figure up 
against the enormous task of overturning centuries of Islamic despotism in favor of liberal, 
western democracy, and coloring the narrative with source material drawn from nearly 
exclusively sympathetic source material, Lewis helped construct the image of Atatürk that was in 
some senses a performance. The popular image of Atatürk in the west as a uniquely benevolent 
dictator molding a Muslim country into a western democracy – an image that has justified many 
western attempts at “regime change” over the last half century, from Vietnam to Afghanistan to 
Iraq – is an image Lewis himself helped translate for the Anglo-American world. 
                                                           
12 Lewis, Notes on a Century, 34-35 
13 Ibid, 52 
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As accurate the representation of the pro-regime intellectual force is in Lewis’ work, one 
cannot help but notice that the teleology of developmentalism and modernization discourse not 
only presents these intellectuals and their ideas as impervious to outside critique, but presents 
them as hermetically sealed in their own world, totally ensconced by a powerful, autocratic 
regime with a singular vision for the advancement of society. For Said, the intellectual was 
primarily a figure of dissent; departing somewhat from the formalistic Gramsciian approach to 
defining the intellectual, Said wrote, “It is a spirit in opposition, rather than in accommodation, 
that grips me because the romance, the interest, the challenge of intellectual life is to be found in 
dissent against the status quo at a time when the struggle seems so unfairly weighted against 
them.”15 It is with this observation in mind that I offer this dissertation as an intervention into the 
study of intellectual history of the Turkish Republic. In truth, the intellectuals and ideas of the 
republican regime did not exist in a hermetically sealed environment. Despite limited outlets for 
political opposition, and often repressive and restrictive censorship, the intellectual life of the 
“single party era” was a diverse ecosystem, and pro-regime intellectuals and ideas cohabited in 
that ecosystem with others who, for the most part, held allegiance to the sovereignty of the 
Turkish republic, and even to the dynamic personality that sat at its head, but dissented from 
many of its policies. The narratives and ideas of the people that populate Lewis’ book were 
themselves a product of the conversations and contests in that ecosystem. This dissertation, in 
shifting the focus away from the men of state and the intellectuals of the regime, offers a fuller 
representation of that ecosystem. 
Literature Review and Theory: Putting the Modern in Modernization 
The historical and theoretical space occupied by this dissertation is one focused on the 
eddies, counter flows, and lacunae that were created as modernization theory and its adherents 
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flattened out the history of the Turkish republic into a steady, unidirectional march of 
modernization and modernity. In selecting events, sources, and archives to study I have 
deliberately chosen examples that do not quite “fit” with the standard interpretations of Kemalist 
modernity and its path from authoritarianism to democracy, but which are essential to a three-
dimensional view of that history. The faults of the influence of modernization theory on Turkish 
historiography have been laid bare many times previous, perhaps most articulately by Reşat 
Kasaba in his 1997 essay, “Kemalist Certainties and Modernist Ambiguities”, but there remains a 
mountain of work to be done to populate the ambiguous moments in Ottoman and Turkish history 
that make up the fabric of the modern experience.16 This dissertation means to be one 
contribution to the recovery of political and intellectual modernism within the very framework of 
Kemalist modernization as it was understood by those that lived under it, struggled against it, and 
ultimately pushed it forward. This mission is drawn from the work of Marshall Berman’s vision 
of the “maelstrom of modern life” in which “world-historical processes have nourished an 
amazing variety of visions and ideas that aim to make men and women the subjects as well as the 
objects of modernization, to give them the power to change the world that is changing them, to 
make their way through the maelstrom and make it their own.”17 If by the 1940s the authoritarian, 
strait-jacketed modernization adherents had begun to construct the guard rails that would constrict 
Turkey’s democratic futures, the anti-imperialist victory of Mustafa Kemal, and the radical social 
opening that came in its wake was the place where the thinkers and writers and politicians that 
populate this dissertation found their purchase in Turkish society, and made lasting contributions 
                                                           
16 Reşat Kasaba, “Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities” in Bozdoğan and Kasaba, eds., 
Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
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of Turkish Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). 
17 Marshall Berman, All that is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity (New York: 
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to the experience of modernity and modernization even as many seemed to lose their struggles 
against the modernizing state apparatus. In this brief overview of the scholarship pertinent to this 
period in Turkish history, as I have throughout the dissertation, I emphasize the ways this 
contestation with Kemalism was integral to bringing Kemalism into being – essentially that 
Kemalism was both a modernizing ideology and a modernist one.  
Building a new republic out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire required its leaders to 
draw on many of the same thinkers that provided the intellectual fuel for the 1908 Constitutional 
Revolution. In contrast to that revolution, however, Mustafa Kemal’s leadership engaged with 
mass politics in order to produce a new nationalist state, rather than preserve a multinational 
imperial framework.18 Intellectuals like Ziya Gökalp were given a second opportunity to see their 
modern formations of Turkish nationalism implemented.19 Erik J. Zürcher has described the 
manner in which the Turkish Republican project prior to Mustafa Kemal’s final consolidation of 
power in 1926 was essentially a continuation of the Committee of Union and Progress’ political 
and intellectual mission.20 As M. Şükrü Hanioğlu has argued in his recent biography of Atatürk, 
the Turkish leader was deeply influenced by rationalism and Darwinism but was an otherwise 
reactive and opportunistic with regards to an intellectual mission.21 A. Holly Shissler has 
convincingly argued in the context of the life of Ahmet Ağaoğlu, that the Russian revolution of 
1917 and the political dismantling of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 destroyed the restraints of 
                                                           
18 For assessments of the intellectual climates at these two points see: Niyazi Berkes The 
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19 This group was almost uniformly disappointed by the incomplete nature of the 1908 revolution, 
which was viewed as a failed opportunity to propagate social change rather than simply political 
and military turnover.  Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 344-8. 
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cosmopolitanism and created the political conditions upon which these thinkers were forced to 
define their previous civic or ethnic conceptions of nationalism on territorial grounds.22 Through 
two different methodological approaches, Yeşim Bayar and Behlül Özkan have shown how the 
territorial ideal of Turkish nationalism was debated in parliament, defined the missions of the 
political organs of the state, and guided nearly every policy directive of the single-party era from 
education to foreign policy.23  
The above are among reasons why the question of defining Kemalism as an ideology in 
the single-party era has been a difficult riddle to solve. Taha Parla and Andrew Davison have 
provided some helpful tools of analysis in their study of Kemalist ideology as part of the 
corporatist “third way” tradition, particularly in regards to their strategies in elections and 
opposition parties.24 Their study highlights the difficulty faced by many scholars of attempting to 
square Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s state’s varieties of state-driven economy, laicism and positivistic 
nationalism with the grander ideologies driving the global political situation in the 1920s and 
1930s, particularly in instances when ideological affinities between one or the other superpower, 
as with Turkish-Soviet cases before the Montreux convention or Turkish-American cases 
following the close of World War II, are buttressed by one or the other form of realpolitik. Early 
attempts at multi-party elections in Turkey were practically a doomed enterprise from the 
beginning. Holding regular elections was, as Parla and Davison point out, “among the party’s 
tasks” despite the view held by the political elite that “neither was the country ready for direct 
                                                           
22 A. Holly Shissler, Between Two Empires, 20-28 
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democracy, nor was every Turk capable of serving the ‘high’ interests of the party.”25 In addition, 
the formation of opposition parties were on the one hand essential to establishing the Kemalist 
state’s bona fides as a “tutelary democracy”, on the other hand, in Parla and Davison’s analysis, 
their solidaristic corporatist ideology rendered opposition parties redundant since the cooption of 
major political classes and corporations was necessary in order to create the sort of political and 
ideological unity required by the state’s charismatic leader.26 The case for Kemalism as an 
ideology meant to bind a bourgeois class, first – thus comporting with the behavior of the sorts of 
ideological regimes described in Charles Maier’s work – and unite the whole of society behind an 
ontological revolution, second – hence the appealing comparisons to fascist regimes – is a strong 
one.27 However, it has the effect of leaving the boundaries of Kemalist nationalism, and the sharp 
distinctions it drew through education, propaganda, rhetoric, and more coercive methods of state 
violence and censorship with “foreign” ideological systems, seem blurry and indistinct. This 
dissertation looks squarely at the points where these “foreign” political ideas came into direct 
conflict with the state in order to offer a negative definition of Kemalist ideology – pointing out 
the precise points where it disallowed contemporary political ideas ranging from women’s 
liberation to racist irredentism to social democracy and economic liberalism; Kemalism did not 
support any of these ideas in full measure, and the limits of its support for each were clearly, and 
often violently demarcated. 
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John M. VanderLippe’s incisive study of the multiparty system’s origins under İnönü 
characterizes Kemalism as an ideology focused on “outcome rather than on process” which 
accounts for the democratic deficiencies of the transition to multiparty politics.28 One of those 
deficiencies, in his description, is that the options left for opposition to Kemalism amounted to 
campaigns for a “new hegemony, with new personnel, imposing their own agenda in the same 
way as their opponents.”29 Reform and contestation in the period of transition to multiparty 
politics, he then suggests, “resulted in the development of a political system separate from 
society,” wherein the two were conceived as distinct entities who were mediated only by 
“experts, career politicians, and the military,” and any contestation over ideology was forced into 
narrow constraints.30 Largely, this dissertation comports with this assessment of the political 
system, but challenges the notion that opponents simply sought new forms of hegemony, showing 
how from the earliest years of the republic onward, opponents held hopes for democratization 
within the Kemalist system, often attempted to work within it, and indeed gained footholds in the 
cultural and social realms that would precipitate political parties and rival ideological movements 
to Kemalism that would characterize Turkish politics up to the present.   
It should be noted, as well, that the story of elites and intellects outside of the highest 
Ottoman and Kemalist circles is quite different than the one covered in the works mentioned 
above, and from the bulk of the subjects of this dissertation as well. Michael Meeker’s seminal 
work on elite transitions in the province of Trabzon masterfully demonstrated how structures of 
imperial control and power not only survived the transition, but formed critical pillars of state 
control throughout the twentieth century in the Anatolian provinces despite the fact that these 
Ottoman legacies remained barely perceptible even to the elites who inherited them. Though there 
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are many differences between my subjects and his, Meeker, and in a somewhat subliminal way 
Bernard Lewis, rightly identified the “counterrevolution within the revolution” of Kemalism – 
namely, that the Turkish nation remained Muslim in large part despite the secular overhaul of the 
state apparatus – I have plotted out, particularly in chapters four and five, some of the ways pious 
and conservative opponents of Kemalism engaged in a modernist critique of Turkish society 
which held the Kemalist, secular revolution as a precondition, and simultaneously prefigured the 
kinds of religious politics that would slowly erode Kemalist and secular politics over the course 
of the second half of the twentieth century.31  
Hale Yılmaz has recently shown how varied and contested the application of the 
Kemalist revolution was in the Turkish provinces.32 Her work shows that while “revolution” is a 
broadly contested term in Turkish historiography, it is clear that “in the sphere of culture, rather 
than social structure, that the Turkish Revolution was truly revolutionary…” and that there was a 
clear “contemporary political and intellectual perspective that regarded this experiment as a 
revolution.”33 Indeed, in the context of the negotiations surrounding the reforms in the provinces, 
she opts for “reform” over revolution since that is closer to how it appeared to those who were 
targeted by the process of nation-making itself.34 However, as I show in chapter three, the 
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ideological contestations of those who saw themselves as caught up in the modernist “revolution” 
were not unconnected to the struggles and negotiations happening in the countryside. In moments 
like the 1930 municipal elections, when read through the archive of the Liberal Republican Party, 
we can see the forces driving opposition intellectuals and popular opposition in the same frame, at 
times speaking the same language, making the same demands of a state who, in their eyes, was 
failing to serve its public.  
What this dissertation ultimately offers is a fuller picture of the modernist political 
landscape of Turkey’s single party era than has typically been provided in histories of this period. 
In doing so, I hope to highlight an antinomy that has largely been, at best, unremarked upon or, at 
worst, openly disregarded in much of the literature. That antinomy is best summarized thusly: as 
the Turkish republic developed its multiparty system, the variety of political alternatives to 
Kemalism in the public sphere became more constrained. Few scholars in the field would 
disagree that the brief periods of the Progressive Republican Party [Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet 
Fırkası, TCF] in 1925 and the Liberal Republican Party [Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, SCF] in 
1930 were followed by periods of severe repression and state consolidation. However, as I show 
in chapters five and six of this dissertation, the creation of the Democrat Party [Demokrat Partisi, 
DP] – which was led by Celal Bayar, Atatürk’s last Prime Minister and his personal choice for 
successor – was also occasioned by severe legal repression of opposing ideas. Had the DP not 
won a surprising victory in the 1950 elections, and followed that with a peaceful transfer of 
power from İnönü’s government, perhaps scholars of the period would be less forgiving of the 
repression that preceded it. As I detail in my chapter on the anticommunist riot that destroyed the 
offices of the leftist daily Tan mere days after the announcement of the DP’s formation, 
contemporary writers as diverse as the conservative Bernard Lewis, the social democrat Niyazi 
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Berkes, and the liberal Ahmet Emin Yalman expressed only the mildest concern over the 
persecution of certain regime opponents – many of them leftists – in the years running up to 
1950.35 For many writers, and especially the modernization theorists, the victory of a less-statist, 
nominally democratic, anti-communist party in Turkey expiated the myriad anti-democratic sins 
of the prior regime.  
By bringing this antinomy back into the historiographical picture, this dissertation 
intervenes in some key questions of Turkey’s period of “authoritarian modernization.”  As 
recognized by Atabaki and Zürcher, disagreement in the press and amongst the intelligentsia was 
viewed on an instrumental basis by Atatürk, “to feed the leaders with ideas… or to spread their 
messages. Those who were too independent-minded soon found themselves ostracized.”36 While 
it is true that the state’s view of the press was often capricious, we should be mindful of the fact 
that the regimes of Atatürk and İsmet İnönü were not the only ones reading the press, and that 
intellectuals who opposed or disagreed with the regime found publics willing to accept what they 
had to offer – and publics who dismayed the disappearance of their preferred newspaper, novelist, 
or poet from the scene in times when the regime turned censorious. In spite of this capriciousness, 
green shoots of democratic contestation around the key cultural and political issues of the single 
party era are identifiable in the Turkish public sphere.  
By largely de-centering the state, and the various political dramas playing out amongst its 
elites, this dissertation offers an alternative take on the extant scholarship on political opposition 
in Turkey’s single party era. Works by Erik Jan Zürcher and Hakan Özoğlu offer rich narratives 
of political contention in the earliest years of the republic, but, at bottom, their focus is on a 
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struggle over power rather than any broad based political or ideological contestation with Mustafa 
Kemal and his closest political allies.37 The reason for this is largely that the politicians at the top 
of each of the sanctioned opposition parties of this period did not have the degree of ideological 
difference from the Kemalists, nor the political capital necessary organize a popular, broad based 
opposition movement. As Frederick Frey eloquently stated with regards to the closing of the TCF 
in 1926, “There was no room at the top for opposition that tried to mobilize support from the 
main sources of Kemalist strength. Hostile pressure so close to the jugular could not be 
tolerated.”38 This is true as well of the early years of the multiparty era, from 1945-1947, when 
İnönü’s government pursued an opening of multiparty politics that, as Cemil Koçak has pointed 
out, was “…interpreted as the first signs of democratic life, but in reality they were about new 
arrangements aimed at amending the single-party government system.”39 As such, any analysis of 
ideological currents in the single-party era, including opposition politics, must stretch beyond the 
bounds of party politics to properly account for the diversity of political opinion and real 
contestation with the power of Kemalism.  
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 The six body chapters of this dissertation take up six different vectors of opposition in 
Turkey’s single party era: gender, class, race, violence, law, and memory, in that order. The 
chapters progress roughly along a chronological axis, identifying specific moments or longer 
periods when these vectors present particularly rich veins for analyzing how political and cultural 
opposition was expressed – and suppressed – but by no means do I suggest that any of these 
vectors were absent at any given point, from any given perspective in this era. Additionally, while 
each of these themes serve as the main lens for a single chapter, they carry on as subthemes in 
every other chapter. This is facilitated by the focus on a relatively circumscribed cast of 
characters, each of whom addressed a wide variety of disagreements with the Kemalist state, and 
intersected with the most centrally contested issues of Kemalist policy at critical steps along the 
way to the introduction of multiparty politics in the late 1940s. Here I will overview the topics 
addressed in each chapter.  
 Chapter Two, “Beyond the Patriarchal Bargain: Gender Fluidity, Women’s Rights, and 
Progressive Politics in the 1920s” addresses the way in which the perception of gender fluidity in 
the 1920s interacted with progressive politics that both spurred and criticized Kemalist policies 
regarding women’s roles in public, and politics. In classical literature on women’s rights and 
Kemalism there is a paradigm, elaborated by Binnaz Toprak, Şirin Tekeli, Yeşim Arat, Deniz 
Kandiyoti, and others, that describes women in Turkey as “emancipated but unliberated.”40 In 
most formulations, this description depicts women as having won a limited set of rights under the 
Kemalist framework, but in so doing only reinforcing patriarchal norms and conservative political 
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and familial structures that restricted (and continue to restrict) any movement of women seeking 
full social independence. This chapter offers two interventions into this literature. First, by 
shifting the focus away from the state, state actors, and the particularities of the emancipatory 
regime enacted by the Kemalists and towards opposition figures we can better see the ways in 
which popular literature, images, and the press advocated for women’s liberation above and 
beyond the Kemalist framework. Opposition figures channeled the air of emancipation that was 
fostered by a quickly liberalizing urban culture in Istanbul and proliferated throughout the 
country by Kemalist rhetoric and policy to advocate for a broader, more comprehensive social 
safety net in areas that directly affected women’s lives – especially in terms of orphan and child 
care. The second intervention involves the way opposition figures addressed anxieties about 
gender fluidity – or at least what was perceived as gender fluidity at the time – in order to prepare 
a political ground for progressive change. The expanding imagination of possible political, social, 
and cultural roles for women in the 1920s simply could not be contained by the Kemalist 
framework, and the ways in which this imagination exceeded Kemalist thinking represented a 
fertile ground on which opposition and critique of Kemalist policy could grow.  
 Chapter three shifts focus to the formation of the Liberal Republican Party (SCF) in the 
summer of 1930, its participation in the municipal elections that fall, and its dissolution not long 
after the election’s conclusion. Formed by then-Ambassador to France Ali Fethi Okyar at the 
behest of Mustafa Kemal, the SCF was intended to be a tightly constrained “loyal opposition” 
party that would offer no challenge to Mustafa Kemal’s authority, nor to his policies in any field 
other than economic policy – wherein Okyar and his colleagues such as Ahmet Ağaoğlu, and 
others would offer a more liberal alternative to the étatist policies of İsmet İnönü and the CHP. 
What was unexpected by the Kemalists was the wide swath of social and ideological opposition 
the SCF would attract. In Istanbul, leftist opponents of Kemal in the press, like Zekeriya Sertel 
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and Arif Oruç would throw their support behind Okyar and the SCF despite their philosophical 
disagreements over economic matters. Across the country, as identified in the party archives, the 
SCF activated provincial political networks by co-opting village chief (muhtar) and Turkish 
Hearth (Türk Ocakları) organizations to garner support from more conservative, middle and 
lower-class Turks who were suffering the most from the fallout of the global economic 
depression the year before. This chapter delves into the leftist support for the party, continuing 
the story of the Sertels from the previous chapter, and provides the first in-depth analysis of 
documents from the archives of the Istanbul and Izmir party offices of the SCF, which detail the 
varied ways the SCF swiftly organized support in advance of the fall elections in September and 
October, as well as the stiff resistance they experienced by state and CHP officials along the way.  
 The failure of the SCF in 1930 to build a sustained opposition party catalyzed a new 
articulation of Kemalist ideology that would engage more heavily in ethnic-nationalist ideology. 
In the opposition, this more radical, less conciliatory turn in the Kemalist state would push 
opponents of the regime in more radical directions as well. The ideological contestation detailed 
in the following four chapters ultimately had its roots in the failure of the SCF in 1930. 
 Chapter four, “White, Yellow, Black, and Brown: The Racing of Turkish Political 
Discourse 1931-1945” looks at the way this ethno-nationalist turn in Kemalism sparked 
ideological polarization, beginning in relatively obscure intellectual journals in the early 1930s 
and later in in major press outlets during World War II. Following the collapse of the SCF and the 
violent quelling of an anti-secular protest near Izmir known as the Menemen Incident, the 
Kemalist government started down a path of articulating in as clear terms as possible an official 
ideology – Kemalism – that would involve the promulgation of numerous journals, conferences, 
government and academic led efforts to justify the cultural supremacy of the Turkish ethnicity. In 
response to this, regime opponents would launch vociferous criticism of the Kemalist definition 
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of Turkishness (Türklük) and Turkism (Türkçülük). This criticism, from right wing ultra 
nationalist circles, conservative modernist writers, and left wing socialist and communist circles, 
centered on the manner in which these Kemalist definitions deployed racial categories. The 
principal point of contestation for both ultra-nationalists and conservative modernists was with 
the Kemalist contention that Turks were “white” and thus not unlike their European counterparts 
– indeed if one follows the Turkish Historical Thesis to its conclusion, Turks were depicted as the 
originators of western civilization. Ultranationalists rejected this, in favor of advocating a form of 
“yellow supremacy” often known as Turanism. Kemalists would have the most trouble drawing 
distinctions between this aggressive and fundamentally irredentist alternative to their 
Turkishness, particularly as other opponents of the regime, particularly from the left, would 
exploit these similarities to paint the regime as racist – a tactic that would carry further weight, 
and cause further polarization as the Nazi regime consolidated and threatened Turkish 
sovereignty during World War II. In addition to examining key aspects of the intellectual 
development of the Turanist and communist critiques, this chapter will also fold into this 
narrative the development of a strand of conservative modernism that began to embrace a 
narrative of Turkish identity that embraced Arab, Persian, and Ottoman Islamic history and 
culture as a rejection of the westernizing measures of the Kemalist regime. Centering on the work 
of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, this chapter posits that his embrace of the nearer Islamic past in an 
attempt to articulate a pious, anti-western modern politics should also be seen in the light of the 
debates happening around race and nationalism in this period.  
 Chapter Five, “The Anatomy of a Riot: Political Violence, the Birth of Multiparty 
Politics, and the Destruction of Tan Press, December 4, 1945” considers a moment wherein the 
elite discussions of the ideological lines of World War II, and the emerging Cold War paradigm, 
would find a violent and popular expression. Following months of heated, vitriolic exchanges 
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between right and left-wing factions in Turkey, on December 4, 1945 a crowd of college-aged 
students and bazar workers gathered in the Beyazıt Square and marched down Ankara Boulevard 
bearing portraits of then-president Ismet Inönü, chanting anti-communist slogans and eventually 
arrived at the doorstep of Tan Press. This printing house, an associated printing house in the 
Galata neighborhood, and a Russian-owned bookstore, were destroyed in the subsequent riot 
effectively marking the end of the journalistic careers of its owners, Zekeriya and Sabiha Sertel, 
that had stretched back to the First World War. The following year would witness the 
inauguration of multiparty politics in the Turkish Republic with the founding of the Democratic 
Party – the leaders of which were intellectually and socially related to the milieu of Tan – and 
would culminate with the Democrats’ first parliamentary majority in 1950. I argue in this chapter 
that the Tan Riot represented a significant, early attempt to constrain political discourse at the 
outset of the multiparty period, and to inoculate the newly formed DP against ideologies that 
might appear threatening to either of the emergent global superpowers – the United States and the 
Soviet Union. The Tan Riot was in many ways a great tragedy of Turkish democracy, as it sent 
Sabiha and Zekeriya Sertel into a period of disillusionment and financial distress that would result 
in their exile to Soviet Eastern Europe and Baku, Azerbaijan in 1950. Their story is threaded 
throughout the dissertation in order to demonstrate their contributions and commitment towards 
the project of Turkish democracy, having run several popular, progressive newspapers with 
editorial lines that could only be described as “social democrat” the Sertels represented an 
intellectual sphere and a public that could have posed a genuine, organic political response to the 
CHP from the left. This chapter, and the one that follows, demonstrate how demagoguery and 
geopolitical contingency foreclosed that possibility. 
 Chapter Six, “Prosecuting Ideology: The Trials of Pan-Turkists and Leftists at the Dawn 
of the Cold War, 1944-1947”, examines documents pertaining to the prosecution of two camps of 
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intellectuals in the years before and after the end of World War II. In 1944, sensing that the 
presence of a vociferous, irredentist political movement with ties to the Nazi regime might 
imperil Turkey’s strategic interests as the Soviet Union turned the tide of the war, roughly two 
dozen major Pan-Turkist intellectuals were arrested in May 1944 and brought to trial on charges 
of forming a secret society with the intent to overthrow the government. These trials have held a 
relatively prominent place in the scholarship on this period for a long time, but the past few years 
have seen the publication of nearly all of the documents related to the trials, many of which are 
still not available through usual archival requests. An in-depth reading of these documents is, in 
this chapter, juxtaposed with similar documents from the trials of Zekeriya and Sabiha Sertel in 
1946 for the crime of insulting the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet 
Meclisi, hereafter TBMM). The Sertel trial came on the heels of the destruction of their printing 
house the previous December – an act for which no one would stand trial, despite the massive 
destruction of property involved – and would close just before the first competitive parliamentary 
elections in July. This chapter considers the ways in which these trials were meant to incubate 
Turkish foreign and domestic politics from ideological threats that were perceived as foreign. In 
the case of the Pan-Turkists, the government was concerned about whether their movement could 
be used against them by the Soviet Union in postwar negotiations that would center on a new 
regime over the Bosphorus Straits, and could have included negotiations over Soviet control over 
some of Turkey’s eastern provinces. In the case of the Sertels, this political trial, in combination 
with the Tan Riot the year before, served to ward off leftist participation in the opposition party 
favored by the government – the Democrat Party (DP) – at a time when Turkey was moving 
closer and closer to joining the American-led anti-Soviet bloc. The articles for which the Sertels 
had been brought to trial directly impugned the Turkish government for not adhering to the 
principles of the United Nations Charter which it had signed in August 1945.  
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 Chapter Seven, “‘A Turk Named O’Brien’: Bedtime Stories of the Turkish Republic from 
the Memoirs of Sevim Sertel O’Brien” examines the unpublished memoir of the daughter of 
Sabiha and Zekeriya Sertel, which was composed in the United States in the 1960s, as a way of 
telling her three young children about the new country their mother had come from, and about 
their grandparents. Born shortly after the close of World War I, Sevim Sertel’s earliest years were 
spent in New York City, where her parents were students at Columbia University, and later spent 
much of her adolescence and young adulthood in Turkey after they returned in 1923 following 
the close of the Independence War. She would later become a frequent contributor to her parents’ 
newspaper, Tan, and by World War II she had married an American AP Press Attaché named 
Frank O’Brien. Following the war, and her parents’ eventual exile to the USSR in 1950, Sevim 
and Frank raised their three children in the United States, primarily in the Washington, DC 
suburb of Chevy Chase, MD. The chapter engages with the memoir as a document that 
remembers the intellectual history of the early Republic in a uniquely feminine manner, one that 
emphasized gender as a component to Kemalist modernity, and highlighted the limits placed on 
women in the public sphere. The chapter places Sevim’s memories in an intellectual context with 
both her own writing in Tan, and the political outlook of her parents as a way of asking questions 
about how attitudes towards Kemalism changed over the course of generations. 
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CHAPTER TWO: Beyond the Patriarchal Bargain: Gender Fluidity, Women’s Rights, and 
Progressive Politics in the 1920s 
 
In classical scholarship on women’s rights and feminism in Turkey, the Kemalist revolution is 
often presented as a point of departure for the fate of women and feminists in Turkey vis a vis 
their counterparts elsewhere in the Middle East, and Muslim world more broadly. Identified by 
Deniz Kandiyoti as a society in which women were subjected to “classic patriarchy” that was 
shared broadly across the Middle East and East Asia – but differentiated from alternative forms of 
patriarchy in Sub-Saharan Africa – Turkey’s revolutionary experience in the 1920s and 1930s 
pushed women in a seemingly unique direction as they achieved contested but significant 
personal emancipation and civic rights, were relatively unburdened by a colonial architecture that 
served to entrench traditional patriarchal norms, and were offered up to the rest of the world as 
prominent symbols of Turkey’s successful modernization project.41 More recent work has 
uncovered the uneven manner in which this revolution in women’s roles was negotiated outside 
of Istanbul and Ankara between lower-ranking state officials, heads of families, and women 
themselves.42 What newer trends in this historical research show is that while Turkey was not 
colonized by a western power in the way many other parts of the Muslim world was, Turkish 
women, especially in rural and impoverished areas, faced a similar sort of pressure that forced 
them to bargain with two distinct patriarchal forces – traditional religious mores enforced by the 
head of household and the modern paternalistic demands of westernization enforced by 
representatives of the state. Largely, Kandiyoti and others have argued that despite differentiation 
in women’s rights movements across the Middle East, most women did not escape the 
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“patriarchal bargain” wherein, “they would rather adopt interpersonal strategies that maximize 
their security through manipulation of the affections of their sons and husband,” rather than open 
resistance.43  
 This framework remains true for women who openly supported Kemalist reforms, and for 
many women who would come to support political movements that explicitly reject Kemalist 
modernity’s proscriptions regarding women, and as Turkish politics has become increasingly 
polarized around the Kemalist legacy, the advancement of women’s liberation has been subject to 
what Yeşim Arat calls a “patriarchal paradox.”44 The purpose of this chapter, however, is to 
elucidate currents of cultural and political thought in the 1920s and early 1930s that may have 
provided women, and men, a vision of women’s liberation from the double-bind presented by 
Kemalist gender politics. I contend that the possibility for such a vision was opened up by a 
process of cultural change regarding women’s role in public, fashion, and attitudes towards 
segregation that preceded any articulation of Kemalist policies. The occupation of Istanbul by an 
international coalition following the Armistice of Mudros in November 1918, coupled with the 
arrival of a significant number of White Russian émigrés fleeing the civil war, greatly increased 
the presence of western women in the capital city. As a bourgeois economy developed in certain 
parts of the city to cater towards unveiled women who mixed openly with men – even, in some 
cases, on public transit, which was still segregated – Turkish women became increasingly 
exposed to, and willing to participate in a kind of western bourgeois society that would not gain 
the approval of the state until nearly a decade later.  
 The immediate reaction to this phenomenon in the Turkish press was a kind of shock at 
the speed with which women’s roles in the family and in public seemed to be changing, and a 
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sustained expression of anxieties about the very nature of gender identity. The first part of this 
chapter will examine articles and cartoons that exemplify this cultural reaction, and how feminist 
politics of the time articulated with those anxieties. This is important to emphasize because two 
competing, though not totally contradictory, modes of thought entered into the cultural 
mainstream by the mid-1920s with the aim of assuaging or containing the reactionary impulses of 
male anxieties about gender roles and identity. The dominant mode was western and conservative 
in character, and would form the backbone of Mustafa Kemal’s paternalist-liberationist policies. 
This view openly adopted western fashions – but constrained them by offering examples of 
women who were modestly dressed relative to the most current Istanbul fashions, and coupled 
them with policies that maintained key patriarchal structures and the image of women and 
women’s politics as ultimately subordinate to those of men. Rejection of this conservatism was 
best articulated by the novelist and feminist Nezihe Muhiddin, who bemoaned the masculine 
character of the Kemalist’s project. This understanding of Kemalist gender policy is not new, but 
it bears reviewing in the second part of this chapter before moving on to the second mode under 
consideration. I characterize this mode as a social progressivist mode, encompassing a range of 
writers and thinkers who aimed to explain, and legitimize, the appearance of fluid gender roles 
and identities in this period by asserting the primacy of sociological explanations as opposed to 
materialist, biological, or religious alternatives. Some of these writers, most notably Sabiha 
Sertel, in turn sought to bind this vision of a truly liberated Turkish woman to progressive politics 
that would ultimately assail the Kemalist state for its massive shortcomings in the development of 
social welfare programs.  
 In a period where direct opposition to Kemalist rule was met with the brutish realities of 
power politics – from coercive cooptation of opponents, to the violent suppression of rebellious 
Kurdish populations and the numerous death sentences and exiles associated with the 
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Independence Tribunal – this chapter begins to articulate a kind of opposition politics that 
operated away from the main arena of Kemalist consolidation, and sought to grow a democratic 
culture in Turkey that contested Kemalist notions of modernity without challenging the 
fundamental legitimacy of the ruling cadre. Some of the most innovative articulations of gender 
identity and politics in the press were happening in a period where censorship and repression of 
political speech was at a high point. As the Turkish Republic entered its second decade, however, 
these fissures were exacerbated. Many of the intellectuals that articulated these finely 
distinguished alternatives to Kemalist modernity in the 1920s would grow increasingly aggressive 
in their stances towards the state, and agitated by the lack of opportunities to channel these 
alternative visions into opposition parties. The rest of this dissertation will explore aspects of this 
polarization, but it is important here to show how seemingly collegial these competing ideas were 
at the outset of the republic. 
Gender Anxiety at the Dawn of the Turkish Revolution 
 The impact of the demographic pressures on gender relations in Turkey in the final years 
of Ottoman rule had already made themselves apparent by the time the First World War reached 
its apex.45 Though felt to different degrees across the Middle East, and regardless of the 
particularities of the postwar administrative arrangements, it is clear that, at least in major 
population centers in Anatolia, the Levant, Egypt, and elsewhere women’s roles in public life and 
their leverage in the family and in the workplace had increased in part as a result of the fact that 
many women had been pressed into new roles as a result of military conscription, and remained 
so because of the catastrophic death toll of the war.46 Istanbul, which was under a form of 
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colonial occupation for five years, and the rest of what would become the Turkish Republic was 
not much different. Well before any organized campaign to encourage westernization amongst 
female citizens of the Turkish republic had begun – campaigns to reform clothing began in 1925, 
limited suffrage was granted in 1930 – a rapid, noticeable transformation had begun amongst 
Turkey’s young, urban, middle and upper-class women. As mentioned above, a number of factors 
ranging from greater dependency on women’s labor outside of the home, to the increased 
presence of occupation forces from western Europe, and White Russian refugee populations, 
contributed to an environment in which women of means began to spend increasing amount of 
time socializing in bars, cafes, and cinemas, wearing more revealing clothing to match western 
fashion trends, and slowly disregarding public segregation at beaches and on public transit.  
 As in other formerly Ottoman metropoles like Damascus, Beirut, and Cairo, in the 
Istanbul press there was a broad expression of anxiety regarding this transformation. The reaction 
to Muslim women’s changing fashions and presence in public life in this instance reflected both 
an overtly sexist objectification of the female form and a subtler anxiety about the increased 
financial and labor strength of women. These two aspects are best distilled in the cartoons of the 
satirical magazines Akbaba (Vulture) and Aydede (Full Moon).47 These two magazines offered 
acerbic weekly reflections on the changing climate of occupied Istanbul. Run by the partnership 
of Orhon Seyfi (Orhon) and Yusuf Ziya (Ortaç), the editorial line was modernist and nationalist – 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Husbands and Housewives to Suckers and Whores: Martial-Political Anxieties in the ‘House of 
Egypt’, 1919-1948” Gender and History 21:3, November 2009, 647-669, Firoozeh Kashani-
Sabet, Conceiving Citizens: Women and the Politics of Motherhood in Iran (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 
47 This subject has been preliminarily addressed by Francois Georgeon in, “Women’s 
Representations in Ottoman Cartoons and the Satirical Press on the Eve of the Kemalist Reforms 
(1919-1924)” in Duygu Köksal and Anastasia Falierou eds., A Social History of Late Ottoman 
Women: New Perspectives (Leiden: Brill, 2013). Much of this phenomenon was also prefigured 
in cartoons in the period following the 1908-1909 Constitutional Revolution, as detailed in 
Palmira Brummett, Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-1911 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000).  
33 
 
a line to which the two would adhere throughout their publishing efforts through the next three 
decades. Many of the cartoons, like Figure A below penned by Ramiz (Gökçe), expressed a kind 
of shock at how quickly fashions had changed. In this particular cartoon from May 1924, a 
mother dressed in short sleeves, without décolleté, long skirt, and unveiled addresses her 
daughter, who is wearing a spaghetti-strapped blouse with significant décolleté and a knee-length 
skirt, “My girl, in our youth we dressed openly, but not this much!” to which the young woman 
responds, “And what century did your youth happen to be in?!” 
 
Fig. A, untitled cartoon, Akbaba, May 12, 1340 [1924], p. 3 
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Cartoons like this one served to objectify the female form and play on the (presumably 
heterosexual male) reader’s eroticized fantasies about western-dressing women. Aside from 
highlighting the rapid pace of this transformation, more banal objectification of women’s bodies 
through risqué drawings of ideal types was a regular feature of both papers.48 Akbaba ran an 
occasional series of drawings, also by Ramiz, that ostensibly featured the prominent women’s 
fashions for each season. In the “spring” drawing from March 1924 [Fig. B, below] the subtitle 
gives away the real meaning of the series, proclaiming “The saplings have begun to sprout!” as an 
unveiled woman in a revealing dress touches her breast. 
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Fig. B, “The Spring Months Are Coming!” Akbaba March 6, 1340 [1924] 
With a similar frequency, however, cartoons would appear that layered anxieties about material 
issues – finances, property, and labor – onto this objectification of women’s bodies. This was 
recognized often in cartoons depicting the changing relationships between men and women. In a 
December 1923 cartoon in Akbaba [Fig. C] an older man and a younger woman discuss how they 
might present their apparently surreptitious relationship to others. The man proposes a solution, 
“If I said to a given woman in the house that I was your father, would anyone be suspicious?” The 
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woman scoffs, “Unbelievable!” and when the man asks why, she replies, “Because the house 
belongs to my mother!” 
 
Fig. C, untitled cartoon, Akbaba, December [Kanuni evvel] 2, 1339 [1923] 
Here the transferal of property to women becomes the twist in a joke on the man’s indecent 
proposal – and a comment on the fact that women’s greater presence in public, and greater power 
in the household, might cause unexpected problems for men in their relationships. The cost of the 
changing fashions was itself a source of anxiety as demonstrated in a February 1922 cartoon in 
Aydede [Fig. D] entitled “The Accountant Husband”. In this scene, a woman has just put on a 
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new outfit, a knee-length skirt and blouse ensemble, and is standing next to the fancy packaging 
in which it had just arrived. She asks her husband, “How did you find me this new costume?” to 
which the husband, who is himself dressed in a three-piece suit and wearing a fez, replies, “Our 
budget is that obvious!” 
 
Fig. D: “The Accountant Husband” Aydede February 6, 1922 
Often, these concerns revolved around labor, such as in a march 1922 cartoon in Aydede 
entitled “A Feminist Husband” [Fig. E]. In this cartoon depicting a traditional, older village 
couple, the wife admonishes her husband, “What, are you a supervisor? If you don’t start your 





Fig. E: “A Feminist Husband” Aydede March 9, 1922 
Women’s labor outside of the home also featured occasionally as a topic of concern. Aydede 
published a cartoon a week after the “Feminist Husband” frame entitled “Regarding the 
Profligacy Taxes” [Fig. F] in which a wealthy man and a waiter are discussing his bill. After 
delineating the tax rates for each of the items on his bill, the patron asks, “How is it fifty kuruş for 
a cup of coffee?” and the waiter explains, “You should be thankful for that since there are no 




Fig. F: “Regarding the Profligacy Taxes” Aydede March 13, 1922 
 By 1923, however, the erosion of old gender divisions had been taken up as a powerful 
political issue by many closely associated with the national resistance effort, and drove women’s 
participation in the public and political spheres. In April of 1923, prior to the announcement of 
elections for a General Assembly – six months before the proclamation of the republic, and five 
months before the Republican People’s Party was formally established – the feminist writer 
Nezihe Muhiddin, along with roughly two dozen of her colleagues, founded the first independent 
political party in Turkey, the Women’s People’s Party (Kadınlar Halk Fırkası, KHF). Roughly 
eight months after its founding, Muhiddin, at the encouragement of Mustafa Kemal, would 
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disband the party and transition its efforts into the Turkish Women’s Union (Türk Kadın Birliği, 
TKB). The TKB would become an influential sounding board for women’s issues, and would 
publish their own journal Türk Kadın Yolu (The Turkish Woman’s Path). One of the first issues 
on which they would come to have an effect would be the consideration of a Civil Code for the 
republic. While a code based on the Swiss version would eventually pass in 1925, an earlier 
version, which was largely a recapitulation of the 1917 Family Law (Hukuku Aile Kararnamesi) 
was introduced in late 1923. This code remained based in Islamic legal concepts, and many of the 
secular and progressive members of the Parliament, and the Turkish Women’s Union, felt that it 
only entrenched women’s subordinate place in the home. Opposition to this proposed legislation 
came to a head at the first women’s meeting of the Turkish Hearth in Istanbul in mid-January 
1924, at which Nezihe Muhiddin gave a stirring speech making the case of legal and political 
equality between the sexes.  
 “The Family Law,” she began her argument, “bears on the degree to which men and 
women are considered same, it is a general question of the country that goes beyond party and sex 
boundaries.”49 Muhiddin rejected the narrow basis of discussion that led to the introduction of the 
bill, asserting throughout her speech that a broad consideration of societal changes in the 
twentieth century, and the inclusion of social science expertise should be paramount in the 
production of a new civil code. She demanded that, “The final decisions on the subject of the 
Family Law should be the product of expertise. You all should distribute the knowledge of 
respected members amongst the experts in the topics of science, morality, and society and 
undoubtedly you should not impede the result of these speedy and lofty opinions to the whole 
country.”50 Muhiddin rejected the ability of sharia law to properly adapt to modern conditions, 
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and insisted on reforms that denied polygamy and supported companionate marriage. She 
recognized that “The most sacred and first responsibility of the Turkish woman in the 
civilizations of the twentieth century is certainly to be a mother,” and that, “the goal of marriage 
in the twentieth century is still undoubtedly the survival of a generation,” but, “the production of 
offspring is not random.” She argued that children that grew up in a non-nuclear family with 
multiple wives and mothers would grow up confused about modern society and disadvantaged in 
every respect, especially in terms of patriotism, “because without apprehending the family 
relations they will not be able to muster the love of the fatherland.”51 Likewise, she argued that 
companionate marriage was fundamental to successful modern childrearing,  
One of the Turkish woman’s dearest responsibilities is that of housewife. However, as 
those who have – to use the idiom – fallen out of companionship with any sudden rage 
that comes from a man’s mouth know, during such times as a low patch or adultery, a 
woman cannot trust a normal heart to be tied once again to a lifelong partner with a very 
weak string of cotton, and her town will not adopt her and warm up to her like a sacred 
temple. A woman who falls into this situation of cheating cannot be an honorable mother, 
a lofty spouse, or a sincere housewife!52 
She insisted that the marriage age be raised, calling on her audience to “extend your hands to 
those you call your sisters who are ten or fifteen-year-old girls. Girls of that age cannot be a 
spouse, nor a mother, nor a housewife.”53 She closed her speech again imploring the experts in 
the audience to take care in considering their opinions on future Civil Code legislation, and 
following a supportive speech by Hüseyin Vasıf Çınar, who would soon become the Minister of 
Education, it was decided that a commission to study the issue of a civil code and report their 
findings to the parliament. After some contentious debate on voting, a commission that included 
nine women – among them Halide Edip (Adıvar), Sabiha Zekeriya (Sertel), and Nezihe Muhiddin 
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– and four male consultants – Ali Haydar, Refik Münir, Necmettin Sadık (Sadak), and Ahmet 
Emin (Yalman) – was formed.54  
 The commission would have only a limited effect since political reverberations of the 
formation of the short lived political opposition in the PRP and the crackdown following the Şeyh 
Sait Revolt would drive some of the commission’s members into exile, and others into a period of 
quiescence, but Muhiddin would sustain her criticism of both conservative elements of society 
and the republic itself through the mid- and late- 1920s in Türk Kadın Yolu and other outlets. 
Across all of her political writing, Muhiddin invoked the radical tumult of Turkish and global 
modernity to argue for legal and social equality between the sexes. In 1923, she inveighed against 
the social double standard that condoned men’s patronage on the Istanbul bar scene, but frowned 
on women’s presence there, “We understand that if you walk towards civilization with the intent 
of a degree of Europeanness [Avrupacılık], without changing our makeshift clothing, we will 
remain completely naked,” and, that if women were disallowed these supposedly male privileges 
on religious grounds then, “this grudging admission of moral belief is evacuated of any 
inspiration.”55 Later in 1925, following the Şeyh Sait revolt, in an article titled, “On the 
republican conception of Turkish womanhood,” she extolled the modernist position in which the 
republic had found itself in, writing, “We should be very thankful that having continued for ages 
the conservative-progressive [muhafazakârlık-teceddütperverlik] struggle we are on the side of 
the second, auspicious winning side.”56 However, she did not see the republic as having granted 
significant freedoms, “in the text of the constitution, men are afforded a partial, quasi freedom; 
our women do not benefit even this much,” and called on the government to initiate reforms to 
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both advance women’s education and create legal and social equality, “From here on, there 
should be no barriers to women benefitting the same as men from the justice and duties of 
citizenship. According to principle, the republic knows no difference in citizenship between men 
and women.”57    
 We see here how, at the same time, the convulsions of the early republican period 
produced both profound anxiety about gender roles and identities, and an organized political 
movement on behalf of political and social equality between the sexes. These two discourses 
would remain in tension with one another as the Kemalist regime advanced its modernizing 
agenda, and the modernist cultural and political discourses surrounding gender fluidity and 
equality would likewise flourish in a period when much other political activism and opposition 
would be silenced following the passing of the Law of the Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sükün 
Kanunu) in 1925. Following the passage of the new civil code, key members of the feminist 
movement continued to push back against the patriarchal elements of the new law that persisted 
despite its westernizing reforms, and throughout, the relationship between anxiety over gender 
roles and the articulation of women’s individual and collective rights is clear. We will turn to the 
development of these discourses in this period in the next two sections.  
“Are Women Becoming Men?”: Sociological Explanations of Anxieties about Gender Fluidity 
 The idea of a “family crisis” that was driven by the changing status of women in social 
and cultural life was hardly new to Turkish society in the 1920s. Duben and Behar clearly 
identify anxieties about these kinds of shifts stretching back to the Hamidian era, and only 
intensifying in the second constitutional period and through the war years.58  While, as Duben and 
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Behar also delineate, reform to Turkish family life was a central tenet of Young Ottoman and 
Young Turk thought, many thinkers that were proponents of modernizing and westernizing the 
Turkish family and women’s place in society expressed dread when faced with gender fluidity. 
Even a feminist figure like Hüseyin Rahmi [Gürpınar] would reach the height of his popularity 
with a 1916 play that centered on this anxiety – Kadınlar Erkekleşince, or When A Woman 
Becomes Like a Man.59 The 1920s, however, witnessed an acceleration of the sorts of trends in 
women’s roles in public life that had been a fixture of intellectual concern in the Ottoman era, and 
with that acceleration, some writers sought new explanations and justifications for the changes 
happening in Istanbul social and family life – some of which would be legitimated by Kemalist 
policies, some of which would not.  
 Echoing Gürpınar’s play, the sociologist Necmettin Sadık [Sadak], published an article in 
February 1927, less than a year after the Turkish Civil Code was passed, that asked the question, 
“Are Women Becoming Men?”60 Sadık’s essay sought to push back against those who saw the 
changing roles of women, signified in Sadık’s view by those complaining about women cutting 
their hair too short, as an unnatural phenomenon. Sadık, heavily informed by relatively recent 
currents in sociology, argued that the separation of women from men in society was a 
fundamentally social construction. He forcefully argued at the beginning of the essay that,  
The thing that differentiates men and women that has become apparent in their 
personality and their relationships is not clothing, it is law. If that were so, then two 
centuries ago in France, where men going out into the street without a long periwig 
would be considered an unfortunate turn of events, they should have been approached as 
women!61 
Sadık criticized those who argue that women’s social position ought to be determined by organic 
(ûzvi) characteristics, calling them materialists (maddiyatperestler), and ridiculing them for 
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erroneously believing that women’s brains are lighter than men’s. The essay then turns to a 
somewhat didactic explanation of what social scientists (içtimaiyat) have said about the evolution 
of women’s roles in the family and society, arguing that the strict separation and division of labor 
between the sexes was due to “a moral obligation of the institutions that have composed despotic 
societies [iptidai cemiyetler].”62 Sadık gave examples of how women’s roles have differentiated 
in pre-modern societies in far flung places like Australia and Madagascar to demonstrate that in 
every society “the division between men and women was manufactured.”63  
 Sadık’s criticism was directed not only towards materialists and religious 
fundamentalists, but also towards certain strains of contemporary psychological theory. He 
argued that one such psychologist known only as “Marion” was “much deceived” when they 
postulated that the progression of society would occasion a greater division of men and women.64 
He cited Emile Durkheim to explain that most often the root of segregation was the result of a 
fear of blood, particularly the blood of women (including but not limited to menstrual blood). 
Following Durkheim, he argued that locating this fear in an organic substance, the artificial and 
irrational belief in women’s segregation has become to be seen as not only a moral or spiritual 
imperative, but a natural one. In Sadık’s view, it is for this reason – the tying together of religious 
morality and beliefs about the nature of organic substances – that gender segregation had 
persisted through the progression of societies, even as women had slowly won new rights. Sadık’s 
primary argument implored his readers to see women’s equality as a marker of social progress 
                                                           
62 Ibid 
63 Ibid 
64 Ibid, Sadık uses the word ruhiyatçı for psychologist as opposed to the loan word sikolog which 
was also in use at the time, possibly giving the term a more mystical, less scientific intonation. It 
is difficult to know for sure who the “Marion” is in this example, there is no textual citation, but 
one is inclined to believe it may have been Mary Anne Evans, a.k.a. George Eliot, the British 
novelist of the middle 19th century who often wrote under the pen name “Marian” and who held 




that could be scientifically measured or observed, but in his criticism of the western psychologist 
and of the Russian doctor, he argued for the primacy of sociology as the discipline that represents 
the key to explaining and justifying the changes in Turkish society in his time. As his argument 
turns towards explaining the shifts in women’s roles in the family, it is implied all along that 
realizing the artifice of gender segregation was what was needed to revolutionize and modernize 
Turkish society.  
 Sadık then detailed how the age-old conception of the family as “the father’s kingdom” 
had faded over the previous century thanks to changes in economic life. In the old system, the 
family was “a type of religion” but also, “an economic institution that satisfied its needs on its 
own” (kendi ihtiyaçlarını bizzat kendisi temin eden iktisadı bir müessese idi), and so the father 
was both king and the boss of the factory floor. As social and economic conditions changed, 
presumably as a result of the industrial revolution, “the characteristics of the laws of the family 
have changed. The family is no longer a religion.” He explicitly tied these changes to the changes 
in women’s roles more broadly. The breakdown of the old conjugal family was, in Sadık’s view, 
a result of women’s increasing presence in the workplace, and this led to increased rights. 
Likewise, he posits that “as this movement progresses there will cease to be any difference 
between men and women, and as women work, meaning that as the institutions that renounce and 
prevent them from work are abandoned and fading, it will be seen that women’s organic and 
spiritual qualities have no effect on their position in social life.” By focusing the issue on 
institutions and away from superficial changes in women’s appearance and presence in public 
life, Sadık made a political point that would be taken up by other writers in his cohort to 
challenge the Kemalist regime’s inability to establish a comprehensive social safety net. Sadık 
welcomes the changes in women’s dress and role in public that many would argue was spurred by 
Kemalist reforms, but the article makes no mention of the 1925 Hat Law, the 1926 Civil Code, or 
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anti-veiling campaign that were in full swing at the time of the article. Crediting economic 
changes with women’s progress marks the ground on which a progressive opposition to the 
Mustafa Kemal’s CHP could, and would be organized.  
 One figure who began operating on precisely these grounds was Sabiha Zekeriya (Sertel), 
a writer and social activist who edited, along with her husband Zekeriya (Sertel), the popular 
monthly magazine Resimli Ay (Illustrated Monthly). Sabiha Sertel would go on to become a 
prominent figure in opposition politics on the left in the 1930s and 1940s, but her writing and 
editing work in the 1920s would closely tie together a celebration of the modern, stylized Turkish 
woman with a sharp progressive critique of both Kemalist policy and bourgeois politics more 
broadly. She, like Sadık and many other prominent figures, had trained in sociology, but unlike 
many others, she received her education in America, at the newly formed New York School of 
Social Work during a period that spanned the Independence War. Sabiha credited much of her 
intellectual growth in New York to two leading sociologists Franklin Henry Giddings and 
William Ogburn, who were incidentally not faculty at the School of Social Work.65  Giddings was 
a veteran of the Columbia faculty and at the time held a chair in “The History of Civilization”.  
Joining the faculty from Bryn Mawr College in 1894, he researched group theory, how 
civilizations developed through concepts of sympathy, and provided some theoretical firepower 
for the burgeoning progressive movement in the early twentieth century.66  In his textbook, he 
stresses the necessity of dissent, disagreement, and skepticism to the evolution of society past the 
barriers of nation and race noting that,  
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While civilization is established by sympathetic and formal like-mindedness, a social 
organization that is no longer fixed, unyielding… but is becoming ever more variable, 
flexible, adaptable, in a word, progressive, is a product of unlike-mindedness, discussion, 
and agreement, and of the resulting rational like-mindedness.67      
Giddings was also an early proponent of women’s education at Columbia; he arrived there from 
women-only Bryn Mawr, and often agreed to speak at Barnard. He even beseeched University 
President Seth Low to open Columbia enrollment to women mere months after joining the faculty 
in 1894.68 Sabiha’s course of study at the New York School of Social Work would earn her a 
diploma in Case Work, most likely with a focus on Child Welfare.69  The curricular requirements 
for that diploma included courses on method, dealing with children in delinquency and with 
handicaps, the historical development of child welfare, psychopathology, community 
organization and other electives that would fill out the degree program.70  Also instrumental to the 
social work program was fieldwork, which Sabiha completed at the Lexington Community 
Center, where she became completely enamored by the stories of immigrants who had flooded 
Manhattan’s Lower East Side in recent years.  Sabiha recalled in her memoir,  
[This place] would be an unbelievable subject for a novelist.  How they came to America, 
what circles did they come from, how were they exploited, how they were clawing their 
way out, the stories of longing for their home country that we heard, these records were 
loaded with the stories of life.71 
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This experience was both a capstone to an intellectual training in sociology and an impetus to get 
involved with the Turkish-American community by helping establish the Turkish Welfare 
Association (Türk Teavün Cemiyeti).72 
 With this background, Sabiha and Zekeriya, who had studied at the Columbia School of 
Journalism and prior to that had studied under Emile Durkheim at the Sorbonne, set out in 1924 
on a journalistic mission to “raise the level of the culture” in Turkey.73 Resimli Ay and other 
Sertel publications, including Resimli Perşembe (Thursday Illustrated), Resimli Hafta (Illustrated 
Weekly), and, for a short time, the flagship daily Cumhuriyet (The Republic), were organized so 
that they might reach the widest possible readership and extend beyond the urban elite if at all 
possible. As Sertel elaborated in her memoir, “At that time in our country eighty percent could 
not read or write, only half had been in school, intellectuals had neglected to enlighten those 
eighty percent, explaining democracy to them was the first goal.”74 This goal would become an 
even more prominent focus after the 1928 letter reform (Harf İnkilabı).  Mehmet Zekeriya wrote 
a disclaimer in the first Latin-character issue of Resimli Perşembe, “Each page should be able to 
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be read in five or ten minutes. The arguments that we have advanced in past issues are 
finished.”75    
 Beginning with its first issue in February 1924, Resimli Ay articulated this synthetic 
vision of the new Turkish woman.  It did so by providing two multi-issue series’ on “The 
Beauties of the East” (“Şark Güzelliler”) and “Today’s Turkish Women” (“Bügünkü Türk 
Kadınlar”).  These large photographic spreads with short descriptions were juxtaposed with 
articles by Sabiha Sertel and others that would directly attack bourgeois lifestyle for being 
inattentive to the problems the urban poor of Istanbul were facing at the time. The articulation of 
this synthetic experience, the framing of explosive political issues with superficially de-
politicized images and profiles of women, was first instantiated in the format of Resimli Ay and 
would later become a common editorial tactic as debates over ethnicity, class, race and gender 
would intensify in the late 1920s and early 1930s.76 
 Resimli Ay set out immediately with its vision for the new Turkish woman. The series 
“Today’s Turkish Women” (fig. G-J) the Sertels provided images and descriptions of Turkish 
women on stage, screen, in the workplace, and in school. The first two women, representing 
women in the arts, had by that time reached a measure of fame as the co-stars of the 1923 film 
Ateşten Gömlek (The Shirt of Flame) which was based on Halide Edib’s famous account of the 
War of Independence and directed by Muhsin Ertuğrul (Fig. G, H).  Bedia Hanım (aka Bedia 
Muvahhit) and Münire Hanım (aka Neyyire Neyir) were pioneers in Turkish film as the first 
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females to appear on screen. The next two images, a woman at work and a student at the Dar-ül 
fünün, were perhaps less recognizable, but depict women achieving a level of prominence in a 




Fig. G: “Bediye Hanım, Woman on Stage” Resimli Ay No. 1 February 1924 (Photo credit: Foto 
Film Kemal) 
 
 The accompanying text for Bedia Hanım’s photograph describes with great drama and 
verbosity the dangers and heroisms of the stage. The article depicts the appearance of Bedia 
Hanım on the stage for a recent production from the Manakyan Theater Company as one instance 
of the manifestation of the heroic glory of the Turkish revolution. She is also praised for 
preserving her Armenian dialect of Turkish (Ermeni lehçesinin Türkçe) that must be “protected 
from the hypocrite of the şeriat”.77 By situating the continuing power of the revolution in its 
reenactment on stage, presumably through stage and later film productions of Halide Edib’s 
Ateşten Gömlek, the author holds up Bedia Hanım, and later her stage and screen counterpart 
Münire Hanım, as the personification of the Turkish struggle.       
 Münire Hanım, who was at the time married to the director of Ateşten Gömlek, Muhsin 
Ertuğrul, was the subject of the next profile in this series.  The author’s obvious astonishment at 
the accomplishment of having women on screen does at times steep to a patronizing level, 
“Women in our lives have been breaking their cages, a bit similar to a chick pecking away at the 
shell of its egg,” but ultimately Münire’s performance in Ateşten Gömlek, particularly the way she 
withstood the pain of her character Kezban’s return to Izmir after it had been sacked by the 
invading Greek army, related a powerful image that had the ability to galvanize society to all 
sorts of social changes. To relive the still fresh experience of the Turkish War of Independence 
through Münire’s performance exemplified to the author how “women on screen have begun to 
clean and purify us as well.”78  
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Fig. H: “Münire Hanım – Women in Cinema” Resimli Ay No. 1 February 1924 (Photo credit: 





The tenor of these profiles shifts considerably with the next two articles, dealing with 
women at work and women as university students. In the “Women at Work” column the author, 
and the accompanying photograph (Fig. I), address women’s roles in a more general way than in 
the first two profiles of actresses. The author is pained by the paucity of women in the workplace, 
but also sensitive to the barriers society has put in place. The author mentions the cynical 
perception that women might only want to work in a store or a workshop as a cover for a 
decadent club-lifestyle, “women coming from a humble class waiting at the front of a store or 
workshop may be mistaken for women going to a narrow water and şerbet club.”79 The author is 
also sensitive to the suggestion that by encouraging women to work that it would be acceptable 
for women to even work amongst the “class of black-faced trash collectors’ (yuzkarasını teşkil 
eden çopcular sınıfı), but insists that no one would want that.80 The vision of the Turkish woman 
at work, while being drastically redefined in this article, is still limited by bourgeois sensibilities. 
She can apply herself as a shopkeeper or telephone operator, or even aspire to embody the 
Kemalist revolution on screen, but heaven forbid she stoop to pick up garbage.   
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Fig. I: “Woman at Work” Reismli Ay No. 1 February 1924  
 In the final profile in the series, “Woman at School”, the issue of materialism comes to 
the foreground. The profile is accompanied by a photograph of Şehime Hanım, a student at the 
Dar ül-Fünün in Istanbul (Fig. J) who is dressed in a trench coat and head covering with a stylish, 
bulky purse.  The article begins by commenting on the long distances some university students 
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must travel to school, and how this particular woman evidences that despite the distance the 
university life can be quite idyllic. Şehime’s bag is described as “elegant” (zarif) and the students 
generally are considered to be heralding an “ornamental age” (bir zinti haline getirmiştir).  
Ultimately, the article concludes with a probing question for its readers, “how happy are they?”81  
The author might concede the values of education, but the materialist atmosphere is clearly off-
putting. 
 
Fig. J – “Şehime Hanım, Student at Istanbul University (Dar-ül Fününde Talebesinde)” Resimli 
Ay February 1924 
                                                           




 “Today’s Turkish Woman” was juxtaposed with another photographic series, this one 
without the accompanying texts, which tacitly compared the images of the contemporary Turkish 
women with women of other eastern communities. “Beauties of the East” (“Şark Güzelliler”) ran 
over the first two issues and featured reprints of photographs by a Moscow art studio, Photo d’Art 
Moscou, and a French photography studio, Foto Fransız. Within the set, three of the idealized 
eastern beauties, one Turk, one Armenian, and one Greek, were implicitly compared to the first 
photograph of the “contemporary” (yevmi) beauty whose over-the-shoulder dress and stylish 
locket would not have been out of place in certain gazinos or nightclubs in Beyoğlu, or for that 
matter, the cover of Resimli Ay, but posed a striking comparison to both the images of the other 
eastern beauties and to “Today’s Turkish Women”.82 
 The first photo in the series in many ways could have been a model for many of the 
covers of Resimli Ay going forward. This model is shown in an elegant gown bearing her 
shoulders and sporting a metal locket of some sort around her neck. She’s facing directly at the 
camera with a sultry half-smile. Many of the illustrations on the cover of Resimli Ay would reflect 
similar aesthetics. The description of a “contemporary beauty” (yevmi güzeli) connotes a sense of 
convention, if not ideal, for feminine beauty. Seen on its own, it would be hard to read this image 
as much other than an idealized image, but in juxtaposition with the rest of the images in this 
series, and with the aforementioned “Today’s Turkish Women” series, it becomes hard to discern 
what sort of value is being placed on being “contemporary” other than it is representative of a 
fashion trend, and a foreign one at that. 
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 The second image in the series differs drastically from both the image of the 
“contemporary beauty” and “Today’s Turkish Women” in that it features a woman in what could 
clearly be described as “traditional” dress. Resimli Ay frequently discussed head coverings and 
veils in its first two issues in a series on “head-fashions” (başlık modaları), but the image of this 
“Turkish Beauty” does not utilize any of the high-fashion styles promoted in those articles. Her 
nearly all-white clothing and her body position, gazing downward into her arms as if caring for a 
child, suggest a more traditional conception of beauty than her “contemporary” partner. However, 
given the same description of beauty, and that the photos came from the same Moscow art studio, 
one could say that the intimate compassion evoked by this image rests on a value-neutral plane 
with the “contemporary beauty.” It should also be remembered that despite their vast differences 
that these images are all equally classified as “eastern” as much as they are said to be beautiful. In 
this way, I believe the editors were not exactly self-orientalizing, but rather out to showcase 
ethnically diverse conceptions of beauty that included both the traditional, the modern, the pious 
and the secular.  
 The next two images come from the second issue of Resimli Ay, in March 1924. The first 
in this issue is the “Armenian Beauty” who is staged in profile with a knitted winter hat and scarf.  
This woman’s stouter figure and less-luxurious outfit stand again in contrast with both the images 
from the first issue.  When considered in tandem with the call to preserve Bedia Hanım’s 
Armenian dialect, there seems to be an attempt on the part of the editors to decenter ethnicity 
from both their conceptions of beauty and from their conceptions of what a modern woman was 
meant to be. Beauty and ethnicity, in both series, are set apart as innate qualities independent 
from a woman’s career or their material choices. The same then goes for the second image in this 
issue, of a “Greek Beauty”. This woman is depicted sitting down wearing a sporty blouse and a 
locket-bracelet that is somewhat reminiscent of the necklace of the “contemporary beauty”. To 
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have these women, representative of the nations against which Turkey fought its Independence 
War, presented here on an equal plane with a traditionally dressed “Turkish beauty” and an 
ethnically ambiguous “contemporary beauty” suggests that the magazine is attempting to break 
down or halt rising ethno-centric nationalism. At the very least, these images, in conversation 
with the discussions of “Today’s Turkish Woman” demonstrate a clear diversification of what a 
modern woman could be.    
 There is a second level of contrast, however, that highlights the way Resimli Ay valued a 
modernist approach to feminine beauty, aesthetics, and the social role of women under a 
republican system. In early issues, Resimli Ay contrasted these images and profiles of modern 
women with the state of women under Ottoman rule, and especially women who were subject to 
enslavement in the imperial harem. The second issue of Resimli Ay, the same that had featured the 
“Contemporary Beauties” series, one of the central articles was a profile of the imperial harem 
that ran under the headline, “In the Palace Years, Thousands of Concubines were Hidden in an 
Industry of Prostitution and Disgrace.”83 The article describes the decadent lifestyle of the 
imperial harem, including abundant food, colorful flowers, beautiful concubines, and, “eunuchs 
moving amongst the beauties like black dots passing out apples on silver trays, wine in gilded 
cups, and a thousand and one types of meze on golden platters.”84 The article relates tales from 
former courtesans of Sultan Selim II (1524-1574), who was renowned for his orgiastic lifestyle, 
but insists that, “Up to Vahdettin [the final sultan] the sultans lived in the same filth (levs) and the 
same disgrace.”85 The article was buttressed by photographic portraits of two veiled concubines, 
another of an imperial eunuch (described as “The palace’s most miserable and unlucky creatures 
[zavallı ve badabahat mahlukları], the eunuchs”), and a drawing of a sultan with his two advisers 
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overseeing a pool filled with naked women. The article does not stop at the lengthy denunciation 
of the Sultan’s debauchery, however. In its final paragraphs the article notes that although the 
sultan and his immediate family have been exiled, “they have left behind a large and heavy 
inheritance [miras] to the nation: the palace and those who lived in the palace.”86 Describing the 
seriousness of the situation, the article notes, “Still, up to today, there are left in the nation’s 
supervision 1,500 concubines, who have lived for no purpose other than the enjoyment and 
delight of the sultan. They have been living by taking money from the purses of the nation’s 
poor.”87 The article is sympathetic to the prospects of the palace’s recently unmoored denizens, 
and closes with critique of the current government’s poor handling of the situation, “How did the 
republic make this comical contradiction lawful? This nation that destroyed the sultanate, and 
also destroyed the life of the palace, should also, like a sultanate, bring an end to this palace 
lifestyle.”88  
 In this example, we begin to see how Resimli Ay’s aesthetic vision and social politics 
were interwoven with one another. This magazine, which represented the editorial vision of the 
Sertels, offered a westernized, modern vision of a new Turkish woman while, at the same time, 
highlighting the ways in which the current regime was falling short in the work of piecing the 
country back together after a decade of war. It heralded the fall of the despotic Ottoman sultans, 
but held great sympathy for the palace workers who now found themselves stranded. It 
championed the hard-won Turkish independence, but was more accepting of ethnic and religious 
diversity than many in the regime. In an era when there was precious little room to articulate 
opposition or criticism of the regime’s policies, Sabiha and Zekeriya Sertel found a way to 
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maximize their position and begin forming a reading public that would stick with them as they 
became more openly critical of Kemalist politics in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Women’s Liberation and Progressive Politics 
Sabiha Sertel’s first editorial enterprise in the Resimli era was an exposé on child welfare 
and mortality entitled “Where are we going? Are we informed of the most frightening dangers 
posing our society?”89  In this article both Sabiha’s sociological training and her politically 
progressive experience in America are evident. It is also a strong reaction to her shock upon her 
return to Ankara and Istanbul after nearly four years abroad, when her country was torn apart by 
war. Describing her return to Ankara in her memoir she writes, “Trash was piled up on each street 
corner…The shops were empty. The people were tired. The burden of the national war for 
independence was borne on every shoulder.”90 Sabiha emphasized both verbally and visually, 
through the use of a pie chart and bar graph, the dire situation of Turkish children in the wake of 
the War of Independence. Her focus on child welfare was also deeply influenced by her 
familiarity with the recent history of activism in the United States on behalf of children, 
particularly the activities of the Children’s Aid Society and Mary Harris “Mother” Jones.  
Repeatedly and throughout the article she emphasized the need to organize a “Children’s Jihad” 
(Çocuk Cihadı), a clear reference to the “Children’s Crusade” march from the Kensington 
neighborhood of Philadelphia to Oyster Bay, New York organized by Mother Jones in 1903.91 It 
was a call not only for protest but an acerbic appeal to the upper middle class to organize on 
behalf of the new nation’s poor children. With the upper class in her sights, her rhetoric is 
shaming and accusatory,  
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There is a place in the budget for pleasing the heart, for running from theater to theater, 
from cinema to cinema for dresses and toiletries, but for helping children there isn’t a 
single space in the budget… In the country, for each act of molestation, for each 
screaming child with tears in their eyes, there is a footmark in the heart of every mother.  
Those who are sitting in their comfortable chairs, can you not see these children through 
the smoke of your cigars?92 
She also sought to galvanize women to organize by appealing to their recently won social agency,  
Whose job is it to establish this organization? Must we wait for the boys for this as well?  Did 
women citizens not win the right to establish such an organization?..  The power to reduce this 
pain and suffering [of children] from ninety-five percent to fifty five percent is in your hands.  
We do not want your money, we want only your hearts and your time, in the streets (the 
Americans will come to our aid in saving our children) are the screaming women who are of your 
same sex.93 
This dialogue echoes the language of the late nineteenth century German thinker August Bebel, 
whom Sabiha Zekeriya had read during her time in New York and would go on to translate in the 
mid-1930s, “The moment woman acquires equal rights with man, the sense of her duties will be 
quickened. Called upon to cast her ballot, she will ask, What for? Whom for?”94 
 Bebel’s influence on Sabiha Zekeriya’s conceptions of socialism and feminism were 
unparalleled. It was first assigned to her in one of her classes with William Ogburn, and aided her 
greatly in understanding the weight placed on women by men, the nation and society at large.  As 
she says in the introduction to her translation, “I had been shown the pressures on women in my 
own country and I had borne the weight of their exploitation. It was in this state of mind that I 
read this book,” and she goes on to describe reading the text as a true social awakening, “I 
witnessed in front of my eyes the evidence and circumstances of why and how the women of my 
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country, and the whole world, had anguished.”95 This is clear evidence of the staying power of 
Sabiha’s formative experience in New York. Additionally, the choice to translate this German 
philosopher’s work, and mention by name the American sociologists who had assigned it to her 
signals Sabiha’s self-representation as a transnational, as opposed to national, champion of 
women’s justice.96 
 By the end of the 1920s, Sabiha Sertel would emerge as the leading female critic of the 
Kemalist government from the left, but she would not be alone. As Kathryn Libal has shown, 
Sabiha’s work with the Turkish Women’s Union, and with the Children’s Protection Society 
(Himaye-i Etfal Cemiyeti) connected her to Turkey’s most prominent women activists, including 
Nezihe Muhiddin and Suat Derviş.97 The reforms of the mid-1920s would not dampen feminist 
critiques of the state, and here, again, many women writers found it necessary to address the issue 
of male-female difference. Nezihe Muhiddin had fallen out with the Turkish Women’s Union in 
1927, and by the mid-1930s retreated almost entirely into writing novels, but her 1931 book The 
Turkish Woman (Türk Kadını) was a definitive statement of her feminist principles, and more 
than her previous work, assailed the social needs that afflicted women across the country. Her 
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introduction mocked and lamented the assumption – mostly held by men – that the differences 
between men and women had been completely erased by the dress and civil code reforms,  
Everywhere you go these days the word from the fashionable ones is, ‘what difference is 
there between us?’ If you get on the tramway, a man is sitting in the place allotted us by 
the municipality. Not wanting to get up, he says, “what difference is there between us?” 
and turns to the window. You might even guess that a woman has possessed the same 
muscular and physical power as a man!98 
For Muhiddin, the focus on sartorial reform was superficial, and had essentially lulled 
both women and men into a sort of complacency about women’s rights precisely because it 
emphasized a sort of gender fluidity that was unidirectional – meaning, women’s advancement in 
society and gaining of rights came with the consequence of dressing, speaking, and acting 
according to masculine norms. “We have begun to see the propensity of the new woman that 
dresses like a man, thinks like a man, and lives like a man. I view this development as harmful,” 
she wrote.99 Muhiddin’s argument rested on the definition of gender difference that emphasized 
the distinct social needs of women, and a feminism that equally balanced equality in terms of 
rights and social needs. For Muhiddin the greatest social need that had yet to be addressed was 
proper care for mothers. In The Turkish Woman she recalled an interview she had published in 
Türk Kadın Yolu with a village woman, named Hanife, who told her of the high mortality rate for 
women during and after childbirth, and the effects of other diseases in her small village of ten 
homes. Hanife reported that her uncle had three daughters who died during or after childbirth, 
that many children had died of smallpox, but had avoided cases of consumption. When asked 
about what the villagers did to help those who had contracted malaria and rabies, Hanife 
described a malaria cure made of garlic and willow leaves and a ritual spell that supposedly cured 
rabies. After relaying the story, Muhiddin turned back to her audience, “This lack of knowledge 
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and ignorance is not only in the villages, is the ratio in the cities of well-nourished women to 
those sickened by rusting plumbing that small?”100 
Muhiddin closed her introduction with a crystalline portrait of the crossroads to which the 
Turkish feminist movement had come, and highlighted the need to oppose the logic of many of 
the Kemalist efforts to “modernize” its women,  
If the new woman sees no need for society, then little goal other than to work side by side 
in men’s professions is to be found. Because she wants to live independently like a man, 
to be liberated like him, to freely walk around and enjoy herself… In the period of 
economic crisis, when men have shown an inability to feed the birds in his nest, it is 
necessary that we demonstrate the capability of women to work as well. 
 This view of mine is a summary of the thoughts on the equilibrium in our public 
life. Otherwise, I am one who believes it is necessary to see women take up every 
profession. Women should be able to feel the wealth of enlightenment and management 
her own life whether it is as a doctor, lawyer, merchant, bureaucrat, teacher, artist, a 
deputy or even yet a minister. However, if every woman’s goal was only to be a doctor, 
engineer, lawyer, merchant, artist, deputy, minister, or record holder and only that, then 
the harmony of our creation would be gone.  
 A happier life in our country, and the elevation of women is one of the most 
important conditions of the powerful path of our great revolution. However, that does not 
have the meaning of women’s elevation, the likeness to men, and the removal of the 
difference between them… Women will be able to purify themselves of their special and 
unique qualities, of the old dirt of their superstition and legends, of the rust and mold 
when they are able to powerfully wield the human and civil rights that have passed and 
will pass into their hands. 
 “What difference is there between us?” “The difference is gone!” are 
superstitious words. This is the way I understand true feminism.101 
 
By assailing the masculine and bourgeois character of women’s emancipation in the 1920s, 
writers like Muhiddin and Sertel provided a view of politics outside the “patriarchal bargain.” 
Their political advocacy sought to build institutions that empowered women to make their own 
social, political, and cultural choices, while the rest of their work – especially Sertel’s in Resimli 
Ay and Muhiddin’s novels like Benliğim Benimdir (My Self is Mine) – was suffused with visions 
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of a society of independent women couched in an au courant modernist, bourgeois aesthetic. In 
this way, we can see how the leading figures of Turkey’s young feminist movement both 
harmonized with and reverberated against the basic tenets of the Kemalist revolution. Moreover, 
they offered women a view on modernity authored by women, standing apart from the male-led 
Kemalist “liberation” movement.  



















CHAPTER THREE: Preparation for a Devolution? The Liberal Republican Party 
Experiment 
 
In the first decade of the Turkish republic there were two serious attempts at forming an 
opposition party to Mustafa Kemal’s Republican People’s Party (CHP). The story of the first, the 
conservative-leaning Terrakiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (TCF), emerged in late 1924 after the 
establishment of the republic. It lasted until the early days of summer in 1925, when in the wake 
of a Kurdish rebellion and suspected murder plots against Mustafa Kemal, it was disbanded, and 
its leaders banished into exile or sent to prison following a series of Independence Tribunals. It is 
clear from the scholarship on this period that the seven-month-long rise and fall of the TCF 
represented the culmination of a power struggle within the upper echelons of the nationalist 
movement, and signaled Mustafa Kemal’s final, radical break from the more moderate elements 
of the Young Turk (or “Unionist”) movement that had held sway over the final years of Ottoman 
reign.102 The two years following 1925 would see the tightest control Mustafa Kemal imposed 
over the public sphere – censorship and imprisonment of opposition figures was high between 
1925 and 1927 – as well as to his most aggressive social and cultural reforms.  
 Following the institution of the script reform in November of 1928, censorship laws 
loosened, and some measure of political space was opened up to previously suppressed figures. 
However, the 1929 stock market crash and ensuing global recession hit Turkey particularly hard. 
Having barely scratched its way out of a decade of near-constant warfare primarily through 
economic partnership with the USSR and state-driven policies, the Turkish economy suddenly 
seemed left in the lurch. In the eyes of Mustafa Kemal, this crisis demanded a political solution. 
By the summer of 1930 he arrived at the idea that in order to let off the steam building amidst 
politicians and the public who were weary of high taxes and a sagging economy, he should invite 
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his close friend Ali Fethi Okyar, a former Prime Minister who was currently serving as 
ambassador to France, to form an opposition party that would adhere closely to Kemalist 
principles, but offer a more liberal economic alternative in parliament to the étatist policy 
preferences of the prime minister, İsmet İnönü. Okyar accepted the invitation, presented in early 
August during a state dinner at Kemal’s summer home in Yalova, and proceeded to form 
Turkey’s second officially sanctioned opposition party, the Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Liberal103 
Republican Party, SCF), with the help from a few prominent intellectuals, chiefly the Azeri-born 
architect of many Turkish nationalist policies Ahmet Ağaoğlu, and politicians, including and a 
young Adnan Menderes and the statesman and banker Celal Bayar, the future leaders of the 
Democrat Party.104 
 The SCF in actuality would have an even shorter life than its predecessor, the TCF. After 
forming in August of 1930, it was shut down a less than four months later. The story of the SCF 
until now has mainly been told from a national perspective, focusing on the elite discourse in the 
press and parliamentary debates. From this perspective, it is easy to see the many mistakes made 
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by party leaders as they tried to organize support within parliament and translate it to a popular 
movement. Hasty organization on the local level in preparation for the local elections in 
September and October meant poor coordination between local, regional, and national command 
centers. The leadership’s resistance to opening an official press organ allowed government 
mouthpieces to dominate coverage, and allowed for the papers and journals that did support the 
SCF to vary widely in their messaging, ideology, criticism, and coverage. The momentum within 
the parliamentary elite never built up enough pressure to have a significant effect on policy 
discussion, despite its sometimes-rancorous tone. This perspective, as is described 
comprehensively in Walter Weiker’s 1973 study of the SCF, has a great many strengths in that it 
provides the backbone of the political narrative of the SCF experience, and serves nicely to 
exemplify the connections between it and those of the Democrat Party elite less than two decades 
later. Its weakness, however, is in its uncritical assessment of the way in which the SCF 
experience helped to organize local opposition to the CHP. Weiker’s narrative focuses mainly on 
the conflict in parliament in terms of real ideological differences. This is a crucial contribution, 
but the lopsided power politics at the elite level do not do enough justice to the real strength and 
character of the political organization on the ground, and away from the parliamentary squabbles. 
Such a perspective has the (perhaps unintended) effect of depicting this experiment in multiparty 
politics as doomed from the start.105 The main purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate, through a 
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reading of the SCF’s local files, and through narratives of SCF supporters who were not 
themselves members of parliament (or even party members), the real democratic potential for a 
truly independent opposition party to emerge in this crucial moment in Turkey’s history.  
By largely taking a ground up view of the SCF experience, this chapter highlights the 
ways in which the SCF, despite its disappointing showing in the municipal elections, and 
ineffective opposition in parliament, was successful at bringing together local opponents of CHP 
policies from all levels of society, and mobilizing them through local political and cultural 
institutions – including village heads (muhtar) and Turkish Hearths (Türk Ocakları), the latter of 
which would be transformed from an independent organization into a party organ, the People’s 
Houses (Halkevleri). It shows that the local party branches in many districts tapped into long 
simmering resentments of the CHP’s performance. By looking first at these records of local party 
organizing in both urban and rural settings, and then incorporating it into the larger narrative of 
the SCF experience, we can understand that although the party was in disarray at the top 
following the municipal elections, it was not broken beyond repair and had made significant steps 
towards organizing a functional opposition party. 
 The second intervention into the narrative I offer is to adjust for the many ways in which 
Weiker’s book is in near perfect accord with the political and historical scholarship of 
modernization theorists, in that it envisions the ninety-nine days of the SCF to have been the first 
significant step in creating a “tutelary democracy” in Turkey. This term, in Weiker’s words, 
asserts that within a single party state, “it is possible to deliberately create conditions in which 
democracy can exist and economic growth and social change can continue.”106 By ascribing this 
term to the Turkish republic between 1930 and 1950, Weiker seeks to demonstrate that the 
Kemalist government, as an aggressively modernizing single-party state desiring of 
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democratization, could indeed continue that modernization process apace while cultivating first a 
“loyal opposition” and later a functioning multiparty democracy. In many senses, Weiker is 
correct in this assessment, as he makes a convincing case that Mustafa Kemal self-consciously 
sought this line as the path towards democracy and certainly the eventual leaders of the Democrat 
party learned a great deal from the SCF experience and aftermath. In his assessment of the SCF’s 
failure, he asserts that the results of the experiment revealed that much of the aggressive 
modernization policies of the 1920s had failed to penetrate most of the Turkish voting public 
rendering the SCF, and by consequence any “loyal opposition” party, incapable of warding off 
infiltration of counter-revolutionaries and conservatives in its ranks.107 In other words, the 
Turkish public was not “ready” to fulfill the promises – meaning, continuing the process of 
aggressive, western, secular modernization – of a “tutelary democracy.”  
What I intend to show in this chapter and throughout this dissertation is that perhaps this 
thinking is backwards; perhaps it was Kemalism qua ruling ideology that was not “ready” to 
harbor a real opposition in 1930. The effect of the SCF’s closure was not only, as Weiker amply 
demonstrates, the beginning of an even more aggressive campaign of democratic “tutelage” but 
also a significant departure point for opponents of Kemalism who were henceforth increasingly 
vocal in their criticism of the state. Opponents of Kemalism became increasingly wary of a 
tutelary process that seemed, in their eyes, more an attempt to co-opt and coerce Kemalist 
modernity into a democratic mold than a genuinely inclusive democratic process.108  
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 Cem Emrence’s study of the ninety-nine days of the SCF gets closer to understanding the 
role of the SCF in shaping opposition politics in the 1930s and 1940s by pointing out the 
consistency not only in political elites but also in the constituency between SCF and future 
opposition parties. In his account, the rural businessmen and landowners who formed the basis of 
SCF support throughout western Anatolia represented a consistent opposition bloc throughout the 
single party era and beyond, and though they were largely accepting of some of Kemalism’s 
cultural reforms, the statist economic policies of the twenties and the Great Depression seemed to 
exacerbate their opposition. Emrence and other scholars rightly note that the aftermath of the SCF 
experience was one that resulted in a cementing of Kemalist ideology brought on by the more 
radical reform processes – the policies that are often seen as the “excesses” of Kemalist 
nationalist modernization, such as name reform, the evolution of the Turkish History and Sun 
Language theories and the greater emphasis on state-led economic development, harsher policies 
against Kurds, and irredentism in Hatay/Alexandretta, all occur after 1930.109 Whereas the 
eventual success of the DP in 1950 was seen in the west as a grand victory for both liberalism and 
Kemalism by scholars like Lewis, Berkes, and Weiker, Emrence rightly points out that, “despite 
its historical importance, the Liberal Republican Party has occupied a limited space in the writing 
of modern Turkish history. The SCF experience heralded Turkey’s breaking point with the 
nineteenth century liberal world in favor of the authoritarian, centralized, hyper-modernist 
1930s.”110 Therefore, I posit that beginning with this experience, the characterization of the 
Kemalist “modernization” efforts of the 1930’s as somehow “liberal” is inherently anachronistic 
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as it clearly sought, above all the other putatively liberal goals of the Kemalist revolution, to 
transform the subjectivity of the Turkish people into one that fit a specific idea of liberal 
modernity.111 In short, the means with which the Kemalist sought a liberal end were anything 
but.112  
 This chapter will look at the very beginnings of the fractures between opposition figures, 
the SCF and the Kemalist center in three distinct contexts. First, it examines the local-level 
organization of the SCF in regions in which it had strong support and an active party organization 
– primarily in Istanbul and the regions in and around Izmir. Second, it will look at the conduct of 
the municipal elections to analyze some of the serious difficulties and obstructions faced by the 
SCF as it tried to get out the vote in October 1930 – difficulties and failures that would in many 
ways precipitate the closure of the party the following month. Lastly, it will move away from the 
party files themselves, to look briefly at the support for the SCF in the Istanbul press. As 
mentioned previously, the SCF had no official press organ, but in Istanbul two publications – Son 
Posta and Yarın – acted as the primary outlets for publishing pro-SCF editorials, and for 
combatting the official government narrative prevalent elsewhere. Notably, the editors of these 
publications were firmly rooted in the Turkish left. Son Posta was edited by Zekeriya Sertel, who 
we might characterize at this time as a progressive social democrat with a distinctly Marxist 
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modernization theory, ideology and political practice in the later period, see Nicholas Danforth, 
“Malleable Modernity: Rethinking the Role of Ideology in American Policy, Aid Programs, and 
Propaganda in Fifties’ Turkey” Diplomatic History 39:3 (2015), 477-503, and Nils Gilman, 
Mandarins of the Future. 
74 
 
outlook, and Yarın was largely the work of Arif Oruç, a more hardline socialist who had 
previously (and would subsequently) be closely involved in communist movements against 
Mustafa Kemal and his party. While the SCF may not have received enough credit as it deserves 
for establishing a functioning political party, the same cannot be said of the absolute hash it made 
of cementing its support amongst opposition intellectuals. If one result of the SCF experiment 
was the quieting of liberal elements in the Kemalist orthodoxy, another was the way liberalism 
fell out of favor with opposition intellectuals of all stripes, and gave way to more radical currents 
– namely Stalinism, völkisch nationalism, and pious Islamism – in the years following the SCF’s 
dissolution. This latter phenomenon will be addressed in subsequent chapters of this dissertation. 
SCF Supporters and the Party’s Organization at the Local Level 
 One of the main justifications for the closure of the SCF was that it could not control 
their supporters from acting violently, and that masses of their supporters exhibited signs of 
reactionary political inclinations that would have run at cross purposes with the idea of a loyal 
opposition party.113 As such, it is worth examining whether any justification for these claims can 
be found in the party archive. Largely, these claims centered on public events and expressions of 
support occurring in urban centers throughout the country, but the archives reveal a very different 
story. In this section I will examine two aspects of the party’s organization that illuminate its 
interaction with its supporters in order to challenge the claim that these supporters were somehow 
illiberal subjects and that the party was incapable of corralling violent behavior. The first aspect is 
direct interaction with supporters evidenced by unsolicited letters of support offered by members 
                                                           
113 By “loyal” opposition party, I mean that the SCF was expected to be loyal to the Turkish state, 
constitution, and its founder. Normally, like in the British parliament, a loyal opposition is not 
loyal towards a party, and in the abstract neither was the SCF, though this aspect is complicated 
by the fact that Mustafa Kemal was still alive, and though he had promised to remain neutral in 




of the Turkish public. In the files examined, these are primarily evident in the Istanbul Regional 
Hearth and the letters mainly come from upper middle-class figures, some of whom had formerly 
held some sort of position within the government regime. Though this is not necessarily reflective 
of the broadest support base that the SCF drew on, it does show that there were ideological 
reasons that social elites – lawyers, doctors, dentists, literati, etc. – supported the SCF. The 
second aspect takes us away from elite discourse and largely away from the urban center of 
Istanbul to examine party organization and activities in the farther flung districts outside of 
Istanbul and Izmir. In these files, we can get a clear idea of the types of individuals who made up 
the party bureaucracy at the grassroots level, what kind of activities they organized, and how the 
SCF worked within existing social structures to create party solidarity in an exceptionally short 
period of time. While the following analysis of the SCF archival material is far from exhaustive – 
only two of the Regional Hearth Presidia’s files were examined – the evidence of support 
provides a representative cross section of the elite and functionary members of the SCF’s 
operation in the regions in which they were most popular. While taking into consideration that a 
broad base of support would surely have posed some problems to the SCF’s hierarchy going 
forward, the manner in which this swift organization came together suggests at the very least that 
the worst fears of a reactionary wave amongst the Kemalist elite were overblown, and that the 
potential for forming a functioning opposition party was squandered. 
Letters of Support 
 In the archives of the SCF, we can observe the sort of institutional and personal support 
the SCF received from various groups and individuals across the social spectrum. There are two 
things we can learn from examining these documents that are crucial to understanding the totality 
of the SCF’s effect on Turkish politics. First, we can better understand the reasons many people 
supported the SCF, and thus draw a better, but in no way comprehensive, picture of the ideology 
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of the SCF’s base, and demonstrate the kinds of coalitions it sought to build across the ideological 
spectrum from liberals to conservatives to social democrats. It is critical to our understanding of 
opposition politics in this period to know whether and how the SCF leadership sought to build a 
sort of umbrella opposition to the CHP without touching the third rails of secularism and the 
unitary nature of Turkish nationalism. Second, we can also discern to some extent the level of the 
SCF’s organization. It is important to the “tutelary democracy” argument that the SCF somehow 
had lost control of its base, and that it was unable to firmly cement the bridges it sought to build. I 
believe that these documents suggest that the SCF’s party organization was actually quite strong, 
and that the reasons for the failure of the SCF should fall squarely on the prejudice against it 
expressed by the state, and the inability of the party leadership to navigate the elitist power 
struggle that followed the announcement of the experiment in August 1930. 
 The letters of support in the SCF archive reveal a few overarching ideological motifs 
from party supporters and low-level functionaries. The first is a frustration with the amount of 
corruption within the various state-run monopolies. For example, a letter received by the Istanbul 
branch addressed to Fethi Okyar in the midst of the Istanbul elections from a resident of the 
Pangaltı district going only by the name Fürüzan, deplored the alcohol monopoly, stating that 
“the insides of this monopoly are in a seriously disastrous and putrid situation.”114 In general, this 
was a concern shared by critics of the CHP from the left who were uncomfortable with the way 
state-private partnerships tended to lead to corruption across these monopolies, although some 
critics on the left also worried that the SCF’s proposed reforms would only hand more power to 
                                                           
114 Fürüzan to Fethi Okyar, October 7, 1930, Archive of the Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, Istanbul 
Vilayet Ocağı Merkezi (SCF Istanbul Regional Hearth Center, hereafter SCF-IVOM), in the 
private collection of Ali Fethi Okyar, Büyükada, Istanbul. 
77 
 
business interests without greater accountability for waste.115 Another intermittent motif is an 
appeal from obviously pious supporters praising the righteousness of Fethi’s mission. One such 
example, from a registered party member and lawyer named M. Muammer Salih praised Fethi as 
a divinely inspired figure and exhorted him repeatedly to “show the path which he is commanded 
to tread,” an allusion to the story of Moses as related in the Koran (11.112).116   
 Other letters sometimes offered unsolicited advice and assistance. One letter from a 
resident of Beşiktaş, going by the name Ihsan, sent to Fethi Okyar in late August alerted the party 
leader of efforts by the CHP to illegitimately disrupt the voting process. He surmises that 
“twenty-five percent of the people will participate in the election but nevertheless, poll boxes will 
be filled with the votes of those who would never come and the majority [meaning the CHP]… 
will break the spiritual power of the people.” He also suggests that the CHP had been working in 
tandem with certain press organs and preachers (hatipler) to propagandize on their behalf. In 
order to combat this in his own precinct of Beşiktaş, Ihsan suggests the party work closely with a 
man named Hasan Tahsin Bey, a local organizer and member of the shop owner’s association 
(Bakkallar Cemiyeti) in order to get people to the polls, and to generally work in concert as much 
as possible with local village chiefs (muhtar) for the same ends.117 While there is not much in this 
sort of letter to discern a clear ideological position, the suggestion that local shop owners, 
preachers, and village chiefs would be amenable to the SCF’s brand of politics, in concert with a 
generally sour view of the CHP, is at least a vague indication that some local leaders were 
disposed against the CHP. 
                                                           
115 Zekeriya Sertel ultimately faced a lengthy prison sentence following the SCF closure for 
publishing damning stories about the state sugar monopoly in the pages of Son Posta, alongside 
articles that explicitly and implicitly endorsed the SCF.   
116 M. Muammer Salih to Fethi Okyar September 16, 1930, SCF-IVOM 
117 Ihsan to Fethi Okyar, August 23, 1930, SCF-IVOM 
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 Another theme amongst the letters of support is the involvement of people who until that 
point had no affiliation with the CHP or any other political party. One resident of Izmir, named 
Mehmet Ali, who had a lot of business with merchant networks in the surrounding villages, wrote 
to the SCF Presidium indicating that he had never had anything to do with party politics, but 
considered himself a “fanatical nationalist” (müfrit milliyetperver) and wished to organize on 
behalf of the party. He particularly felt that the CHP administration had been wasteful, and “set us 
on the road to darkness.” He complained about how he could not speak with their members about 
the SCF without hearing exaggerated concerns over “arabization” (istirab içinde inleyordu).118 He 
reported that he had spent a significant amount of time explaining the party’s program to the 
villagers and had even recruited a local schoolteacher to organize on behalf of the party. Included 
in the correspondence was a separate written statement affirming his desire to join the party by 
adopting the party program “in the capacity and opinion of a secular republican and a 
nationalist.”119 Another Izmir resident, a lawyer named Nuri Sıtkı, likewise expressed his desire 
to enter into politics through the SCF and offered himself as a candidate in the municipal 
elections on their list despite the fact that, “until now the reason I have not been affiliated with 
any party is that it is not in my nature to have anything to do with party discipline.” It would 
appear that Sıtkı’s name actually had appeared already on the SCF list, and that he was happy, if 
surprised, to have received their endorsement, and requested that he be added to the membership 
roll of the party as a consequence or have his name removed from the list of candidates.120 
                                                           
118 Arabization (istirab) here likely means concerns regarding religious politics, though 
admittedly it is possible here the author of the letter meant to write about “painfulness” (istirap), 
since these spellings occurred before the orthographic changes to modern Turkish were set, but in 
this case the context suggests otherwise. 
119 Mehmet Ali to Liberal Republican Party Presidium, September 1, 1930, SCF Izmir Vilayet 
Ocağı Merkezi files (hereafter, SCF-IzVOM) 
120 Nuri Sıtkı to Liberal Republican Party Izmir Regional Hearth Administrative Council 
Presidium, October 12, 1930 SCF IzVOM 
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 Looking solely at intramural, privately kept letters of support inside the SCF archive it is 
hard to get a clear picture of what kind of ideology bound its supporters, but it is important to 
note the absence of the sort of overtly radical or reactionary voices to which the party would be 
attached in the media establishment over the course of the election campaign. If the party had any 
connection or control over groups who would become violently disruptive to the party’s political 
growth, there is no real sign of it in their internal correspondence.  
Party Organization – Izmir and its Environs 
 Beginning in September 1930, the SCF got to work quickly to solidify a party 
organization at the local level throughout western Anatolia in advance of the municipal elections. 
Since much of the party leadership were veterans of the Turkish Hearth organizations, all party 
branches were also named “hearths” and worked to establish ties with other social and political 
groups at the local level, including village heads (muhtar), township boards (nahiye), local 
military branches, and educated professionals. This class of documents, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
makes up the vast majority of the files in the SCF archive. 
The SCF had great success in quickly putting together a party organization in the regions 
around Izmir. One of the earliest letters in the files of the SCF’s Izmir Regional Hearth Presidium 
(İzmir Vilayet Ocağı Riyaseti) is a letter of support addressed to Fethi Okyar signed, with seals, 
by twenty-two village heads of the city of Bergama, roughly a hundred kilometers north of Izmir. 
The letter expresses a sincere excitement at the formation of the party, stating,  
We have spent years awaiting such an organization to give birth to the fundamental 
ambitions and truths of the republic. When the clarion of your party filled our horizon, 
that great sound, that lofty feeling of duty became apparent and we rushed to serve it. We 
are those who have awaited your party most impatiently.121 
                                                           




It is clear that the village heads of Bergama, of whom six are listed as merchants or shop-owners, 
had felt marginalized by the CHP’s activities of late. They insisted that, “a village sits on the edge 
of our country. Until now… humility has not been one of the true qualities of the republic.”122 
The seemingly spontaneous organization of these village heads and the manner in which local 
social organization there sprang into service of the SCF shows how the party was able to tap into 
general political discontent amongst rural Turks, and build off of already existing political 
structures like the Turkish Hearths.  
 Membership reports from the Bergama Hearth that follow the statement of support from 
the village heads demonstrate that the local leadership came from a similar class of people. In an 
undated list of members, likely from around the time of elections in mid-October, fifteen 
members are listed along with their occupations. Nine of the members, including the Hearth 
President Hıfzı Celal, were listed as merchants and there rest were lawyers (four), a doctor, and a 
pharmacist.123 By early November, however, there was a transition in the leadership of the 
Bergama Hearth following their victory in the late October municipal elections there, reflected in 
a series of letters from November 6, as they sought the resignation of seven unnamed members of 
the administrative council (idare hey’eti) so that they could be replaced by two local lawyers, four 
new merchants, one of whom was the president of the municipality, and a farmer.124 The 
correspondence indicates that there was an ideological disagreement between the members of the 
council, as the Hearth President Hıfzı Celal wrote, “all along, the posture and thoughts of one or 
the other persons have been unsuitable to our hearth council… there are a few of my friends who 
would be more suitable and are in a position to put together a powerful organization that works in 
                                                           
122 Ibid. 
123 While it is clear that this document is a list of party members, the date is unclear and may have 
been included as an attachment to the document cited in ibid coming from the muhtars SCF-
IzVOR. 
124 A short, unsigned message from the Bergama Hearth to the SCF District Hearth Presidium 
congratulating the party on its victory dated October 23 can be found in SCF-IzVOR. 
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the favor of the country and the party…”125 While it is impossible to tell from the archives what 
ideological details drove this shake up, the emphasis on Hıfzı’s social circle, and the addition of 
more lawyers to the administrative council suggests a move towards consolidating the local 
party’s power and driving membership from the professional classes following the elections. 
 A bit closer to Izmir, in the rural district of Urla which sits to Izmir’s west between near 
the present-day resort town of Çeşme, we can observe an even more dense network of 
organization. The party files provide here a fascinating portrait of just who was involved in 
organizing party activities on the local level. The Urla District Hearth (Urla Kaza Ocağı) held its 
first official meeting on September 11th in a four room office that was procured in central Urla for 
the purposes of establishing a party headquarters.126 At the meeting, Mustafa Nuri, a local 
merchant, was elected President, a local dentist by the name of Hulusi Ahmet was named 
Secretary, and Recepoğlu Ibrahim, a farmer, was named Treasurer.127 By this point, the party 
leadership had designed a seal, made plans to take part in a celebration the following day 
commemorating the founding of their city, and recruited party leaders for each of the eleven 
neighborhoods of central Urla.128 They had even managed to acquire the signatures of ninety-two 
local villagers and place six party members onto the eleven member council that would oversee 
                                                           
125 Hıfzı Celal to SCF Central Hearth Presidium, November 6, 1930, also Halûk to Izmir Regional 
Hearth Presidium, November 6, 1930, both SCF-IzVOR. 
126 Mustafa Nuri (Urla Hearth President) to the Izmir Regional Hearth Presidium, September 11, 
1930, SCF-IzVOR  
127 Ibid, the professions of these members are mentioned in a separate correspondence from 
Mustafa Nuri to Ekrem, a lawyer for the SCF in Izmir on September 7, 1930, SCF-IzVOR   
128 Mustafa Nuri (Urla Hearth President) to the Izmir Regional Hearth Presidium, September 11, 
1930, SCF-IzVOR, Nuri felt it necessary to mention in this letter that the celebrations would be 
“calm” and reported the following day in a telegram sent to Fethi Okyar in Istanbul that “the 
people are fondly and affectionately showing their support.” Mustafa Nuri to Fethi Okyar, 
telegram, September 12, 1930 SCF-IzVOR. 
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the municipal elections (intihap encümeni), despite noting some difficulty in reaching out to 
village heads.129  
 Sometime between the party’s founding in early September and the end of that month, 
there was a shake up in the Urla Hearth when Mustafa Nuri resigned as President for reasons that 
are unclear from the archival material and was succeeded by Hacı Hafız zade Ibrahim Hakkı, a 
graduate of the law faculty, a local trader and owner of a small manufacturing outfit.130 While the 
reason for this change is unclear, one could surmise that Hakkı’s superior education and 
relationship to the business community in Urla were of greater accord with the SCF’s overall 
strategy of appealing to business owners and rural landholders. In fact, in a detailed report from 
the days running up to the November election, it is clear that educational and professional 
resumes were important identifiers of the local SCF elite – besides the aforementioned dentist and 
farmer in the administration, four of the party members are listed with similar but lesser 
credentials, including the high school educated farmer and reserve officer Balaban zade Hamdi, 
or Baltalı oğlu Adil, also a farmer, who had attended law school for one year before having to 
leave to serve in the Turkish War for Independence.131  
 Once the party leadership was solidified, however, membership grew considerably in the 
first few weeks of October. In a report from October 5, Hearth Secretary Hülüsi Ahmet reported 
to the Izmir Presidium that the party had begun to conduct a membership drive in the surrounding 
villages of Urla, and that twenty-two sworn and sealed oaths of membership were recorded in the 
previous week. Inside the main city of Urla, the reported numbers were even more impressive, as 
eighty were recorded in the same span, bringing the total party membership in the city to 1,303 
                                                           
129 Ibid  
130 Confirmation of Nuri’s resignation from the office of Fethi Okyar is found in Okyar to SCF 
District Hearth Presidium, September 30, 1930, SCF-IzVOR  
131 Separately reported in correspondence between Urla Hearth Council to High Regional Hearth 
Presidium, October 27 and November 11, 1930 SCF-IzVOR 
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out of an estimated population of 1,450 males.132 According to the same report, the CHP had 
begun to take note of this rise and filed motions to expel certain elite members from the party, 
including local lawyers and a hotelier, but this did not worry Hülüsi Ahmet much as he reported 
that, “we have been astounded by the organization of a significant majority amongst the junk 
dealers, yogurt sellers, and quilt-makers.”133 
 There is not much in the archives of this particular hearth that allow us to characterize the 
ideological outlook of the party members at this level, but there is at least one clue. An early 
document sent to a lawyer in Urla named Ekrem from the Izmir Central Hearth President, who is 
unnamed in the document, provides a series of instructions as to how the party must set up 
operations in the region and, oddly, gives the name of the SCF as the Liberal secular Republican 
Party (Serbest lâyik Cumhuriyet Fırkası).134 Combining this with the rest of the reported activities 
in the Hearth archive, which suggest that the local party was not out to rock the boat too much – 
particularly when they participated in elections and local civic affairs – one gets the idea that at 
the very least the party leaders understood the ideological bounds within which they were allowed 
to operate. Whether or not Ekrem or any other party leader in Urla supported secularism as a 
                                                           
132 “Report Number 3” Hülüsi Ahmet to Regional Hearth Presidium, October 5, 1930 SCF-
IzVOR. The figures here are all Hülüsi Ahmet’s estimations, so should be considered with a grain 
of salt, but even if they are off by a significant margin, it would still leave nearly half the city’s 
male population as members of the party.  
133 Ibid.  
134 Izmir Central Hearth President Doctor Ekrem to Ekrem the Lawyer in Urla, September 7, 1930 
SCF-IzVOM. This is somewhat confusing as both the sender and recipient of this letter are named 
Ekrem. Little is known about the recipient, the lawyer, but the sender is Ekrem Hayri (Üstündağ) 
who was the president of the Izmir Regional Hearths, handpicked by Fethi to lead the party there 
during his Izmir trip, would later go on be an organizer for the Democrat Party in 1946, and 
Minister of Health after the DP won the 1950 parliamentary elections. See Weiker, Political 
Tutelage, 119. Additionally, one must note that it is possible that there is a typographical error 
and the party name is meant to be read as the Liberal noble (layık, instead of lâyik) Republican 
party. Turkish orthography in 1930 was hardly uniform, however the inclusion of the circumflex 
over the “a” and the long vowel “i” suggests a variant of “laik” (secular) which is seldom used 
following various reforms put forth by the Turkish Language Society (Türk Dil Kurumu) in the 
1930s and 1940s.  
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principle is unclear, but we might at least assume that he could be going out of his way to 
emphasize the secular nature of the party as a constraint imposed by Mustafa Kemal by inserting 
“lâyik” into the name of the party. 
 About sixty kilometers up the coast from Urla, in the small seaside village of Karaburun, 
another party hearth was being organized apart from the Urla hearth. The archive includes a short, 
but revealing correspondence in which fourteen members of the Karaburun community petitioned 
Fethi Okyar for one of their “brilliant youths” by the name of Fadil to represent their hearth in the 
party administration. The request itself is relatively ordinary – the group also effusively praised 
Fethi for having “brought comfort, brought happiness and breaking the bloody and shining chains 
of tyranny and domination” – what is interesting is that the letter was posted not to the SCF 
administration, but was intended to be forwarded there by the editor of the newspaper Yeni Asır 
(New Age), Ismail Hakkı.135 The request was apparently carried out by the director of the paper, 
H. Şevket, three days after it was received.136 This brief correspondence demonstrates that even in 
areas where official party outreach could not penetrate, citizens were eager to organize on their 
behalf. Additionally, it shows a close relationship between newspapers who supported the party, 
the party administration, and of course, their readership.  
 As the calendar rolled towards the October elections, there were some signs, particularly 
in Izmir, that the party’s organization was weakening. In one instance, six party members from 
the İsmet Paşa neighborhood of Izmir wrote to the central hearth president in Izmir, a doctor 
named Hayri, complaining in effusive prose about the lack of representation from their district in 
front of the party’s administrative council. The authors began praising the party – which they 
                                                           
135 Karaburun residents to Fethi Bey care of Yeni Asır editor in chief Ismail Hakkı Bey, 
September 10, 1930, SCF-IzVOM 




repeatedly described as “sacred” (kutsi or mukaddes) – and Fethi Okyar for leading the country in 
the causes of “free thought, free spirit, and free trade,” but quickly turned to lament the fact that 
because most of the inhabitants of their neighborhood – whom they number, inconsistently, 
between four and nine thousand – were not officially members of the party, despite their undying 
fealty to the SCF, their needs were not being addressed by the party’s administrative council. 
They insist that their local hearth had vigorously opposed “every zone where a hearth is 
organized apart from the central regional hearth” and had accepted the whole community by 
opening their hearth and “taking them into our bosom with a loyalty that even an earthquake 
could not shake (layetezelezel bir sadakatla aguşumuza aldık).”  
Despite this, the complainants described a serious situation in their district in which they 
had gone at least a week without being able to procure oil necessary to provide their community 
with heat or light. Furthermore, the person whom they had sent to the central hearth to advocate 
on their behalf had been accused of an unspecified impropriety by the council that “brings doubt 
upon the honor and dignity (namus ve şeref)” of their representative. The letter demanded that the 
identity of the accuser be revealed before listing a series of demands that amount to a request that 
the neighborhood be given greater local autonomy in its administration, particularly that 
whomever was to be responsible for rationing in their district be a member of their own 
community. It is clear that while the party and its ideology had maintained a connection with this 
group – the praise of the party leaders is truly effusive, Fethi is described as a man who “has a 
conscience, a heart, a spirit and all of the pure characteristics that we see in ourselves” – it is also 
clear that the party organization was running into some administrative difficulties by late 
September. Unfortunately, there is no other correspondence on this issue in the SCF archive, but 
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it does show that while things appear to have been run smoothly in farther outlying districts like 
Urla and Bergama, more densely populated areas might have been more difficult to administer.137 
 While information on the makeup of the local party leadership is definitely uneven – not 
every hearth’s files provide the kind of peek inside hearth administration as the files on Bergama 
and Urla do – we can discern even more about the strength of the party organization by looking at 
the files that pertain directly to the elections, as we will in the next section of this chapter.  
The Municipal Elections: Propaganda, Conflict, and Voting Fraud 
 As the Municipal Elections moved on from September contests in the provinces to the 
major cities like Istanbul and Izmir in early October, concerns about vote fraud and corruption ran 
high within the SCF establishment. These concerns came atop the already confusing situation 
created by the new Municipal Law that devolved authority over local elections down to officials 
at the lowest levels, making the already hurried task of assembling SCF lists difficult. The voting 
procedure itself was changed significantly, ostensibly to guarantee impartiality at the polls, such 
that each voter would choose a ballot from either of the two parties, and affix their name, address, 
signature or seal to the ballot before dropping it in the box. As we saw in the case of the Urla SCF 
files above, some party branches had done an efficient job of organizing the creation of seals for 
voters across their district – and perhaps consequently, Urla was one of the thirty districts in 
which the SCF was victorious.138 There is little evidence to suggest, however, that this level of 
preparation was uniform across the local hearth organizations. Ultimately, the election results 
would be disappointing for the SCF, winning in a mere six percent of the 502 localities 
                                                           
137 Letter to Izmir Central Hearth Presidium from Korkutoğlu Ihsan, Muzaffer, Rıza, Fırıncı İsa, 
Ahmetoğlu Rıza Efendi, Süleymanoğlu İsmail, undated, but text of the letter suggests that it was 
written sometime before September 30, 1930, SCF-IzVOM. The letter, which is typewritten in 
Latin characters, also has idiosyncratic spelling of many words, which have been corrected in the 
above to their modern Turkish spellings.   
138 Weiker, Political Tutelage 111, 115 note 3. 
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competing and losing in many populous Istanbul districts by a margin greater than two to one.139 
The results reflect what appeared to be a general disarray amongst the party at the national level – 
Weiker attributes the weak performance to a muddled series of debates in parliament, a 
disorganized approach to handling the press, and a lack of attention paid to local issues.140 
The elections in Istanbul began in early October and internal documents from the Istanbul 
SCF organization suggest their efforts to organize and campaign had been significantly curtailed 
by the police. In one report from the Kadıköy district head, which was delivered to the Istanbul 
general headquarters and forwarded on to the SCF’s general staff, all of the SCF’s propaganda 
material in the district of Göztepe had been confiscated by the police, and several residents who 
were SCF supporters had their homes searched and were intimidated against voting for the SCF. 
Included in the report were mentions of similar instances of intimidation from the Hasanpaşa, 
Ikbaliye and Osmanağa districts.141 A telegram sent on September 30 from the party branch in 
Silivri, a district on the outskirts of European Istanbul, reported that a local supporter of the SCF, 
Samail Efendi, was insulted and physically beaten in public by a CHP supporter, Doksatlı 
Hüseyin, with appeals to the local gendarmerie and public prosecutor pending.142 
The head of the party’s Istanbul branch, Ismail Hakkı (Baltacıoğlu) found himself deeply 
concerned with making sure all SCF officials understood how to combat instances of vote fraud. 
In a memorandum circulated October 7, 1930, Ismail insists anyone suspicious of vote fraud 
should immediately file a police report and gives clear instructions on how to make appeals up 
the chain of command, should underlings at the police department prove sluggish or intentionally 
unhelpful in this regard. In particular, he repeatedly mentions the necessity of eye witness 
                                                           
139 Weiker provides approximate vote totals on p. 114, note 2. 
140 Ibid, 107-116 
141 Kadıköy Kaza Reisi to SCF Hearth, October 2, 1930, SCF-IVOM. Ismail Hakkı’s handwritten 
comments indicate this message was forwarded onto the general staff. 
142 Silivri Hearth to Fethi Okyar, Telegram, September 30, 1930, SCF-IVOM. 
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testimony because, “It is possible that the people working particular shifts at the police station are 
hardly saints themselves and mixed up in this vile corruption.”143  
In Izmir, the SCF faced similar sorts of struggles in getting out the vote. In a report from 
the district of İkiçeşmelik in central Izmir, the first day of the elections was met with a good deal 
of confusion about ordinances governing the polls, and as a result turnout was reported to be very 
low as only five out of the sixty-five persons who had said they would vote for the SCF showed 
up to the polls on that day.144 In a second report from later the same day, however, the issues 
seemed to be resolved as it was reported that of the 73 votes cast that day in İkiçeşmelik and 115 
in nearby Dolaplıkuyu, all but four went to the SCF.145 While it may seem that some of the early 
difficulties were smoothed over, the final election report from the İkiçeşmelik Hearth confirmed 
widespread reports of problems at the polls across the city and determined that while the SCF 
won at the polls in a landslide with 162 out of 196 total votes cast, the final tally of membership 
in the party in the township was a staggeringly high 1,100 members.146 Unfortunately, the 
archives provide no direct explanation for the discrepancy between the SCF’s high membership 
totals and the overall low voter turnout.  
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While there are several reports of suspicious and violent behavior on the part of the 
police and People’s Party representatives in the archives, there are comparatively few indications 
that SCF supporters had resorted to violence. One illustrative, and revealing, example of this is a 
letter sent to the Izmir council president Doctor Ekrem Hayri from a local businessman and 
customs official Agâh Kemali a week before the elections were to begin in early October. Agâh 
had been mounting a run as an independent candidate in the election, but was largely sympathetic 
to the SCF, having distributed a list of sixty-eight candidates, sixty-three of whom were either 
candidates or members of the SCF, to his friends to solicit their support. According to the 
correspondence, the remaining names were his own and four of his closest friends. On the 
evening of October 3 at ten o’clock a local businessman and member of the nearby hearth 
council, Ali Riza, rang Agâh’s doorbell with three unnamed companions. After demanding to 
know who gave Agâh the permission to publish such a list, Agâh attempted to explain that he 
needed no such permission. The group then proceeded to curse him heavily, slap him in the face, 
and kick him three times in the groin for having included on the list of names persons who were 
running against the SCF. Despite this awful experience, Agâh insists that although “it is clear that 
they acted on the account of the SCF, I would never believe that such ignorant and base actions 
could be commanded by the higher ranks of the party, only… that these gentlemen were 
bureaucrats in the hearth administration and they accordingly admitted that the hearth council did 
not show them how to [properly] attack an election.”147 So while it may seem that the party had 
only a loose grip on the lower ranks of its administration, it is clear that for some supporters, like 
Agâh, even violence within the SCF could not disrupt their support for the party’s ideals.  
 These examples provide some of the first details of the violence and corruption around 
the municipal elections that became a critical, and fatal aspect of the fall of the SCF. While 
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Weiker points primarily to the failure of political elites to agree on the acceptable nature of an 
opposition party, and the hasty, disorganized approach that the SCF took to party building, as the 
main factors in the demise of the SCF, it is clear that these instances of corruption and violence 
played a significant role in the party’s eventual closure. In his final session of parliament before 
the closure of the party, Fethi Okyar introduced a motion on November 6 insisting that the 
Interior Minister account for these instances of “misconduct and corruption.”148 The debate over 
this motion, which would not be carried out until November 15, would immediately precipitate 
Fethi’s decision, together with the party leadership, to close the party.149   
The Left and the Liberal Republican Party: The End of the Affair 
Upon the announcement of the party’s formation, Zekeriya Sertel offered a cautiously 
optimistic word of support in his Son Posta column. Though Sertel had spent significant parts of 
the 1920s in prison, being one of the few people who went before the Independence Tribunal and 
lived to tell the tale, he saw the arrival of the SCF as a sign that Kemal’s revolution was 
beginning to deliver on its promises of democracy. In the editorial, he detailed that there are two 
“excuses” for having a single party state, the first being dominance of either a single class or a 
single thought in a given society. Soviet Russia and fascist Italy were given as examples for both 
of these. The second reason, he elaborated, is that single-party states are a natural, but hopefully 
temporary, outcome of revolutions. As he explained, “[r]evolutions cannot satisfy many classes 
and many people. Revolutions occur because some classes are offended and desire to change 
many institutions over the course of some years. In order to create a sustainable revolution and a 
working majority, single party rule is permissible”; but, he reasoned, “[a]s a revolution finishes, 
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this unnaturalness cannot remain, at that time the lone party must allow for other parties to find 
their place.”150 Here we see how Sertel’s political commitments led him to see democracy and 
modernization as two very different things – modernization is a revolutionary process for 
transforming society, democracy is a natural state. For this reason, he welcomed Fethi’s new 
party, “[e]specially if word comes that this party will happily move a bit to the left,” but he 
cautioned that, “[i]t is most crazy to think that having created a new party we will go straight on 
to a complete democracy.”151  
Zekeriya’s support for the SCF in Son Posta would increasingly have less to do with his 
support of their ideology and more to do with wariness towards the direction the CHP was headed 
under İsmet’s leadership, particularly with regards to the Prime Minister’s étatist (devletçi) 
political preferences. In a pair of columns from late September, Zekeriya expressed concern that 
the CHP was abandoning the liberal tenets of the Republic by espousing étatism. In the first, he 
quickly dismisses criticism of the CHP as liberal and reactionary by arguing that “In truth, 
liberalism doesn’t exist in the twentieth century. On every side, étatism is a more progressive 
system relative to liberalism.”152 Then, responding to İsmet’s claim that “we are moderate 
étatists,” he insisted that this is a new development for the CHP since the Law of Fundamental 
Organization (Teşkilâtı Esasiye Kanunu), as constructed by the CHP, was “disposed towards 
liberal principles… and in securing the freedoms of thought (sây), assembly (içtima), and speech 
(söz) he agreed to defend all of the principles of the liberals.”153 He squarely laid the 
responsibility for introducing étatism into the CHP (and by consequence, the nation) on İsmet’s 
leadership, which, he accused of “randomly” (gelişi güzel) and unscientifically applying the term 
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merely in order to justify the aggrandizement of state authority. Two days later, returning to the 
topic of the CHP and étatism, Zekeriya revealed both the specific fear he had of İsmet’s 
engagement with étatism and his own ideological departure from the tenets of the SCF. In the 
column, which reiterates a demand for İsmet to further explain what he means by étatism, 
Zekeriya provides a typology of the different forms étatism had taken around the globe in recent 
years. He explains to his readers that in fascist Italy, étatism means that “the state is in service of 
the state. Namely, everything is subject to the state, and everything is for the state. This is a kind 
of autocracy… this style of étatism is prone to despotism.”154 He then moved to Germany, which 
he described as having a similarly absolutist type of system prior to WWI. At this point, he 
explained in a style that reveals his attachment to the Marxist dialectic, that this absolutism of 
Italy and Germany developed primarily in reaction to the old liberal order, but that the remnants 
of that order have birthed two separate forms of étatism of its own – state capitalism and state 
socialism. In his explanation of state capitalism, Zekeriya explained that services that are meant 
for public benefit like railroads and tramways must, under this system, be provided using state 
funds, but that the driving principle is for the state to make a profit. Zekeriya praised state 
socialism as “the final and truest form [of étatism]” and provides the following explanation, 
In this system, all of the power to benefit the public is found in the hands of the state. It 
does not support the goals of individual trade. The state uses its own funds to make these 
goals easier for the people. However, it does so inexpensively. It does not await profits. 
But it does take losses into consideration. The purpose is not trade, it is the public 
services for the people. By providing these basic services it benefits the well-being of the 
entire people. If there are profits, this too generally goes to the use of the people.155 
He then demanded to know which of these systems of étatism the CHP preferred, and then stated 
that his criticism of the party as it had behaved up until then would persist until this issue was 
clarified. This reveals Zekeriya’s clear preference for a socialist style system, putting him in 
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definite contrast with many of the intellectuals and party leaders most closely associated with the 
SCF. Clearly, Zekeriya’s support for the SCF was derived from his apprehensions about the 
direction of the CHP, and his willingness to back an opposition party for the sake of having an 
opposition in parliament was shared by some of his acquaintances on the left.  
Zekeriya had begun to have his doubts about Fethi and the rest of the SCF by this point. 
Although Son Posta remained supportive of the SCF throughout the elections, that support came 
mostly in the form of trenchant criticism of İsmet and the CHP. In his memoirs, Zekeriya 
admitted that already by the time of Fethi’s Izmir tour in early September, he had pressed Fethi 
personally to elaborate on the details of his platform and was given a disappointingly vague 
answer.156 As the paper was continuing to investigate corruption within the sugar monopolies, an 
investigation that would ultimately find Zekeriya in front of a judge for the second time in six 
years, Zekeriya felt that Fethi and the leadership, “remained in the shadows, the party was slowly 
falling into the hands of profiteers.”157 In the end, the SCF experiment would put further distance 
between Zekeriya and the liberal wing of the Turkish intellectual elite, as his later journalistic 
adventures would only amplify his Marxist and social democratic leanings.  
Sabiha Sertel, for her part, had even less sympathy for the SCF, which she believed was 
largely comprised of profiteers who did not have the needs of the people at heart. As a result, 
even though her husband’s newspaper continued to support the experiment, she decided to run as 
an independent candidate in the Istanbul municipal elections. Her program was published by 
Resimli Ay Matbaası and reflected her strong commitment to progressive values. The nine-plank 
platform emphasized local ownership and control over public works and greater accountability in 
the bureaucracy through elections, the establishment of a bureau for complaints (şikayet 
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büroları), regular publication of the municipalities performance, and better inspection of weights 
and measures. It also focused heavily on worker’s rights, particularly rights for child workers, 
including a call for a new law on overtime from Parliament that would establish the eight hour 
work day, accident insurance and compensation, one week’s paid vacation, maternity leave 
(hâmile kadınların çalıştırılmaması), and the provision of working papers to children.158 Included 
in the pamphlet with the program was an extended explanation of her candidacy and the 
overarching goals Sabiha hoped to affect through a successful campaign. Sabiha explained that 
her platform seeks to address three broad categories of needs – Social (İçtimâî), Health (Sıhhî), 
and Economic (İktisâdî) – and couched her campaign in an overall effort to improve the 
democratic life of the city; she opened the explanation by dramatically stating, “The first thing 
that should be taught to our children is that this city, this piece of earth, is ours…” and insisting 
that, “In the most important points in our future collisions the governmental authority must be 
made to agree that the deepening of democracy (demokrasiyi derinleştirmek), the authority and 
the well-being of the people are superior to it.”159 While there is little mention of this campaign in 
her memoirs, it is clear that Sabiha saw her candidacy as part of a longer campaign for children’s 
rights that she had been carrying on for the better part of a decade in Resimli Ay. She had even 
gone as far as to draft her pre-teen daughter Sevim into the movement in the previous year when 
Sevim campaigned for children’s rights at her local Turkish Hearth in Tepebaşı and later in the 
pages of one of the final issues of Resimli Ay in May 1930 with her own editorial entitled “Why 
Do They Cheat Us?” listing a set of demands for limiting child labor.160  
Zekeriya Sertel and Son Posta would remain cautiously supportive of the new party as the 
campaign for the municipal elections continued, but Zekeriya Sertel himself was increasingly 
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skeptical of the close cooperation between Fethi Okyar and Mustafa Kemal, as well as the 
emphasis on liberal economic policies which he believed would only increase the already corrupt 
relationship between the state and private business. In his memoir, he relayed a version of the 
story of the SCF’s collapse in which he played a significant hand. According Sertel, around the 
time of the municipal elections the SCF leadership holed themselves up in Ankara and was 
suspected of carrying on a series of secret meetings with Atatürk. Sertel learned through an 
anonymous source that Okyar and Kemal had reached an agreement that should the SCF win a 
parliamentary election, Kemal would not intervene so long as it was agreed he would remain 
president for life. Hearing this news, Sertel ran to the SCF headquarters and inquired about the 
deal to Okyar, as well as Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the SCF General Secretary Nuri Conker, who 
eventually confirmed the news and allowed him to print an official statement in Son Posta. The 
publication of this news angered Kemal, who pressed Sertel to reveal his source. After failed 
attempts by Okyar to get Sertel to give up the source, Kemal decided that he could not continue 
the experiment of the SCF so long as it appeared to be so blatantly managed from above, and 
promptly closed the party down.161  
If Son Posta represented the social democratic column of SCF support, Arif Oruç’s paper 
Yarın, would embody a harder line of leftist support – and cause even more problems for the 
SCF’s propaganda efforts. Prior to the founding of the party, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, the SCF’s chief 
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intellectual, had a great amount of sympathy for Oruç’s outfit, since he had become a sort of 
magnet for opponents of İsmet İnönü’s tenure as Prime Minister. In the early days of the SCF, the 
paper garnered support from Fethi, as well as from Mustafa Kemal who thought Yarın should 
become the official press organ for the party. Ağaoğlu ultimately disagreed with this path, 
because he saw Oruç’s position as too divisive, as he wrote in his memoirs, “Yarın supported 
heading down the path of demagogy at a more violent speed, it aroused a thousand types of 
disagreement, right and left, amongst old notables and veterans against the new party…”162 
Ağaoğlu would find the Sertel’s more even handed editorial style more suitable to his own 
outlook on the future of Turkish democracy, but his rejection of Yarın caused a split between him 
and Fethi, as well as adding to his disagreements with Mustafa Kemal.  
 For his own part, Oruç seemed to coordinate only in the loosest sense with the SCF 
administration, and much to the deficit of the party’s operations, particularly with regards to the 
municipal elections. According to Weiker’s account, despite a conscious effort on the part of 
Fethi to distance himself and the party from Oruç and Yarın, Oruç somehow managed to make it 
onto the SCF’s candidate list in Istanbul.163 This is surprising for a number of reasons, chief 
among them being that Oruç had a good deal of experience organizing communist groups in 
Turkey, and had even opposed Mustafa Kemal for a time in the early twenties. He likewise used 
Yarın to lob overzealous rhetorical bombs at CHP figures, who did not align with the generally 
conciliatory demeanor of the party elite. By mid-October, Oruç departed completely from SCF 
orthodoxy in an explosive editorial that called on Mustafa Kemal to step down from his position 
as President so that he could become Prime Minister, and to have Marshall Fevzi (Çakmak) take 
his place. He argued that in the apparent failure of the SCF, the crisis at hand for the country 
demanded a “Great Man” (Büyük Adam) to lead the country out of the mess made by the current 
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Prime Minister, İsmet. This argument drew a great deal of criticism from both CHP and SCF 
figures, as Mustafa Kemal’s apparent neutrality throughout the experiment was viewed as central 
to the entire project.164 Ultimately, having such a divisive figure on the ballot for the SCF seems 
to have hurt the party’s performance in Istanbul significantly.  
 As Weiker acknowledges, one of the major missteps of the SCF was failing to open up an 
official press organ at the outset of the party. It was only after Oruç’s outlandish proposal that 
Fethi began to conceive of a party-organized press outfit, finally heeding the advice Ağaoğlu had 
been insisting on for months, but it was indeed too little, too late to have much of an effect on the 
remaining electoral contests.165 The lack of a party press organ made it very difficult for the SCF 
to present a unified message of opposition. The party clearly had aims to bring leftist intellectuals 
into a coalition with liberals against the CHP, but without a real editorial coordination, the 
associations that figures like the Sertels or Oruç had with the SCF were weak. Additionally, since 
the two left-oriented papers Yarın and Son Posta were the only papers in Istanbul that vocally 
supported the SCF, Okyar’s liberal critique of the CHP was left to reporting from his speeches on 
the Anatolian tour and in parliament. For both the Sertels, who would be much warier of 
engaging liberals in the future, and Oruç, who would briefly take Yarın to southeast Europe in the 
years following 1930 before returning in the 1940s to take up organization of socialist parties, the 
hash that the SCF administration made of the Istanbul press, and intellectual cadres generally, 
would be a significant disappointment, and contributed to their general disillusionment with the 
liberal project in Turkey.  
Closing the Party, Foreclosing Democracy 
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 In the end, the collapse of the SCF was met with some regret even by those closest to the 
Kemalist center. Falih Rıfkı Atay, whose monumental 1961 memoir Çankaya functions as a court 
history of the period of Atatürk’s rule, reflected on the experience as something of a rare and 
curious misstep on the part of Atatürk. At the outset of his retelling of this story he wondered 
aloud, “why would the reformist Atatürk, who was always so deeply resentful of reactionary 
forces, give his permission to found an opposition party? Nobody can give a true answer to this. 
Because no one can clearly read anyone else’s thoughts.”166 To Atay, the arrival of the SCF 
brought along with it the recognition by everyone in the Kemalist center that “the regime had not 
yet normalized,” that Atatürk’s reforms had yet to reach into the public as deeply as was 
necessary in order to realize a multiparty democracy in their own vision.167 Despite this, Atay and 
others expressed some regret over the fate of the SCF, particularly because the harsh measures 
against the press and more elite supporters of the SCF hindered what they believed to be critical 
fixtures in a democratic society, and Atay himself attributes this event as the point past which 
Atatürk began to tighten his political circle, and entrench himself ideologically, 
 In the end, a grave danger was stopped with the closing of the SCF.  
I wish this danger had never arisen, that a large movement, a movement of honest 
criticism and introspection could have been continued… 
Because press freedom and political freedom disappeared, other abusers got to work. 
Being that the regime was often rocky in its relationships during Atatürk’s lifetime, with 
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conspiracy theories emanating from Ataturk’s increasingly tighter inner circle, the great 
man of the people was gradually distanced from the people.168 
Atay also mentioned that years later, sometime after the death of Fethi Okyar in 1943, Ismet 
İnönü confided to him that, “What if there were time, could we not have spent the time for the 
regime to naturalize against such a catastrophe? If the Liberal Party had continued, we would 
have already weathered this crisis.”169  
 Ultimately, it is reflections like these that give away the game that the Kemalist center 
was playing during the SCF experiment. What followed this experience was a significant break 
from the liberal tenets of the early republic, and an increasingly toxic adversarial relationship 
with opposition intellectuals. Zekeriya Sertel was indeed correct that there were many liberal 
tendencies, and liberal aims of the early Kemalist control, and the fallout of the closure of the 
SCF resulted in many of the staunchest supporters of those liberal ends on the outside looking in. 
This had an immediate, and serious effect on the direction of Kemalist policy. In early 1931, the 
six “arrows” of Kemalist ideology were made official – and each of them reflect a revolutionary, 
state-led outlook, without any reference to the liberal principles outlined in the Law of 
Fundamental Organization. The Turkish Hearths, which had served as breeding grounds for local 
political movements in Anatolia for decades and were crucial to building out the SCF’s party 
structure, were given over to CHP controlled and transformed into “People’s Houses” meant to 
assist in the indoctrination of the general public around this now-official ideology. It is following 
this episode that the ethno-nationalist focus of Kemalist policy began to intensify – including the 
liquidation of faculty at the Darülfünün and its resurrection as Istanbul University, the 
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establishment of the Turkish Language Council (Türk Dil Kurumu), the imposition of family 
names, as well as the policies that are often deemed to be the “excesses” of Kemalist dogma like 
the advancement of the Turkish History Thesis and Sun Language Theory, and the increasingly 
violent suppression of Kurdish groups in the southeast. What this reflects in the nature of 
Kemalist ideology is how they viewed their revolution as one that had ostensibly liberal aims, but 
one that saw a revolutionary, wholesale change in the subjectivity of their citizens, as a necessary 
step towards achieving said aims. The Kemalists, such as they remained after 1930, believed 
thoroughly that the state needed to forcibly create liberal subjects from what they saw as an 
illiberal, reactionary populace in order to bring about a liberal society. This is the point where the 
liberal thinkers who made up the SCF elite – and even the leftist thinkers who supported the SCF 
– departed from the top-level Kemalist elites; politicians like Fethi Okyar and Ahmet Ağaoğlu 
may have been nationalists, but at bottom they would only go so far in supporting the more 
Jacobin-style measures of Mustafa Kemal, believing as they did that granting individual liberty 
was, ultimately, the path to a liberal order. Their active participation in the Kemalist project to 
that point could be credited with the tension between different interpretations of liberalizing 
strategies throughout the 1920s, but the SCF experiment ultimately resolved that tension in favor 
of the more revolutionary, étatist cadre.   
 The remainder of this dissertation will examine what this departure from a commitment 
to individual liberty, and entrenchment in ethno-nationalist policies meant for opponents of the 
regime. As I will show, as the Kemalist program radicalized over the 1930s, so too did its 
opponents. Leftist social democrats – like the Sertels – engaged more deeply in hardline 
communist politics, while more conservative figures began to articulate positions more deeply 
informed by political Islam. We even see in this decade the emergence of an ultranationalist, Pan-
Turkist camp that offered up a racist critique of Mustafa Kemal and his party. This polarization of 
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the opponents to Kemalism has some of its roots in the failure of the SCF experiment, and as I 
will argue, contributed significantly to the handicapping of the public discourse at the outset of 
the multiparty period in the late 1940s. Rather than serving as a kind of “teachable” or “tutelary” 
moment on the way to democratization, the failure of the SCF thwarted what was possibly the 
best opportunity for a healthy, loyal, organic opposition to the CHP to find its way in the new 
















CHAPTER FOUR: White, Yellow, Black, and Brown: The Racing of Political Discourse in 
Turkey, 1931-1945 
 
In 1928, I was reading a geography book in Istanbul’s French office in between my classes, and 
after looking at the pictures and illustrations, I saw that it counted the Turkish race as a yellow 
race and of a “secondaire” or secondary order. I took one look around and I truthfully could not 
see how this picture and this information could be appropriate. 
I showed the book to Atatürk. That one, and I had also quickly taken Professor E. 
Pittard’s (Les Races et l’Histoire. Paris 1924) “The Races and History.” I did not comply with 
the information in that book or the geography book. 
These works had introduced the concept that Turks occupied a second-class status in the 
field of civilization. Because the European histories had given the sobriquet barbarian to the 
Turks simply because they were an invading people.  
Atatürk was opposed to these two concepts.  
Not only did he reply, “No, it must not be so. Let’s get busy on this,” but I personally saw 
that new books on the subject would be immediately undertaken, and so the work had begun. 
- Afet İnan, 1959170 
 
This chapter addresses the deepening of ideological divides amongst intellectuals in 
Turkey in the 1930s and 1940s across the spectrum. In the aftermath of the Liberal Republican 
Party experiment in 1930, we can observe a deeper engagement with radical politics amongst 
intellectuals and government representatives alike. For the ruling Kemalist cadre, this meant the 
first articulations of “Kemalism” as an official ideology of the ruling party, the exploration of 
chauvinistic expressions of nationalism in ethnic and linguistic terms in the forms of the Turkish 
History Thesis and the Sun Language Theory, increasing violence against non-Turkish minorities 
– including the indiscriminate bombing of Kurdish populations in Tünceli/Dersim in the late 
1930s, and, during World War II, a “Wealth Tax” that amounted to the mass confiscation of the 
property of non-Muslims and dönme  in Istanbul – and a widespread effort to indoctrinate the 
populace in this ideology through a revamping of the education system and the transformation of 
                                                           




the Turkish Hearths into People’s Houses [Halkevleri] run by party apparatchiks. Intellectuals 
who were disillusioned by the failure of multiparty experiments in 1925 and 1930, and actively 
opposed to many of these measures, began to find shelter in more hardened, and more radical 
forms of political discourse, and many began to work with clandestine political organizations 
such as the Turkish Communist Party and ultra-nationalist Pan-Turanist groups. The story of this 
radicalization begins in the mid-1930s with the formation of a suite of small journals that had 
very low-circulation but served as venues for many intellectuals to articulate at a high level 
Turkish interventions into European ideological trends ranging from a reinterpretation of the 
pious conservatism popular in France, to open critiques of fascism and capitalism inspired by the 
efforts to “build communism” in the USSR, and even a völkisch nationalist critique of the 
Kemalist project. Despite frequent obstruction from the state, and a worsening political and 
economic crisis at the outset of World War II, many of these insular radical groups began to find 
a purchase in the popular press. The popularization of these ideas was indirectly related to the 
deepening political and ideological divide in Europe, and as a result it is through these 
intellectuals and their writings in the 1940s that Turks began to make associations between their 
politicians and intellectuals and sweeping ideological trends like fascism, communism, 
nationalism, liberalism, and conservatism on a mass level, for the first time. 
 In order to demonstrate this trend, the chapter will look at the development of three 
oppositional ideological and intellectual spheres and chart their progress from elitist journals in 
the early 30s, to the popular press in the 40s. The first will be the völkisch nationalist movement, 
led by Hüseyin Nihal Atsız that began in 1931 with the appearance of his namesake journal Atsız 
Mecmua (Nameless Journal) which would morph into Orhun (roughly meaning “lofty”), inspired 
by ancient Central Asian terminology, and also found a popular outlet through the colorful Gök-
Börü (Grey Wolf) which was run by his close associate Reha Oğuz Türkkan. Then I will turn to 
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the leftist and communist group to focus on the work of Nazım Hikmet. In this period, having 
reached popular acclaim in the early 1930s for his work in Resimli Ay, Nazım experienced a 
number of run-ins with the law, spending several months in prison, and generally feeling 
increasingly restricted in how he could criticize the state. By the mid-1930s, Hikmet came to use 
his work to advocate more directly for socialist causes and attack European fascist movements 
(and Turkish flirtations with fascism by extension) through longer poems like Taranta Babu’ya 
Mektuplar (Letters to Taranta Babu) and Simavne Kadısı Oğlu Şeyh Bedrettin Destanı (The Epic 
of Sheikh Bedreddin). The publication of the latter would ultimately lead to his decade-long 
imprisonment for attempting to subvert military officers, which would only end with his exile to 
the Soviet Union in 1950 following a hunger strike and global campaign for his release, and 
during which he would compose his magnum opus Memleketimden Insan Manzaraları (Human 
Landscapes from My Country).  Finally, I will examine a conservative movement, centered 
around the figure of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, whose outlook was heavily inspired by both the 
outlawed Nakşibendi branch of Sufism and the work of continental philosopher Henri Bergson. 
Kısakürek’s works first appeared in the elite literary journal Ağaç (Tree) in 1936, but would come 
to greater popularity in the mid-1940’s as the spearhead behind Büyük Doğu (The Great East).  
 This period represents a time of intense ideological conflict both domestically and 
internationally that would ultimately produce much of what we traditionally understand as 
Kemalist ideology – a set of commitments to an ethnic and territorially defined Turkish nation, a 
statist or corporatist approach to the economy, strict laicism, populism, and a revolutionary 
approach to culture embodied by language reform and historical revisionism. This process of 
ideological formation, and the critiques levelled by each of the abovementioned characters have 
been studied separately by numerous scholars, but what this chapter represents is one of the first 
attempts to place them in context with each other and determine some of the effects of their 
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interrelations. This way we can better understand the multi-sided conflict over the definition of 
Turkish identity and official ideology that was promulgated by the state in this period, and the 
cleavages along which political and intellectual camps polarized. Since a comprehensive analysis 
of the many ways in which ultra-nationalists, Islamist conservative modernists, and leftists 
diverged from each other and the state in this period would be outside the scope of a single 
chapter, I have chosen to view this process of polarization around the issue of racism.  
By taking up race to study ideological polarization in the 1930s and 1940s, this chapter 
contributes to the agenda laid out by Murat Ergin for considering race as a valid analytical lens 
for studying Turkish modernity.171 As Ergin notes, although the Turkish state’s intellectual 
tradition and organizational makeup prevented it from implementing a thoroughly racist system 
of exclusion, “in specific instances… the state was sufficiently powerful to institute a practice of 
racial discrimination,” and that ability was derived from a long cultural, academic, and political 
discourse on race and Turkish identity stretching back at least to the eighteenth century. However, 
as Howard Eissenstat has argued, the turn towards race among the Kemalists in the 1930s was 
part of a somewhat counterintuitive attempt to construe a Turkish “nation” that was inclusive of 
all Muslim citizens of Turkey, but did not resort to religion as the basis for a national project.172 
For the purposes of this chapter, I will consider in this section the development of a racist 
ideology that contrasted with the raced project of Kemalist Turkish nationalism by disavowing 
Kemalist claims to Turkish “whiteness” in favor of a system of racial superiority focused on 
“yellow” and “Asian” characteristics. A conflict then ensued between the racist-Turanians of the 
                                                           
171 Murat Ergin, “‘Is the Turk a White Man?’ Towards a Theoretical Framework for Race in the 
Making of Turkishness” Middle Eastern Studies, 44:6 (November 2008) 827-850.  
172 Ibid, p. 830. Eissenstat rightly points out that one result of this emphasis on race was a 
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many corners until the late 1920s. Howard Eissenstat, “Metaphors of Race and Discourse of 
Nation: Racial Theory and State Nationalism in the Early Decades of the Turkish Republic” in 
Paul Spickard, ed., Race and Nation: Ethnic Systems in the Modern World (New York: 
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Atsız circle, and the Kemalist center, who disavowed some of the irredentist aspects of Atsız’s 
type and ascribed to a markedly different racial eschatology, but remained committed to 
“Turkism” [Türkçülük] as an ideological underpinning.173 This conflict first played out through a 
stark criticism of the state-sponsored scholarly projects that developed the infamous Turkish 
Historical Thesis and Sun-Language Theory launched by Atsız in his early journals, and later, 
more publicly, in the climate of the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War 
through the prosecution of more than fifty individuals, including each of the major figures in the 
racist-Turanian group, on various propaganda charges between 1944-1947, which are collectively 
known as “The Trials of the Racist Turanians” (Irkçılık Turancılık Davaları).174  While the 
conflict between the racist-Turanians and the Kemalist center has been fairly well covered in the 
scholarship, the manner in which this prominent fight over the racial character of the Turkish 
modernization project highlighted the distinctly racial terms on which ideological polarization 
proceeded in the 1930s and 1940s, abetted by the racial dynamics of the ideological conflict of 
the war, has yet to be examined.175  
Over the course of the rest of this chapter and the chapter that follows, I will show how 
opponents of the Kemalist regime employed race in different ways to forward their arguments, 
                                                           
173 Eissenstat makes a helpful distinction between the “inclusive” or “assimilationist” racial 
discourse of the Kemalists (to the extent that one can consider any racist discourse “inclusive” the 
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Case of Racism-Turanism: Turkism in the Single-Party Period, 1931-1944” Ph.D. diss, Boğaziçi 
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Maksudyan, Türklüğu Ölçmek: Bilimkurgusal Antropoloji ve Türk Milliyetçilliğin Irkçı Çehresi, 
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and how this engagement with race was reflected back on the opponents by the state and its allies 
at the height of the ideological conflict of World War II, effectively marking racist-Turanians, 
leftists, and pious conservatives alike as “others” that existed outside the accepted framework of 
“white” Turkism. By the 1940s, we might crudely refer to racist-Turanism as a form of “yellow 
supremacy,” a non-white form of colorism. In the case of Nazım Hikmet, the embodiment of a 
black Ethiopian character in Letters to Taranta Babu as a rhetorical tool to critique fascist 
imperialism – a common communist rhetorical tactic of the 1930s – served to create a close 
association in the Turkish public sphere between Hikmet, and communists generally, and the 
cause of black Africans and other non-white peoples, presumably over and against the Kemalist 
project of (white) Turkish modernity. Particularly as the European conflagration reached its 
climax in the 1940s, leftists of all types were painted in the Turkish press as traitors to their 
ethnicity and race – whether as “Armenian-lovers” (ermeniperverler), crypto-Jews (dönme), or 
simply as “reds” – in ways that worked ultimately to exclude leading Turkish leftist intellectuals 
from the Kemalist conception of the ethnically Turkish body politic. The extent to which Nazım 
Hikmet’s racial discourse – in both the descriptions of black bodies in Taranta Babu and in his 
1936 pamphlet German Fascism and Racism – worked to bring a race-oriented communist 
critique to the Turkish public sphere, as well as the unintended side effects of “racing” leftism as 
the domain of non-white peoples, or perhaps in this case black people particularly, have so far 
been unexamined in the scholarship on this period.  
In a similar fashion, the Islamic conservatism of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek became “raced” 
as non-white as a consequence of his embrace of Nakşibendi Sufism and the “East” generally as 
an aesthetic and rhetorical device. Much like his former roommate at the Naval College – which 
he and Nazım Hikmet attended in 1918-1919 – had adapted Soviet-inspired communism to 
Turkish culture and society, Necip Fazıl’s work in the 1930s sought to construct what Nazım 
108 
 
İrem has called a Turkish “conservative modernism,” inspired by his former teacher Henri 
Bergson, blended with the teachings of the Nakşibendi Sufi figure Abdülhakim Arvası.176 This 
chapter examines the efforts in Necip Fazıl’s first literary journal, Ağaç [Tree], where he, along 
with other Bergson-inspired writers like Mustafa Şekip Tunç and Ziyaettin Fahri Fındıkoğlu, 
articulated an artistic and philosophical vision of an anti-positivist, Islamic modernity that would 
become the bedrock of Islamist politics in Turkey for decades to come. Necip Fazıl would 
embrace a more strident version of this political vision in the 1940s through his most famous 
journal, Büyük Doğu [The Great East] that would propel him to the head of a movement that 
would blend nationalism and Islamic politics in a way that would prove particularly useful to 
politicians in some corners of the Kemalist Republican Peoples’ Party and later to the Democrat 
Party in their efforts to mobilize Turks against real and perceived threats from the Soviet Union. 
The Development of Völkisch Nationalism in the Turkish Press 
 The development of a racist critique of Kemalism in the 1930s has only recently begun to 
find its place in the historiography of the Turkish republic. İlker Aytürk has provided an excellent 
overview of the thought and politics of the most prominent figure of this movement, Hüseyin 
Nihal Atsız.177 Aytürk rightly demonstrates two particularly useful results for examining the work 
of Atsız and his contemporaries. First, by examining the often harshly racist critique of Kemalist 
policies, we can come to see the exclusion of religious and ethnic minorities from the Kemalist 
modernization project – particularly Kurds, Greeks, and Armenians, but eventually Jews as well – 
as less driven by a hardened and eschatological racist ideology and more as the evidence of 
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crippling effect of personal prejudice within a system aspiring, but failing, to inculcate an 
egalitarian form of civic nationalism. As I will detail in this section, the völkisch assault on 
Kemalism took aim not merely at the particular policies of the state, but at the very ideal of a 
territorial, civic nation. In fact, this criticism reached its early heights precisely in the period when 
the Kemalist project, and Atatürk in particular, was engaging deeply with the woolier aspects of 
ethno-nationalist mythmaking in the promulgation of the infamous “Turkish History Thesis” and 
“Sun-Language Theory”. Second, Aytürk’s work, particularly insofar as he focuses on the 
production of Atsız and his circle in the 1940s and 1950s, demonstrates how the current-day 
hagiographers of Atsız – including an oft-violent youth wing associated with the Nationalist 
Action Party (Milli Hareket Partisi, MHP) dubbed “The Young Atsız’s” (Genç Atsızlar) – have 
elided or ignored their hero’s virulent attacks on Atatürk in order to appeal to nationalist and 
racist elements in the wider Turkish public.  
 In this section, and in the chapter overall, I will provide a closer look at the early years of 
völkisch nationalism in Turkey, particularly between 1931-1944, in order to fill out the context 
and framework of criticism of Kemalism provided by Aytürk and others so that we can better 
understand the movement in two critical respects. First, while Aytürk does an admirable job 
characterizing the specific challenge Atsız posed to Kemalism, we are left to guess what Atsız’s 
place was in the context of other opponents of Kemalism. By understanding a bit better how Atsız 
not only assailed Kemalism, but Kemalism’s leftist critics as well, we can better understand the 
broader ideological polarization that was occurring in this period. Second, this section will look 
closely at the völkisch publication of this period to elucidate the concrete terms of the racist-
Turanian ideology, how its roots differed from Kemalism, and from which foreign sources it 
might have borrowed or inherited its thought. This is critical, as Aytürk assumes, perhaps 
correctly, that the genesis of Atsız’s racist ideals was very similar to those of most mainstream 
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Turkish nationalists of the period, but that leaves the pieces that make up the irredentist, race-
based assumptions somewhat missing in the analysis.  
Early Developments: Atsız Mecmua and Orhun Dergi 
Hüseyin Nihal (Atsız) would begin his first publication, Atsız Mecmua, within a few 
months of graduating from the Literature Department at the Darülfünün (soon to be renamed 
Istanbul University) where he studied under the prominent historian and literature scholar Fuad 
Köprülü. The journal was published two or three times a month between May 1931 December 
1932 and afterwards changed its name to Orhun until it shut down its operations in July 1934. 
While the journal was certainly in low circulation in this period, it became the venue in which 
Atsız would begin to clearly articulate a racist-nationalist critique of Turkish society and 
government that would become more popular through the publication of his novels and short 
stories, such as Dalkavuklar Gecisi (The Night of the Sycophants) and İçimizdeki Şeytanlar (The 
Devils Inside Us).  
What was novel about Atsız’s contributions to the discussion of Turkish nationalism was 
the high level of commitment to race as the sole basis for a nationalist movement. Atsız clearly 
saw race as a scientific and anthropologically indisputable historical constant, and it was from 
this basis that he assailed the Kemalists’ construction of a territorially based nationalism. In fact, 
so strong was Atsız’s commitment to race-based thinking that in his initial writing on the subject, 
an article in the first issue of Atsız Mecmua entitled “From What Race are the Turks?”, he 
essentially admitted that nationality was a social construct,  
In order to live today as a civilized nation, there is no need to claim that your civilization 
was created in the ages before Jesus. Thusly, not one of today’s European nations is the 
owner of such an old civilization. The West’s civilization started to supersede the East’s 
in the 16th century. If they [opinion editors] wanted to defend a new original thesis 
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supported by documents we do not know about and available evidence, undoubtedly the 
place for it is not in the columns of a newspaper.178 
It is important, however, to point out that he was not exactly doing so in the pejorative sense that 
some of today’s scholars might (i.e. with the implication that we ought to dispatch with social 
constructs like nations or races as organizing principles) but rather to demonstrate that the great 
Turkish nation was yet to be built, and it necessarily must be done on the notion of a race-
centered heritage.  
 In this foundational essay, Atsız argued for two important distinctions. The first, as 
introduced above, he argued for race as the organizing principle of the nation instead of territory. 
He argued that those who support a territorially based nationalism were in part arguing on the 
basis of emotion, and thus attempting to attribute ancestors to the Turkish people who are 
“unsuitable,” he even suggested that his opponents, among whom were major Turkish nationalist 
thinkers and the Kemalist elite, were risking making imposters out of the Turks by insisting that 
Turks are not “Turanian” but Aryan – in essence Atsız argued against the claim that Turks are 
white. He surmised that the impulse for his opponents’ case, “has to do with long held 
assumptions about the Mongol’s wildness and barbarism, and the Aryan’s civilization,” and for 
this reason they have put forward arguments like the ones that argue for Turks as inheritors of the 
ancient Hittite tradition.179 He asserted that,  
One of the concepts borne of the result of counting the Turks as Aryans is that the Hittites 
were Turks. This is advanced by theoreticians [nazariyetçiler] who want to find a true 
inheritance and proof of antiquity for Turks in Anatolia. Undoubtedly, we all want this 
for emotional reasons. However, the truth of the matter is this: The monuments of the 
Hittites have been read, and they were not Turks, they were understood to be Aryans.180 
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He warned that arguing that the Turks inherit Hittite culture, “is a very dangerous path for us to 
take,” because it gives ammunition to those who, “want to deny our anthropological 
characteristics [antropolojik hususiyetlerimiz] and say that we are the descendants of the ancient 
Greeks.”181 Effectively, he believed that territorial nationalism amounted to a figurative white 
washing of the history of the Turkish race, and thus would open the nation up to a line of critique 
from white, or “Aryan”, nations who would want to make Turkey subservient, that in “becoming 
Aryan” Turks would be forced to admit they were “unrelated to the wild Mongols [vahşi 
Moğolları], deny Turanism, and become members of the Gypsies.”182 
 The second distinction, which follows from the first, is between Aryan and Turk. The 
purpose of making this distinction is to argue for a separation of races, and that indeed the entire 
history of the biological construction of the Turkish race was so that, “[our babies] could live 
between a crowded nation and a harsh climate.”183 It is here that Atsız embraced “anthropology” 
and linguistics in a way that bears some similarity to Nazi ideology in that the evidence he 
pointed to of a primordial Altaic-Turanian-Mongol race (he uses the proper nouns somewhat 
interchangeably) are shared characteristics of language, “virtues of the warrior” [askerin 
meziyetleri], and distinct phenotypical features. The last aspect is the most crucial to him, as he 
openly connects Turks to “yellow Mongols” early in the essay and at the end offers a description 
of “pictures found in eastern-Turkestan and Turkish statues” that have recently been analyzed by 
“German scholars” in which “Turkish, Chinese, Iranian and Hindi faces are shown to be very 
separate from one another,” which rests Atsız’s case as, “the final and positive evidence that we 
are not comparable to the Aryans.”184 This is the clearest statement Atsız makes confirming his 
commitment to race-based nationalism against territorial varieties and over claims to cultural 
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heritage that cannot be traced back to some sort of immortal and primordial essence of the 
“Turk”.  
It is then left to consider what role culture plays in the construction of Atsız’s ultra-
nationalist future in Turkey, as this is the field in which Atsız was certainly most active, 
contributing mainly to the production of a racist-Turanian literary canon, rather than furthering 
the sort of scientific racism that he held in such high regard. In an issue of Atsız Mecmua from 
July 1932, Atsız drew a picture of a café for Bulgarian students at the Darülfünün known as 
“Filibe Restaurant”.185 In the article Atsız described how in this restaurant, you can only hear 
Bulgarian spoken, there are Bulgarian decorations on the walls, and the students often sing 
Bulgarian songs. He interpreted this to mean that the Bulgarians have created here a space in 
which the “Bulgarian ideal” (bulgar mefküresi) can be enlivened and progress.186 He used this 
example to develop a theory of an “organic tradition” (uzvî hâdisesi) that is necessary to the 
socialization and maturity of a nation, and stresses that “like any organic tradition, socialization 
and maturity necessitate an environment.”187 Atsız did not provide a lengthy explanation of the 
characteristics of this organic tradition, but they included sentiments typically associated with 
Ottoman and post-Ottoman nationalist ideologies such as “bravery (mertlik), a mission (vazife), 
and a devotion to the homeland (vatan)” as well as the inculcation of both Turkishness (Türklüğü) 
and revolution (inkilap) in the minds of the youth.188 The rest of the article proceeded to lament 
the fact that Turks have failed to create such environments for their own youth. He makes a clear 
distinction between the values of this organic tradition and those of the leaders in government and 
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society, who he believes are more interested in bourgeois activities and merely mimicking the 
west than they are in the progress of the nation. The article closes on the attack,  
Cities that spend their budgets on stadiums and beaches should be ashamed!  
The dorm for students at the back of the Darülfünün that the President had 
signaled is now open. Those who gave speeches at the opening of Sports facilities and 
dance salons should be ashamed! Have these men who are opening a humble dorm for 
students in Istanbul done anything to save the children in the homes and coffee corners in 
their own provinces? Let’s take inspiration from our Bulgarian guests! We should all be 
ashamed…189 
With this statement, Atsız begins to make the case for a separate space for the creation and 
amalgamation of a racist-nationalist culture.  
Çınaraltı, Gök-Börü and the popularization of racist-Turanian thought in wartime Turkey 
 If the early 1930s were a period when racist-Turanian discourse developed as an 
intellectual and ideological tradition in opposition to the dominant ethno-nationalist race 
discourse of the Kemalists, the 1940s saw the popularization of this discourse and, ultimately, the 
formative moments in its transition from an intellectual enterprise to a political movement. Prior 
to the reappearance of Nihal Atsız’s Orhun in 1943 after a hiatus of almost a decade, a cadre of 
racist-Turanian intellectuals, including Atsız, Reha Oğuz Türkkan, Zeki Velidi Togan and the 
retired General E.H. Erkilet could be found writing frequent pieces in the journal Çınaraltı 
[Under the Plane Tree] which was founded by the veteran journalists, and creators of the satirical 
nationalist paper Akbaba [Vulture], Yusuf Ziya Ortaç and Orhan Sefyi Orhon and printed under 
the auspices of Cumhuriyet Press, beginning in August of 1941. Two years later in 1943, after 
Çınaraltı came under some fire from the state for spreading pro-German propaganda, Atsız would 




once again begin publishing Orhun and his compatriot Reha Oğuz Türkkan would go a more 
colorful route with the journal Gök-Börü [Grey Wolf].190  
 Before analyzing a few examples of the racist-Turanian discourse in these publications, it 
is important to note that the popularity of this discourse, and the prominence of its proponents, 
was buoyed by two factors. The first, which I will describe in further detail later in the chapter, is 
the close relationship many of these writers had with the German delegation, and the ideological 
affinity they expressed during a time when the military and political conflict between Nazi 
Germany and Soviet Russia was dominating the news in Turkey. There is strong evidence to 
suggest that some of the racist-Turanian writers were, at this time, taking money from the 
German embassy in Ankara, were close acquaintances of the German Ambassador Franz von 
Papen, or were, at the very least, receiving Nazi propaganda materials.191 This fact proved to be 
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the favored line of prosecution against the racist-Turanians when the state would eventually take 
aim at them in 1944. The second factor, which we will explore more deeply here, is the proximity 
these racist-Turanians were afforded to more prominent and established intellectuals like Peyami 
Safa, Yahya Kemal, and Mehmet Emin Yurdakul in addition to the editors Orhon and Ortaç. 
Writing alongside these much more prominent philosophers and litterateurs in Çınaraltı, and for 
the same printing outfit as Turkey’s most popular daily newspaper, Cumhuriyet, allowed their 
ideas to reach a much wider audience, and land with much more legitimacy than it had in the 
earlier days of the 1930s.  
 From its first issue, we can begin to see in Çınaraltı – whose subhead read “Unity in 
Language, Thought, and Work” – the dynamic relationship between the idealist nationalism of 
figures like Orhan Seyfi and the racist-Turanians. On the cover of the first issue, Orhan Seyfi 
delivered a short, rousing appeal to the “ideal” of his readers. In a call and response format, he 
asked what the deficiencies of the Turkish people are, and in turn denied that they lack any of the 
essential material goods or structural necessities of modern life – from cotton to tramway service 
to children’s education – and, yet, are in need of developing an “…ideal that can sustain a great 
and sacred fire. A brave, bold, feverish, dynamic ideal that increases our urge to meet the future, 
that multiplies our energy, that will save us from egoism [hodkâmlık] and the love of comfort 
[rahatseverlik]!”192 The call to this kind of aggressive national modernism echoes continental 
fascist rhetoric, and he even went as far as to assert that as the nation grows under this ideal, “it 
will be our eternal springtime.”193 The issue went on to feature an article by Kâzım İsmail 
Gürkan, a professor at the Haydarpaşa Medical School in Istanbul, on “The Race’s Health 
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Struggle” which espoused a blatantly eugenicist outlook on society stating that, “Civilization was 
born in the places that discovered population,” and quoting directly from the work of noted racist 
thinker Arthur de Gobineau.194 Nihal Atsız also made an appearance in the first issue with a long 
article entitled “What must our view of Turkish history be?” which reiterates much of his prior 
criticism of the Turkish History Thesis forwarded in the early 1930s, rejecting the idea that 
ancient civilizations like the Akkadians or the Hittites were somehow Turkish, and warning that 
“Turkish children must not learn this chaotic history. Aside from this in this history every time a 
student is shown that every nation becomes ‘Turkish’ their confidence in the book leaves them 
and after everyone becomes a Turk, the national feeling [milliyet duygusu] weakens because the 
prerogative of ‘Turkishness’ has left.”195 More so than the other articles in the first issue, this 
piece by Atsız directly criticized the government, particularly the involvement of President İsmet 
İnönü in the establishment in 1931 of the Turkish History Society [Türk Tarih Kurumu] and took 
a line on the history of Turks that was in direct opposition to the official position.  
 Seven months later, as the German offensive into Soviet territory was nearing its climax, 
Çınaraltı had solidified its stable of writers and attracted some relatively well known and 
respected writers from big daily newspapers like Cumhuriyet and Tasvir-i Efkar. An issue from 
early March 1942 featured four articles that neatly outlined the fundamental outlook of the racist-
Turanians at a time when Turkey was closely courting an alliance with the Nazis. First, retired 
Ottoman-era General H.E. Erkilet – who by that time was acting as a spy for the German 
embassy196 – penned an article, in response to some criticism he had received in a separate piece 
that appeared in Cumhuriyet, elaborating his thoughts on “The Geography of the Turkish 
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Union.”197 In the article, Erkilet argued that the divisions of “Turkistan” between Turkey and 
“Chinese Turkistan” were “political divisions, rather than natural or geographic ones.”198 He went 
on to explain that the goal of the Russians in separating the various peoples of Turkistan into 
separate soviet republics was that they could “apply different lexicons and alphabets to the 
dialects of the Azerbaijanis, Turkmen, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kazaks and Kyrgyz” and over time 
convince the different Turkish tribes to accept more Russian words in their vocabulary.199 This 
possibility represents a disaster for Erkilet, who ended the article on a wistful notion,  
How happy would it be for us if from Tuna to the Great Wall of China we enter into a 
single national body of at least seventy million people of the same language, same 
culture, same history and same religion that were unseparated by foreigners. As we know 
ourselves, losses cannot be sustained from any side for the security of our nation and our 
race. The only destiny of peace lies in the unity of great nations.200 
The adventurism – bordering on irredentism – inherent in this outlook would ultimately constitute 
the most threatening aspect of Pan-Turanism in the eyes of the İnönü regime. The political, and 
ultimately military, steps necessary to accomplish the kind of reality Erkilet and the other Pan-
Turanists desired were unimaginable in the current environment, and less than a year later, after 
Stalingrad, it would be understood that the mere suggestion of such adventurism – particularly by 
a figure with ties to the Turkish military like Erkilet – would be seen as destabilizing. 
 The issue featured two articles that dealt specifically with race. Hüseyin Namık Orkun’s 
entry, entitled “The Race Issue: The Aims of this Work Have Fallen on Us” echoed some of the 
same worries as Erkilet’s piece.201 To start with, Orkun addressed the ways in which 
anthropologists had trouble agreeing on which cranial or blood characteristics defined Turks as a 
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race. Typically, racist-Turanists accepted this kind of race science as proof of their own racial and 
supremacist outlooks, but here, faced with some evidence that the Turkish race might not actually 
be a scientific fact, Orkun dismissed these methods of racial determination as “a childish posture” 
[çocuk vaziyetindedir]. This is not to say Orkun assented to the notion of race as a social 
construct, however. He continued to argue that the reason for this confusion is that Turks are a 
“people connected by roots [soy] and parentage [nesil]” and that Turks, over the centuries had 
intermingled and married to the point that “The Turkish root is one that has spread to the four 
corners of the Earth.” The threat posed by this intermingling is the loss of Turkishness [Türklük], 
and this is evidenced for Orkun by the fact that the Cuman Turks living in Hungary and the Avar 
Turks of Transylvania had ceased to speak Turkish. Indeed, the most pressing threat in this regard 
for Orkun was Russia, whose nationalities policy threatened to “Russianize” all of these Turks. 
Orkun proposed three missions to help prevent this sort of imposed rootlessness, the first being to 
make sure the youth were completely loyal to their customs and traditions, “They must not be 
allowed to change into the dress of civilization [medeniyet elbise], they must not be frankified 
[alafrangalılaşmak].” The second proposed mission was to ensure that the “root” was protected 
by imploring the government to consider laws banning marriages with foreigners – a 
phenomenon he considered “the greatest treachery” [en büyük hiyanettir]. The third and final 
mission was to promulgate further and better education about the Turkish language – making it 
compulsory to speak in Turkish, opening schools and running conferences to support that effort.   
 The second race-oriented article in this issue comes from a less well-known writer, 
Mustafa Hakkı Akansel, entitled “The Turkish Race State” that argued that modernity demanded 
the foundation of a state on the basis of the Turkish race.202 The article quotes several American 
and European philosophers, sociologists, and historians extensively in translation. The first third 
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of the article is attributed mainly to the work of the American historian Harold Lamb (1892-1962) 
and the French travel writer Fernand Grenard (1866-1942) who wrote extensively on the history 
of the Mongol, Moghul, and Timurid states to argue that previous “Turkic” states had no basis for 
rule other than the aggregation of personal power – race, language, nationality, or social standing 
played no role according to Akansel’s interpretation of Lamb and Grenard. According to Akansel, 
“this age has been left long in the past” and the country now “is commanded to form a state on 
the basis of national feeling [milliyet duygusu] and even racial thought [ırk fikri].”203 Akansel then 
moved to quote French sociologist Ernst Renan’s work to suggests that wars fought “after the 
birth of national feeling” would be fought between nationalities in the way different species of 
animals fight each other – to the death.204 Akansel suggested that, given this dire situation, “there 
is no idée force [fikir-kuvvet] that can save us other than that of the ‘Turkish Race State.’”205 
What follows is an extended argument over how the Ottoman elite could not sustain their 
“personal energy” [şahsın enerjisi] and deteriorated in the face of European enlightenment. The 
answer to this, in Akansel’s view, was to elevate Turkism [Türklük] and the utopian ideal of the 
Turkish Race State to a national level because it, more than the personal energy of the Ottoman 
elite, was rooted in the identity of the poor and middle classes of society – essentially imputing 
the idea of race onto these classes. Accomplish that and the Turkish nation “will be flushed with a 
renewing energy, virtue, potency that will not be blunted, on the contrary, it will be permitted to 
spread, to see its work, and in this way the Turkish Race State will live forever.”206 
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 The third article worth examining here briefly demonstrates how the racist ideas of 
Çınaraltı became closely tied with some of the more mainstream, well-respected currents of 
Turkish intellectual life. Peyami Safa, a giant of Turkish philosophy and literature, wrote 
frequently for Çınaraltı, usually on the subject of nationalism. In this particular issue, he set out 
to write about “A Few Truths of Nationalism.”207 Safa, who in the 1930s was a conservative, 
modernist thinker who was inspired by the work of the French philosopher Henri Bergson – to 
whose influence we will return shortly – brought to this nationalist publication a similar 
approach, positing the nation as the fundamental aspect of all society. He likened the nation to the 
system in which an atom maintains its structure, or a body relates to its limbs, or the sun relates to 
the stars. He went on to state that “nationalism is neither an ideology, nor is it a theory; it is an 
expression of the actual circumstance of the pull of the earth, the burning of the flame, the way 
objects are oriented in their place.”208 Safa’s vein of Bergsonian Turkish modernism usually 
veered more secular than most of his contemporaries, and here we can see how that jived with the 
paganist and secular outlook of the Turanians. For Safa, “In a secular world, everything lost by 
religions can be won by the nation,” and, “In a place where there is no nation, there is no 
morality.”209 Safa was careful here not to explicitly assent to the more stridently racist positions 
of Atsız, Erkilet, and others – there are some important distinctions to be made in his vocabulary, 
as he opts for “nationalism” [milliyetçilik] and Turkism [Türklük] over the “ideal” [mefküre, ülkü] 
favored by the racists, and his preoccupation with morality [ahlak] over anthropology or 
pseudoscience210 – but it is not difficult to see the affinity of these viewpoints, since they 
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appeared in the same journal, and by understanding the shared cause he made with the racist-
Turanians in supporting Nazi positions in Çınaraltı and elsewhere. 
 Along with the popularity of Çınaraltı and the brief revival of Atsız’s own publication 
Orhun in 1943, there were signs of some hard division within the racist-Turanist camp that may 
have contributed to its inability to start a mass movement in the face of state suppression at the 
end of the war. The main division was between Atsız and his younger colleague Reha Oğuz 
Türkkan, who at the age of twenty-two started a journal of his own entitled Gök-Börü (Gray 
Wolf). According to Umut Üzer, who had the opportunity to interview Türkkan before his death 
in 2010, the split occurred over the issue of how racist ideology should engage religion, and a 
personal dispute over Türkkan’s own ethnicity (Atsız accused him of being a secret Armenian).211 
Türkkan had slightly moderated from Atsız’s views on religion, proposing a program of the 
“Turkification of Islam” as opposed to Atsız’s more paganist, anti-Islamic outlook, and on 
geopolitics, arguing for economic cooperation between independent Turkish states rather than 
their outright unification.212 According to the first issue of Gök-Börü, there was also a dispute 
with the Çınaraltı camp over an agreement to revive an older publication, called Bozkurt (Grey 
Wolf), which was ultimately revised on the insistence of Atsız.213 These personal issues aside, 
Türkkan himself very clearly laid out the ideological differences between the Gök-Börü and 
Çınaraltı camps in a drawing featured in the first issue (Fig. K). 
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Figure K "Views on Turkism: Our Tableau, the Turanist Tableau, the Anatolianist Tableau 
Türkkan used this image to demonstrate that his particular camp of Turkism held the most 
comprehensive view. As explained in the accompanying article, the various “struggles” indicated 
by the labels on each mountain described the movement’s priorities. Gök-Börü’s outlook saw the 
struggle for pure blood (race) [temiz kan (ırk) davası] and the national struggle [milliyet davası] 
as the most pressing priorities, but wanted to keep in mind that after that, the movement should 
fight for women and the family [aile ve kadın davası], the youth and education [gençlik ve maarif 
davası], morality [ahlak davası], and yet further the struggles for the village [köy davası], 
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industrialization [sanayileşme davası], religion [din], language [dil], science [ilim], art [fen] and 
administration [idare] all of which would be in the service of pursuing the furthest mountain 
range, which was labeled “The Struggle for Greater Turkish Unity” [Büyük Türk Birliği Davası]. 
By comparison, the Anatolianist [Anadolucu] group had a more limited view, including only pure 
blood, nationalism, family, village, morality and administration, and the Turanist tableau 
[Turancı] only contained a pair of mountains, labeled Turan and nation.214 Ultimately, what 
would prove to be the critical difference was the long-term perspective, and less-adventurist 
position towards other Turkish states.  
 Gök-Börü would ultimately have a relatively short run of publication, only thirteen issues 
were published between November of 1942 and May of 1943, but the fact of this split with the 
Çınaraltı group is important as these differences may have affected some of the outcome of the 
racist-Turanian trials in 1944. Türkkan was arrested in a major sweep on September 7, 1944, and 
tortured to the point that he lost vision in one eye. During the course of the trial and offering his 
defense, subjects I revisit extensively in chapter six, he mostly held the vision he had ascribed to 
in Gök-Börü. These included the belief that Turkish political unity was a distant goal, that Atatürk 
himself had already begun the work of creating racial divisions by denying certain state positions 
to Greeks and Kurds, and that only the threat of a communist takeover of the state would justify 
the subversion of the government.215 This is significant, because Türkkan’s co-defendant, 
Alparslan Türkeş, also ascribed to this view, and while Türkkan would leave Turkey for a long, 
self-imposed exile in the United States in 1947, Türkeş would go on to be one of the founders of 
the Nationalist Action Party (Milli Hareket Partisi, MHP) and a prominent political figure from 
the 1970s onwards. In many ways, by distancing themselves from German influence, and taking a 
less adventurist foreign policy stance, the Gök-Börü cadre of racist-Turanists would plant the 
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seeds of the future ultra-nationalist political movement that is still a significant force in Turkish 
politics. 
Black Bodies, Anti-racism, and Anti-fascism in the Turkish Left 
Nazım Hikmet: Black bodies and Red politics in the Turkish context 
 Thanks in large part to his partnership with the Sertels in Resimli Ay and his recording of 
his poems for phonographs in the early 1930s, Nazım Hikmet had become a well-known poet by 
the middle of the decade. In 1933, however, fortunes had begun to turn against him when in a 
roundup of radicals across the country, he was arrested and tried for spreading revolutionary 
propaganda. Though initially there were calls to sentence him to death, he managed to receive a 
number of reduced sentences and only spent about a year and a half imprisoned in Bursa before 
being released in August 1934. While in prison he began to compose a series of poems and prose 
pieces that would launch him to international acclaim. Published in late-1935, and translated into 
French the following year, Letters to Taranta-Babu (Taranta-Babu’ya Mektublar) amounted to an 
incendiary assault on fascism and Mussolini’s rule in Italy, but was also a thinly-veiled critique of 
the Kemalist state’s assault on his work and his imprisonment.216 The work comprises thirteen 
poetic “letters” ostensibly written in the Oromo language by an unnamed Ethiopian exile of the 
Galla tribe, who had previously been arrested and sentenced to death by firing squad, to his wife, 
the eponymous Taranta-Babu. The letters are couched in a prose frame story that explains their 
origin – that they were sent to Nazım by an Italian “friend,” who “got interested in Asian and 
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African languages because he could not use his own language, in his own country, the way he 
wanted to.”217 
 The frame letter from the Italian friend is dated August 5, 1935 – two months before 
Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia – and the poem as a whole is dedicated to the memory of Henri 
Barbusse, the French communist novelist who died in Moscow on August 30th of that year. This 
is worth mentioning because although the precise release date is unknown, the poems certainly 
served as a contemporaneous comment on the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, and the heightening 
tensions between fascism and communism across Europe and the Mediterranean that year. Like 
his earlier long poem, Giaconda-and-Si-Ya-U (Jokond ile Si-Ya-U), the Letters to Taranta-Babu 
brought the crucible of the global ideological struggle between communist and capitalist forces 
into the Turkish idiom, but because it engaged with a nearer neighbor with a shared history, and 
because its hero was not exactly an elite, the weight of Nazım’s communism-inspired critique 
lands heavier throughout Taranta-Babu.  
 In both the prose frame letter and the poems, Letters to Taranta-Babu serves the didactic 
purpose of explaining what fascism meant in Mussolini’s Italy. In the frame story, fascism is 
explained as a cult of the state and a natural outgrowth of finance capitalism,  
To understand how deep, unfathomable the Fascist vision is realized, one need not rise to 
the gatherings in the ballrooms of the Bertolino Splendide Hotel, under lights even 
brighter than the Italian sun, but only descend to those living in the Quartieri Popolare – 
the People’s Quarters. The residents in these districts have actually been most effectively 
contained by the State’s prisons, tax offices, and police stations and, indeed, have been 
made to understand nothing of value exists outside the State.218 
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In the poems, the author first lamented the way Italians had been impoverished by fascist rule and 
how Mussolini had enriched the elite, including Pope Pius XI who was excoriated in the third of 
the letters:  
 I saw Pope Pius XI, TARANTA-BABU! 
 here he’s 
  what our tribe’s 
  medicine man is there… 
 Except 
 our witch doctor 
 doesn’t ask for money 
  to drive the blue devil with three heads 
    over the Harar Mountains…219 
 In the sixth letter, the author elaborated on a typology of fascist artists engaging in a 
critique not only of fascism in practice, but the bloody ends to which artists and poets he 
considers to be “geniuses” were put to use. According to him, there were three types of artists in 
Italy. The first type was comprised of the founders of the Italian Futurist movement, “like 
D’Annunzio… like the frenetic Marinetti; like Pirandello, who, prized by the dynamiter Nobel, 
questions everything but IL DUCE’s fist.”220 These men the author held in high regard for their 
skill as men who “talk like gods, full of impenetrable obscurities, these writers unreachably 
elevated, unfathomably deep. Yet they get belly-aches, the same as you. They get hungry like 
me.”221 He humanizes these “geniuses” only to point out that the content of their genius was little 
more than a glorification of warfare, “that dying, your throat slit, in a yellow desert guarantees 
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you life everlasting in the bluest sky over Italy, the eternal mirror of the waters of the 
Mediterranean – out of such notions, these men make literature.”222  
While the words here are meant for the pen of a black Ethiopian writer and prefigure a 
conflict that the Turkish republic had little to do with, they are also meant to evoke a past and 
present that Turkish readers shared with both the Ethiopian anti-fascist poet and the Italian 
futurists. Roughly twenty-five years earlier, in 1911, the Ottoman army was locked in its own 
battle with an Italian army, defending Tripolitania, an Ottoman territory that roughly corresponds 
to today’s Libya. That conflict, along with the Balkan war that followed it the next year, is known 
for being the first to widely employ mechanized forms of warfare, including airplanes, tanks, 
machine guns, and automobiles. Relatedly, it is also known for serving as the inspiration for the 
futurist movement, as the movement’s founder F.T. Marinetti participated in the conflict and was 
inspired by the mechanical spectacle to create new forms of “kinetic poetry” that would embody 
the principles of speed and mechanization espoused in the Futurist Manifesto he had published in 
Le Figaro in 1909.223 Comparatively, the Italo-Ottoman war of 1911 is somewhat overlooked as a 
moment of genesis for the Turkish republic, often overshadowed by the cataclysmic events of the 
First World War and the War for Independence, but the resonance here would not have been lost 
on Nazım Hikmet’s Turkish readership. That conflict was, in fact, the first battle in which the 
Turkish founder and president Mustafa Kemal had participated, and tales of his heroism in that 
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losing effort were already ascending to the status of hagiography by 1935. In some ways, the 
legacy of the Libyan conflict carried itself through to the Independence War, as Mustafa Kemal 
frequently campaigned across eastern Anatolia with Ahmad ibn Idris al-Sanusi, the deposed 
leader of the Libyan tribe on whose side the Ottomans had fought, and even offered him the 
position of caliph before the office was abolished.224 The sense of the loss of an African territory, 
the conflict against Italy, and the ascendancy of the Futurist movement and fascist ideology 
juxtaposed with the increasingly authoritarian turn in the Turkish state, the imprisonment of 
intellectuals like Nazım, and the creeping fear of a second global conflagration would have 
landed powerfully in Turkish audiences of Letters to Taranta-Babu. Activating all of these 
images and connecting them to the aesthetic and artistic form of futurism serves a point Nazım 
was struggling to make at the time about the corruptibility of art, and the necessity of working in 
historical, verbal, and even formal vernaculars and contexts in order to deliver his radical content. 
This mission would drive the next period in the development of Nazım’s poetry as he engaged 
directly with forms, sounds, and vernaculars that were more familiar to the Turkish literary 
canon, culminating in the two works of his that are widely perceived as masterpieces, The Epic of 
Sheikh Bedreddin, which would ultimately land him in prison, and Human Landscapes from My 
Country, which he composed in prison and would not see initial publication until years after his 
release in 1950.       
 While the local contexts and histories here are critical to understanding the imagery 
Hikmet meant to evoke in his readers, there is also the somewhat more obvious global context of 
the racial dynamics of the Soviet anti-fascist and anti-colonial efforts in the global sphere. Nergis 
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Ertürk has argued that the presentation in Letters to Taranta-Babu of black bodies fighting 
against fascism through several screens of mediation, or in her words “spectralization in 
anonymity,” is not meant to obscure or “other” the struggle of those raced bodies for Turkish 
audiences, but rather to familiarize and universalize them through a “perpetual ‘othering’ of the 
self in translative language,” that gives the impression that “the republic of letters in ‘Taranta-
Babu’ is nothing less than a dispersed, open collective of such anonymous ghostwriters.”225 The 
use of this technique, in tandem with the rhetorical move of animating a black body whose speech 
is obscured for the purposes of promoting a communist and egalitarian message, draws heavily on 
Russian Soviet attacks on the treatment of blacks both in the Americas and in fascist Europe.226 
There are several examples of this in Soviet cultural history but a few are worth mentioning as 
specific contextual references for international readers of Letters to Taranta Babu. First would be 
a poem by one of Nazım Hikmet’s Soviet heroes, Vladimir Mayakovsky, from 1925 entitled 
“Black and White” which directly assails the subjugation of black workers in Cuba.227 In the 
poem, the protagonist, a janitor at the Henry Clay Cigar factory, openly ridicules his boss, 
 Too bad that 
  just then 
   heaved his way 
 toward the King of Cigars 
  Henry Clay, 
                                                           
225 Ertürk, Grammatology and Literary Modernity in Turkey, 177-8. [FULL CITE NEEDED] 
226 Meredith L. Roman has explained how the Soviet anti-racist policy was elevated to a “hard-
line” policy following the introduction of the Five-Year Plans in 1928 and 1933 that pushed the 
Comintern to draw harder distinctions between communist and capitalist societies, a move that 
embraced the increasing number of African Americans emigrating to or visiting the USSR in an 
effort to depict soviet society as a place where race was “absent.” Meredith L. Roman, Opposing 
Jim Crow: African Americans and the Soviet Indictment of U.S. Racism 1928-1937 (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2012). 
227 Mayakovsky had made a trip the United States in the early 1920s and wrote extensively about 
racial oppression there in the years that followed. Roman, Opposing Jim Crow, p. 6 
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 in pluperfect whiteness 
  and a big jowl wag, 
 his royal 
  sugar highness 
   Mr. Bragg. 
 Up to the fat one 
  runs the 
   ‘nigger’: 
 “Beg yo’ pardon 
  Mr. Bragg, 
 Ain’t it funny 
  yo’ lily white 
   sugar 
 Black man makes and puts it in the bag. 
 With yo’ white color 
  black cigars sho’ 
   out o’ place; 
 goes lots better 
  on the black man’s 
   face. 
 Sugar in yo’ coffee?— 
  Help yo’self, 
   help; 
 Be so kind, sir 
  make it 
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   yo’self.”228 
Another contextual example would be the film Circus (Tsirk) released in the same year as Letters 
to Taranta-Babu which tells the story of an American circus performer who escapes to the Soviet 
Union after she gives birth to a biracial child. In the climax of the film, the villain, a German 
circus master, and an obvious stand-in for Adolf Hitler, attempts to kidnap the young black child, 
only to be thwarted by the crowd who spontaneously bursts into a multilingual lullaby, passing 
the child from one person to another until he (and some of the crowd) is sound asleep.229 As Beth 
Holmgren has argued, the comedy and melodrama of the film utilized, and subverted, many 
tropes of Hollywood film making in order to portray soviet society as a welcoming, loving family 
opposed to the outright racism of fascist Germany or capitalist America.230 By casting black 
actors in several supporting roles, including the child of Marion, the main character, Circus, 
“offered a bold corrective to [a] specifically Hollywood practice” that was amplified by the fact 
that Jimmy Patterson, the actor who plays Marion’s child, was himself the son of an African-
American immigrant who had come to Russia to work in the film industry and address issues of 
race.231 
                                                           
228 Vladimir Mayakovsky, “Black and White” trans. Isidor Schneider, in American Quarterly on 
the Soviet Union July 1940, 90-92, http://www.unz.org/Pub/AmQSovietUnion-1940jul-00090. 
The poem also served as an inspiration for a short, animated film in 1932 with the same name 
directed by Ivan Ivanov-Vano and Leonid Amalrik, which more directly targeted the United 
States by featuring scenes of agricultural slavery, whipping, and lynching. A few versions exist 
on YouTube, some featuring different cuts and one with an overdub of the spiritual “Sometimes I 
Feel Like a Motherless Child.” The original full version seems to exist at this address: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kG-Cx-wO3Ec  
229 Grigori Aleksandrov and Isidor Simkov, Tsirk (Circus), Mosfilm Studios, 1936, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ia4DyErYhAs.  
230 Beth Holmgren, “‘The Blue Angel’ and Blackface: Redeeming Entertainment in 
Aleksandrov’s ‘Circus’” The Russian Review 66:1 (January 2007, 5-22. 
231 Holmgren, “The Blue Angel”, 17-18. Patterson (b. 1933) was born to an African-American 
father, the actor Lloyd Patterson, who had emigrated to the Soviet Union in 1932, and a 
Ukrainian mother, theater artist Vera Ippolitovna Aralova. Meredith Roman departs from this 
analysis in her work, offering up Circus as a sign that Soviet antiracist policies, particularly as 
they concerned black Americans, became a secondary priority for propaganda in the mid- and 
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 That Nazım Hikmet would address race through these lenses is not terribly surprising, as 
his education was heavily influenced by the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist views on racial 
justice that were being formulated in the University for the Toilers of the East (KUTV) at the 
time he was a student, and continued as he worked more closely with the international socialist 
community in the 1930s.232 It is easy to see how Letters to Taranta-Babu fits into the 
international soviet context in this way, why it struck Louis Aragon to have it translated for his 
journal Commune in 1936, and also how it neatly fits in with Hikmet’s earlier globally-oriented 
poems Giaconda and Si-YA-U (1929) and Why did Banerjee Kill Himself (Benerci Kendini Niçin 
Öldürdü? 1932), which feature non-Turkish and non-Western main characters whose racial 
features are not amplified to the same degree as the Ethiopian in Letters to Taranta Babu. What 
remains to be interrogated, however, is whether this ideological tactic, or the “perpetual 
‘othering’” of the republic of letters described above by Ertürk had its desired effects in the 
Turkish context, where race was figuring increasingly large in the construction of a national 
Turkish identity, and racist-Turanians like Nihal Atsız were gaining wide cultural acclaim. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
late-1930s as the USSR took a softer line against the United States, Britain, and France in favor 
of directly attacking Nazi Germany – evidenced in Circus by the centering of a white female 
victim and a Hitleresque German villain, as opposed to the black bodies that featured more 
prominently in earlier propaganda pieces. Opposing Jim Crow, 193-206 
232 Nazım Hikmet extensively elaborated his views on race in 1936 when he published a short 
book entitled Alman Faşizmi ve Irkçılığı (German Fascism and Racism) where he offered a fairly 
standard Marxist critique of the history of racist ideology, assailing the manner in which 
Darwinist evolutionary theory was abused by capitalist ideologues in order to serve the ends of 
imperialism throughout the nineteenth century, and culminating in the rise of National Socialism 
in interwar Germany. The book explicitly states at the beginning that the work “has collected 
quotations from the works of Théodor Balk’s Races Mythe et Vérité [1935], Ernst Henry’s Hitler 
Over Europe [1934], and B.M. Bernardiner’s Filosofia Nietzsche i Fascism [1934]” and in 
offering a critique of (Neo) Darwinism specifically cites Friedrich Engels’ Ludwig Feuerbach 
and Classical German Philosophy [1886] and Anti-Dühring [1878]. This collection of citations 
suggests Nazım was able to readily access newly available works published by socialist printing 
houses in Europe – such as the one Balk’s work was published in – and maintained access to 
works in Russian like Bernardiner’s, which had yet to be translated into Turkish. Reprinted in 
Nazım Hikmet, Yazılar 4 (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2002), 308-378. 
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 Nazım Hikmet was not alone in his acceptance of Soviet discourse in the middle and late 
1930s, in fact this is probably the time when such discourses were most pervasive in leftist 
Turkish circles and works central to the Soviet worldview were being translated into Turkish for 
the first time.233 One of the major figures in this process was Sabiha Sertel. After Resimli Ay 
ended its publication run in 1930, the printing house remained open and largely sustained itself by 
printing chapbooks, educational texts, and translations of classic works of literature. This work 
allowed Sabiha Sertel to also begin the work of translating book-length socialist texts like Karl 
Kautsky’s Class Struggle (Erfurt Program), August Bebel’s Women and Socialism, and Vladimir 
Adoratsky’s Dialectic Materialism into Turkish.234 Sabiha Sertel had also been one of the longest 
standing critics of Jim Crow in the Turkish press, having published editorials in Resimli Ay on 
subjects ranging from the pervasiveness of the Klu Klux Klan to the dangers of the slave trade.235 
While her wartime columns in Tan may not have directly addressed issues of race, a manuscript 
of a book she was writing in the midst of the war that remained unpublished until its discovery in 
                                                           
233 What is surprising about this is that the period following the 1933 visit of Soviet officials for 
the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the republic was a time when Turkish officials were 
working most closely with their Soviet counterparts and courting leftist and communist input on 
the economy, as evidenced by the close relationship between the leftist journal Kadro and certain 
members of the Kemalist elite and the promulgation of a five-year plan in 1934. At the same 
time, the clandestine Turkish Communist Party was mostly in disarray, membership in the official 
party was at an all-time low, and many of the most prominent members, including Nazım Hikmet, 
had been expelled from the party. See George S. Harris, The Origins of Communism in Turkey 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Publications, 1967), 145-148, and Erden Akbulut, Komintern 
Belgelerinde Nâzım Hikmet (İstanbul: TÜSTAV, 2002), 181-216. 
234 The translations appeared as: Karl Kautsky, Sınıf Kavgası (Erfurt Program) Sabiha Sertel 
trans., (Istanbul: Vakit Gazete, Matbaa, Kütüphane, 1934), Vladimir Adoratsky, Diyalektik 
Materyalizm: Marksizm, Leninizm’in Nazarî Temeli Sabiha Sertel, trans., (Istanbul: Yenikitapçi, 
1936), and August Bebel, Kadın ve Sosyalizm Sabiha Sertel, trans., (Istanbul: Vakit Gazete, 
Matbaa, Kütüphane, 1935). Each of the translations were made from their English versions, the 
translations of Adoratsky and Bebel each included introductions by Sabiha.  
235 On the KKK, see “Dünyanın en büyük ve korkunç khafi cemiyeti” [The World’s Largest and 
Most Frightening Secret Society], Resimli Ay, October 1924, 5-7, on the slave trade see, “Esir 
Ticareti: Kapitalist Devlet ve Milletler Geri Milletleri Nasıl Oldürüyor ve İstismar Ediyorlar?” 
[The Slave Trade: How are the Capitalist States and Nations Killing and Exploiting Backwards 
Nations?] Resimli Ay, March 1930, 17-19. Both articles are unsigned, but Sabiha Sertel was part 
of the editorial collective with her husband Zekeriya in both cases. 
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the 1990s suggests she accepted a very similar diagnosis of racism and fascism to that laid out in 
Nazım’s 1936 text. Writing on the development of National Socialism she claimed,  
[National socialism] smothered social reform, and whilst pacing towards a capitalist 
dictatorship put the problems of race and nationalism in the center. By their own account, 
although they lead with the national principle, they were demolishing the reality of other 
independent states and nations in Europe with this order, from two sides a powerful 
current of nationalism and racism with a powerful German nation they brought a 
monopoly to the fore… Without scientific explanations, they forwarded the superiority of 
the German nation, the Teutonic race’s capacity for administration, and the inferiority of 
other nations, these demagogues applied nothing other than the theory of monopoly and 
meaningless accumulation.236 
As one of the editors and opinion writers of one of the most popular daily newspapers, it is 
significant that we understand that during the conflagration of World War II, Sabiha Sertel, like 
Nazım Hikmet before her, saw the fight against racism and the fight against fascism as 
inextricably entwined. While she may not have invoked black bodies in the same way Nazım 
Hikmet did, the focus of much of her critique of fascist imperialism rested on European 
adventurism in Africa, particularly in Ethiopia and Sudan, just as it had for Nazım.  
Bergsonism and “The Great East”: Islamic Conservative Modernism in the 1930s and 1940s 
 For intellectuals who hoped to articulate alternative responses to the construction of an 
ethno-nationalist Turkish identity in the 1930s and 1940s, perhaps no single European 
philosopher was more influential than the modernist Henri Bergson. Bergson’s articulation of a 
modernity that rejected the dominant material trends of nineteenth century positivism in favor of 
                                                           
236 Sabiha Sertel, II. Dünya Savaşı Tarihi (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları, 1999), 180. This book, 
along with translations of works such as Lenin’s Imperialism, the Final Phase of Capitalism and 
Stalin’s Problems of Leninism, were written mostly between 1941-1942 during a period when she 
was suspended by the state from writing in Tan but according to her memoir were left 
unpublished “because the conditions of those days did not allow them to be published.” The 
manuscripts were left with her older brother Neşet Deriş in 1950 when she left Turkey for good, 
and only rediscovered in 1990 amongst the belongings of Sabiha’s nephew Osman Müeyyet 
Binzet by her daughter Yıldız Sertel and her nephew Avni Refiğ. See II. Dünya Savaşı, 9-10 and 
Sabiha Sertel, Roman Gibi (Istanbul: Gül Matbaası, 1978 [1969]), p. 225-6. 
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a personalist, dynamic articulation of “freedom” proved seductive to many critics of the turn 
towards a cultural revolution in the 1930s. Nazım İrem has expertly charted how Bergson’s 
influence was central to the creation of a “conservative republican” wing of the Kemalist 
intellectual milieu; primarily in the figures of İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, Peyami Safa, Ahmet 
Ağaoğlu, Hilmi Ziya Ülken, and Mustafa Şefik Tunç.237 These figures, though largely politically 
aligned with Kemalism throughout the 1930s, would eventually lay the groundwork for some of 
the more popular expressions of a secular Turkish conservatism in the 1940s and 1950s.238 Less 
well discussed in the intellectual history of this period is the influence of Bergson on a figure who 
would come to represent the most prominent Islamist critique of Kemalism – Necip Fazıl 
Kısakürek.239 This actuality is surprising given the fact that among the many intellectuals who 
engaged with Bergson’s work across the political aisle, Necip Fazıl was the only one to directly 
study under Bergson as a student at the Sorbonne in the early 1920s.   
 Early on, Necip Fazıl’s essays and poetry in his journal Ağaç (Tree) were championed by 
conservative-modernists and Kemalists alike. In one of the first issues of Ağaç one of the chief 
Bergsonian intellectuals, Mustafa Şekip Tunç, penned an article praising the emphasis the journal 
had placed in its subtitle on the term “aksiyon” (action).240 Tunç defines the term as a conscious 
                                                           
237 Nazım İrem, “Undercurrents of European Modernity” and “Turkish Conservative Modernism”  
238 One exception would be Baltacıoğlu, who was mentioned in the previous chapter as a 
prominent figure in the Liberal Republican Party, but would remain a staunch supporter of the 
CHP well into the 1950s. 
239 Also left unaddressed by İrem is the somewhat sizable influence Bergson’s philosophy had on 
leftist thinkers, in particular the coterie of the Language, History and Geography Faculty at 
Ankara University who in the 1940s published their work in the art and philosophy journal Yurt 
ve Dünya (Home and World), including leading critical lights like Behice Boran, Pertev Naili 
Boratov, Adnan Cemgil, and Niyazi Berkes. See, inter alia, Niyazi Berkes, “Bergson’un Sosyal 
fikirleri” in Yurt ve Dünya No. 2, February 1941, 34-42.  
240 The subtitle of the journal was “Art-Thought-Action” (“Sanat-Fikir-Aksiyon”), the main thrust 
of the article was meant to define this French loan-word in contradistinction to Turkish words like 
hareket (movement) or istikamet (direction) in that aksiyon carried with it a meaningfulness and 
consciousness that was tied directly to Bergson’s conception of “durée” and his meaning of 
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(şuurlu) movement that is the result of “the impetus towards the future while having gathered the 
past” (geçmişi toplayarak geleceğe sarkması). He uses the metaphor of a play to explain its 
distinction: “These movements still alight on the stage as in a ‘play’ but only until the end of the 
rehearsals after which they can only be organized as action by the one who is doing them [and not 
the director]. In these rehearsals, these past experiences and action melt into one another and are 
reborn into a new shape of action that is itself a true action.”241 Extending the analogy somewhat, 
Tunç suggests that the Turkish revolution had yet to advance to the stage of action, or even going 
so far as to suggest that, “it is possible the action of nature has been silenced. Until now, the time 
and place of our heroic action is further deepening and walking up to this line.”242 Tunç suggests 
that journals like Ağaç are “a unique means for cautiously following the weakness and strengths 
of our culture announcing our spiritual health, consciousness” and celebrated thinkers like Necip 
Fazıl who, “come to this foreign word with open arms and signals that he will meet it with a 
sympathy in our language.”243 
 What began to separate Necip Fazıl from the group identified by İrem was his particular 
marriage of Bergson and conservative modernism with Islamic philosophy and literary traditions. 
While some followers of Bergson, Peyami Safa especially, advocated for the importance of 
religion in shaping cultural and national character, Necip Fazıl took a more idealistic stance, 
offering a version of Turkish national modernity that more tightly entwined the canon of Ottoman 
and Islamic literature with Bergson’s emphases on mysticism and individuality.244 An early essay 
                                                                                                                                                                              
“spontaneity” (Tunç translates this term as lâhzalık) as derived from Leibniz. Mustafa Şekip 
Tunç, “Aksiyon” Ağaç March 28, 1936, 2-3. 
241 Ibid, 3 
242 Ibid 
243 Ibid, 2-3 
244 As İrem notes, the republican-conservative approach to religion championed by characters like 
Safa emphasized mysticism and “folk-Islam” in order to provide a personalist, non-abstract 
template for following Islam in a secular society – in effect these secular thinkers sought to “open 
the gates of interpretation” or “ijtihad” for the foundational Islamic texts famously “closed” by 
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of Necip Fazıl’s, printed in Ağaç demonstrates his unique synthesis of Bergsonian and Islamic 
worldviews.245 The essay, entitled “A Quick Look at Artists and Intellectuals of the Turkish 
Middle Ages”, Necip Fazıl used a naturalistic metaphor to explain the relationship between the 
Turkish individual and society, 
Language, syntax, templates, techniques, criticism, culture, logic, morality, the 
concept of the world and the beyond, temperament, precision, aesthetics, in sum a 
transfiguration of the wealth of all of the reflections of itself is placed on a systemic 
platform. 
 The platform of this society, and society itself is built on the faith and ideology of 
Islam. According to the equilibrium of that age, the faith and ideology of Islam was a 
sunny sky, society was a ground which took heat from that sky, artists and intellectuals 
also, being individuals who were rooted in that ground and were accordingly nourished 
by it, gave it a tree.  
Neither sky, internal composition of the earth, nor the quality of the ground on 
which the tree was nourished, could play the role of the distributor of a structure of 
freedom. According to the intimate relations and the borderlines they drew amidst them, 
the quality of the sky was in the sky, the earth’s in the earth and the tree’s in the tree. 
However, in the case of the tree, earth and sky, THE INDIVIDUAL, SOCIETY AND 
IDEOLOGY, must enter harmony and order such that life and its unending circulation is 
established.246  
                                                                                                                                                                              
the philosopher al-Ghazali in the 14th century. The motivation here was to formulate a religious 
paradigm that articulated with Kemalism such that it acknowledged the cultural and moral 
coherence provided by religious faith, but eschewed the attachment to political structures and 
authority tied to the Ottoman era that were deemed “reactionary” by the Kemalist state. Where 
Necip Fazıl departs from this group is, as I show in subsequent paragraphs, in his assertion that 
Islam and its literary-philosophical tradition, including folk figures, Ottoman ulema, and classical 
scholars in equal measure, provides the social bedrock for modern society. İrem, “Turkish 
Conservative Modernism”, 98-101.  
245 In adopting Bergson in the way that he does, Fazıl makes what has been identified as a 
common misapprehension of Bergson’s formulation of the “mystic.” Fazıl’s elevation of the 
mystic and mysticism to near lawgiver status, runs contra to Bergson’s insistence on defining 
mysticism and the role of the mystic “in its most modest sense” – meaning, as Philippe Soulez 
describes, a man who “sets the moral level of a society or, if you prefer, the acceptable degree of 
openness,” but is not himself a leader, and indeed is more limited in scope than Rousseau’s 
“lawgiver” despite some obvious similarities. See Philippe Soulez, “Bergson as Philosopher of 
War and Theorist of the Political” trans., Melissa McMahon, in Alexandre Lefebvre and Melanie 
White, eds., Bergson, Politics, and Religion (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2012) 
ebook, 99-125.  
246 Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, “Manzara 2: Türk Orta Çağ Sanatkâr ve Entellektueline Kısa Bir 
Bakış” Ağaç April 11, 1936, 1-2. Emphasis in original. 
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Here we see Necip Fazıl asserted that Islam was the basis for the relationship between Turkish 
intellectuals and society – and by extension all Turkish individuals. While this does harmonize 
somewhat with the mysticism and “folk Islam” espoused by the conservative-modernist group 
identified by İrem, Necip Fazıl embraces the kinds of classical Islamic texts and Ottoman-era 
religious figures in ways that group sought to reject, creating a stark contrast not only between 
himself and other conservatives, but between himself and the Kemalists. As the essay elaborates, 
what Necip Fazıl saw as the unique ground from which Turkish intellectual and artistic life grew 
could be found in, “This society’s precise quality is in Fuzuli [poet, d. 1556], its mastery and 
aesthetic in Baki [poet, d. 1600], its foundational logic and intellect in Nabi [poet Yusuf Nabi, d. 
1712], its eloquence and élan in Nefi [poet, d. 1635], its idiom and grace in Nedim [poet, d. 
1730], its lore and subtlety in Şeyh Galip [poet, d. 1798], its religious temperament in Süleyman 
Çelebi [poet, d. 1422], its conception of the afterlife in all of the mystics, the form of its temple, 
school and palace in Sinan [architect, d. 1588], its singing voice and the spirit of its harmony in 
Dede Efendi [probably musician Hammamâzâde İsmâil Dede Efendi, d. 1846], the method and 
technique of its culture in Kâtip Çelebi [scholar, d. 1657], and all of these conditions, in any other 
measure or attribute, they are all there.”247  
 Seen in concert with writing from other Bergson-inspired intellectuals in Ağaç, it 
becomes clear that some members of this school, including Necip Fazıl, approached religion in 
such a way that, first, essentialized faiths to their respective spheres in an east-west dichotomy, 
and second saw clear and stable divisions between ethnicities and nations within those spheres. 
For Necip Fazıl, Turks were Muslims first, and insofar as they were building a nation, they were 
the direct descendants of the Ottoman Islamic intellectual tradition. Fazıl and his ilk saw the 
wholesale adoption of western culture as decadent and degrading to what was essential to Turkish 
                                                           
247 Ibid, 2 
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culture, though they clearly had little difficulty reaching these conclusions by wedding their study 
of Islam with their study of western philosophers, like Bergson.248 This essentialization extended 
even to Bergson as well, whose ethnicity and personal faith was the subject of an essay by 
Ziyaettin Fahri Fındıkoğlu entitled “Was Bergson a Catholic?” in June of 1936. Fındıkoğlu began 
the essay with a quote from a German newspaper editorial whose author had expressed delight at 
Bergson’s recent visit to German churches thusly, “A great philosopher has at last finally attested 
to Christianity, is this not proof of the truth of our honored religion.”249 Fındıkoğlu admitted that 
this appears as a banal fact, but adds quickly, “the philosopher Bergson is a Polish Jew who 
settled in France. Aside from this fact, he has contributed a great many concepts to Christianity 
with his philosophical works.”250 Fındıkoğlu went on to explain Bergson’s explanation of how 
great men, mystics, philosophers, and prophets (ostensibly including Bergson in this category) 
can transcend “static religion” and open up the borders erected between religions, clans and 
nations.251 For Fındıkoğlu, Bergson’s acceptance of “dynamic religion” does not cancel out his 
                                                           
248 This of course is one of the age-old debates of Turkish intellectual and political society. I have 
written about some aspects of the Turkish view of western science and culture as decadent during 
the early republican era in “‘Unveiling’ the Tramway: The Intimate Public Sphere in Late 
Ottoman and Republican Istanbul” Journal of Urban History (Online First, April 2016). 
Recently, Alper Yalçınkaya has expertly detailed this conflict amongst Young Ottoman 
intellectuals in the late nineteenth century in his book Learned Patriots: Debating Science, State, 
and Society in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2015).  
249 Ziyaettin Fahri Fındıkoğlu, “Bergson Katolik mi oldu?” Ağaç, June 13, 1936, 3-4 
250 Ibid, 3. Bergson’s family was indeed of Jewish lineage, though only Polish on his father’s side 
– his mother was of English and Irish Jewish background. Bergson himself was a practicing 
Catholic, though his relationship with the Church’s hierarchy was at times contentious, as 
Fındıkoğlu references the times when his earlier works were banned by the Vatican throughout 
the article. Insofar as his philosophical works are concerned, they interface far more with the 
Christian theological tradition than the Jewish one. For two insightful essays on this topic, see 
Vladimir Jankélévitch “Bergson and Judaism” Melissa McMahon trans., in Alexandre Lefebvre 
and Melanie White, eds., Bergson, Politics, and Religion, 217-245, and Keith Ansell-Pearson and 
Jim Urpeth, “Bergson and Nietzsche on Religion” idem, 246-264. 
251 It is interesting to note that in most cases here Fındıkoğlu uses a loan word “misitik” for the 
words mystic and mysticism, with the sole exception in the piece where he quotes a translation of 
Bergson’s Two Sources of Morality and Religion wherein the words “mutasavvıf” and “tasavvuf” 
respectively are used. We can be reasonably certain here that Fındıkoğlu is translating from the 
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Jewishness, as he wrote, “It remains that Bergson did not separate his own primary religion (ana 
dini), Judaism, from Christianity. In his eyes, Jesus is a personality that transformed and 
humanized Moses, ‘In place of a national religion came a universal religion. In place of a god that 
only existed to provide justice to your own people came a god that all of humanity could 
love.’”252 At the same time, Fındıkoğlu contrasted Bergson with Albert Einstein, who “could not 
think of any other measurement than the blessing of the honor of Judaism,” as an example of an 
intellectual whose religion was static, and thus not able to transcend his nationality.253  
 Necip Fazıl would ultimately find greater popularity in the wartime environment through 
the publication of a new weekly journal, Büyük Doğu (The Great East). It is in this journal that 
Kısakürek more openly embraced an occidental position. The magazine first appeared in 1943, 
but was suspended shortly thereafter only to reappear in November of 1945, shortly after the 
close of the war, when it would emerge with a staunchly anti-communist, anti-Soviet line. In the 
first issue of 1945, Necip Fazıl laid out a nine-point manifesto under the heading “The Ideological 
System” that demonstrated both his inclinations towards Anti-Westernism and Bergsonism. He 
described the east as a giant, knotted ball of string, insisting that, “in the surroundings the 
endlessness is great and in the center the endlessness is singular,” and poetically describing the 
name he’s given the magazine as, “cracking the shell of the meaning of birth, under the 
increasingly rosy horizon sparking with the breath of seeds, embracing the domain of the Eastern 
world, heaven and cypress, palace and dome, arches and ruins, from all of the outer lines and 
                                                                                                                                                                              
French original, as the footnoted citation of the quote directs the reader to the French title Le deux 
sources de la morale et de la religion and not the Turkish translation provided by Mehmet Emin 
in 1932, and so it remains interesting that in the translation reflects terminology that more directly 
associates mysticism with Islamic “sufi” movements – sufi, mutasavvıf, tasavvuf all share the 
same root and connotation – rather than the European, and presumably Christian-inflected loan 
word.    




inner embroideries.”254 He also differentiated this Occidentalism from the position of the racist-
Turanists,  
“[The Great East] Is not the highest isolation and meaningfulness, many times the most 
wretched personification and purposefulness a constant plague?.. BÜYÜK DOĞU’s 
embrace and integration of the east, does not thrive wherever a plan for one race and one 
geography outside the borders of the nation exists… Don’t confuse our work with that of 
the racial endeavor of making a physical and spiritual border, of the ambitions of tribes 
and appetite for land! In the name of the great and true foundation, we are ones that are 
one hundred percent connected to the role of the enemies of the western opposition and 
support those who form a front to stand against them!255   
 
Necip Fazıl’s occidental stance would, in the short term, find common cause with nationalist 
groups in leading pressure against leftist and communist groups, beginning with his participation 
in, and cheerleading for the riot that would destroy Tan Press on December 4, 1945, as we shall 
see in the following chapter.  
Open Conflict Between Leftists and Racist-Turanists in WWII 
 If the 1930s represented a period where discourse around race bloomed in every corner of 
Turkish thought, the advent of World War II, where many of these ideologies and racial 
discourses would at least appear to have found patronage in one or the other of the war’s 
belligerents, – each of whom, at different points, would pose a serious threat to Turkish 
sovereignty – exerted a pressure on ideological discourse that would ultimately collapse the fine 
differences between these different strains of racism and anti-racism, and bring them under 
heightened scrutiny by the state, ginning up popular movements both for and against a politics of 
race in Turkey that would help polarize the public as it moved into the new Cold War world 
order.  
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One classic aspect of race discourse that is conspicuously absent from the most 
prominent engagements with racial thinking in the Turkish republic of letters in the 1930s and 
1940s is the assertion that race is an entirely social construction with no real basis in biology. For 
both the Kemalists and the Pan-Turanists the idea of race as a biological fact helped shore up the 
positivist bona fides of their chosen visions of Turkish modernity. For Nazım Hikmet, race was 
better explained by political economy than it was by sociology. For Necip Fazıl and the 
Bergsonian clique, race as a biological constant (if somewhat blurrier than the Kemalist and Pan-
Turanian constructions) served their end of articulating an anti-western “oriental” response to 
secular decadence. In each instance race theory and race discourse served political ends – the 
Pan-Turanists sought to assert Turkish racial superiority, the Kemalists incorporated it in hopes of 
de-Islamicizing Turkish identity, Hikmet saw the end of racism as concomitant with the end of 
fascism and capitalism, and Necip Fazıl’s limited engagement with race mirrored the Kemalists 
by tying the Turkish race with Islam so that their specific spiritualism would reinvigorate Turkish 
politics with a Bergsonian spontaneity.  
 In order to find a critique of race and racism as a political discourse tout court in Turkey 
during this period, one has to go to the writing of a budding group of leftist sociologists and 
literary critics who, while positivist and nationalist in their own way, were able to articulate a 
vision of modern society that had no use for the idea that a biological category like race had 
social effects. Leftist critiques of racism would only intensify as the war broke out in Europe and 
racist-Turanians like Atsız felt more empowered by the advancement of Nazi ideology. The 
central conflict between leftists and racists grew from the increasing antagonism between Atsız 
and his former college roommate, the novelist Sabahattin Ali. While this particular conflict has 
been given a central place in the history of racism in Turkey, it is worthwhile here to explore, 
briefly, the work of his colleagues in the Language, History, and Geography Faculty (Dil, Tarih 
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ve Coğrafya Fakültesi, hereafter DTCF) at Ankara University. The members of this faculty and 
their intellectual colleagues made up a core of highly trained academics, including Behice Boran, 
Niyazi Berkes, Mediha Berkes, Pertev Naili Boratov, Adnan Cemgil and others along with Ali, 
worked together to advance a critical, leftist perspective on Turkish politics primarily through 
their bi-monthly journal Yurt ve Dünya (Home and World).  
 In the second year of Yurt ve Dünya’s publication in 1942, the journal began to seriously 
take up the issue of racism and respond directly to the worldview espoused by Gök-Börü, Orhun, 
and Çınaraltı. In December 1942, the sociologist Niyazi Berkes offered a lengthy dismantling of 
racist-Turanian claims to sociological and scientific legitimacy. Berkes’ critique is at once a full-
throated denunciation of racism and an example of the left-wing positivist-nationalist perspective 
on modernity. Unlike Nazım Hikmet, Berkes avoids rooting racism in the history of capitalism 
and fascism specifically, and instead opted for placing it as a particular outgrowth of western 
culture: “racism is completely foreign to our culture and nestled in entirely foreign roots… The 
youth who are found in western countries who make propaganda of racial enmity have seen the 
caution with which we have often taken the westerners’ racial project. Whereby the Turkish 
people are democratic, whereby they are noble and do not accept the superiority of blood, it is in 
this case that it is necessary to stand against these uninvited racist ideas.”256  
Following from this polemical position, Berkes began by assailing the claims racist-
Turanians had over the scholarship of the Young Turk era nationalist Ziya Gökalp. As Özdoğan 
has neatly demonstrated, having a legitimate claim on the intellectual tradition of Ziya Gökalp 
was a sine qua non of Turkish nationalist intellectual prominence.257 In his article, Berkes quoted 
extensively from Gökalp’s work, including his final treatise The Principles of Turkism (1923), to 
                                                           
256 Niyazi Berkes, “Günün Terimleri: Irk ve Irkçılığı” (Today’s Terminology: Race and Racism) 
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argue that even though Gökalp wrote quite a lot about race in relation to science and biology, he 
explicitly rejected any connection between race and social characteristics, national or 
otherwise.258 Berkes’ argument then, based primarily on the positivist sociological tradition of 
which Gökalp was a part, proceeded to demonstrate that the appearance of race in humans was 
the product primarily of humans living in clans for long periods separated from each other by 
distance, and he further argues that the appearance of race can be better explained by sociology, 
“the human clans we observe as societies are not races, they are families, tribes, villages, towns, 
cities, nations and national communities.”259 Berkes explained that the ideal types of each race 
that are centered by racist thinkers are practically non-existent amongst single individuals in each 
group because the types themselves merely represent statistical averages of characteristics that are 
indeed shared by individual who belong to many different sets of races. Berkes then moved to 
counter claims of racial superiority and inferiority, which he believes are “absurd” [saçma]. He 
suggested that it is only natural that “primitive” [iptidai] tribes believe in their own racial 
superiority, citing a Malaysian creation myth in which black and white races were the result of 
being over or under “cooked” by God, but that the racism encountered in present day Turkey 
could be drawn back to nineteenth-century intellectuals like Arthur de Gobineau and Houston 
Stewart Chamberlain, who with a “herd of politicians at their backs” helped to construct theories 
of “master” and “slave” races. He described these theories as attempting to explain the relative 
progression and regression of different societies throughout history, which is faulty reasoning 
because,  
a people, without changing the structure of its race, can be found in one historical age to 
be regressed, and in another to be advanced; the same racial structure can be found in two 
nations, one regressed, one much farther advanced. Racial qualities are organized as a 
result of humans living for a time in a certain place, and developing their own culture 
which sees themselves as withdrawn, separate from other societies, in an abstract life. 
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However, culture or civilization is, from the perspective of the exigency of geography 
and the exigent social perspective, the product of contact, acquaintance, encounter, and 
mixing.260  
Ultimately, he concluded that since there is no biological or sociological significance to the 
appearance of races in humans, the motivations of these racist intellectuals must necessarily be 
political. Berkes characterized these politics as a politics that “truly oppressed other nations, they 
worked to spread these incorrect thoughts through various propaganda in order to show that those 
policies were legitimate and necessary,” and so that a false racial division could be sown in 
subject nations such that, “our social unity would fall to a broken ground but they themselves 
would benefit from this discord.”261  
In a previous issue, the philosopher and poet Adnan Cemgil took an even more pointed 
stance against the racist-Turanians, accusing them of acting directly on the behalf of foreign 
powers. In an article entitled “Hidden Faces” [İçyüzleri], Cemgil accused Atsız and the publishers 
of Gök-Börü of taking money to spread foreign (presumably Nazi) propaganda,  
…those who are giving advice that exploits the excitement of the youth of our country, 
are showing their hidden face as they write racial propaganda that will tear our national 
unity apart. Since they have such foolish and ignorant thoughts that not a single person 
could find agreeable, and since they do their work with secret sources of funding, we are 
learning that they are people who are unscrupulous to the point of being incapable of 
love.262  
These strong terms also reflect the degree to which the wartime environment raised suspicions of 
sedition, or at last cooperation with foreign elements, on the part of all opposition intellectuals. 
Here, Cemgil was in fact making a very wide accusation that extends not only to Atsız but to a 
wider circle of writers, including Yusuf Ziya Ortaç, Peyami Safa, Orhon Seyfi, and others who 
did not write from the most stridently racist-Turanian publications but nonetheless offered their 
                                                           
260 Ibid, 441 
261 Ibid, 441 
262 Adnan Cemgil, “Olduğu Gibi: İçyüzleri” [“Such as it is: Hidden Faces”] Yurt ve Dünya Vol. 2 
No. 22-23, December 1942, 395 
147 
 
support for “Turkism” (türkçülük) in publications such as Çınaraltı [Under the Plane Tree] and 
tacit support for the Atsız and their ilk in private.  
 This line of attack from the positivist left demonstrates how the wartime environment 
effectively collapsed much of the space dividing ideological differences between strident racist-
Turanian factions, German-sympathizing conservative nationalists like Safa and Ortaç, and, to a 
lesser extent, the Kemalist elite themselves. In the prior decade, the conflict between the likes of 
Atsız and the Kemalist center became a defining feature of the development of an “inclusive” 
ethno-nationalist narrative, but insofar as fear of Russian encroachment nudged İnönü towards the 
German camp, maintaining the difference between an inclusive Turkism and an exclusive 
Turanism became harder and harder. In fact, we can easily trace the emboldening of Turkist and 
Turanian rhetoric, and their subsequent fall along the same lines of Turkish-German relations 
during the war. Prior to the Soviet victory at Stalingrad in late 1942 and early 1943, Turkish 
foreign policy had been predicated, as Onur İşçi has argued, on the revival of a Brest-Litovsk 
alignment brought about by a German victory over Russia, followed by an Anglo/Allied victory 
over Germany. It is in this period that the Turkish government, newly elected Prime Minister 
Şükrü Saraçoğlu in particular, provided the open encouragement to Turanian currents in a speech 
delivered along with his government’s program on August 5, 1942: 
We are Turkish, Turkist and shall ever remain Turkist. For us, Turkism in essence is 
related to blood in as much as it concerns conscience and culture. As Turkists we neither 
want to be diminished nor do we encourage it; on the contrary, we wish to grow larger 
and shall ever endeavor in that direction.263 
                                                           
263 Şükrü Saraçoglu, “Speech on Foreign and Domestic Policy Delivered to Parliament on August 
5, 1942” the above translation is slightly modified from that which is provided in Günay Göksü 
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While Atsız was not active at this particular time, Özdoğan points out that the popular “Turkist” 
journals of that time, including Türk Yurdu [Turkish Home], run by Hasan Ferit Cansever, and the 
aforementioned Çınaraltı which was operated by Ortaç and Orhan Seyfi Orhon, both of which 
applauded the speech and took it as a sign that their engagement and took it as a sign that the 
CHP was finally living up to its racial rhetoric of the previous decade.264 
 Over the next year and a half, the Soviets had turned back Nazi advances at Stalingrad, 
the Turkish leverage with the Allies began to wane, and Turkey’s priorities had shifted 
dramatically towards a desperate attempt to secure assurances against a Soviet territorial 
incursion, first from Britain and later from the United States. Accordingly, Turkish officials had 
become much more hostile to the racist-Turanian and German-leaning Turkist crowds.  
Having revived his magazine Orhun in late 1943, Nihal Atsız penned an open letter in 
March 1944 to Prime Minister Saraçoğlu that specifically invoked the above passage from his 
1942 speech. In the letter, first of two he would publish that year in Orhun, Atsız praised the 
former speech, saying, “As an intellectual who has grappled with Turkish history, I can say that 
never in the history of our race, nor in the history of our state, has such a definite statement of 
Turkish nationalism been uttered from an official’s mouth,” but went on to express concerns that 
the Prime Minister was not living up to his word, “However, in the intervening year and a half, 
since we can see that our situation has not progressed into the workspace of Turkism, we are born 
into distress.”265 His appeal to the Prime Minister to return to the Turkist position he held a few 
years prior rested on the purported need to defend the country from leftists – all of whom Atsız 
considered to be traitors. His first complaint in this regard refers to a recent event at the People’s 
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House in the Eminönü neighborhood of Istanbul in which the prominent CHP intellectual Ismail 
Hakkı Baltacıoğlu was giving a conference on, among other things, the history of Turkish theater. 
In Atsız’s telling, a sizable group of leftists in attendance repeatedly interrupted the speech, either 
by registering vocal interruptions from the lectern, or by coughing and laughing conspicuously at 
moments when, again according to Atsız, they wished to register disapproval of Baltacıoğlu’s 
adherence to Turkish nationalism. The protestors were eventually shouted down by right wingers 
and chided by Baltacıoğlu himself until four or five police officers escorted the leftists from the 
venue. Despite what seems to have been a relatively banal occurrence, Atsız was struck by one 
point in particular,  
In a People’s Party institution, whilst affronted by enemies of the nation and motherland, 
not a single deputy of the People’s Party stirred a hair. Neither the People’s House nor 
the Police saw the need to make an accusation or open an investigation. The same night 
at the Leylî Medical Students’ dormitories arguments between the nationalists and the 
leftists broke out and in every place it is always seen that the way is closed for unbiased 
and conciliatory figures to enter into the fight.266 
He went on to warn the Prime Minister that these students will one day become the doctors and 
leaders of the nation and that it was necessary to deal with these protestors more harshly lest they 
not be sufficiently instilled with the notion of Turkism – indeed he notes reports of dissention 
from Turkism amongst the youth,  
Still in the People’s Houses there are mongrels who do not stand while the Independence 
March [the Turkish National Anthem] is being played, in a boy’s high school there is 
history teacher who says, ‘just like a driver is not himself a car, a Turkist is not a Turk,’ 
in a girls’ middle school another history teacher says, ‘Are you not a Turk? God damn 
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you. I am regretting that I am not German or English’ all of whom assault our national 
honor, and yet these microbes are allowed to continue spreading their arrogant 
opposition.267 
In essence, Atsız was attempting to appeal to the anti-Soviet bias prevalent amongst government 
elites while maintaining his position on the superiority of the Turkish race.  
 This appeal fell on deaf ears, despite the fact that there were not a few people in the 
administration who maintained a hard anti-Soviet line. Atsız’s appeal to a stridently racist, and 
thus Nazi-oriented outlook at a time when the tide of the war was turning against the Germans, 
and Turkish-German relations were themselves severely weakened, went too far. In the ensuing 
months, and partly as a response to this letter and subsequent attacks against the faculty at the 
DTCF at Ankara University – particularly Atsız’s former roommate, Sabahattin Ali – Atsız and 
his closest collaborators would stand before a series of lawsuits and trials that would severely 
hamper their movement for years. On the government’s part, the desire to distance themselves 
from Atsız, and, in a way, from Saraçoğlu’s previous remarks, was strong enough to elicit a 
speech from President İsmet İnönü that would be the government’s strongest renunciation of 
race-based nationalism to date. Following the conclusion of the Sabahattin Ali lawsuit on May 
9th, which had witnessed some rowdy demonstrations from Turanists on behalf of Atsız, arrests of 
the core group of writers at Orhun – including Atsız, Türkkan, Zeki Velidi Togan, and Hasan 
Ferit Cansever – were conducted May 18th on charges of disseminating propaganda, racism and 
subversive ideologies. The following day, at the annual celebration of Children’s Day, İnönü laid 
out the justification thusly, 
We are Turkish nationalists; however, we are the enemy of the principles of 
racism in our country. Those in our country who have held political grudges under the 
pathetic guise of racism are still alive in our memory. In the years of 1912, those who 
supposedly went to every effort to hold onto Rumelia for Turkish troops, they were 
proved to have schemed behind the backs of the Grand National Assembly together with 
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the Albanian Hasan from Pristina and Derviş Hima to spread racist politics. These men 
claimed, “political necessity” without the slightest difficulty, they believed their words 
and an even bigger disaster was visited upon us: while they shouted, “political necessity!” 
they would not refrain from spreading a new sinister principle. 
 Turanist thought has in recent times once again been shown to be harmful and 
sickening. From this perspective, it is necessary to understand the Republic well. In the 
last days of the National Liberation struggle, we were only friends with the Soviets and 
the hostility of our neighbors was alive in all of our minds.  
 The Turanists, in an example that would have been fatal to the Turkish nation 
and all its neighbors, were immediately found making enemies in the charming name of 
sovereignty. To be sure, the Republic is taking every precaution against the lies of such 
unconscionable and unscrupulous troublemakers so that the fatality of the nation will not 
be given a free reign. The troublemakers suppose that we will not dispute ideas that 
oppose the nation and cheat young children and pure citizens. They are cheaters and they 
will continue to cheat.  
 Now, I would like to answer two questions that are on the minds of our citizens: 
The racists and Turanists have attempted to make secret arrangements and organizations. 
Why? Are thoughts of secret sinister organizations walking amongst the kinsmen in the 
country? Especially, have the Secret Turanian Societies been captured from countries 
East and West? These are such a thing we can only begin to trample under foot by the 
laws of the state and its fundamental organization.  
 In this case, the gilded thoughts are behind the curtain, we are directly opposed to 
attempts against the existence of the Republic and the Grand National Assembly. The 
conspirators are accused of gradually and secretly cheating all of us, from our ten-year-
old children all the way to ourselves.  
 Let me ask a second question to our citizens: Given the situation of world events, 
to which nation are those who claim Turkey must be racist and Turanist appropriate, to 
whose purposes are they benefitting? It is true that those who wish to spread ideas that 
will only bring scourge and disaster to the Turkish nation are not doing any favors to the 
Turkish nation. These actions can only benefit foreigners. Are the troublemakers in 
service of foreigners? Are the foreigners in a relationship of control over the 
troublemakers? It is impossible to prove these assertions. But, it is an indisputable truth 
that those who deliberately serve foreigners and who have close relationships with 
foreigners only bring to the fore actions which harm the Turkish nation and the Turkish 
motherland, only for the benefit of foreigners.  
 My dear citizens! 
 You can be sure that we will powerfully defend our motherland against these 
troublemakers.268 
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This speech essentially represents a reset in official Turkish race discourse to the original debates 
around the Turkish History Thesis insofar as it rebuffs racism-Turanism on the grounds that its 
politics are fundamentally adventurist and irredentist. In so doing, İnönü relies most heavily on a 
fundamentally xenophobic rhetoric to turn the popular will against Atsız and his compatriots.  
This is a tactic Kemalists would ultimately resort to when the time came to ridiculing leftists in 
the following year, but for the time being, and until the geopolitical pressures of the new Cold 
War environment ratcheted up in the postwar period, the Kemalist government was focused on 
marginalizing the most strident pro-German voices. The result of the trials pursuant to this speech 
and the arrests that preceded it, for the overarching discourse of Turkish nationalism, was the 
persistent differentiation between irredentist, racist, exclusive, and adventurous “Pan-Turkism” 
and an inclusive, border-conscious, non-racist “Turkish nationalism” that as this study and others 
show, papered over a much more complex, and flexible set of ideologies and political allegiances 
both before and after the moment of the racist-Turanian trials.269   
 Reading the moment of the racist-Turanian trials in sources sympathetic to the Atsız and 
his ilk, this moment of intense conflict with the state reads as the origin point of a movement. As 
one of the chief Turanist historians, Yavuz Bülent Bakîler, notes, “May 3 [the first day of the Ali-
Atsız lawsuit] was a historical turning point. Until that time, there existed only a sentimental and 
intellectual Turkism [türkçülük] that rarely exceeded the bounds of literature and science, and on 
the third of May 1944, it suddenly became a movement.”270 In many senses, he is correct since it 
is only after this period that Atsız’s ideas would have purchase in the Turkish political landscape 
– coming to a head in the 1960s and 1970s with the rise to prominence of one of Atsız’s co-
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defendants, Alparslan Türkeş, who helped lead the 1960 coup against Adnan Menderes’ 
Democrat Party and eventually establish the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (Milli Hareket 
Partisi) in 1969. We will return to the trial of the Turanists and the political considerations of the 
state’s fluctuating relationship with racism in chapter five. 
Conclusion: Whither Race Discourse in the Postwar Environment? 
 With the announcement of the foundation of the Democrat Party late in 1945, the 
multiparty era of Turkish democracy would have its proper beginning. In the emerging Cold War 
landscape, however, the negotiation of that multiparty framework would be freighted with a 
different set of ideological and global contests and conjunctures as fascist powers lost their hold 
on Europe and American power ascended. The five years of political and cultural negotiation – 
both between Turkish diplomats and the Americans, and amongst Turks themselves – would 
prove in many ways to be just as contentious as the interwar period had been, and for a few 
prominent figures, it would spell the end of their careers in Turkey. These changes will be 
discussed at length in the ensuing chapters, but it is worth noting here that the rise to power of the 
Democrat Party, which represented a more culturally conservative, rural, power base – and who 
were much friendlier with intellectual figures like Necip Fazıl Kısakürek than they were with 
leftists or Kemalists – represented a departure from the racial rhetoric that sparked so much 
polarization in the 1930s and 1940s. Race discourse did not disappear in Turkey, but the 
geopolitical and ideological engine that drove it to the forefront of Turkish politics had been 
disassembled and reconfigured in a Cold War context. Some of the more strident ethno-
nationalist policies of the Kemalist period – most prominently, the insistence on a Turkish call to 
prayer – would be undone in the early days of the Democrat Party rule in 1950, and the CHP 
would crack down on communist and leftist journals and newspapers during the run-up to the 
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1950 election, creating an atmosphere of repression that was harsher in many ways than the 
censorious environment of the Second World War.  
 This shifting landscape after 1945 is significant for the history of race discourse in 
Turkey because it witnessed the coercive marginalization of the racist-Turanist cadre, thanks in 
part to the geopolitical impetus for their trials during the war. It also witnessed, through the 
silencing, imprisonment and exiling of a wide swath of leftist writers – and the disappearance of 
the largest daily leftist voice in the Turkish press, Tan – the erasure of leftist anti-racist critiques 
that bound racism to capitalism and fascism. At the same time, the rise of a Democrat Party that 
was to some degree influenced by Necip Fazıl’s “Great East” movement, further served to 
entrench a kind of xenophobic, anti-westernism that would raise its ugly head during a pogrom 
against Istanbul’s Greek community on September 6-7, 1955.271 Racism would continue to be a 
feature of the Istanbul press, and Turkish politics, as it more or less had been since the 1920s, 
well into the 1950s, but without the intensely race-conscious ideological conflict of the interwar 
period, and as both racist-Turanists and communists had become personae non gratae in the eyes 
of the state, race discourse would become somewhat disaggregated from the major ideological 
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CHAPTER FIVE: The Anatomy of a Riot: Political Violence, the Birth of Multiparty 
Politics, and the Destruction of Tan Press, December 4, 1945 
 
Onlar ümidin düşmanıdır, sevgilim, 
akar suyun, 
 meyve çağında ağaçın, 
 serpilip gelişen hayatın düşmanı. 
Çünkü ölüm vurdu damgasını alınlarına : 
 -- çürüyen diş, dökülen et --, 
 bir daha geri dönmemek üzre yıkılıp gidecekler. 
Ve elbette ki, sevgilim, elbet 
dolaşacaktır elini kolunu sallaya sallaya 
dolaşacaktır en şanlı elbisesiyle : işçi tulumuyla 
  bu güzelim memlekette hürriyet… 
 
They are the enemies of hope, my dear, 
under the branches of the fruit tree, 
 the enemies of life 
 are sprinkled with the river’s water. 
Because to those who have borne the stamp of a death blow : 
 -- rotten teeth, decaying flesh --, 
 for those who went to destroy, don’t ever come back. 
And it surely is, my dear, surely 
the roaming hand swaying in the arm 
roaming with the most heroic garment : the worker’s overalls 
  this is freedom in my beautiful country… 
 -- Nazım Hikmet, “6 Aralık 1945” [“6 December 1945”] 
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On the morning of December 4, 1945 a large group of young Turkish citizens, many of them 
students at Istanbul University, numbering in the thousands, paraded through the city, arriving at 
the publishing house responsible for the Turkish language daily Tan (Dawn), which was operated 
by Zekeriya and Sabiha Sertel, then proceeded to the offices of the leftist newspapers Yeni Dünya 
(The New World), owned by Vedat Baykurt and operated mainly by his father Cami Baykurt in 
partnership with the novelist Sabahattin Ali and the leftist writer Esat Adil Müstecaplioğlu, and 
the French-language La Turquie, also operated by Cami Baykurt, and later at a Russian-owned 
bookstore.272 The mob destroyed each building’s insides, tossing its contents into the street and 
wrecking their printing equipment. The following is an attempt to provide the fullest 
understanding of what precisely happened that day.  
In order to do so I will provide a comprehensive overview of differing narratives 
provided by observers and those involved. These narratives include the perspective of some of the 
participants in and eyewitnesses to the demonstration, the Sertels themselves, Istanbul’s press and 
the United States Department of State through the archival records of its Istanbul Consulate and 
Ankara Embassy. Having related as deeply as possible the most relevant and available narratives 
of the events of December 4, 1945, I will show how they demonstrate the precise ways in which 
ideological and political lines were being drawn surrounding this event. As will be apparent from 
reading these narratives, different political and intellectual camps both inside and outside of 
Turkey read the ideological symbolism differently. What I will offer in the analytical section of 
this chapter is to suggest that the riot itself, its orchestration, its provocation and the response to 
it, was an attempt by components of the Turkish state to clearly, and violently, demarcate what 
the acceptable spectrum of political ideologies would be in the new multi-party system. 
Furthermore, I suggest that this process of cordoning off “acceptable” and “unacceptable” marked 
                                                           
272 Yeni Dünya first appeared on December 1, 1945 and only ran four issues. In the masthead, 
Vedat Baykurt is listed as owner, Cami Baykurt as editorial director.  
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a shift in what could be considered Kemalist ideology that had dominated Turkish politics for 
almost three decades from an ideology that could manage a vituperative, modernist public sphere, 
to one overly concerned about the influence certain putatively dangerous political elements might 
have on the newly sanctioned opposition parties.  
Symbolic Violence and Multi-party politics 
 The place of this riot in the history of Turkey in the multi-party period is representative of 
a phenomenon described by philosopher Slavoj Žižek as “symbolic violence.” As Žižek explains, 
symbolic violence is one of two forms of objective violence, which constitutes  
…violence embodied in language and its forms… this violence is not only at work in the 
obvious—and extensively studied—cases of incitement and of the relations of social 
domination reproduced in our habitual speech forms: there is a more fundamental form of 
violence still that pertains to language as such, to its imposition of a certain universe of 
meaning.273 
Though the Tan Riot was an event that would meet the standards of what Žižek would call 
“subjective violence,” it is this process of the “imposition of a certain universe of meaning” 
which I would like to explore in this context. To put a finer point on it, I argue that this is an 
instance in which the relation between the uses of subjective and objective, or symbolic, violence 
is made painfully apparent by the historical record. The Tan Riot, and instances of state violence 
against leftist political groups in the years that followed, served as a tool of state power to not 
only limit political discourse but to impose a particular meaning onto the transnational political 
language of the Cold War. Whereas in the single-party period the spectrum of acceptable 
intellectual and political opposition to the Kemalist center could encompass, or at least tolerate, 
views from the radical left and right sides of the ideological spectrum, hence the popular 
understanding of Kemalism as a “third way” or “corporatist” ideology, during the multi-party 
                                                           
273 Slavoj Žižek, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections (New York: Picador, 2008) 1-2 
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period the language of political ideology became officially “loaded” so that the Turkish public 
knew, for instance, who was communist, that they presented a threat to Turkish sovereignty and 
were thus an enemy of the state.274  
 The era of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s leadership, in addition to being one of state-driven 
economic, social and cultural reform, was one in which Turkey enjoyed a substantial, friendly 
relationship with the Soviet Union.275 While this friendship had deteriorated before the start of 
WWII, the Turkish state still maintained at the close of 1945 many of the same principles of 
étatism, single-party rule, and cultural reformism that had made the original ideological 
connections between it and the Soviet Union more than just a marriage of geostrategic 
convenience.276 Furthermore, I argue that it was in part because of this friendship and its remnants 
that left- and communist- oriented public figures like the Sertels could survive in the public 
sphere even though they were often outspoken in their opposition to the general direction the state 
was headed. But, and some ways paradoxically, because the introduction of multi-party politics 
coincided with a drastic geopolitical realignment, in which Turkey completed its transition from 
the Soviet orbit to “Active Neutral” to signatory of the UN Charter, to NATO member, meant that 
voices which had once represented the opposition to the state could not be afforded a place in the 
nominally more democratic and liberal political structure.  
                                                           
274 Andrew Davison and Taha Parla, Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey.  
275 This relationship has been explored by a number of different scholars, but for the purposes of 
this essay I am following the lead of Samuel J. Hirst who has addressed not only the geostrategic 
elements of this partnership, but their ideological underpinnings in “Anti-Westernism on the 
European Periphery: The Meaning of Soviet-Turkish Convergence in the 1930s” Slavic Review 
Vol. 72 No. 1 Spring 2013.   
276 Turkey’s second, and final, five-year plan was initiated in 1939, a year after Atatürk’s death, 
but was nullified a year later in 1940 due to economic distress in a number of areas, but most 
significantly in overspending on the military. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey 
Second Edition (New York: Oxford, 1969), 296.  
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 The period between the end of WWII and the electoral triumph of the Democrat Party in 
1950 has been portrayed as a story of the “emergence” of a liberal democracy in Turkey. In his 
seminal work on modern Turkish history, Bernard Lewis, who has viewed himself as a champion 
of liberalism, hailed the defeat of the Republican People’s Party in 1950 as that party’s “greatest 
achievement—a second revolution, complementing and completing that earlier revolution out of 
which the Party itself had sprung.”277 Another self-professed champion of liberalism, Ahmet 
Emin Yalman, saw the election as “probably the first instance in history when an absolute power 
yielded, without violence, to the will of the people freely expressed by secret ballots which were 
honestly tallied.”278 Even writers more sympathetic to the plight of the Turkish left, such as one-
time Sertel collaborator Niyazi Berkes, himself a frequent contributor to Tan, have seen the multi-
party period as one that represented “laboratory check-tests of the validity… of a secular regime 
in a Muslim country” and that “…Turkish secularism withstood all of the strains [of 
obscurantism].”279 Each of these writers explicitly or implicitly elides the violence and 
suppression upon which the success of the Democrat Party was built. Yalman remembered his 
own dilemma following the Tan Riot as one in which he and the supporters of the Democrat Party 
needed “to make clear our conviction that public protest against red agitation was right, but that 
violent suppression was wrong.”280 Lewis, also reflecting on the Tan Riot, mentions that, “[t]here 
was very little sympathy in Turkey for the Communists and fellow-travelers… On the other hand, 
there were many who regretted that, in order to deal with them, recourse should have been made 
to such perversions of democracy as press demagogy and mob violence.”281 For these writers, the 
violence that suppressed and ultimately excised popular and public leftist visions was just that, a 
                                                           
277 Ibid, p. 303 
278 Ahmet Emin Yalman, Turkey in My Time (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956) p. 
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279 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 
1964) p. 503 
280 Yalman, Turkey in My Time, p. 226. 
281 Lewis, Emergence, pp. 309-310 
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perversion or an aberration, rather than a fundamental step towards incubating the eventual 
successor-party from an ideology that was geopolitically poisonous. In reasserting the different 
contexts and narratives of the Tan Riot as I have below, this historical narrative is disrupted, and 
we can come to a better understanding of the way a violent clash of ideologies helped shepherd 
Turkey into the American-led western, liberal orbit at the outset of the Cold War.  
The Riot’s Anatomy 
The story of the Tan Riot, known popularly in Turkish as the Tan Olayı, has been told 
from many different perspectives, but there is no existing account that pulls all of the accessible 
memories and archives together.282 In recounting as many narratives of the event as are available, 
I hope to construct a “historical anatomy” of the event. Such an approach bears a resemblance to 
what has been known as “microhistory.”283 In much the same way as a microhistory often does, I 
will provide several detailed perspectives on the event through a variety of sources, each 
mediated to one degree or another by the circumstances of their documentary genre. By 
considering these degrees of mediation in the analysis of the narrative whole, I follow Carlo 
Ginzburg in the quest to create a history in which “the hypotheses, the doubts, the uncertainties 
[become] part of the narration; the search for truth [becomes] part of the exposition of the 
                                                           
282 Olay in Turkish carries with it a number of different meanings. It can generally refer to any 
event or occurrence as such, but often carries a connotation of an unusual or even troublesome 
character. For instance, when paired with the verb çıkarmak, it means “to make trouble” as in 
olay çıkarmaz (“don’t make trouble”). I have chosen to translate it here as “riot” both for its 
aesthetic qualities (“The Troublesome Event at Tan” is obviously clunky) and for the reflection of 
the fact that this was a mass, public event whose outcome was, at least to some extent, violent. 
This event is also sometimes referred to as the Tan Baskını or “The Tan Raid” which emphasizes 
the looting, but perhaps overstates the role of the police in the physical dismembering of Tan’s 
office. 
283 For a summary of the intellectual history of the term “microhistory” see Carlo Ginzburg, 
“Microhistory: Two or Three Things That I Know About It” trans. by John Tedeschi and Anne C. 
Tedeschi, Critical Inquiry Vol. 20, No. 1 (Autumn, 1993), 10-35. 
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(necessarily incomplete) truth attained.”284 But, in the interest of emphasizing the very way each 
of these narratives are mediated by, among other things, memory, political realities, media, art 
and literature I have chosen to analogize the history of this riot in a way that bypasses any 
overarching narrative – that of an anatomy.285  
Many of the memories that shed light on this event are inherently problematic, for 
reasons that range from ideological bias, personal aggrandizement, faulty memory and 
geographic and temporal distance from the events themselves. Zekeriya and Sabiha Sertel, two of 
the prime targets of the most violent aspects of the riot, have provided a narrative in their 
memoirs that places them in the position of victims of intense fear-mongering and violent attacks, 
and indeed they were very much the focus of intense anti-communist feeling. However, their 
memories of the precise events that took place on Ankara and İstiklal Avenues on December 4, 
1945 are mediated by the simple fact that they received reports on the events over the phone, 
while hiding in their flat on the opposite side of the Bosphorus. Eye-witness accounts present 
similar problems of historical memory. Orhan Birgit’s first-hand account of the events presents its 
own problems, since his memoir was published sixty years after the fact and after he had made 
personal and ideological amends with the Sertel family. Kemal Karpat and Gün Benderli, who 
relayed their memories of that day to me in 2015, provided vivid images of the scene of the riot, 
                                                           
284 Ibid, 24 
285 Surely, I am not the first historian to make use of an anatomical analogy in order to 
comprehend, or pretend to analytical exhaustion, the history of a particular event or series of 
events. Perhaps the most prominent example is that of two works on the Vietnam war by the New 
Left historian Gabriel Kolko. In constructing studies of a decades long conflict and its outcome, 
Kolko might have loosely understood the history of that war to have been itself a body with its 
own inertia and agency in the sense that it was driven by ideology and constrained by political, 
military and diplomatic structures. In assessing the history of a much smaller event like the Tan 
Riot, while attempting something of a comprehensive history, I am interested in taking this 
analogy a bit more directly than merely presenting an exhaustive account and calling it an 
“anatomy”. Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States and the Modern 
Historical Experience (New York: Pantheon, 1985) and Vietnam: Anatomy of a Peace (New 
York: Routledge, 1997).   
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but little in the way of precise detail. More contemporary source material from the Turkish press, 
from the US State Department Archives, or even the minimal information from the Turkish state 
archives, present a variety of viewpoints with their own set of ideological biases and mediated 
perspectives. By understanding and presenting these narratives and sources along with analysis of 
their mediation we can come to a clearer understanding of what the anatomy of this riot was, even 
as we acknowledge the faultiness of several of its individual parts. 
The Participant’s Perspective: Orhan Birgit, Kemal Karpat, and Gün Benderli 
I begin with one of the only published accounts available of a participant in the riot, that 
of Orhan Birgit, a journalist and lawyer who was a law student at Istanbul University at the time 
of the riot. Birgit remembers the students assembling that morning for a lecture from Professor 
Hüseyin Naili Kubalı when an “auburn-haired student whom we knew to be from one of the 
upper classes” entered the room, spoke with the Professor and began to read from a recent 
editorial by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçin published in Tanin (Echo) entitled “Rise Up Oh Patriots!” 
[Kalkın Ey Ehli Vatan!]. The student, who he later learned was named Tahsin Atakan, “added his 
own words to the article, saying that the Sertel’s Tan newspaper was communist propaganda and 
that we were all going to gather in Beyazıt Square.” He was then hurried along with the crowd to 
the nearby Beyazıt Square, no more than two or three blocks from his classroom, where a crowd 
was forming with large signs, placards and flags. He noted that one group had come from the 
nearby Covered Bazaar, and had gone first to the Nuruosmaniye Mosque outside the bazaar, 
indicating that they might have identified as religious. Another group in the crowd consisted of 
students from the military training, economics, literature, and medicine departments. As the 
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crowd began to process towards Cağaloğlu, where Tan was located, a group of artisans joined in 
as they passed the ancient Çemberlitaş just outside of Beyazıt.286 
The rhetoric of the crowd, according to Birgit, was generally nationalist as many were 
requesting Turkish flags and onlookers had begun to intone the verses of Turkey’s national 
anthem, “The Freedom March” (“İstiklal Marşı”).287 As the crowd moved in the direction of 
Sirkeci, headed first for the Tan building, Birgit described his position in the crowd, both in terms 
of location and his own political growth, “I wasn’t at the very front, nor was I among those at the 
back. I was counted among those rows watching from the middle of the crowd. This was my first 
meeting.288 I did not regret going. I was one of those who were not thinking about what would or 
would not happen.”289 Clearly, Birgit likens his own memory of the event to that of participant-
observer. Whether we can credit that to the fact that his politics had certainly changed in the sixty 
years since the event or to his own objectivity is hard to say, but what follows certainly colors the 
event as a nationalist plot with cooperation of the government.  
As the crowd passed the printing houses of the brothers Hakkı Tarık and Asım Us, Birgit 
remembers seeing the silhouette of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, the conservative intellectual and 
virulent anti-communist. Birgit remembers the crowd, upon noticing Kısakürek, shouting in 
appreciation.290 Soon they would come upon the Tan building. In Birgit’s telling, and this is 
corroborated somewhat by the Sertel and US State Department narratives, December 1945 saw 
the Sertels taking aggressive measures to claim the new Democrat Party for the political left. By 
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287 Ibid, 32 
288 I have chosen to translate this term as “meeting” since the Turkish term “miting” is a close 
cognate, though more often this term is used for very large gatherings or protests (i.e.: the May 
1919 Sultanahmet Mitingleri) as opposed to the more common word for a small “meeting”, 
“toplantı”. 




proclaiming that the founders of the new party would write for their publication Görüşler 
(Viewpoints), covering the early youth meetings of radical groups lead by Alaattin Tiritoğlu, and 
taking a generally leftist line during WWII, the Sertels, according to Birgit, “were leftists, but 
their views often overlapped with communists and extremist elements of the party.”291 
Birgit, clearly sympathizing with the Sertels in retrospect, narrated the events of the 
attack on Tan,  
Those who were provoked by the meeting broke the windows of the Tan building, and a 
short while later entered the building. People climbed the building as high as the roof and 
destroyed whatever they could find; reams of paper were thrown out on the street and 
drifted as far as the ferry port in Sirkeci [a distance of roughly four city blocks], the 
rotary machine was broken.292 
From there, the crowd advanced over the Golden Horn towards Taksim Square. Along the way, 
the offices of the French-language publication La Turquie (which was also associated with the 
Sertels) were destroyed. The crowd then marched down Istiklal Avenue towards Istanbul’s 
commercial center in Taksim, at which point Birgit claims he remembered that he had left his 
coat in the lecture hall and thus retreated to Beyazit to retrieve it.293  
                                                           
291 Ibid, 33. The issue of whether or not Zekeriya or Sabiha Sertel were ever members of the 
Turkish Communist Party or any such affiliate is hotly contested by surviving members of the 
Sertel family and those who knew them. The facts remain that for their opponents, they were one 
of the utmost symbols of the communist party in Turkey, along with their close friend, and certain 
party member, Nazım Hikmet. A CV from the Comintern archives translated into Turkish, and 
housed at the Turkish Foundation for Social History Research (TÜSTAV) claims that Sabiha 
Sertel had been a member of the suppressed Turkish Communist Party as early as 1934, but the 
document is riddled with numerous factual errors so can only be taken at face value. Following 
the fallout of this riot, they found themselves exiled to the USSR in Eastern Europe and, 
eventually, Baku, Azerbaijan. TÜSTAV “Novik Yoldaşa – İlmühaber” January 6, 1943, 
495.266.23.2 
292 Ibid. The rotary machine mentioned here by Birgit was a special loss for the Sertels since it 
was a new piece of technology that Zekeriya Sertel had first learned of when he was writing for 
the New York Times in the early 1920s. 
293 Ibid. One amusing note regarding this part of the riot’s history is worth relaying. Birgit says 
that while the crowd advanced on Taksim, many of the small shop owners selling charcuteries 
replaced placards describing their “Rus Salatası” (Russian Salad) with placards describing 
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 In April 2015, I interviewed Kemal Karpat, a renowned Turkish historian, about his 
memories of the event. At the time, Karpat was a classmate of Birgit’s at the Istanbul University 
Law School. He described himself as a supporter of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s vision for Turkey, 
but at the time he recalled being deeply suspicious of the ruling party – noting the war had 
severely affected the economy, that political dissent was harshly repressed, and the secret police 
had permeated through many student groups. He, like Birgit, participated in the demonstration – 
he considered himself an opponent of communism and did not view Tan’s editorial line favorably 
– but, though he remembers only few details of the riot, he remembers leaving as things turned 
violent at the Tan offices. He recalled vividly the rioters who had “rage in their eyes.” Karpat 
credited this experience, and others like it, as pushing him towards supporting the Democrat Party 
– not out of any specific ideological affinity, but out of opposition to a party that might support or 
condone the riotous violence.294   
 Also in 2015, I met with the writer and journalist Gün Benderli in Budapest to discuss her 
memory of the Tan Riot and its aftermath. Benderli was only sixteen years old in 1945, but would 
leave Turkey a few years later for eastern Europe, eventually settling in Budapest where she 
would come to work alongside the Sertels and Nazım Hikmet on their communist-party 
sponsored radio program Bizim Radyo (Our Radio).295 Benderli remembered that the entire period 
of the war was frightful, that they would often put pots on their heads during air raid drills, she 
                                                                                                                                                                              
“Amerikan Salatası” (American Salad). American readers will of course identify this sort of 
gastro-ideological formulation from the infamous history of “Freedom Fries” in the Capitol 
building cafeteria, but in this instance, it would appear to this author that the original political 
meaning of the difference between “Russian” and “American” salad in Turkey is all but lost in 
the current vernacular. 
294 According to a document in the Prime Ministry Archives, Karpat would continue to receive 
some financial support from the CHP as a student at Istanbul University the following year. 
Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi [BCA] Fon 490 1 00 [Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi] “CHP’nin 
öğrencilere verdiği burslar hakkında tamim” 6.34.8. Interview with Kemal Karpat, April 25, 
2015, Istanbul, Turkey.  




described it as “quite a surrealist thing.” On December 4, 1945, she remembered visiting the 
scene of the Tan Riot after it had occurred, seeing papers and machinery strewn about, and 
described it as nothing short of “savagery” (vahşet). After that point, she described her parents as 
having been sympathetic to the Democrat Party, primarily because they had many close friends in 
Nişantaşı, where they lived, who had been hit hard by the Wealth Tax (Varlık Vergisi). After 
training briefly in the late 1940s at both the medical and law schools at Istanbul University, she 
would leave Turkey in 1949. What she witnessed that day would stay with her, and in her 
memoirs, she remembers meeting Sabiha Sertel first in Paris, who still “shuddered at the memory 
of that day’s horror.”296  
The Rhetorical Spark: Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın 
 By 1945, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın was one of the deans of the Bab-ı Ali newspaper circuit, 
and his daily newspaper, Tanin, boasted a history that stretched back to the late Ottoman period. 
Throughout the war years, his near-daily wartime column was used to consistently defend any 
perceived threat against the sovereignty of the Turkish nation, especially from Soviet Russia. As 
mentioned in Birgit’s narrative, and many other narratives of the Tan Olayı, it is his editorial from 
December 3, 1945, entitled “Kalkın Ey Ehli Vatan!” [“Rise Up Oh Patriots!”], which provided 
the rhetorical spark for the protests that occurred the following day. It was this article that was 
read aloud in classrooms at Istanbul University, and by and large, his rhetoric crystalized much of 
the rhetoric that would be deployed throughout the course of the riot. In this section, I will assess 
the way in which Yalçın made use of this editorial, and the rarely mentioned second editorial he 
wrote that day, to stake out a specific, and rather nuanced, ideological ground for himself, and the 
İnönü government by extension.  
                                                           




 In “Rise Up Oh Patriots,” Yalçın exhorted his readers to form a national front to combat 
“…the threat of enemy invasion, in the form of Communist propaganda that has begun oozing 
through our ranks,” and insisted that “…the fifth column is active and passing through our 
body.”297 The call to action, however, was one that was explicitly nonviolent in tone, since he 
explains that the Sertels wished to create a sort of victim complex in order to incite an uprising 
against the state, supposedly in the name of Soviet Russia. To combat this, he called for “anti-
propaganda,” explaining that, “this battle’s weapons are only words” because that is what was 
necessary to “awaken our fellow citizens.”298  
 Following that opening, Yalçın dove into a line by line refutation of one of the articles 
from the first (and only) issue of Görüşler, entitled “Chained Freedom” (“Zincirli Hürriyet”) 
penned by Sabiha Sertel. First, he attacked lines of the editorial that emphasized personal 
sacrifice in the interest of the collective – sentiments like “the grandest slogan of a society of free 
people is the requirement of sacrificing personal freedom in the interest of others.”299 Yalçın 
attacked this line as “a guileless deception” that is a classic example of communist rhetoric. He 
insisted the only freedom Sabiha Sertel was interested in was her own, since her tactics reflected 
in his eyes the way communists insist on “…mak[ing] inconspicuous expressions… in the name 
of freedom in order to create a worker’s proletariat, only for their own personal freedom and at 
which point our freedoms will be shown to be chained… Just as it is in Russia: There is freedom 
there. But only for Communists and Communist leaders.”300 
 Yalçın only ratcheted up this line, and took the liberty of answering some of the questions 
Sertel posed to her readers in her article, 
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Lady Sertel, in a moment of curiosity; she asks: 
--In what democracy does the press law foreclose the freedom of speech, 
thought and conscience? 
 Allow me to answer:  
 In your beloved and adulterous genuine Russian democracy. 
 Lady Sertel asks: 
 --In what democracy does the civil law foreclose the struggle to form civil 
society and political parties? 
 Let me answer: 
 In the genuine Russian democracy that you want to bring to our country. 
 Lady Sertel asks:  
 --In what democracy are citizens delivered to the police for their political 
views or creeds, pushed from the safety of their homes out into the square and have 
their houses given over to the police jurisdiction for search? 
 Let me answer: 
 In your dear Russian democracy. 
 Lady Sertel flutters: 
 “Building a democratic state, a workers and villagers organization, strikes 
and demonstrations must occur in order to defend justice…” 
 --Yes Lady, the reactionary and backward European democracies and the 
capitalists you wish to sink to the bottom of the ocean are well familiar with the 
backward and rightist American workers strikes and demonstrations that in reality they 
are in the name of true democracy but if adopted in Bolshevik Russia the penalty for 
strike is death!301 
 
The condescending and sexist tone of Yalçın’s article continued through the conclusion of the 
piece where he applauds the supposed lack of government response to these incitements – 
presumably he was excepting the stern denials from the government officials that were 
supposedly to write in upcoming issues of Gorüşler. Ultimately, he rested the response to this 
article on the actions of the people, because the Sertels, “are far from serious, simply because the 




people and the government are incited by this obstreperousness and against this contentious 
publication the silence and tolerance given as an answer by the government is the kindest yet 
most deafening silence.”302 
 This quite famous editorial provides much in the way of exemplifying the level of vitriol 
with which many of these ideological or propagandistic debates played out in the Turkish press 
throughout the Second World War. Yet, it provides little more than, as he himself wrote, “anti-
propaganda” and not much material with which we might understand Yalçın’s own ideological 
leanings and thus why he was so invested in this particular rhetorical struggle. Yet, in all of the 
accounts of the Tan Olayı, none mention the other editorial Yalçın published on the same day, on 
the same page as the infamous “Rise Up Oh Patriots!” This article, entitled “Left-Right and 
Progressive-Conservative” delved much farther into his own outlook on the global ideological 
struggle and points more specifically to where his issues with the Sertels might lie. In this article 
he attacked the perception of a global divide over left and right, progressive and conservative, 
Bolshevik and Fascist as “meaningless stack of words, if you look at the shape taken by our 
country, all you will be able to find is a bluster of bad propaganda.”303 As an example, he took 
again to the pages of Görüşler, according to which, the world is shifting to the left citing the July 
1945 victory of Clement Attlee’s Labour Party in the United Kingdom over Churchill’s 
conservatives.304 Yet, he pointed out that the same article five lines later states that “America and 
England are afraid of Europe’s ninety-degree shift to the left and are rather working to support a 
greater equilibrium from the right…” as an example of the leftist publication contradicting 
itself.305 He emphasizes his readers the internal feuds within the global left, stating that, “anyone 
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who doesn’t agree with Communism is rightist, conservative and reactionary.”306 Clearly, he took 
issue throughout the article with the dogmatic approach to leftism that he sees exhibited by 
Marxists. He insisted that communism is not a new philosophy – that it was exhibited by ancient 
Greek philosophers, Jewish prophets and the first Christian societies – but that Marx and his 
followers are so impatient for a revolution that they will deny freedom in the process of trying to 
bring one about. Yalçın positioned himself against this tactic as someone who in fact sympathizes 
with the traditionally leftist elements of Kemalism. As he stated at the end of the editorial, “Like I 
said twenty-one years ago when I stood before the Independence Tribunals: I am a radical and 
secular Republican [Cumhuriyetçi, radikal ve laikim]. I’m on the side of equal rights for 
everyone. I believe in the Four Freedoms307 and I stand against Görüşler and Yeni Dünya’s 
Communist propaganda in the name of this liberal western democracy.”308 
 Yalçın therefore threw his political and ideological weight behind the victors of World 
War II by making the case that the fundamental principles of Kemalism and the version of 
liberalism espoused by FDR were in harmony with one another. His view also neatly aligns with 
the geopolitical situation that Turkey found itself in during December 1945 – afraid of Russian 
encroachment on its territory, and desirous of assistance from the rising hegemon across the 
Atlantic. By coupling the more philosophical and universalist tone of “Left-Right, Progressive-
Conservative” with the nationalist and xenophobic tenor of “Rise Up Oh Patriots!” we see on the 
same page of the newspaper, from the same intellectual, an accurate reflection of how Turkish 
political discourse was affected both by the general progress of Second World War and by 
Turkey’s oscillating neutrality. To support the Turkish policy in the political press of this period 
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307 That would be the freedoms articulated in Franklin Roosevelt’s 1941 State of the Union 
Address: the freedom of speech, the freedom of worship, the freedom from want and the freedom 
from fear. Though it is hard to believe that Yalçın explicitly invoked Roosevelt when he faced the 
Independence Tribunals in the late 1920s. 
308 Ibid.  
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required showing both of these aspects, since too clear an ideological association with one foreign 
party or another would leave one open to claims that the national interest was not paramount, but 
the lack of one would suggest that Turks had nothing to say about the world-changing ideological 
battle being fought in Europe. Yalçın understood this perhaps better than any of the intellectuals 
in Istanbul at the time, and this is one example of how he walked the line in print. And yet, he 
might not have been the most prominent figure involved in supporting the protest once it began. 
The Cases of Büyük Doğu and Tasvir 
The brief opening of press restrictions in the spring of 1945 saw the eventual re-entry of 
several newspapers to the scene in Istanbul. Tan and Tasvir (“Description” formerly Tasvir-i 
Efkâr), whose frequent internecine conflicts over the course of WWII had caused the government 
to shut them down indefinitely in late summer of 1944, were re-instated in late March, 1945309 
and in November the poet Necip Fazıl Kısakürek re-booted his weekly magazine Büyük Doğu 
(The Great East) after it was suspended in May of the previous year.310 Kısakürek’s new version 
of his magazine had a clear political aim of reorienting the populace away from the moral decay 
of Europe and towards the Eastern, Ottoman, and Islamic heritage of Turkey’s past. Kısakürek, as 
                                                           
309 Over the course of the war, Tan was suspended seven total times for a total of two and a half 
months, prior to its indefinite closing on 12 August 1944. Tasvir/Tasvir-i Efkar, was suspended 
eight times in the same period, before an indefinite suspension on 30 September 1944. Newspaper 
suspensions were a very common practice during the war for the İnönü government, for more 
information see Cemil Koçak, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Turk Basını” in Tarih ve Toplum, Vol. 35, 
November 1986, 29-33. All newspaper closings were conducted under the infamous Article 50 of 
the 1931 Press Law, and while the Kararname announcing suspensions were normally somewhat 
vague as to the precise infractions of the given newspaper, the Kararname announcing Tan’s 
1944 suspension singled the paper out for “spreading dangerous seeds of discord and provoking 
dissent amongst the citizenry” (“…yurt içinde tehlikeli nifak tohumlar eken ve vatandaşları 
birbiri aleyhine eder...”) BCA Başvekalet Muamelât Umum Müdürlüğü (MUM) 080 19 01 02 
106 58 15. The re-instatement for Tan was ordered on 22 March 1945, BCA MUM 080 18 01 02 
107 106 10.  
310 While daily newspapers like Tan, Vatan and Tasvir resumed their usual numbers, ordering 
systems, etc. once their suspensions were lifted, the re-arrival of Büyuk Doğu was in essence a re-




introduced in the previous chapter, was a modernist poet, a pupil of the French philosopher Henri 
Bergson, and had a worldview that in many ways rejected traditional images and symbols in favor 
of an incorporation of modernist artistic and poetic styles into modes of Islamic thought. The 
cover art of Büyük Doğu tended to strike a chord that was at once demonizing the West and was 
reminiscent of European modernist artistic movements, such as Italian Futurism [Fig. L]. 
 
Figure L: “This City is Floating Away!!!” Büyük Doğu no. 1, 2 November 1945. The balloons 
are labeled “Adultery,” “Gambling,” “Drunkenness,” “Doubt,” “Theft,” and “Murder” 
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Following the riot, Büyük Doğu championed the cause of the rioters. In the first issue 
published after the riot, on December 7, the cover [Fig. M] of Büyük Doğu featured a triptych of 
photographs: a shot of the crowd on Ankara Avenue holding signs and pictures of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk and İsmet İnönü, a photograph presumably taken inside Büyük Doğu’s office of 
Kısakürek with two unidentified university students, a former parliamentarian and reporter for the 
official Trade Office, Kazım Nami Duru, and a columnist for Büyük Doğu, Nejat Muhsinoğlu, 
and lastly a photograph of the crowd surrounding the Monument to the Republic (Cumhuriyet 
Anıtı) in Taksim Square, with the caption “The youth came to us and brought the Communists’ 
documents.”311 The following week the cover featured photocopies of several such “documents” 
purportedly proving the Sertel’s Soviet inclinations, including a copy of a Russian newspaper 
with Zekeriya Sertel’s name penciled on it, a map, in Turkish, of the world where Moscow is 
circled and lines radiated out to other soviet-friendly nations, a copy of the French newspaper Le 
Carrefour with the headline “Le Choix du 21 Octobre: Mystique Communiste,” and an unsigned 
letter addressed to Zekeriya Sertel detailing a recent report from a Soviet radio station out of 
Moscow expressing support for Armenian separatists hoping to join the Soviet Union. The 
caption for this cover read, “The Documents of Tan’s Spirit and Work!”312 
 The issue on December 14 proceeded to recount the events on December 4, and what 
Kısakürek was doing throughout the day of the riot. According to this report, Kısakürek was 
alerted to the events in Beyazit Square at around eight in morning when an anonymous student 
called his office at Büyük Doğu. The student informed him that a protest was beginning in 
                                                           
311 Büyük Doğu, 7 December 1945, “Gençler bize geldi ve kömünistlerin evrakını getirdi” 
312 Büyük Doğu, 14 December 1945, “Vesikalar (Tan)cıların Ruhu ve İşi” The focus here on 
Armenia is significant given the resonances with the USSR’s policy towards Turkey in the weeks 
and months following V-E Day, when Stalin made numerous demands on the İnönü government 
to renegotiate the Straits regime established in the Montreux conventions and repatriate the 
regions surrounding Kars and Ardahan. For an in-depth discussion of these negotiations, see Onur 
Işçi, “Russophobic Neutrality”, 265-276   
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Beyazit Square and that they were “proceeding against the communists.” After an undetermined 
period of time, Kısakürek, with Nejat Muhsinoğlu at his side, went down to the Tan offices to see 
what was happening for himself. It appears he arrived there just before the majority of the crowd 
made it to Tan. The article mentions that there was in fact a police cordon in front of the office, 
but that once the crowd arrived the police were either overrun or disbanded since “…within 
seconds all of the barriers, together with the windowpanes of Tan, were torn and strewn about, 
and Tan Press began to shake like a rotten tooth.”313 
 After returning to the business office of Büyük Doğu, Necip Fazıl was visited by a 
number of unidentified youths who were involved in the protests. The first group, described as 
“truly right thinking” and “who were on our side and dependent on our spirit” came to the offices 
covered in blood, though without introducing themselves or saying much of what they had been 
up to. They washed in the faucets of Büyük Doğu and then left in a hurry. A while later, the 
article mentions a group of youths had assembled outside the offices of Büyük Doğu and began 
discussing moving the protest against Akşam (Evening) newspaper.314 Necip Fazıl greeted them 
with a few words and the response was, as the article says, “with the strength that could have 
lifted the wooden building into the air.”315 
 Following this intrusion, two college students, the ones who are depicted on the cover of 
the December 7 issue [Fig. M], burst into the Büyük Doğu offices “with faces like lightning” and 
a stack of documents and newspapers in their hands. The protestors claim to have found these 
documents, some of which are published in photocopy on the cover and inside the paper, at the 
                                                           
313 Ibid, “Hadiseler” 8 
314 It is notable that Akşam is discussed as a target in this account because its owner, Necmettin 
Sadak, was a noted Nazi sympathizer. There are no details given in this source that detail why 
Akşam was not ultimately targeted, and no other sources corroborate this story. It remains that 




offices of Yeni Dünya, owned by the Sertel colleague, Cami Baykurt.316 After leaving the 
documents with Kısakürek and taking the aforementioned photograph, the youths left. The article 
describes the documents published on the front page, particularly the note supposedly written in 
Zekeriya Sertel’s handwriting, as “unequivocal proof that they were one of the bases for secret 
communication [of Soviet Propaganda].” After briefly reviewing the documents, the article 
concludes, “We are immediately delivering these documents to the government, [the documents] 
are without a doubt proof that [the Sertels] were involved in an organized and systematic struggle, 
particularly on behalf the Armenians and for Armenianness. We are certainly not on the side of 
the idea that gives lessons in error, we are not ones who should be held accountable for questions 
about our loyalties to another country!”317    
                                                           
316 Ibid, Cami Baykurt was the proprietor of both Yeni Dünya and the French-language La 
Turquie, these were the second newspaper offices that were sacked on December 4.  
317 Ibid, the article also states that the documents were delivered to the Istanbul branch of the 




Figure M: “The Youth Have Come to Us and Brought the Communists’ Documents!” Büyük 
Doğu 7 December 1945. Necip Fazıl Kısakürek is depicted second from right in the middle 
picture, the two protestors who procured the documents to his right. 
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 While Büyük Doğu was self-consciously constructed as an organ of a specific political 
ideology, Tasvir was a daily newspaper, and though its editorial staff had clear anti-communist 
leanings its coverage of the events leading up to and after the Tan Riot provide a different gloss. 
Following the announcement of the Sertels’ new magazine, Görüşler, Tasvir published a short 
response from the politicians named as contributors to the magazine on December 1. In response 
to questions from the Tasvir reporter about whether or not he had consented to write for Görüşler 
Celal Bayar made his own ideological leanings clear,  
Let me speak precisely to this question: I am attached to the aims of Kemalism that seek 
to secure independent national sovereignty, and have been purely and innocently so from 
the beginning. I have absolutely no connection to any ideology other than Kemalism. As 
within Kemalism, as you know, in this notion of democracy there is free expression. 
From the first days, and increasingly so as time goes on, I have taken it as my 
responsibility that it is impossible for me to separate myself from our fundamental 
reforms. In order for political life to continue, we must put these prevailing ideas in a 
central place. Everyone will see this. 
Up until now, I’ve never claimed to be an “editorialist” [“muharrirlik” 
iddiasında bulunmadım]. And I have still not found myself on that path. It is not a good 
bet that I will be part of such a journal as this or any other. Without exception, the 
substance of any publication I have made, related to the statements of our reforms in our 
historical age, I have found that I have been the one giving information [i.e.: he has been 
a newsmaker, not a news writer]. I have no other words to give on this subject.318 
The article also briefly questioned Adnan Menderes and Fuad Köprülü, who it said gave the same 
reply, and Tevfik Rüştü Aras, who responded by insisting that unless his byline appeared, he did 
not write anything and that “I have not been writing articles for other writers who are intent on 
taking a path that is contrary to the interests of the country.”319 
 The following days included reports of stern anti-communist reaction from public 
officials and general surprise at the advertised inclusion of Bayar, Menderes, and Köprülü in 
                                                           
318 Tasvir December 1, 1945, “’Görüşler’ isimli komünist mecmuasının münasebetsizliği” 
319 Ibid. Ultimately, an essay written by Aras did appear in Görüşler, though it was a reprint of an 
earlier essay that recalled some of his last days spent with Atatürk before his death. See below for 
a summary.  
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Görüşler. Particularly strong reactions were reported in Izmir, where a group of youths publicly 
tore up the copies of the magazine that they acquired, and in some instances writing, “do not read 
this Communist journal” underneath the banner of each issue. Such reports prompted the 
assessment of Tasvir’s editors that “This journal that wants to spread red propaganda has been 
met on all sides by public disgust.”320 The same article also featured a report from Eskişehir, 
stating that, “The Görüşler journal came here, but after they read it, those on the side of the 
people knew immediately what the principles and purposes of it were. For this reason, it is 
understood that the second printing of the journal that was meant to be sent here will be 
returned.”321 On the day of the riot, Tasvir printed a letter written by a group of university 
students who were angered by the announcement of Görüşler addressed to former Foreign 
Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras, who had often been sympathetic to the Sertels. The letter attacks 
Aras for betraying his storied service in the War for Independence, and for corrupting the 
memory of Atatürk, concluding that because of this betrayal, history would remember him as 
Tevfik Rüştü the Miserable [Zavallı Tevfik Rüştü].322    
 In the days following the riot, Tasvir applauded the students who led the riot with 
headlines like “The Cheers of the Youths” and detailed reports from the riot and reactions from 
around the country. The paper reported that after some organization at Istanbul University the 
students began to gather in Beyazıt Square around ten o’clock to put together placards. A 
selection of the reported slogans included: “No country is as democratic as we are,” “We are 
neither Fascist nor Communist, we are Democrats,” “Long Live Atatürk,” “Damn the Sertels” 
and “Damn the Traitors.” Tasvir estimated the crowd at around five or six thousand students – 
                                                           
320 Tasvir, December 3, 1945 “Izmirdeki gençler Görüşler mecmuasının afişlerini yırttı” 
321 Ibid. 
322 Tasvir, December 4, 1945 “Zavallı Tevfik Rüştü”. The nickname is a direct retort to Aras’ 
brief article in Görüşler that was titled, “Büyük Atatürk! Zavallı Atatürk” (“The Great Atatürk! 
The Miserable Atatürk!”). 
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they make no mention of workers from the nearby bazar as Birgit does in his memoir. As the 
crowd passed the CHP party headquarters, the paper reported that students requested party flags 
from the workers there, but were refused. Once the group reached Tan Press, the paper reported 
that windows and glass were broken, books were thrown out of the windows, and chants of 
“damn the communists” and “damn Tan and Görüşler” could be heard. Unlike any of the other 
sources, Tasvir reported some sort of struggle between the police and students at the barricade in 
front of the building’s door, mentioning that after a brief scuffle, the barricade was broken. When 
the crowd, which Tasvir reported had grown to nine or ten thousand by this point, left Tan Press 
to cross the Galata bridge they were met again by 150 or 200 police officers, who were no match 
for the demonstration at that point. As the crowd pushed up Istiklal Avenue, they were met by a 
greater police force, including mounted police and gendarmes, but from the point of view of the 
Tasvir article their main purpose was to help keep the demonstration on the main road up to 
Taksim. After briefly pausing to inflict damage on the Berrak Bookstore – which was known to 
sell Russian newspapers – the crowd pushed towards Taksim. According to Tasvir, at this point 
older women approached the crowd to kiss the hands of the youth. When the crowd reached 
Taksim, one of the youths gave a short speech beneath the Monument of the Republic, 
This meeting is not the product of incitement. If there are agents provocateurs 
here, they too are among those who have for a long time served and written for 
other countries that have strove to break the Turkish union against Turkish 
martyrs and Turkish history.323  
 From this point, it becomes clear that the police were to take a more active role in 
corralling, if not outright suppressing, the demonstration. As the crowd headed back down Istiklal 
Avenue they were met by a heavy police presence near Galatasaray Lycee, at which point many 
of the organizers from the University Student Union began running to the next destination, which 
was the offices of Yeni Dünya and La Turquie, “Tan’s little brothers” according to Tasvir. Details 
                                                           
323 Tasvir December 5, 1945 “Solcu tahriklerden muğber olan gençliğin tezahüratı” 
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on the damage that took place once they got there are not provided beyond saying that these 
offices met much the same fate as Tan did. The youths then returned to Ankara Avenue to report 
back to various friendly periodicals, including Akşam, Büyük Doğu, and Vatan. Interestingly, 
there was apparently some confusion as to whether Ahmet Emin Yalman’s paper, Vatan, was to 
be protested, since he in fact was one of the co-founders of Tan, but Tasvir reported that some of 
the youths in the crowd began to shout at those headed in Vatan’s direction, “No!.. they have 
separated from the communists who oppose our nation.”324 Following all of this, Tasvir reports 
that the crowd scattered, with no mention of whether any groups had boarded ferries to root out 
the Sertels in Moda.  
 Of the press sources who provided extensive coverage of these events, Büyük Doğu and 
Tasvir were among the most vocally in support of the riot, and provided the greatest amount of 
detail of the events as they unfolded. The manner of the reporting is instructive, as both organs 
and their proprietors would become supporters of the Democrat Party over the following five 
years. Necip Fazıl Kısakürek had reached some acclaim as a poet and ideological figure by 1945, 
but positioning himself at the front of this anti-communist and nationalist demonstration surely 
boosted his profile, and he would likewise see increasing popularity as the Democrat Party grew 
in strength. Kısakürek’s legacy has been as one of the main intellectual influences on pious 
conservatism in Turkey, finding himself at the head of a group of resurgent voices of political 
Islam in the 1940s and 1950s. As Duran and Aydın suggest, the space for an emergence of a 
political movement behind figures like Kısakürek was created in the vacuum created by the wake 
of Kemalist modernization in that it, “neither became a rival ideology to Islam, nor did it allow 




the emergence of any ideologies that might rival Islam.”325 It is in events like the Tan Riot that 
Kısakürek’s brand of political Islam would hew closer to the mission and purpose of the Kemalist 
state than it had previously, and make a pitch to occupy ideological space not only in the “rules 
and values [that] shaped the daily lives of individuals and the larger society,” but in the space of 
acceptable political discourse in the coming multiparty era.326 That a variety of political Islam 
espoused by Kısakürek thrived in this environment and the social democratic leftism of the 
Sertels and their cohort did not is in no small part a result of the way events unfolded on 
December 4, 1945.  
 Tasvir, for its part, is exemplary of the sort of pitch being made for the Democrat Party 
establishment. Its proprietor, Ziyad Ebüzziya, would join the DP shortly after its founding and 
would serve as a member of parliament for that party from 1950-1955. Whereas Kısakürek’s 
support for the DP buttressed their connections to Islamist politics, Ebüzziya’s early support for 
the DP filled out more liberal pillars of the party. Ebüzziya and other liberals would eventually 
have a falling out with the DP in the course of a Justice Department raid on certain members of 
the party, known as the “Proof of Righteousness Affair” (İspat Hakkı Olayı) that would lead to 
the formation of the Freedom Party (Hürriyet Partisi) in 1955.327 Nonetheless, that future liberal 
and Islamist pillars both celebrated the rioters, cheering a violent attack on free speech in the 
name of inoculating the infant DP against the supposed threat of communism was an augur of 
future repression of ideas on the left end of the political spectrum that would become 
commonplace in the run up to the DP’s success in the 1950 parliamentary elections.  
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The Muslim World Vol. 103 October 2013, 482. 
326 Ibid. 
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 The Sertels and the Riot 
It is evident from nearly every account of the riot, including Birgit’s, that the Sertels were 
perceived as communists who were bent on co-opting any serious opposition party for the 
purposes of spreading soviet-style socialism in Turkey. Examining the source material from the 
perspective of the Sertels, as well as from the perspective of American Consular documents, this 
public perception of the Sertels was, at best, a gross exaggeration, and, at worst, utterly and 
completely false. The question that I wish to explore in the wider history of this riot is how the 
Sertels came to be painted in such ideologically “red” colors despite their efforts to articulate a 
new vision for Turkey which was by almost any international standard, liberal and democratic. 
In his memoirs, Zekeriya Sertel began the story of the riot several months prior, not long 
after the decision to have multi-party by-elections was made. He described a meeting he had with 
a close acquaintance, the long-serving foreign minister and soon to be UN representative Tevfik 
Rüştü Aras, regarding the potential for a new party under the leadership of Celal Bayar and 
Adnan Menderes. During the meeting, Zekeriya remembered coming to an understanding that the 
new party should have four guiding political principles: “1. The party must defend the freedoms 
and rights of the bourgeois. 2. It will be progressive-statist. An attempt will be made to separate 
private companies from the state. But, they will remain under the control of the state. 3. A 
Turkish-Soviet friendship will be fundamental to foreign policy. 4. Turkey will remain 
independent and pacifist.”328 In the timeline of the run up to the Democrat Party’s foundation and 
                                                           
328 M. Zekeriya Sertel, Hatırladıklarım 1905-1950 (Istanbul: Yaylacık Matbaası, 1968), 260-261. 
When considered against what is classically considered to be the political backbone of Kemalism, 
these pillars do not seem all that controversial. However, by the time this meeting took place, the 
proposition of Turkish-Soviet friendship would have been practically incendiary given that 
Turkey’s realpolitik of neutrality throughout the war was largely guided away from the Soviet 
sphere, and towards the burgeoning American one. As Samuel Hirst has shown, the Turkish-
Soviet partnership during the reign of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was built on more than 
coincidental ideological resonances, and the deep marks it left on culture and economy. Onur İşçi 
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the Tan Riot, this is one of the rare moments of insight we have from the Turkish state archives. 
A record sent from the police bureau tasked with surveillance of potential dissidents to the Prime 
Ministry recounts a meeting that lines up fairly well with Zekeriya Sertel’s memory. The 
informant reports of a series of late-May or early-June meetings between both Sertels, Adnan 
Adıvar (husband of Halide Edib Adıvar), Foreign Minister Aras, and two other prominent 
Istanbul intellectuals, Sadrettin Celal Antel, then a professor at Istanbul University, and Esat Adil 
Müstecaplioğlu, both known socialist intellectuals who occasionally wrote for Tan, the latter of 
which would write for Görüşler. According to the report, the purpose of the meetings was to 
discuss possible platforms for a new party, in line with Sertel’s memoirs, as well as the 
publication of two newspapers that might be flagships for the new party’s agenda – one to be 
called Parti and headed by Hikmet Bil, one of Tan’s editors, and the other an unnamed journal to 
be run by the former editor of Yarın [Tomorrow], Arif Oruç.329 
In August, ahead of potential changes to the Press Law and Law of Associations that had 
been used to suppress newspapers like Tan throughout the war, and following Turkey’s signing of 
the UN Charter, Zekeriya expressed tremendous optimism in a conversation with US officials 
Jack Evarts Horner, Harvey Hall, and Burhan Belge, one of the editorialists at the newspaper. 
According to a memorandum of conversation housed in the US National Archives, “Mr. Sertel 
believed that only Communistic and reactionary parties would be prohibited. By “reactionary” 
party Turks usually mean the policy of religious orthodoxy, the revival of the Caliphate, not 
reaction in the European sense. In fact, many of those who would be classed as reactionaries in 
                                                                                                                                                                              
has recently demonstrated the weakness of this partnership in the face of the geopolitical crises of 
the late 1930s by detailing the diplomatic deterioration following the Montreux Convention and 
through the course of the war. See Samuel J. Hirst, “Anti-Westernism on the European 
Periphery” p. 32-53 and Onur İşçi, “Russophobic Neutrality”. 
329 Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi, Başbakanlık Özel Kalem Müdürlüğü Evrakı [Documents of 




Turkey may at the same time be liberals in so far as economic and political life in general are 
concerned.”330 A mere four days after that conversation, however, Sertel’s hopes were dampened 
following a bizarre incident in which he received notice that Tan was once again suspended by 
the authorities, only to receive an order revoking the first one forty-five minutes later. Horner, the 
Third Secretary of the Embassy, suspected that the Turkish cabinet had passed the suspension 
without getting clearance from President İnönü, who later revoked it. In conversation with the 
same parties as before, Zekeriya expressed doubt that little more would be changed besides the 
troublesome Article 50 of the Press Law and that the early creation of a real opposition was 
unlikely. Horner also related that he had heard from a close relative of Celal Bayar, who even at 
that time was assumed to be the primary prospect to lead an opposition movement, had his doubts 
about forming an opposition party because “he felt that the Turkish people were politically 
immature and that the idea of a parliamentary and non-violent opposition was foreign to the 
nature of the Turkish people,” and Sertel himself was apparently “somewhat shaken” by Bayar’s 
views, and expressed his own uncertainty about where he stood, particularly with regards to how 
he felt about his prior pro-Russian stance in the paper.331 
Later that year, following a press conference regarding a new land reform policy, 
Zekeriya recalled that Adnan Menderes came over for dinner. Following dinner, discussion of the 
above principles ensued, Menderes asked Zekeriya directly if he was a communist, to which he 
responded “this was an unwarranted question.. and if I was going to come out against the design 
of the Land Reform it would be necessary for it to be liberal in meaning.”332 Clearly, Zekeriya 
                                                           
330 US NARA RG 84 UD 3288 Box 13 (Memorandum of Conversation August 23, 1945) 
331 US NARA RG 84 UD 3288 Box 13 (Memorandum of Conversation August 27, 1945). Horner 
also notes that he felt Sertel had been backing off his support for Russian policies for some time. 
332 Zekeriya Sertel, Hatırladıklarım, 264 
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came out of the meeting having got his message across to Menderes, as well as an apparent 
understanding of the principles he had discussed earlier with Aras.333  
It was following this meeting that Zekeriya Sertel took it upon himself to go about 
defending himself and his newspaper from accusations that they represented a communist fifth 
column in Turkey. Beginning with a column he recalled from October 11, he attempted to 
dissuade the Turkish public that communism was on the march, but did so by measuring Turkey’s 
situation in ways that strike the ear as inherently Marxist. In the article entitled “An open 
conversation with our readers” Zekeriya tried to explain to the public that, “In order for 
communism to spread in a country there are objective and subjective conditions that are 
necessary,” and that the Turkish situation, unlike even that of Germany, England, America and 
France, had not yet exhibited the necessary internal industrialization (sanayi kurulmamış), class 
consciousness (sınıflar belirmemiş) or capital accumulation (sermaye birikimi) to meet the 
objective criteria for communist revolution.334 He further stated that even subjective criteria, such 
as the broad organization of the working class with a political leadership or the appearance of 
outward class conflict were undetectable and that “the bourgeois have been deluded into thinking 
that the current situation in Turkey can be called nothing but communist and that there is a 
communist threat.”335 Whether or not Zekeriya’s analysis could have proved truthful, it is rather 
easy to see how this article might not have had the desired effect of disabusing the public of the 
notion that he was a communist. 
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In Zekeriya’s memoir, he suggests that it was in the interest of further diffusing these 
accusations of communism that he set about trying to start a new publication that would be the 
voice of the official opposition party. This magazine, which would be called Görüşler, was first 
discussed discussed in October and November of 1945. It was to be under the direct editorship of 
Sabiha Sertel, and, initially at least, Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, and Tevfik Rüştü Aras had 
agreed to write for it.336 According to Sertel, the newspaper could ultimately not afford to 
compensate Bayar, since their budget allotted only five thousand lira and at the time Bayar was 
making more than seventy thousand from his post at the popular bank, İş Bankası.337 Bayar’s 
position, or perceived position, here is key in the Sertels’ telling, since he is considered by Sertel 
to have sold out their cause to İnönü’s government in order to be sanctioned as the first official 
opposition party. Zekeriya, before retelling the precise events of December 4, 1945, relayed that 
Radio Moscow was making Bayar out to be an enemy of the Soviets, but that Bayar told Zekeriya 
directly, “However, as you know, I am Atatürk’s man. On his deathbed, I promised to carry out 
his will as one of my most holy commitments. For that reason, I cannot be an enemy of the 
Soviets,” but then Sertel laments, “…after the Democrat Party came to power Bayar had 
permanently betrayed Atatürk’s will and made an enemy out of the Soviets.”338 
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According to Zekeriya, Görüşler “exploded like a bomb” at its release on December 1, 
and he could only retain a single copy of the first issue for himself.339 The first issue had 
advertised future issues with perspectives from Bayar, Menderes, and Fuat Köprülü. The cover of 
the magazine featured a drawing by Faris Erkman, a communist party member and attributed 
author of the anti-fascist pamphlet En Büyük Tehlike (The Greatest Danger), that depicted an arm 
labeled Görüşler pulling back a curtain to reveal three cowering male figures labeled, 
“Corruption” (Suiistimal), “Profiteering” (İhtikar) and “Fascism.” In its mission statement, 
Zekeriya Sertel claimed that Görüşler would be, “the first political review published in Turkey” 
and heralded its appearance by informing his readers that, “In western countries, particularly in 
England and America, political reviews have a big position and role… Penetrating into the inside 
story of events is necessary to explain them. This is the biggest goal of this review.”340 The 
twelve-page journal included two opinion articles from Sabiha Sertel, a review of political 
opinion from Zekeriya Sertel, op-eds from Cami Baykurt, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Esat Adil 
Müstecaplioğlu, Adnan Cemgil, and Behice Boran, along with a short story from Sabahattin Ali, 
a poem from Nail V. Çakirhan, and a short comic piece from Aziz Nesin. The final page featured 
a series of political cartoons.  
In the articles, Zekeriya Sertel offered four brief opinion pieces – what in contemporary 
parlance we might call “hot takes” – including a denouncement of the Press Law, saying, “there is 
no Publication or Press Union law in any democratic country” and denounced the law as a 
“fascist law.” That take was followed by a call for new laws enshrining free elections, praise for 
the leftward turn of governments in Britain, France, Scandinavia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and 
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Bulgaria, and a stand against the continued experimentation with atomic weapons.341 Cami 
Baykurt offered a warning about the intentions of the three major Allied powers in maintaining 
peace, stating that each power had starkly different motivations, and deep fears of the other that 
could lead to another conflagration. To Baykurt, WWII was unlike previous wars which, “were 
between nations that for the most part resembled each other in their social characteristics. This 
last war was not like this: To a degree it was a war between imperialist powers, and in the 
common international fronts it was a war that gave birth to a class struggle.”342  
In the first of her two editorials, Sabiha Sertel seconded Baykurt’s line of argument by 
emphasizing the necessity that, “Every block of people uniting against fascism and reactionary 
thought is the only hope we have for the future.” She argued that conditions following this recent 
war had not yet vanquished these elements, and that they well might reorganize and prosper as 
they had after the previous world war.343 The centerfold of the magazine featured two articles, the 
first one was from Esat Adil Müstecaplioğlu detailing the contradictions of principles between the 
Turkish constitution’s guaranteeing of freedoms to organize, strike, of the press, of the thought 
and body, and other personal freedoms with the severe restriction of those freedoms in laws 
ranging from the civil and criminal codes to the Press Law.344 The second article, the one that had 
so incensed Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, was Sabiha Sertel’s “Chained Freedom.” The article was 
provocative, taking a somewhat similar argument to Müstecaplioğlu’s in that she fiercely 
defended her commitment to the rule of law and the constitution, writing on the freedoms 
mentioned by her colleague that,  
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The law is the greatest guarantee of these freedoms. We do not want anarchy… We do 
not want laws that engender the tyranny and oppression of the ruling class. We do not 
want a system that hands the national will and authority over to the character of 
totalitarianism… The Independence struggle… was a struggle to establish a new Turkey 
that supported freedom for all people and various human rights. The hands that wrote the 
constitution had as their goal bringing this to Turkey. 
However, she described that revolution as incomplete, and having shifted so far in the opposite 
direction that, “Today, our economic system, our laws, our politics, our social and cultural 
mechanisms are the mechanisms of a completely fascist system.” The only difference between 
these laws and the laws of a fascist system, according to Sabiha Sertel, was that “these laws that 
have fascist content and spirit also have a democratic name.” She followed these assertions with 
calls to overturn the laws that had restricted the formation of new political parties and the Press 
Law, which she characterized as the chains on the freedoms that the constitution enumerated.345  
 Sabiha Sertel’s editorial was certainly the strongest condemnation of the current Turkish 
government, but it was not the only inflammatory piece in the magazine. Adnan Cemgil’s 
contribution was a lengthy personal attack on the intellectual, and Tasvir columnist, Peyami Safa, 
entitled, “Missionaries of Fascism, No. 1: Peyami Safa.” Cemgil likened Safa to Alfred 
Rosenberg, the Nazi ideologue, and the article accompanied an infelicitous depiction of Safa, 
prostrate in front of a radio listening to the Führer himself [Fig. N].346 Likewise, Safa, Cumhuriyet 
editor Nadir Nadi, and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın were depicted in mocking cartoons in the last page 
of the paper [Figs. O and P].  
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Figure N: Peyami Safa bows to Hitler 
 





Figure P: H. Cahit Yalçın: Ya, how should we attack America now?! [The text reads: 
Cannabalist Fascists! Murderer Hitler, Damn You Fascists, Long live Churchill, Rascally 
Bolsheviks! Red Fascists! Damn You Bolsheviks! Long Live Bevin! America's note to Turkey: A 
New Status Quo in the Straights.] 
The day following the publication of Görüşler, a group of university students gathered 
outside of Tan’s offices and fearing that they were going to provoke violence, Zekeriya 
telephoned the provincial governor, Vali Lütfi Kırdar, who told him “I know and I have taken the 
necessary precautions, don’t worry.”347 The next day, December 3rd, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın 
published his provocative article, “Kalkın Ey Ehli Vatan” (“Rise up Oh Patriots”), which 
surprised Zekeriya since he had thought he had relatively friendly relations with Yalçın. Early 
that morning, an unnamed university student telephoned Zekeriya saying that a group of youths 
were planning to riot and destroy Tan Press. He again phoned the governor, who said that they 
would surround the vicinity of the press with police.348 Zekeriya described the riot from his own 
memory much as if he had been there to witness it, even though he was certainly at home across 
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the Bosphorus in Moda during the entirety of the affair. Nonetheless, he described the actions of 
the protestors in harrowing detail, saying that they bore axes, sledgehammers and carried with 
them bottles of red ink. Upon busting into the Tan offices, he wrote that some of the protestors 
asked where the Sertels were in hopes that they could arrest them, strip them naked, and douse 
them in the red ink as if to say, “here are the reds” (işte kızıllar). He insisted, perhaps rightly, that 
this wild crowd destroyed the offices with the police as onlookers. Once they were done 
rampaging the Tan offices, and after they had moved to Beyoğlu to trash the offices of La 
Turquie, Sertel claimed that many of the protestors had boarded a ferry to Kadıköy so that they 
could find them in their home and attack them there. Zekeriya and Sabiha received reports of all 
of this over the phone, and later called the Vali a third time, incensed and afraid, to tell him, “Are 
you sure you took the measures that you said you would? Now the fascists are coming to my 
house. You let my press be destroyed, at least let us avoid the same to our lives.” The Vali then 
assured them that their life was not in danger as the boat the protestors had boarded was 
redirected toward the Marmara Islands instead of Kadıköy. When the Vali then asked if the 
Sertels were still in their house and recommended they stay there, Zekeriya knew this “meant that 
we could not stay in the house. Our lives were in danger. At this time, we heard a buzzing coming 
from afar. With each minute, the buzzing sound seemed louder to us. We left our house and took 
refuge in one of our neighbor’s homes.”349   
Zekeriya stated that after the events of December 4, not a single one of the organizers 
could be found. He wrote that he had no doubt that President İnönü knew that his Prime Minister, 
Şükrü Saraçoğlu, gave the order to the police to organize and assist in the conduction of the riot, 
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and that there were plainclothes police officers amongst the crowd.350 Sertel concluded his 
narrative of these events by relaying a strange instance he experienced a few months afterwards. 
He had purchased a book in Istanbul’s old antiquarian bookshop and a piece of paper had fallen 
out. The scrap had a note on it addressed to Prime Minister Saraçoğlu and read simply, “My dear 
sir, I’ve fulfilled your orders, now I am waiting for my reward. Signed: Yaşar Çimen.”351 He tells 
us in the memoir that Çimen was a propagandist for Italian fascism, and had been seen amongst 
the crowds at the riot – proving to Sertel at least that he must have been one of Saraçoğlu’s 
contacts for organizing the riot. As I will show later, Çimen was in fact one of the organizers of 
the riot, but his connections to Saraçoğlu and the CHP elite are somewhat obscure. 
While Zekeriya Sertel’s opinions often garnered suspicion from colleagues and 
government officials alike, it was often the more pointed and direct opinions of his wife and 
partner, Sabiha Sertel, that provoked a public outcry. The name of the new newspaper that 
sparked the ire of columnists like Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Görüşler, was in fact the same as 
Sabiha’s regular column in Tan. In the days leading up to the riot, her opinion pieces became 
increasingly defensive of her and her husband’s newspaper, and increasingly accusatory towards 
the efforts of the ruling CHP to silence them. On December 1, her editorial ran with the title “The 
İbret and Meşveret Newspapers of this Era”, and compared attacks against Tan and the 
newspaper of their one-time partner Ahmet Emin Yalman, Vatan to those of the notorious 
Ottoman sultan Abdülhamid II against the leading lights of the Ottoman constitutional 
movement.352 Her editorial of December 2, “The Fear of the Opposition”, she criticized the 
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efforts of the CHP to manage the new opposition parties directly, “…our opposition is defeatist, 
they are regarded as traitorous… [the CHP] says that those who are not opposed to itself can still 
criticize the government. Only the pot can call the kettle black.”353  
Sabiha’s memoir provides further details of how the Sertels spent the day of the riot. 
Initially, fearing that they would find themselves under attack at their home, they went to the 
house of Sabiha’s seventy-eight-year-old mother. They stayed there until evening, and when all 
was clear they returned to their house. The following day they were visited upon by their friends 
and co-workers Vâlâ and Müzehher Nüreddin, from whom they learned of the Istanbul mayor’s 
ploy to send the protestors who had boarded the Kadıköy ferry to the Marmara Islands, and with 
whom they spent the three days following the riot.354 While there, Sabiha ruminated on the 
extreme violence the crowd had wished upon them, “At that time I understood how awful this all 
was. They had wanted to ensure victory by destroying the press and murdering the owners, they 
could not be defeated with discussion. In what way could this be the promise of democracy? This 
was nothing other than fascist terror.”355 Sabiha describes the time spent at their house following 
the riot to be incredibly tense. They took no visitors after returning from Nüreddin’s house save 
one English reporter, to whom she insisted that, “during the war years, the impact of the 
assistance provided to fascist Germany by the men of the state against the will of the people was 
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disastrous. And now they are taking an attitude against the progressive newspapers, it gives the 
impression that democracy will not be established in Turkey for a great many years.”356   
From the perspective of the Sertels, we can see that their own hopes for a genuinely free 
democratic regime in Turkey’s near future were effectively dashed by the destruction of their 
printing house. While they would not leave Turkey for nearly five years following this event, 
their presence as public intellectuals, as publishers of a major newspaper, and as confidants of 
opposition politicians that they had held for nearly three decades was severely damaged by these 
events, and would be almost completely extinguished following their trial for espionage in the 
following year. While the Sertels had certainly faced pressure from the state before, this sort of 
popular outrage against them, however much they believed it was stoked by the state, effectively 
ended their mission to create an opposition to the CHP that was rooted in social democratic and 
liberal values. Likewise, it is worthwhile to contrast the Sertels’ despondency regarding the 
prospects for Turkish democracy in the wake of the riot with those of Celal Bayar and the 
champions of the Democrat Party, many of whom had been pessimistic about the multiparty 
project until shortly after the riot. It is in these attitudes that questions arise about the sincerity of 
the transition to multiparty democracy in Turkey, because at least in the wake of this riot, it 
would appear that the organic and loyal opponents of the regime, those best positioned to build a 
popular opposition party were silenced while those opposition members closest to the Kemalist 
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center enjoyed protection, and, in effect, inoculation against the many accusations of treachery 
that were launched against any member of Turkey’s left in the early days of the Cold War.  
Where is the State? 
The Turkish Prime Ministry Archives naturally hold a wealth of information that would 
reveal a great deal about the nature of this riot, who was involved, and what could be determined 
about its outcome. Unfortunately, only scant evidence has, at this point, been made available that 
provides some glimmers into the state’s perspective. Following the events of December 4, the 
Martial Law Administration, which had control over all elements of policing in Istanbul at the 
time, conducted an investigation into the riot that was concluded on or around December 15. 
While the full archives of the police and Martial Law Administration are unavailable to 
researchers, because they are housed in the Interior Ministry, a four-page summary of the 
investigation was submitted to the Prime Ministry on 6 January 1946. The report points a finger 
at Tan, La Turquie, Görüşler, and Yeni Dünya for “inciting those who love their nation and 
motherland,” while acknowledging the central role of Yalçın’s editorial and Tasvir’s provocations 
in the days leading up to 4 December.357 The report implicates a specific group of Istanbul 
University students, including the aforementioned second year law student Tahsin Atakan along 
with his classmate Turan Tamer and a student from the Literature Faculty İhsan Göğüş as the 
main organizers of the riot, and they were later joined by another student Yaşar Çimen.358 The 
report appears to have determined the plan made by this group the day prior to the riot, which 
consisted of the following points: 
I- While gathering the university youth in Beyazit square, wire those that made the 
negative publications. 
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II – While going in front of the Halk Parti and Vilayet houses assure the allegiance of the 
youth to the government and the party. 
III – After arriving at Taksim square and placing a wreath on the monument, determine to 
disperse.359 
 
According to information in the report acquired from Yaşar Çimen, once at Taksim the plan was 
to place the placards, banners, and wreaths on the Monument to the Republic, a display they had 
nicknamed “The Russian Flower Market” [Rus Çiçek Pazarı]. Investigators also observed a 
number of the placards distributed by the group once they arrived in Beyazit Square, they 
included the following:  
A) These bigots want the Spanish Civil War in our territory (İspanya kardeş boğuşmasını 
Yurdumuzda isteyen yobazlar) 
B) Don’t forget that a national front is born 
C) There isn’t this kind of freedom in the most democratic countries 
D) Long Live the Turkish Democratic Country 
E) Don’t read the journals and newspapers of malicious people 
F) We are neither fascists nor Nazis, we are the lovers of Democracy 
G) If there is something wrong with our party, let’s resolve it as brothers. Find that in 
your writing.360 
 
The report summary estimated the crowd numbered close to ten thousand people – most of which 
were not students – and that police presence was light compared to the size of the protest since a 
little more than one hundred officers were sent to Beyazıt at the start of the demonstration, only 
fifty were left to try and protect the Tan building, and perhaps a few more were to blockade 
bridges going over to Galata.  
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 The summary also provided a bit more information on the Soviet-affiliated bookstores 
that were destroyed following the destruction of La Turquie. Berrak bookstore was the most 
prominent store that faced violence that day, the report mentions that thousands of Soviet or 
Russian newspapers remained strewn about Istiklal Avenue days after the event and that at least 
one clerk from the nearby Soviet Consulate, Andre Slomo, was observed at the scene. The crowd 
also destroyed the A.B.C. Bookstore before heading back to Beyazit where they intended to 
destroy a Russian-owned bookstore there named Lena, but were totally dispersed by police before 
arriving.361 
 The report concluded with three separate findings: that there were no foreign elements or 
agents provocateurs involved in the protest, that the motives of the crowd should not be judged 
“since the mass was composed of those whose national pride and excitement was incited by those 
whose motives are unknown,” and that the prosecution of crimes related to this event were in fact 
outside the jurisdiction of the Martial Law Administration and it was thus requested that civilian 
authorities apply the appropriate legal processes in this regard.362 It is apparent from several 
points in the report that the police received relatively little cooperation from either the parties 
involved in orchestrating the riot or the victims, and that resistance to providing information to 
the investigation was part of the reason for a referral to a civilian prosecution. 
 From what little there is in the state archives it is hard to determine what, if any, 
relationship might have existed between the state, via the CHP, and the students who organized 
the protest. It appears from a few other documents related to Ali İhsan Göğüş and Yaşar Çimen 
that these students had been involved for at least a few years in promoting CHP activities on 
campus, though the nature of their ties with the party are not yet entirely clear. The party itself 
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was very active on university campuses across the city, and Istanbul University especially where 
it provided scholarships and housing stipends to hundreds of students every year. It would appear 
from party records that in 1946 Göğüş was among the students living in the CHP-subsidized 
dorm on campus, it is unclear whether he received a scholarship but it seems safe to assume that 
he benefitted from CHP funds in the same year that he organized the riot.363  
 Another glimpse into the event from the Turkish archives comes from two requests for 
assistance addressed to the Ministry of Finance through the Beyoğlu Notary, one each by the two 
owners of La Turquie, Cami Vedat Baykurt and his wife Afife Nermin Baykurt. While the 
requests for compensation were rejected by the Finance Ministry, they do detail the extent of the 
damages to both the offices of the newspapers owned by Cami Baykurt and the printing house 
owned by Afife. In physical damage to the two properties, including the destruction of various 
machines, fixtures and furniture, in the two buildings totaled 108,140.75 Turkish Liras and the 
combined losses from work stoppage and compensation totaled 60,823 Turkish Liras.364 These 
were significant sums of money, which likely accounted in part for the loss of livelihood not just 
for the Baykurt’s but also the staff of each newspaper. No such requests exist on behalf of the 
Sertels or other businesses affected by the riot, but considering that Tan Press resided in a much 
larger building – it was a more widely distributed paper than either La Turquie or Yeni Dünya and 
housed more expensive printing machines – we might be able to speculate that the losses 
sustained by the Sertels were somewhat larger than that of the Baykurts.  
 These scant documents raise more questions than answers about the state’s role in the 
Tan Riots. It is clear from the Interior Ministry’s report that the Martial Law Administration and 
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the Police were, at the very least, sympathetic to the rioters. That those named as organizers of the 
riot ultimately faced no retribution, and that the Baykurt’s request to be reimbursed was denied 
suggests that the legal system in place at the time held a similar sympathy. Yet, no documents in 
the archive point to the higher levels of the CHP administration, either President İnönü or Prime 
Minister Saraçoğlu, as having any direct involvement in the conduct of the riot. Absent a fuller 
opening of the archives at the Interior Ministry, it is unlikely we will get a fuller understanding of 
the role of the state in these events, at least by their own account. It is unclear whether the 
disposition to favor the demonstrators on the part of the Martial Law Administration was shared 
widely by members of the CHP or the Prime Ministry.  
 Aside from the government records, we do have the recorded memories of Kazım Alöç, 
the lead prosecutor for the Martial Law Administration, who recorded a series of memories 
regarding various trials of the forties and fifties – including his prosecution of the Sertels and the 
Pan-Türkist groups, the topic of the next chapter – in 1967, which have recently been republished. 
Alöç wrote that the Martial Law commander did not want to disrupt the protests earlier on 
because they did not want to “enter a nest of knowledge” (ilim yuvasına girmek), but Alöç 
wondered why they waited as long as they did to suppress the riot as it became violent. Alöç then 
mentions that Ali Ihsan Göğüş and Yaşar Çimen, who he then identified as a bureaucrat at the İş 
Bankası’s Eminönü branch, were taken into custody along with five others, whose names he 
could not remember. 365 Sometime later, Alöç remembers going to the Istanbul Police Bureau to 
check on those who had been detained. While he was meeting with the director, Ahmet Demir, he 
noticed the detainees were in the next room with the CHP inspector, Alaatim Tiritoğlu, who 
seemed to be obliging to the protesters, even offering them cigarettes. Alöç then asked the 
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director whether he was concerned about the appearance of familiarity between the CHP 
inspector and the protestors, given the gossip he had heard which was harming the authority of 
the Martial Law Administration. The director responded, “You’re right… however, we’ve 
reached a fait accompli” (lâkin bir emrivaki ile karşılaştık).  
The American Consular Perspective 
 I will now turn to a view of the situation based on documents in the US Archives from 
the Istanbul consulate and the Ankara Embassy. The story from these documents is vital to the 
story of the Tan Riot for several reasons. First, and perhaps most obvious, the United States had a 
vested interest in drawing Turkey into its orbit and preventing the spread of communism, and 
therefore its consulate took a keen interest in the internal political happenings of Turkey, 
especially at the dawn of the multi-party period, which could be seen as a potential opening for 
socialist or communist elements in the Turkish public sphere. Secondly, in tandem with the 
Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the consulates were 
extraordinarily well-connected to every level of the Turkish government and society, including 
politicians, journalists like the Sertels, and even the Turkish secret police. As such, there are 
materials from interviews conducted by the US consulate available nowhere else, as well as 
translations of documents whose originals have either since been destroyed or exist in folios of 
the Turkish archives that are not yet open to the public. Lastly, it is important to understand the 
manner in which the United States assessed communist and anti-communist activity in Turkey 
because it shows us exactly how these two allies saw each other on ideological grounds, and the 
extent to which fighting communism in Turkey was a joint project. 
 There are only a few documents that had come to the US consulate through the Turkish 
secret police that relate to the Tan Riot, but they provide significant insight into the management 
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of the events by the Martial Law Administration and the government as a whole. The first is the 
prominent place given to Zekeriya Sertel in a memorandum translated by OSS from the Turkish 
secret police on Communist activities in Turkey. The memorandum, which was obtained by the 
Ankara Embassy on October 9, 1945 and forwarded to attaché Richard Gnade and Ambassador 
Edwin C. Wilson, singles out Tan as one of the few newspapers to have successfully survived as 
a proponent of the communist agenda despite the heavy restrictions of the Turkish censors. Halil 
Lütfü Dördüncü, a founder of the newspaper along with the Sertels, is described as “a half-
ignorant man, whose ambition for earning money is boundless” and the newspaper’s policy 
“resembles that of the German propaganda system.”366 The report identifies three main tactics in 
Tan’s supposedly devious propaganda: first to cause a fall out with the government by 
exaggerating every small grievance and taking an analysis that “supposedly inclines towards the 
doctrines of Roosevelt but actually almost always towards Marx;” second, by espousing a 
worldview that is inherently revolutionary and consistent throughout all of the articles, even by 
placing supposedly Marxist terminology into the paper’s crossword puzzles so that “the definition 
of Socialism, mostly Marxism, [is put] in terms that even children and women can understand;” 
lastly by identifying prominent Marxists outside of Turkey and from history in order to teach its 
readers about the success of Marxism worldwide.367 
 Declassified confidential files from the Ankara Embassy reveal that the US delegation 
anticipated an increasing anti-Soviet feeling amongst the citizens of Istanbul, and likely saw the 
Tan Riot at the culmination of an anti-communist movement that was swelling as World War II 
came to a close. As early as May 1945, the Chargé d’Affaires in Ankara, E.L. Packer, had been in 
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contact with the office of the Secretary of State regarding the ideological position of Turkish 
informants to the US Consulate in Istanbul relative to the growing rivalry amidst the then-
victorious Allied Powers. Packer explained in his report that the “average Turk regards the 
Russian… as a hereditary enemy” and that “although all through the war there have been a 
number of Turkish newspapers labeled “pro-Allied” their pro-Allied sentiments extend (with the 
possible exception of Tan) to the United States and Great Britain but not to Russia.”368 And so as 
early as May 1945, the US delegation was aware that anti-communist sentiment in the press 
might be directed specifically at Tan.  
 A further report relayed to the state department offices in Washington, DC expands on 
the perspective of the US delegation on Tan as an intellectual enterprise. A memorandum of 
conversation between John Evarts Horner, then Third Secretary of the Ankara Embassy, and 
Frank O’Brien, an Associated Press Correspondent and husband of Sabiha and Zekeriya’s eldest 
daughter Sevim, characterized Tan as a “leftist Pro-Allied and Anti-Nazi newspaper [that] made 
its chief appeal to the intellectual class.”369 The memorandum also characterizes Zekeriya Sertel 
as “the most Americanized in manner of all editors, and comes closest to expressing the reactions 
of a normal American,” since they had both studied at Columbia a few decades earlier and 
Zekeriya had visited the US as a guest of the Office of War Information in 1942.370  
 Naturally, the US diplomatic mission took a great interest in the formation of the 
Democrat Party, and went to great lengths to gather information on where the various potential 
leaders might fall in terms of ideology, and relationship with the Soviet Union. In a letter on this 
subject sent from Ambassador Wilson to the Secretary of State two days prior to the riot, Wilson 
indicated that, according to unnamed Turkish sources, Bayar’s announcement of his intentions to 
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lead a new Democrat Party was directly precipitated by Görüşler’s announcement that he would 
write for them. Wilson also noted that according to the French language daily Istanbul, on the 
evening after the riot subsided, Bayar was summoned to İnönü’s residence for a long 
conversation followed by dinner, which was perceived as an apparent sign of friendship given 
“the strong animosity the President is understood to have harbored toward the ex-Prime 
Minister.”371 
 In addition to a more specific assessment of the ideological factors at play, the consular 
archives give us a number of details of the day of the riot that are quite a bit more specific than 
what any of the memoirs are able to give. A cable sent to the Secretary of State, the recently 
appointed James F. Byrnes, from Ambassador Wilson on the day of the riot reported the damage 
done to the presses and bookstores, noting that the policies of each had been “pro-Soviet” and 
that the crowd had forced establishments to display Turkish flags and scrawled “down with 
communists” in chalk against streetcars and walls along the path of the protest.372 Another cable 
sent at 5 p.m. tells us that the assembly at Istanbul University described by Birgit occurred at 
around 10 a.m., proceeding from there to Tan, then a Russian bookstore and finally to the offices 
of La Turquie, reporting that “all three of which seem to be completely wrecked.” According to 
this cable, the riot was over by 12:30 p.m. and estimates the size of the crowd from 2,500 to 
3,000, though some estimates were reportedly as high as 10,000.373 The critical details here relate 
to the suspicion on behalf of the American delegation as to what extent the sitting government or 
the police may have had in the riot. The cable asserted that Consul General Macatee had “the 
impression police displayed little energy in dispersing the crowd other than to keep it away from 
                                                           
371 US NARA RG 84 UD 3288 Box 13 (Wilson to Secretary of State December 6, 1945) 
372 NARA RG 84/HMS: UD 3287/Box 92/800.b 
373 Ibid. The estimate of 2,500-3,000 came directly from Istanbul’s Consul General Robert 
Macatee. A later telegram relaying the coverage of the event in the Soviet organ Izvestia 
suggested that estimates ranged on the day of the event as high as 20,000, but eventually settled, 
by way of the semi-official Anadolu Ajansi (Anatolian Agency), on 2,000. 
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the Soviet Consulate General which was protected in force. He saw no outward evidence that 
agents provacatuers were behind the action.”374  
A separate cable, which is untitled, gives further details, although it incorrectly states the 
date of the riot at December 5, about the behavior of the police and the organization of the riot. 
The cable corroborates Zekeriya Sertel’s account to a degree, relaying that they were warned 
about the riot both by police officials and friends who worked at Istanbul University. It also states 
that police went to the offices of Tan and La Turquie prior to the arrival of the crowds to evacuate 
any workers on the premises, according to the report “these precautions were taken for the 
purpose of avoiding bloodshed. Everything was well organized and nothing was done spur of the 
moment. The Stambul Police, the Office of Martial Law, the political authorities, and the local 
section of the People’s Party were all in full accord.” It proceeds to describe the organization of 
the students from Istanbul University as a “TOUR of demonstrations” across the city with very 
specific destinations, during which they were handed pictures of Atatürk, İsmet İnönü, Turkish 
flags and signs, some of which read: “We will not surrender to anyone,” “Nobody will be allowed 
to be allowed to breathe freely through the Straits,” and “We will not permit our country to 
become the theater of Civil War as the case with our Brothers in Spain.” The report also noted 
that the crowd cheered wildly as they passed the British Embassy, and that in addition to the 
police presence guarding the Soviet Embassy were, “Major Raghib375, and the two Assistant 
Directors of the Police, Tevfik and Said.” The report offers two explanations for the riot that were 
apparent in “local Turkish circles” including the complete quashing of any possible communist 
movement by the destruction of press organs sympathetic with the Soviets and to issue a warning 
to all new opposition parties who might threaten the hold the CHP had on political power. The 
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375 “Major Raghib” is likely Recep Peker, who was previously Director of the Interior Ministry, 
and would go on to serve as Prime Minister by August 1946.  
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report also suggests that part of the reason for targeting these newspapers was a new sense of 
hesitation towards the suspension of newspapers following Turkey’s signing of the Atlantic 
Charter and joining the United Nations. It also suggested that Bayar’s invitation to dine with 
İnönü was intended to smooth over any bad feelings that may have resulted from the 
demonstrations.376  
 This evidence suggests that the only interest the government had in managing this affair 
was to protect against the possibility of international incident, and bloodshed against prominent 
members of the leftist intelligentsia, which would likely also stoke a stronger reaction from the 
Soviets. The level of coordination between various authorities, and the apparent speed with which 
the organizers of the demonstration worked in this instance is remarkable, and suggests that there 
must have been at least some coordination between government authorities and those in charge of 
leading the riot. 
 The US delegation assessed further possible causes of the riot in the final cable to the 
Secretary of State at 9 p.m. that day. The six possible explanations included existential worries 
over Soviet designs on Turkey and areas of the Middle East generally, the generally “pro-Soviet” 
line of the newspapers being attacked – especially that of Görüşler in which “unauthorized use 
was made of names of highly respected oppositionists such as Celal Bayar” – and the generally 
nationalistic character of Turkish youth, which had been fanned by recent editorials by Hüseyin 
Cahit Yalçın, Ahmet Emin Yalman and others in papers such as Tanin, Tasvir, and Vatan. In the 
cable, Wilson points out the irony that the very article read aloud to students at Istanbul 
University, written by Yalçın, stressed non-violent tactics in defending Turkey against the 
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encroaching Soviet fifth column, which leads him to conclude, rightly, that “there are of course 
ugly possibilities in [sic] situation if Soviet Government wishes to exploit them.”377 
 Sure enough, a cable sent to the Ankara embassy from Moscow two days following the 
riot detailed the response to the event in Pravda. The Soviet press organ published a headline 
regarding “Fascist rowdyism in Istanbul” proclaiming that the “character of the demonstration 
indicated that it had been prepared in advance by authorities… destroyed quarters and presses of 
democratic papers… beat members of their staffs and committed other fascist hooliganisms.”378 
This report is the only one to speak of physical violence carried out against the staff of either 
newspaper. It concludes with a snide reaction to the Turkish reporting on the event, asserting that 
officials wanted to “depict these outrages as manifestations of some sort of ‘democracy’” and that 
the Istanbul police chief described the event as a “patriotic demonstration.”379 A further report 
from the Moscow Embassy on December 13 reported on elevated rhetoric against the Turkish 
state and organizers of the riot in Pravda, which declared the event a “pogrom” and comparing 
the riot to similar events organized by Hitler, stating the “world well remembers analogous 
incidents in other countries also accompanied by smashing of democratic establishments and 
book burning.”380  
 The American archives also chronicle some of the Turkish reaction to the Tan riot, 
including a transcript of a press conference given by Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu the 
following day. While the Prime Minister’s speech began with an overview of the ongoing 
negotiations over the administration of the Straits, his remarks on internal affairs reflected 
concerns over the review of Turkey’s press laws. He referenced a prior concern of his that 
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although he aimed at making Article 50 of the Press Law more flexible, “obstacles to this may 
come from journalists themselves,” and that he had since witnessed that “publications directed 
against the linguistic revolution, against the affairs aiming to purify the Turkish language, 
violence, anger and indignation prevail instead of moderation and logic…”381 Saraçoğlu then 
proceeded to denounce a recent report in Tan, authored by Zekeriya Sertel, regarding a rumored 
investigation into secret foreign bank accounts held by cabinet ministers and other elites in the 
Republican People’s Party, perhaps including the future head of the Democrat Party, Celal 
Bayar.382  
 The American archives reveal a variety of viewpoints and positions on the Sertels, Tan, 
and the demonstrators, and it is obvious that the staff of the Istanbul Consulate and Ankara 
Embassy were trying to balance concerns about Soviet encroachment in Turkey and the attacks 
on freedom of the press. They also point towards similar attitudes amongst the leaders of the 
CHP, who seemed to be more concerned with protecting the DP against the impression that they 
might be communist than protecting the press. What this position amounts to is that despite 
knowing well that the Sertels were loyal to the regime, the CHP elite felt they got what was 
coming to them. While attitudes within the Embassy and Consulates varied on the Sertels, and 
indeed they often relied on Zekeriya and his son-in-law for information, the fact that the Sertels’ 
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application for asylum in the wake of the riot was denied demonstrates that the American position 
was ultimately of accord with that of the CHP.383 
A Transition to Post-Kemalism? The Tan Olayı and State Ideology 
 The period from 1945 to 1950 can be seen as the last, and most successful stage in a 
series of Kemalist experiments in electoral democracy. While Kemalism as an ideology certainly 
remained a potent, and often dominant, political force in Turkey for decades after the CHP’s 
defeat in 1950, it is important to reflect on this period as a point of transition for Kemalism as an 
ideology, and the role that the Tan Olayı and other similar instances of mass violence played in 
said transition. Taha Parla and Andrew Davison have provided some helpful tools of analysis in 
their study of Kemalist ideology as part of the corporatist “third way” tradition, particularly in 
regards to their strategies in elections and towards opposition parties.384 Their study highlights the 
difficulty faced by many scholars of attempting to square Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s state’s 
varieties of state-driven economy, laicism and positivistic nationalism with the grander ideologies 
driving the global political situation in the 1920s and 1930s, particularly in instances when 
ideological affinities between one or the other superpower, as with Turkish-Soviet cases before 
the Montreux convention or Turkish-American cases following the close of World War II, are 
buttressed by one or the other form of realpolitik.  
 The question of why the generation of political elites that ran the country following the 
death of Atatürk initiated the transition to a multiparty system remains. Additionally, if we are to 
follow Parla and Davison’s analysis, are we able to conceive of this transition within the same 
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ideological framework of corporatism? There are a few different possible explanations available 
here. First, it is clearly evident that as World War II progressed, the İnönü regime had much less 
success containing or coopting its ideological opponents than had his predecessor. In truth, the 
ideological convictions of these cultural elites, like the Sertels or Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, had 
become more energized and pointed in the midst of the global conflagration, and their constant 
agitation exerted occasional pressure on Turkish diplomatic efforts to stave off encroachment 
from Russia and Germany.385 Whereas during the reign of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, geopolitical 
pressures such as those that İnönü faced were less existent and ideological opposition from leftist, 
liberal or fascist corners could usually be dealt with in less direct ways.386 From this vantage 
point, the onset of true multiparty politics in Turkey following the close of World War II could be 
seen as an attempt to let off the steam, so to speak, that had been building as ideological 
contention on behalf of competing ideologies throughout the war, all while ensuring that the new 
party itself would have a fairly limited ideological scope by violently excising elite elements that 
might be sympathetic with communism. In this view, Parla and Davison’s articulation of 
Kemalist corporatism coheres, but perhaps a bit weaker, since the two parties were at least 
initially two sides of the same coin, much like they had been during the Liberal Republican Party 
experiment in 1930 – and indeed the Democrat Party had drawn from some of the same figures 
and power bases as had the SCF.  
 A second possible explanation would be that the geopolitical pressures, as perceived by 
İnönü, would demand that Turkey become a multiparty democracy in order to adhere to the still-
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386 This reality accounts in part for the perception of Kemalism as a “flexible” ideology, not only 
did it actively incorporate elements from other modernist ideologies, but it allowed for at least 
some ideological opposition that hewed closer to the likes of those sponsored by the United 
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story from the perspective of Turkey’s relationship with the Soviet Union.  
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nascent postwar international order. This opinion, as shown above, was held be at least some 
members of the American diplomatic mission who were convinced that the Atlantic Charter and 
formation of the United Nations would force a new set of normative democratic values onto its 
member nations. Turkey’s position within the wartime global economy was a precarious one 
thanks to its neutrality, and it would become increasingly obvious over the course of the late 
1940s that the postwar order could provide economic benefits if formerly neutral nations allied 
themselves closely with one of the two prevailing superpowers. Turkey’s alliance with the 
ascendant United States made a natural fit in light of Turkey’s deteriorated relationship with the 
USSR and the steep economic price it paid to be a “mobilized neutral”, but in terms of ideology 
there was much to sort out. As many American consular documents throughout the course of the 
war indicate, the United States saw Turkey as a potential valuable ally in a postwar fight against 
communism, but was cautious to come to a conclusion as to where the nation stood on ideological 
grounds. The benefits of announcing a new Democrat Party and attendant elections in the wake of 
the war were many in this regard. While the American diplomatic mission viewed the creation of 
this system with some skepticism, it is fairly safe to say that the process overall was seen as a sign 
of Turkey’s intent to adhere to the orbit of the United States going forward. Whether or how this 
game of perceptions factored into the role the government played in the Tan Riot is hard to assess 
at this particular moment, but it is clear that the ties between opposition ideologies and Turkey’s 
friends and foes abroad were, for better or worse, stronger following events that persecuted those 
that supported, or appeared to support, such ideas.  




CHAPTER SIX: Prosecuting Ideology: The Trials of the Pan-Turkists and the Leftists, and 
the Dawn of the Cold War 1944-1947 
 
A series of trials carried out between 1944 and of 1947 against groups of intellectuals 
belonging to ultranationalist and leftist camps would drastically alter the political and intellectual 
landscape in Turkey as the nation moved into the multiparty era, and faced the new challenges of 
the Cold War environment. Coinciding roughly with Turkey’s deliberate shift towards the Allied 
powers after the Soviet victory at Stalingrad – Turkey would halt trade with Germany in April 
1944, break off relations in August, and formally enter the war in February 1945 – and the 
multiparty parliamentary elections in July 1946 – in which the newly formed Democrat Party 
would win 64 of 465 seats – these trials greatly impacted the place of two sets of opposition 
voices in Turkish politics that had been growing in prominence and popularity beginning the mid-
1930s, and which had only accelerated over the course of World War II. This chapter examines 
the archival, press, and memoir accounts of the prosecution of Pan-Turkist387 figures including 
                                                           
387 I use Pan-Turkist as an umbrella term that encompasses some finely distinguished nationalist 
ideologies amongst the defendants. This includes more racialized ideologies like racism-
Turanism (ırkçılık-Turancılık), but also less racialized forms of ethnic irredentism. For helpful 
discussions of the fissures in the Pan-Turkist movement, see Jacob M. Landau, Pan Turkism: 
From Irredentism to Cooperation, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995 [1981]) 
and Umut Üzer, An Intellectual History of Turkish Nationalism. In those works and others, the 
issue of the Pan-Turkist trails has received quite a bit of scholastic attention since excerpts of the 
proceedings, some press materials, memoirs, and the published indictment, these works are cited 
throughout this article, but a more comprehensive consideration of the proceedings has only 
recently been made possible by the publication of much more extensive documents by followers 
of one of the defendants – Nihal Atsız – including the investigative reports and appeals decisions, 
published in Hayri Yıldırım’s two volumes, Son Türkçü Atsız (Istanbul: Togan Yayınları, 2013) 
and 3 Mayıs 1944 Olayı ve Irkçılık Turancılık Davası (Istanbul: Togan Yayınları, 2015), and the 
nearly complete testimony and questioning of every defendant, published in Yavuz Bülent 
Bakîler, 1944-1945 Irkçılık-Turancılık Davasında Sorgular, Savunmalar, all of which are still 
unavailable to researchers who might inquire after them in the archives of the Justice Ministry. 
The persistent interest in these figures, and the recent publication of these documents, suggest the 
events discussed here have been formative ones in the memory and mindset of nationalist 
movements in the present day. Similarly, the recent republication of the Sertel memoirs and the 
transcript of their defense statements and charges – the first republication of the latter in seventy 
years – signals a renewed interest in the persecution of leftist figures in the ear of transition to 
multiparty politics.  
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Nihal Atsız, Reha Oğuz Türkkan, and Zeki Velidi Togan, which began in 1944 and carried on 
through their ultimate appeal in 1946 and retrial in 1947, and the 1946 trial of Halil Lütfü 
Dördüncü, Sabiha and Zekeriya Sertel – the owner and editors of Tan – who would be convicted 
in March 1946 of defaming the republic and members of the Grand National Assembly, but 
would win an appeal that fall. 
 The issues at stake in each of these political trials demonstrate the confluence of the 
geopolitical shifts occurring near the end of World War II and shortly thereafter with the 
transition to multiparty politics in Turkey that was occurring at the same time. In the previous 
chapter I detailed how one violent event – the Tan riot of December 4, 1945 – served to set up 
ideological boundaries for acceptable politics in Turkey’s new multiparty environment, and to 
shape an image of Turkey as an anti-communist power at a time when protection against Russian 
demands on Turkish territory could only be provided by a friendship with the Anglo-American 
world. In this chapter, I demonstrate how legal apparatuses were used towards very similar ends, 
and with lasting effects on the ability of certain opposition figures to make legitimate political 
claims in the multiparty era.  
   I have detailed over the last two chapters some aspects of one of the two overarching 
rationalizations for these trials – ideological polarization and violent protests. In detailing the 
development of racial discourse from the 1930s and 1940s, and the toxic anti-communism that 
led to the Tan Riot on December 4, 1945, we begin to see how intellectual camps grew around 
these two poles in an organic exchange of ideas over how to define “Turkishness” and how the 
resulting polarization accelerated drastically over the course of World War II. To the extent that 
the environment had become too toxic for these ideological extremes to weather, it was because 
of a second factor – the accusation of foreign interference or treason that had become a motif of 
the criticism levelled at both these camps from the Kemalist and liberal centers by the end of the 
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War. To the extent that Nihal Atsız and his colleagues were considered dangerous by the İnönü 
government, it was because they were credibly charged with working for the German Embassy, 
and likewise, attacks against the Sertels reached their violent apex only after the insinuation that 
Tan had been coordinating their editorial line with Pravda and Isvetsia. Such accusations have 
become commonplace during political crises in Turkey, and certainly these were not the first 
individuals to suffer them, but because the defendants in each case had histories that entwined 
them with the founding moments of the Turkish Republic, and because their ideas developed so 
organically in relationship to the political tides of Kemalism, this chapter will first assess the 
degree to which these accusations might have been true in the wartime environment of the 1940s 
before moving on to the trials themselves, and their immediate aftermath.  
The timing of these trials, in addition to the domestic and foreign political consequences, 
provides a unique opportunity to explore how legal suppression of regime opponents, on the basis 
of anti-communist or anti-fascist fears, during the height of World War II came to be viewed as 
an important aspect of Turkey’s transition to multiparty democracy. It helps us locate, in this 
space between the emerging poles of the Cold War, the tensions and contradictions in the 
relationship between democratization and the fight against various sorts of radicalism.388 Through 
the publicity surrounding the trial, and the subsequent lionization of the defendants in each case, 
the trials served to turn each of the defendants into personifications of the ideologies they 
supposedly represented, as well as Turkish stand-ins for conspiracies of a German or Russian 
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fifth column, real or imagined. Despite the ultimate victories for each of the defendants on 
appeals, the prosecution severely damaged the immediate political potential of the Pan-Turkists, 
but laid some important ideological groundwork for the revival of their movement after the 1960 
coup d’état. Continued suppression of leftist activities following the Sertels’ victory in appeals 
court, however, virtually ended the public careers of the Sertels, who found little freedom in a 
financially and psychically toxic environment for leftists and ultimately fled to the Eastern Bloc 
in 1950, ending their storied press careers in Turkey that had begun roughly four decades prior. 
This chapter, in analyzing the court documents of these trials, also takes the opportunity 
to examine how the court and the state negotiated the ideological valences of each trial 
differently, and what rhetorical and political strategies were deployed by the defendants. In both 
these cases it is clear that the trials meet the standard of Otto Kirchheimer’s fourth level of 
political trial – what he calls “the artificially created political offense.”389 Such cases normally 
appear as perjury or libel suits, and present a particular choice to the defendant: whether or not, or 
to what extent, is it necessary to accept the premises of the suit, and the legal system that 
underpins it.390 The difference in the way the two sets of defendants answered this question 
highlights the ways these two ideological camps related to the state in this transitional period. In a 
time when the government helped create a toxic environment for leftism, out of a fear of Russian 
encroachment on Turkish territory, the Sertels condemned the premises of the suit against them, 
without offering any defense or articulation of their ideological preferences. Ultimately, they won 
                                                           
389 Otto Kirchheimer, “Politics and Justice” in Frederic S. Burin and Kurt L. Shell, eds., Politics, 
Law, and Social Change: Selected Essays of Otto Kirchheimer (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1969 [1955]), 420. 
390 The Sertel trial more immediately fit the nature of a libel suit, as I will show. The Pan-
Turkists, though charged with forming a secret society intent on overthrowing the government 
and tried under the martial law administration, were nonetheless brought to trial on a case that 
rested on a particular characterization of their political beliefs, as the evidence from their 
testimony and questioning reveals. For this reason, I believe Kirchheimer’s fourth level 
description is still apt. 
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on appeal in shorter order and with less pain than the Pan-Turkists, but their movement sustained 
continued repression throughout the 1940s, to the point that they left the country in exile in 
1950.391 The Pan-Turkist trial was far more contentious, but, as this chapter will show, this trial 
was fundamentally different in that it directly concerned the acceptability of Pan-Turkism and 
racist ideologies to the Turkish state and society. The defenses, questioning, investigation, and 
appeal ended in a decision that effectively declared irredentist ethno-nationalism suitable for the 
multiparty environment – since Nazi Germany no longer proved, in 1946 and 1947, the threat that 
it had at the time of their arrest in May 1944.  
This chapter will first take an opportunity to explore some aspects of the relationship 
between foreign agencies and Turkish press figures. Many of the accusations and anxieties about 
the figures on trial in the war years centered on cooperation with foreign regimes, my 
examination shows that indeed nearly every major belligerent was involved to one extent or 
another with the Turkish press during the war, but that those relationships were more diverse, and 
different than many openly suspected. The chapter then turns to discuss the first major accusation 
against the Pan-Turkists – a pamphlet published by the Turkish Communist Party detailing the 
existence of a German fifth column in Turkey that caused a stir in Parliament, and precipitated 
some of the investigations that would result in the arrest of the Pan-Turkists. Before examining 
documents from each of the trials, the chapter also examines the press reactions to the arrests of 
the Pan-Turkist group in May 1944, a rare moment of universal accord across ideological camps 
in the press.   
The Foreign Elements of Turkish Ideological Polarization 
                                                           
391 On the fears of Russian encroachment in this period see Onur İşçi, “Russophobic Neutrality”. 
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 Naturally, the backdrop for the intensifying ideological divides in the Turkish public 
sphere was the deterioration of the post-WWI European order and the global conflagration of the 
1940s.392 Turkey’s neutrality in the conflict, the reasons behind it, and the manner in which it was 
maintained has an almost outsized place in the historiography of this period, particularly given 
the facts that until quite recently Turkish archival material on this subject in the Prime Ministry’s 
Republican archive had been closed, and as of this writing the archives of the Turkish Foreign 
Ministry have yet to open.393 While there are serious and important disagreements over many 
aspects of Turkey’s neutrality in the scholarship, one overarching theme of these works is that 
Turkey’s overlapping diplomatic partnerships in this time were not driven by any ideological 
affinity between President İnönü’s upper echelon or diplomatic corps and their counterparts in 
Russia, Germany, Britain, or the United States. Many of the authors working on this subject go to 
great lengths to stress this point in order to focus on the truly skillful diplomatic maneuvering that 
saved Turkey from what might have been a disastrous defensive campaign against either or both 
of the Axis or Allied powers.394 What this allergy to addressing ideology elides is that although 
Turkey’s neutrality was not based on ideological motivations of the elite actors, Turkey’s 
oscillation over the course of the war between the various great powers played itself out in the 
public sphere in distinctly ideological terms. The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, this 
occurred because the state expressed a sincere concern that an overabundant sympathy in the 
                                                           
392 Onur İşçi has argued convincingly that a restoration of this post-WWI order, in the form of a 
renewed “Brest-Litovsk” alignment brought about by a German victory over the USSR, followed 
closely by an Allied victory over Germany, was the desired outcome of the Turkish foreign policy 
establishment and provided the strategic framework for Turkey’s narrowly won neutrality. See 
İşçi, “Russophobic Neutrality”.  
393 İşçi, “Russophobic Neutrality”, Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy in World War II: An Active 
Neutrality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), Frank G. Weber, The Evasive 
Neutral: Germany, Britain and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1979), Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, Baskın Oran, 
ed., Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents (Salt Lake City: 
University of Utah Press, 2010). 
394 Deringil and Weber in particular, although even İşçi’s more detailed work veers away from 
ideological questions at certain key points.  
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press and public sphere towards one or the other belligerent would hinder their negotiations with 
both camps, and thus closed, suspended, imprisoned, and censored publications that were 
perceived to be at cross purposes with the goal of neutrality.395 The second reason is that the 
foreign powers themselves, especially Germany and the United States, played very active roles in 
the Turkish press throughout the course of the war. The involvement of foreign governments in 
shaping the Turkish press has long been a subject of intrigue and speculation in the scholarship on 
Turkey in WWII, but very little of it has been backed up with hard, archival evidence.396  
 When archival evidence is brought into the picture, the relationship between the state 
sponsors of these polarizing ideologies and the intellectuals that were sympathetic to them, and 
responsible for their propagation in the Turkish public sphere, is revealed to be much more 
complicated than the scholarship traditionally suggests.397 In reading the classical scholarship on 
this period, one could be forgiven for assuming that many of the most prominent intellectuals of 
this time were totally given over to demagoguery and acting as agents of foreign governments; 
Zekeriya and Sabiha Sertel are often portrayed as being fellow travelers who were in lockstep 
with the Comintern by the 1940s, major journalists like Yunus Nadi and Necmettin Sadak, the 
proprietors of Cumhuriyet and Akşam respectively, are frequently portrayed as Nazi 
sympathizers, and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and Ahmet Emin Yalman, then of Tanin and Vatan, are 
often seen as stalwart liberals and defenders of the Anglo-American alliance. These depictions, 
while founded in some truths about the stances each of these figures took publicly, belie two key 
points that complicate the suggested relationship between each figure and foreign powers. First, 
                                                           
395 The rate at which newspapers were closed in this period might only have been matched by the 
immediate aftermath of the Takrir-i Sükün laws in 1925 or the height of the reign of Abdülhamid 
II. See, Cemil Koçak, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Türk Basını” Tarih ve Toplum, No. 35, 1988, 29-
33.  
396 Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, Deringil, An Active Neutrality 
397 Of the classical scholarship on this period, Weisband is perhaps the most nuanced in this 
regard, John M. VanderLippe’s more recent work is also even handed. Weisband, Turkish 
Foreign Policy, VanderLippe, The Politics of Turkish Democracy 
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each of these figures were products of the same late-Ottoman and early republican intellectual 
environment and the associated cataclysms, and so while they remained ardent proponents of one 
or the other transnational ideological movement, they did so in specific relation to the Turkish 
national context and for the most part, by virtue of having survived a truly tumultuous and 
contentious intellectual period, remained committed to the Turkish national project, irrespective 
of their disagreements over the present direction the state was taking. Second, the two-
dimensional portrait of ideology in Turkey at this point obscures the ways various foreign 
delegations interacted with these intellectuals, which, from the perspective of the foreign 
delegations, was premised more on successful intelligence gathering than it was effective 
propagandizing. Both these aspects are revealed through archival documents, as I will now 
demonstrate. 
 To illustrate the first point, I argue that while the racist-Turanian group of intellectuals 
remained vociferous critics of Mustafa Kemal, and presented an ideological front that was 
superficially simpatico with the kind of racist ideology espoused by the Nazis, their German 
counterparts did not find their espousal of a “Greater Turkestan” to be compatible with the aims 
of Nazism. Onur İşçi and others have pointed out that the extent to which the German legation in 
Istanbul attempted to engage the racist-Turanians, and other Pan-Turkist figures, they did so with 
the relatively limited goal of igniting a rebellion amongst Crimean Tatars against the Soviet 
Union.398 Since they were opponents of a regime that the Germans wished to sway into the Axis 
alliance, the racist-Turanians were held at arms-length for strategic reasons as well. But, as a 
translation of an interview with an unnamed interpreter for the German Embassy’s Press Section 
reveals, the Nazi ideologues in the German legation had little regard for Turks, who they 
themselves viewed as subhuman, even if they mimicked their own racist language. The 
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interpreter says that the Press Section was indeed collecting copies of Turanian journals like 
Orhun, but for the most part they were interested only in translating articles relating to internal 
politics, Communism, and Turanism, and explicitly disinterested in articles about culture, science 
or history. As the interpreter states,  
The reason why they [Press Officer Seiler and resident German journalists] laughed at 
these cultural and scientific articles was that they were completely without knowledge of 
the Orient which they considered to be an ‘area populated by a lower race.’ For all those 
named above sensation was the chief desire and not one of them had a deeper 
consciousness of the mentality of the Oriental countries… For that reason even the 
Propaganda Ministry was able to do such foolish things as to send among its propaganda 
material for distribution here a large package of magazines which bore the title ‘The Sub-
Human’, among the subjects of which Jenghiz Khan was included along with Stalin. 
Upon a hint that the mention of Jenghiz Khan in this connection in Turkey would arouse 
criticism, widespread distribution of this magazine was given up… At any rate the 
propaganda which was prepared in Berlin for Turkey was based upon a lack of 
knowledge of the Orient and consisted only of boasts of the high capabilities of Germany 
in every area. If, for example, one looked at the newspapers in the ‘Tataric’ language 
which were printed in Germany and which came here through Herr Hempel for 
distribution, then one must remark that except for the great victories and the unbeatable 
leadership of Germany, nothing much was offered.399 
Here we can see that in addition to the fact that it would have been strategically unwise for the 
German legation to press the Turanian issue within Turkey too hard, there simply was not a real 
ideological compatibility between the two groups, and the Germans showed no interest in 
supporting their efforts beyond their rather limited strategic ends. It is also telling that in the 
course of reviewing the development of racist-Turanian ideology through their press outlets, very 
little direct or explicit engagement with Nazi propaganda, symbolism, or inspiration is mentioned. 
The movement itself was homegrown, and for its own part espoused something like a fascist 
outlook, but never truly acted at the behest of the major global proponents of fascism. 
                                                           
399 Memorandum, September 4, 1944, Turkish Embassy Ankara Classified General Records US 
NARA RG 84 UD 3288 Box 10. According to the memorandum, the interview was conducted in 
the last week of August 1944, at the request of an OSS contact in Ankara, and came under strict 
assurances that the information would not be revealed to Turkish officials.   
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 While the German legation certainly held the Turanians at arm’s length, that does not 
mean that they were disinterested in running a propaganda mission in the Turkish press. The same 
interview with the former interpreter reveals a great deal about the lengths the German legation 
went to propagandize to the Turkish public. He states that he had some knowledge of the 
Embassy’s financial situation and that the budget for the Press Section included headings for 
“Turkey” and “Near East” that totaled roughly 26,000 Turkish liras per quarter and that those 
funds were consistently overdrawn.400 He also details a list of Istanbul newspapers that were 
directly underwritten by the German Embassy, which included a small Turkish publication named 
as “Turkish Trade Gazette” which was run by an unnamed former employee of Anadolu Ajansı, 
the French language newspaper Beyoglu which was previously handled by Italian interests but 
was later underwritten by the Germans, and, not surprisingly, Istanbul’s only German language 
daily, the Türkische Post, whose proprietor Schafer received a total of 45,000 Turkish liras before 
he left the paper.401 The biggest catches for the German legation, however, were Yunus Nadi (and 
his sons Nadir and Doğan), the owner of Cumhuriyet, and Necmettin Sadak, the owner of Akşam, 
two of the most widely read daily newspapers in Turkey. What should be made clear, however, is 
that money paid out to Nadi and Sadak was largely in the form of gifts and bribes and that the 
operations of either paper were not directly underwritten by the Germans. Nadi and Sadak were 
frequent guests at German-sponsored cocktail parties, the interpreter states that both were close 
friends of Seiler and had certainly received funds through the Embassy or the Consulate General. 
Additionally, he states that Sadak was likely also a friend of the Ambassador, Franz Von Papen, 
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and that the embassy had gifted him Cuban cigars worth 750 Swiss francs between March and 
July 1944.402  
What remains unclear from these claims, however, is the degree to which the German 
legation was successful in convincing these papers to print material directly produced by the 
Embassy or their superiors in Berlin. In the case of Cumhuriyet, the paper certainly took a steady 
pro-Axis editorial line throughout the war, and many of their writers, notably Peyami Safa and 
Muharrem Feyzi Togay, were honestly sympathetic to their cause, but there remains no proof of 
stories being directly “planted” by the embassy in Cumhuriyet. In the case of Sadak and Akşam, it 
is more curious as Akşam’s editorial line was decidedly more even handed throughout the course 
of the war. Weisband’s book provides a revealing story in this regard, in which Sadak was called 
in front of the German Ambassador Von Papen to explain why he had failed to take a pro-Axis 
line – indeed he was even writing mildly anti-Axis editorials at the time. Sadak answered the 
accusation, “Rest assured, Mon Excéllence, the Turkish public does not read my editorials. I 
spread the German point of view personally among my friends who are influential,” which 
garnered this response from Von Papen, “Herr Sadak, the Reich is not interested in this kind of 
                                                           
402 Ibid, this also loosely corroborates accusations in Weisband’s book that suggest Nadi was 
provided printing paper for Cumhuriyet at a discounted rate by the German Embassy, as well as 
other luxury items, such a Mercedes automobile and expensive furs, that were provided to Sadak. 
Weisband had two sources for these accusations, the first was personal interviews conducted with 
Ahmet Emin Yalman and Leo Hochstetter, a former field representative of the Office of War 
Information, in 1969, and the second was a memorandum found in the papers of the American 
Ambassador Laurence A. Steinhardt at the Library of Congress that was filed by Hochstetter to 
the OWI on September 6, 1944 which contained the testimony, dated September 2, 1944, of Fritz 
Fiala, the Chief of Transkontinent Press and a former agent of German intelligence who had 
defected in the previous months. Fiala’s accusations go well beyond that of the unnamed 
interpreter, suggesting Cumhuriyet, as well as Tasvir-i Efkar were given subsidies in the form of 
discounted printing paper and that Yunus and Nadir Nadi were engaged in substantial war 
profiteering operations. It should also be mentioned that Sadak was frequently working with the 
United States Embassy as an informant, though no evidence exists of him receiving funds or 
bribes from the Americans. Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-45, 78-82, notes 28-31, 39. 
For evidence of relationship between Sadak and US Embassy, see G.H. Damon to Amb. Edwin 
C. Wilson, October 25, 1945 US NARA RG 84 UD 3288 Box 16. 
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corruption.”403 The irony of this story is that Sadak vastly underestimated his own influence in the 
public sphere. Akşam was one of the most widely read newspapers in Turkey, as anti-communism 
expressed in the Turkish press had the power to provoke strong reactions from the general public 
– most famously in the form of the riot that destroyed Tan Press on December 4, 1945, but similar 
types of demagoguery had helped buttress discriminatory policies against ethnic minorities, such 
as the infamous Varlık Vergisi (Wealth Tax), and would continue to do so for years to come.404  
 On the side of the socialists and communists, there is a somewhat different story to tell. 
To the extent that leftist Turks held any allegiance to the USSR and the Communist Party, their 
activities were largely kept underground in the late 1930s and the war years. By 1938, their most 
prominent intellectuals – Nazım Hikmet and Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, among others – were in prison, 
and their work was largely suppressed or banned, though underground circuits allowed for illicit 
copies of Nazım’s poems to circulate with ease. The communist intellectuals who managed to 
avoid prison had only a tenuous relationship with the Comintern. Though files relating to the 
Soviet Embassies in Turkey were not available for this study which would shed light on their 
relationship with Turkish intellectuals, the Soviets would intermittently advocate for imprisoned 
communists, and routinely spoke out against anti-communist sentiment in public.405 However, 
                                                           
403 Weisband, 81-82, note 39 
404 According to a US State Department report, Akşam’s circulation figures in 1945 were between 
15,000-20,000, roughly the same as Tan, and roughly five thousand copies fewer than 
Cumhuriyet. According to the same report, Akşam’s editorial line was considered to be 
“Government-center… favorably disposed toward the democracies. Fearful of Russian aims in 
the Balkans,” and its list of contributors included figures like Adnan and Halide Edib Adıvar, 
towering public intellectuals in their own right, who held no sympathy for Nazi ideology. Office 
of Strategic Services Research and Analysis Branch, “Character and Composition of the Turkish 
Press (1939-1944)” January 8, 1945 US NARA RG 84 UD 3288 Box 16  
405 There is a slight indication in the American archives that Soviet agents in Turkey did have 
some relationship with members of the Turkish press. A November 1945 correspondence 
between the Embassy and the Office of War Information (OWI) reports that rumors were being 
spread through Vedat Baykurt, owner of La Turquie one of the newspapers whose offices would 
be destroyed on December 4, that the Turkish Secret Police and British Intelligence were 
planning a coup d’etat against İnönü. The source for this report, named as Aslan Humbaracı (but 
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one of the war’s belligerents did in fact have an ongoing relationship with major leftist figures in 
Turkey in this period – the United States.  
 The outlet for the United States legation, which included not only the embassy staff but 
the intelligence and propaganda arms like the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS) as well, into the left and left-leaning intellectual community in Turkey 
was primarily through Zekeriya Sertel. On numerous occasions Sertel met with US officials – 
meetings that were often arranged through Sertel’s son-in-law Frank O’Brien, who was the AP 
Press Attaché in Istanbul – to discuss internal happenings in Turkish politics and the press. 
Zekeriya and Sabiha were often vilified as Soviet stooges throughout the war, and ultimately 
those attacks would come to a head-on December 4, 1945 when their newspaper operation was 
wrecked during an anti-communist riot. There is little evidence of any connection between the 
Soviet state and the Sertels, but despite being somewhat vocal about supporting the Soviet Union 
against Germany, Zekeriya was held in relatively high regard by the staff at the US embassy. On 
many occasions, and increasingly so towards the end of the war, Tan was described as “Pro-Ally” 
and “friendly” by US officials in internal correspondence of the Embassy and the Office of 
Strategic Services [OSS].406  In fact, the American Embassy was exceptionally well-connected 
across the Turkish political spectrum, having established ongoing relationships with a range of 
government figures, as well as liberal journalists like Ahmet Emin Yalman, and leftist ones like 
                                                                                                                                                                              
in all likelihood, was Arslan Humbaracı, a noted go-between for Soviet Embassies in the Middle 
East), suggests that this rumor was being fed to Baykurt by the Soviet Embassy in order to 
“foment uncertainty among the uneducated masses.” G.H. Damon, the OWI representative is 
unsure whether Humbaracı was telling the truth or merely trying to discredit La Turquie, but 
concluded “either is possible, and I have no opinion on the matter.” G.H. Damon (OWI Istanbul) 
to John Evarts Horner (Ankara), November 6, 1945. Ankara Embassy Classified General 
Records, RG 84 UD 3288 Box 16. On Humbaracı’s reputation see Riaz Ul Islam, “Review: 
Middle East Indictment by Arslan Humbaracı” Pakistan Horizon Vol. 13, No. 1, 1960, 82-85. 
406 See Amb. Edwin C. Wilson to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes., “Report on Informational 
Activities: March and April 1945” June 21, 1945, Office of Strategic Services Research and 
Analysis Branch, “Character and Composition of the Turkish Press (1939-1944)” January 8, 
1945. Ankara Embassy Classified General Records US NARA RG 84 UD 3288 Box 16.  
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Burhan Belge.407 Their association with Yalman turned out to be a more poorly kept secret than 
their association Zekeriya Sertel, as accusations of being an “agent” of the United States surfaced 
about each in 1945.408 
The Greatest Danger: The Gas on the Fire 
 Suspicion of a plot against the Turkish government emanating from Pan-Turanist and 
fascist circles began to rise in April 1943 with the publication of a brochure composed by 
members of the Turkish Communist Party (TKP) titled “The Greatest Danger: The Hidden Face 
of a Counter Movement Against the Turkish National Cause” (En Büyük Tehlike: Milli Türk 
Davasına Aykırı Bir Cereyanın İçyüzü) which was meant to detail the activities of clandestine, 
German-funded Turkist and Pan-Turanist political organizations and journals.409 According to a 
                                                           
407 Belge had kept the US Embassy abreast of his plans to make new publications in 1945. For 
their part, the Embassy staff believed Belge to be receiving a stipend from the Turkish Secret 
Police, and that he was generally a “‘poseur’ without real political convictions.” See E.L. Packer 
(Charge d’Affaires) to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, “Recent Press developments, new 
newspapers to be published in Istanbul” September 3, 1945. Ankara Embassy Classified General 
Records US NARA RG 84 UD 3288 Box 16 
408 Yalman was accused openly of being a foreign agent in Ulus by Rahmi Apak, an MP from 
Tekirdağ verbally during a press conference in early September, and later in print on September 
18 and 20, 1945, claims that Yalman vigorously denied in Vatan on September 11. Ambassador 
Wilson, for his part, stated in a report to Secretary of State Stettinius that “Members of this 
Mission in the past have been told by some Turks… that they believe Mr. Yalman receives a 
subsidy from the United States in return for his pro-American articles.” Ambassador Edwin 
Wilson to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, “Ahmet Emin Yalman, Editor of VATAN is 
accused of being a foreign agent” September 20, 1945. Ankara Embassy Classified General 
Records, RG 84 3288 Box 16 
409 Faris Erkman and Suat Derviş, Kırklı Yıllar – 1: En Büyük Tehlike, Niçin Sovyet Birliği 
Dostuyum (Istanbul, TÜSTAV, 2002) [Originally published as En Büyük Tehlike! Milli Türk 
Davasına Aykırı bir Cereyan İçyüzü… (Istanbul, Ak-ün Matbaası, 1943)]. The brochure was 
published under the name Faris Erkman, a member of the TKP who would be given a three-year 
prison sentence for the publication of this report and who would die shortly thereafter from 
stomach cancer, but nearly all sources agree that Erkman was not the author of the text. While no 
definitive document exists naming the true authors, a report uncovered in a 1946 police raid of 
the home of long-time communist organizer Şefik Hüsnü confirms that the brochure was 
published by the party but does not say who was involved in the writing, other sources have taken 
that to mean Hüsnü was indeed the author, perhaps with some assistance from his colleague Reşat 
Fuat Baraner, but ultimately, no conclusive evidence exists for this claim. For a reprinting of 
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report by Şefik Hüsnü (Değmer), then a leader in the TKP, that was uncovered in a 1946 raid, the 
brochure was meant as part of a “systematic struggle against the racist fascist movement…” and 
that its publication would “awaken a hateful excitement amongst the University youth and it 
would extraordinarily increase our movement’s reputation amongst the youth.”410 Following the 
publication, Hüsnü reports that the TKP funded several student groups that established a “Broad 
Front Against Fascism and Profiteering” but mentions they faced resistance from both racist 
propaganda outlets – most prominently Çınaraltı – and a generally sluggish response in 
parliament. 
 The brochure was first addressed in parliament on July 5, 1943 when the representative 
from Sinop, Cevdet Kerim İncedayı brought up the claims made in the brochure during a 
discussion on the passport law. İncedayı claimed to have read the brochure – he called it a letter 
(mektup) – and the accusations “of racist currents which wear the guise of Turkish patriotism and 
quasi-Turkish citizenship, and of imperialist movements against Turks outside of our borders…” 
but asserted that he knew “neither of this kind of movement nor this type of nationalist concept,” 
nor did he think they were “seriously fundamental and developed.”411 He followed with appeals 
to the unitary nature of the CHP’s program, and called on concerned deputies to explain the 
threats and accusations made by the brochure. In response, Foreign Minister Numan 
Menemencioğlu took the rostrum to lament, “[i]t is unfortunate that Turkey, who is protecting its 
condition of neutrality, cannot completely prevent a piece of propaganda from this or that path 
when it appears on the scene. The government should not hesitate to take powerful and immediate 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Hüsnü’s report, see Fethi Tevetoğlu, Türkiye’de Sosyalist ve Komünist Faâliyetler 1910-1960 
(Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1967) 503-509, for an overview of the controversy and some 
tentative theories as to its authorship, see Hayri Yıldırım, Son Türkçü Atsız (Istanbul: Togan 
Yayıncılık, 2013) 348-369. 
410 As noted, this report is reprinted in Fethi Tevetoğlu, Türkiye’de Sosyalist ve Komünist 
Faâliyetler, 505-6 
411 TBMM Tutanaklar 7. Dönem 4 Cilt Birleşim 44, July 5, 1943, 13-14 
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action against propaganda that does not comply with Turkish goals.”412 Suggesting both that the 
accusations of propaganda in The Greatest Danger as well as the publication of the brochure 
itself, would be investigated. This is instructive, as it demonstrates the connection between 
Turkey’s shifting neutrality and the management of the press. Menemencioğlu nonetheless felt 
compelled to articulate the difference between the “Turkishness” espoused by the CHP program 
and the supremacist irredentism of the groups identified in the brochure, 
The program says that “The unity of the national language, culture and ideals are 
connected to the whole of the social and political organization of our citizenry.” 
There it is friends, the motto for Turkey is right there and the honesty of Turkey’s politics 
is obvious to everyone. It is our Turkey’s only wish for the welfare and prosperity of the 
Turks that reside outside our borders. On this side, all of our politics, all of our 
Turkishness, are pertaining to Turks who enter this country through our borders and only 
them. (Bravo sounds). 
You can find a description of our Turkish nation in the People’s Party program. Those 
who suggest with this or that intention of suggesting to us the thought of hatred of the 
Turkish nation or the connection with imperialism is a very unreasonable and 
overwrought mistake. We are Turks and we speak Turkish. However, you know well 
from me what I mean when we say this. For ages in this country there was a doomed 
situation where every type of blessing was deprived, every type of burden was increased, 
but living under the will of the nation from the perspective of a deep love for our Turkish 
economy, culture and ideal, we are called to make a most prosperous life for the Turkish 
nation and this is our Turkishness and our Turkism (Türklüğümüz ve Türkçülüğümüz) 
my friends. (Applause)413 
The dustup over The Greatest Danger would bring this conflict between the left and the Pan-
Turkists into the spotlight by bringing it to the attention of the Assembly, and in particular to the 
Education Minister, Hasan Ali Yücel. Since many of the participants in this fight were employed 
as teachers and professors at grammar schools and universities across the country, having this 
debate reach the floor of the Assembly would prompt Yücel to try to reign in ideological fights 
within his ministry through a variety of tactics, including strongly worded memoranda, the 
suspension of several professors, and the prompting of the suit brought by Sabahattin Ali against 





Nihal Atsız that would ultimately trigger the demonstrations that preceded the mass arrests of the 
Pan Turkists.  
The Pan-Turanist Trials 1944-1945 
Arrest and Indictment 
The mass trial of Pan-Turkists was precipitated by a protest against the faculty of Ankara 
University and Sabahattin Ali, a leftist novelist and professor, on May 3, 1944. Nihal Atsız had 
lost a libel suit with Ali, and organized much of the boisterous incident. Atsız and at least two 
dozen others were arrested on May 9 in Istanbul, which was still under Martial Law, based on a 
list prepared by Education Minister Hasan Ali Yücel, the precise number of arrests is unknown 
but the list which was published after the fact contained forty-seven names.414 In September, 
twenty-eight people were brought to trial, largely charged with the formation of a secret society 
intent on overthrowing the government, but in the end, only ten of those were found guilty in a 
verdict delivered in February 1945. The guilty parties included Zeki Velidi Togan, Reha Oğuz 
Türkkan, Cihat Savaşfer, Nurullah Bariman, Necdet Sançar, Alparslan Türkeş, Dr. Fevzi 
Teretoğlu, Nihal Atsız, Cemal Oğuz Öcal, and Cebbar Şenel, and were sentenced to prison terms 
ranging from ten years (Togan) to nine months (Türkeş).  
 In reviewing the indictments, some of which were made public at the time, and records of 
the testimony that have been passed on to and published by Atsız’s acolytes in the last few years 
we can see that the charges against this group hinged on their allegiance to a secret society intent 
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on overthrowing the government. In this section, I will focus on these documents to demonstrate 
how the state used these trials to try to ascertain the ideological makeup of this group, and silence 
those who posed a political threat to CHP hegemony.  
 The indictments and final reports of the investigation were handed down on September 7, 
1944 under the direction of the assistant prosecutor Kazım Alöç and Sâbit Noyan, a prosecutor 
from the Martial Law Administration. This report was published in that month’s Ayın Tarihi 
(Month’s History), a state-run publication, and totaled twenty-eight pages.415 The primary charge 
against the group was the “attempting treacherous actions against the fatherland and the nation 
while forming a secret society with the aims of Racism and Turanism.”416 The bulk of the 
evidence provided in the indictment was based on letters sent between the various members that 
were confiscated following their arrest.  
 The indictment identified a few different circles within which the prosecutors suspected 
treasonous activity to have occurred. The first centered around Zeki Velidi Togan, a former leader 
of revolutionary movements in Central Asia who had been living in Turkey since 1925 and who 
rose to prominence as a critic of the Turkish History Thesis. Togan was accused of rejecting 
Atatürk’s conception of the Turkish nation, specifically the idea of a “bordered nation” 
(hudutlandırılmış milliyeti) in a confiscated letter sent to Reha Oğuz Türkkan and Cihat Savaşfer, 
urging them to not espouse a “quasi-Atatürkist” (gûya Atatürkçü) position in their journal Bozkurt 
as they positioned themselves against Nihal Atsız.417 Additionally, it detailed how Togan made a 
trip to Germany at the outset of the Nazi campaign against the USSR in 1941 to meet with two 
Turkish representatives there, Nuri İman Karadağlı and Ahmet Karadağlı, with the intent to 
                                                           
415 “Irkçılarla Turancıların Muhakemeleri hakkında İstanbul Örfi idare Komutanlığın ilk 
duruşmalarına ait raporu” Ayın Tarihi, September 1944, 28-56 
416 Ibid, 28 
417 Ibid, 30 
230 
 
organize a secret society in service of a German victory over Russia, the creation of a Turkish 
Union, and the overthrow of the Turkish state.418 When questioned about this in his interrogation, 
Togan admitted to forming the secret society and to meeting with Turks in Germany, but 
explained that the purpose of the group, apparently named the Eastern Turkish Union (Doğu Türk 
Birliği), was meant to come to the aid of Turks who hailed from the region between the North 
Caucasus and the Great Wall of China (Seddiçin), and to support the cause of Turks struggling in 
these regions under Russian rule, but not to overthrow the government, an answer which the 
prosecutors called “evasive.”419 The prosecutors then provided a transcription of documents 
retrieved from the Taksim apartment owned by the wife of Nuri İman Karadağlı that included the 
two-part oath of the secret society and the four-pronged goals of the group. The oath read as 
follows, 
1 – In order to give life to a great Turkish state that will save imprisoned Turkish 
countries [esir Türk ülkeleri] and unite them with Turkey, I pledge my blood, my soul, 
my honor, and my wealth 
2 – If I betray this organization with this oath, I accept that the organization may kill me 
and that the religion of the Qur’an is final.420  
The four aims of the group were listed as, 
A – The Turkish government is afraid of Russia. For that reason, our activities are not 
supported. Because of that, we will work very much in secret. 
B – Today’s government is poorly administered. It is missing a historic opportunity. We 
will immediately advocate with the government to support at German victory. 
C – Our organization will always gather more components. 
D – We acknowledge the request of Zeki Velidi Togan to travel to Germany to establish 
communications there and to organize those who are imprisoned there.421  
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In summary, the indictment centers this secret society on Togan, and indicates that his leadership 
was corroborated by each of the arrested members of the society. These charges would largely 
stick, as Togan would receive the harshest penalty of the group – a ten-year prison sentence plus 
four years of exile.  
Perspectives from the Press and American Diplomats 
 Reactions to the arrest of the racist-Turanists in May 1944 in the Istanbul press reflected 
a rare consensus in the midst of one of the most contentious periods in Turkish intellectual and 
press history. Writers on nearly every side of the political spectrum, from Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın 
to Zekeriya Sertel to Ahmet Emin Yalman and even Nadir Nadi, who was infamously close to the 
German legation, supported the government’s charges and denounced Atsız and his group’s 
ideology. Later that year, the education ministry would publish a bound volume collecting 
together a full seventy editorials that were published in May 1944 to this effect, along with all 
public speeches on the subject from President İsmet İnönü, Prime Minister Sükrü Saraçoğlu, 
Education Minister Hasan Ali Yücel, and the General Secretary of the CHP, M.Ş. Esendal.422  
 Yalçın, who was a supporter of the Anglo-American alliance in the war, framed his attack 
in a column that warned against irredentism on May 18 in his newspaper, Tanin. He argued that it 
was irredentism amongst the national minorities of the Ottoman Empire that ultimately brought 
the empire down, and in turn inspired a Turkish nationalist movement amongst the majority of 
Ottoman citizens and statesmen that was fundamentally anti-irredentist.423 The following day, he 
addressed the tension between Kemalist nationalism and Turanism in perhaps a clearer way than 
any of the Kemalist statesmen had, explaining, “[Turanism], while occupying a completely 
literary and emotional place, plays a role in our political life by functionally inspiring hope and 
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strength in the hearts [of Turkish citizens]” but warning that one of the main principles of the 
Turkish Republic was to “make a movement for peace within its own compass while considering 
that the its own wealth is its most fundamental guarantee it must not follow an aim of conquest 
regarding its neighboring countries and must not give rise to a politics of aggression.”424 In a third 
editorial, Yalçın explicitly stated that the Turanist movement was a pawn of the Nazi government 
and that their “goal has followed with racism in Turkey, however it consists of destroying and 
deconstructing Turkey.”425 
 Zekeriya Sertel, who, along with his editorial partner and wife Sabiha, would often bear 
the brunt of criticism from figures like Yalçın throughout the war, took a similar line to his more 
liberal-nationalist counterpart. On May 8, the day before the arrest of the Turanists in Istanbul, 
Sertel warned the readers of his daily Tan about the activities of a “fifth column” in Turkey. He 
reminded his readers that, “We are witnesses to a few provocateurs who wish to create a dualism 
amongst our citizens while hiding under the mask of racism, religiosity (dincilik), and 
nationalism.”426 Beyond casting his aspersions on the Turanists, Sertel forwarded an argument for 
Turkish nationalism as a necessary precondition for democratic politics. He did not see 
nationalism as a philosophy that precluded left and right divisions, “In these days when our 
country and nation are needing the greatest unity, it will not be a harmful thing to say that we 
should work to divide the country into left and right. Without nationalism, one cannot imagine a 
Turk. However, we understand the meaning that our nationalism and this nation was determined 
by Atatürk’s People’s Party Program…” and that those who “arrogate a racist or imperialist 
understanding to Turkish nationalism” amounted to traitors who wanted only to divide the 
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country. He paraphrased Falih Rıfkı Atay, a close companion of Atatürk, saying that “we are 
neither like those in a Trotskyist country and we do not give a place in this nation to movements 
who wish to create anarchy throughout the world nor are we on the side of those who have an 
imperialist conception of nationalism.”427  
On May 19th, the Youth and Sports holiday and the same day as İnönü’s speech 
denouncing the Turanists, Sertel continued this argument in favor of Atatürk’s conception of 
nationalism, “Atatürk was a nationalist. However, his nationalism was not an aggressive 
nationalism, the nationalism of invaders running after some crude dream… he brought a new and 
realist nationalism that desired Turkey to live freely and privately, spreading wealth and 
prosperity within its own national borders.”428 The following day he reiterated this argument, 
delineating that Turkism had two primary causes in the Ottoman period’s second constitutional 
period: the first cause being that it emerged in order to compete with other nationalist movements 
within the Ottoman political world, and second cause being to confront foreign wealth holders 
who were “playing the Turks for suckers” (Türkü istismar ediyorlardı). The Ottoman rulers had 
tried in vain to combat these issues with Islamism and “Caliphateism” (hilâfetçilik), but Atatürk, 
“disposed with these movements that came from the Ottoman Empire and could not but do both 
more and less than was necessary. He brought an end to Islamism and Caliphateism… He drew 
borders that deviated from the Turkism of Turanism and racism, he explained that meaning, and 
agreed to a nationalism that was befitting of the new Turkey.”429 
 The most prominent exponent of German propaganda in the Turkish press, Cumhuriyet’s 
Nadir Nadi, tried to downplay the arrest of the Turanists and play up his Atatürkist bona fides in 
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May 1944. On May 10, Nadi dismissed the events in Ankara calling the protests “a thoughtless 
racket,” and telling his readers that “It is necessary that if you look at them, the events in Ankara 
do not constitute an important issue.”430 He brushed off the prominent position given to the 
Turanist protestors saying that, “It’s possible to run into three or four youths who have for a 
moment been dragged to incorrect thinking by radical or foreign viewpoints anywhere,” and 
shook off worries that they would succeed in indoctrinating the Turkish students by asserting, 
“there is no doubt that the Turkish youth, as a bloc not seen in any country in the modern world, 
are prepared to be in the powerful position of Atatürkists and patriots.”431 Departing from his 
colleagues in the Istanbul press, Nadi instead indirectly argued for leniency in their case by 
offering a defense of free speech. He argued that despite the war, “the world that we live in is a 
world where nations are coming into closer and closer contact with one another… it is a truth that 
we are living in an age where the exchange of ideas between nations has reached the point of 
greatest density.”432 He argued that the state, any state, was powerless to stop the forces of 
propaganda in the modern era, when “One hundred-ton tanks that can destroy castles are 
completely powerless in the face of short wave radio stations… Under these conditions we are 
finding that there is no doubt that it is very hard, even impossible in this situation to attempt to 
apply something like a ban, or a limitation, or a censor on reading or listening, with the goal of 
protecting against a determined order of thought.”433 While making the dubious claim that the 
Kemalist regime was not one of “raids or bans on the circulation of thought,” Nadi argued that 
Turkey’s neutrality in the global conflagration was due to its youth’s attachment to their own 
intellectuals while, “left and right regimes, the fashion comes and all the ideologies pass by…”434 
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In the days after İnönü’s Children’s Day Speech, Nadi celebrated the pragmatic relationship 
between realism and idealism that Atatürk propagated, using a musical metaphor, “under the flag 
of the People’s Party the waves of the six arrows [of Kemalism] are in complete harmony… If 
someone wishes to make the slightest deviation from one of our principles, it harms our national 
harmony. It is true and necessary that for this reason the government treats this subject [ideology] 
with the highest degree of sensitivity, and does not show the slightest tolerance to the slippery 
slope of left and right.”435  
The trial was also followed closely by American agencies in Turkey, particularly because 
the trial coincided with Turkey’s lurching move into the war on the side of the Allies. A report 
filed at the Ankara Embassy by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) on the trial gives us some 
details of the geopolitical interests at stake in the conduct of the trial. The OSS officials saw the 
Turanist group’s agenda as “the establishment, under a fascist regime, of a Greater Turkey which 
would include the 17,000,000 people of Turkish stock now living in the USSR.”436 The OSS 
observed that while the overarching charge against the group was that of planning a putsch, “little 
stress was laid upon the activities directed against the Soviet Union.”437 Eager to gauge the 
feeling of the Turkish public about the trial, the report noticed that press coverage was extensive, 
but “public opinion in general was not hostile to the Turanists. Their campaign for ‘liberation’ of 
the Turks beyond the frontiers, directed as it was mainly against the USSR, was viewed with 
sympathy by a large section of the Turkish public.”438 It is clear that despite these public 
sympathies, the American legation saw the Turkish government as being somewhat cautious in 
their prosecution to avoid angering the USSR at a period when Turkey had little leverage against 
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their prospective demands. Indeed, the report notes that the sentences delivered to the group were 
considered light by Soviet officials in comparison with those handed out to communist 
sympathizers earlier in the course of the war, and that the Soviet embassy might press for a re-
opening of the trial. However, they arrived at the conclusion that the Turkish government could 
“be expected to avoid any action which might endanger negotiations for a new Turco-Soviet 
treaty or jeopardize its relations with the Allies in general.”439 
We can see here a somewhat jarring disconnect between the broad consensus of the 
Istanbul editorialists in the wake of the arrests and the report filed on public opinion by the US 
Embassy a year later. Considering the attitudes many in Turkey and the Turkish government took 
towards the Turanists earlier in the war, when the outcome of the war was shrouded in more 
doubt, this, perhaps, comes as less of a surprise. Many opposition journalists – Nadi especially, 
and perhaps Sertel to a degree – may have been trying to cover their bases in case the arrest of the 
Turanists signaled a renewed clampdown on the press. The Americans, in their report, did well to 
consider the long view, and, as we shall see, were not far off base in their assessment of the 
Turkish government’s attitude towards the Turanists. It remains, then, to take a deeper look at 
how the Turkish government and legal apparatus shifted its perception of the threat posed by the 
racist-Turanists from the time of their arrest in 1944 to their final acquittals in 1945 and 1947. 
Defense, Investigation, Appeal 
  In his lengthy defense statement, Togan repeatedly accuses the prosecution of doctoring 
evidence. Beginning with the aforementioned letter to Türkkan and Savaşfer that warned them off 
of a “quasi Atatürkist” position, he claims the prosecution inserted the word “quasi” (gûya), that 
he had never said that he “established a secret society” nor that he was a member of “The Eastern 




Turkish Union secret society” (Doğu Türk Birliği gizli cemiyetim), that the statement that he was 
given “representative authority for the Turkistan National Union” (Türkistan Milli Birliğinin 
temsil salahiyeti verilmişti) was false, and that he initially came to Turkey to support Dr. Rıza 
Nur’s rebellion in 1925 was also inserted into his testimony.440 Beyond the charges and 
descriptions in the initial indictment, Togan claimed that at least a dozen sentences or statements 
presented as evidence in his diary and in other confiscated letters had been doctored to one extent 
or another in order to implicate him in a plot to overthrow the government.441 After addressing the 
doctoring of evidence, Togan’s defense then turned to explain his statements have been taken out 
of context to make it appear as though he was an enemy of Atatürk. To the main charge that he 
advised Türkkan and Savaşfer against appearing too much like Atatürkists, he explains that he 
was merely to assist Türkkan in his dispute with Atsız by counseling him to avoid being seen as a 
“shield” (siper) for Atatürk specifically in his dealings with Selim Sarper, who at the time the 
letters in question were written was serving as the head of the Press Directorate, but had since 
been promoted to the position of Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Togan felt that as far as the 
split in the Pan-Turkist camp was being adjudicated in the Press Ministry, Atatürk should be left 
out of it.442  
Togan’s defense then turned to address ideology – specifically his beliefs about Atatürk, 
racism, fascism and Turkism. Togan listed his Atatürkist bona fides, focusing on the courses he 
taught while he was on the faculty at Vienna University and Göttingen University in the mid-
1930s on Turkish history, and his book on the history of Turkistan in which he compared Enver 
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Paşa and Atatürk favorably to the anti-crusader Sultans Kılıç Arslan and Salah al-Din Ayubbi.443 
He noted that “never in my life have I found myself to be a sycophant to anyone. I wasn’t to 
Atatürk either,” noting that he opposed, on objective grounds, Atatürk’s push to elaborate the Sun 
Language Theory, but that the accusation that “he harbored bad thoughts about Atatürk was 
among the greatest injustices.”444 The charge that he believed in racism he also found impossible. 
Togan reiterated claims that his letters to Reha Oğuz Türkkan had been doctored to make him 
seem like a racist, and that the purpose of the letter was to “ward them off the biased path of Dr. 
Rıza Nur.” He read what was presumably the un-doctored text of the letter, which emphasized the 
need to “understand the racial and ethnic characteristics of the fathers of our nation, which has 
lived amongst various tribes for ages, [but] whose blood appears to be pure and unmixed;” but to 
avoid “espousing a Turkism that made enemies” out of “Bosnaks, Circassians, Arabs, and 
Persians like Rıza Nur did.”445 Togan elaborated that his study and understanding of race and 
ethnicity was focused on customs (örf), traditions (âdet) and folklore of the Turks that was not in 
contest with other ethnicities, and that he had consistently explained that Turks “should struggle 
not to digest our nationalism like the racism [rasistlik] of the Germans and the Grey Wolves.”446 
He added that in letters to his friend Ragıp Hulusi, he had also argued that such a racist position 
was politically unwise, noting that “the dangers of chauvinism in Muslim countries that are 
neighbors of Russia are becoming clear.”447  
His opposition to racism as a political philosophy was likewise set on imperial grounds. 
“In truth,” he said, “I have never bothered with the race question… In my works and articles I 
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have written that the racism in Europe, the absolutism of a Hindu-German civilization, the 
organizing principle forwarded by a Duce or Führer system, being more international than 
national movements, are not appropriate for the Turkish national spirit.”448 To back this up, he 
recited a passage from an article he had published in the second issue of Atsız Mecmua in 1931 in 
which he assessed both communism and fascism as being in a struggle with democracy, “fascism 
has opened up a path in the space created by the weaknesses of democracy in its struggles against 
communism that is dark and suspicious… although fascism has the idea of itself as a champion of 
nationalism, it is an international chauvinism, not a national one.”449 He also noted the awkward 
German propaganda that had been circulating amongst Turkish nationalists in Germany that 
inappropriately argued for a cognate to the “führer system” in the “chieftain” (tekyolbaşçı) 
position in some Turkish tribes, and that he had criticized this propaganda in a letter to the 
president of the German Academy of the Sciences.450  
Over the rest of his defense, Togan focused on a review of his scholastic writings to 
contest the charge that he had espoused any form of racist politics, and that he had contributed to 
the understanding of Turkish nationalism in a way that augmented, rather than detracted from the 
ideals of Atatürk. Despite the depth of his defense, and the accusations of tampering with 
evidence, the tribunal handed down a guilty verdict to Zeki Velidi Togan for establishing a secret 
society intent on overturning the government of which he was the president, which carried with it 
a ten-year prison sentence, plus four years of probation and a lifetime ban from public service.451  
 Of the question and answer testimony from the trial that has been published, the judge 
focused mainly on questions of ideology – how to define Turkism, racism, nationalism, and so 
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on; how did each defendant fit in with the movement of racist-Turanism; what were their feelings 
about other ideologies like Republicanism, Communism, and liberalism. Each defendant’s 
prepared statements go to great lengths to detail their viewpoints, ideologies, and relationship to 
both the racist-Turanist movement and the Turkish Republic itself, but in the questioning sections 
reveal more distilled versions, and clearly reveal the positionality of the state. Of the transcripts 
that are available, Nihal Atsız’s is in-depth, and revealing.452 The judge’s first questions asked 
Atsız to define the “current of thought” he wanted to “awaken” in the country. Atsız replied, “Sir, 
the current I wanted to create, the thought I wanted to defend was Turkism (türkçülük).” The 
judge replied, “plain Turkism?” And Atsız proceeded to clarify, 
Yes, plain Turkism. Only when you say Turkism there are several elements included. For 
example, racism is an inseparable part of Turkism. Really this phrase, it is more or less 
[efradını cami ağyarını mani] one meaning of the term, and these concepts also enter it. 
Nationalism [milliyetçilik] is a general concept. Whereas here in the previous statements 
it has been said that Turkism and nationalism are somewhat different things. Whereas 
when you say nationalism, for example France’s nationalism is also nationalism. 
Whereas the name of our nationalism is Turkism. Meaning that Turkism is through and 
through Turkish nationalism.453   
The judge then asked Atsız to explain what Turanism is,  
Atsız: Turanism [Turancılık] and Turkism are the same. Like with Marxism and 
communism, one is above the other. 
Judge: Are you a Turanist [Turancı]? 
Atsız: Sir, there are three stages of ideals for nations. The first phase is independence 
[istiklâl]. The second is to establish a national unity [milli birlik] alongside its co-
racialists [ırkdaş] outside the country. The third is world domination [cihanı istila]. If up 
till now no single nation has been able to occupy the entire world, different nations 
holding these same ideals find themselves in resistance against one another. This is 
already a biological fact [biyolojik bir hadisedir]. Every vegetable and animal is also 
working to do this… 
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Judge: In that case is your thought and opinion that a state should be founded that brings 
together all the foreign Turks [dış Türkler]? 
Atsız: Yes! 
Judge: For what reason do you want this? 
Atsız: It is our ideal, our aim. We want this because it is the realization of our aim.  
Having clearly established that Atsız’s philosophy is fundamentally irredentist, and thus contrary 
to the popular conception of Turkish nationalism, and, more immediately important, Turkish war 
aims, the judge turned to the subject of racism. Atsız’s reply to the judge’s request to elucidate his 
theory of racism explained how he felt foreigners weakened great empires, 
Sir, the most secure nations are the homogenous [mütecanis] nations. The most important 
reason or cause of the destruction of great states is the foreign elements mixing inside 
them. In the history of the world up until now we have counted four great empires: the 
Arab, Roman, Ottoman, and English empires. Of these, the first three have been 
destroyed. The fourth is living. The reason for this is that in the first three there was 
wealth in persons not belonging to their own kind. Thusly, the English Empire has not 
been destroyed by the foreign races mixing inside it. The aim of my racism is not to 
repeat the mistake of this history. And in this country, to give to these duties this nation’s 
own children, really to give it to Turks. This, is a necessary and indispensable job.454  
Satisfied that this accurately represented his views, and the views he was accused of holding, the 
judge moved towards the more contested terrain of Atsız’s views on the parliament and the 
republican regime more broadly. When asked for his opinion on parliament, Atsız insisted it was 
not a true parliament because the members are unelected, indeed he claimed he never voted 
except for one time when he was employed by the Education Ministry. He claimed that he 
supported the Liberal Republican Party, that his movement voted for two hundred of their 
members, but the votes were canceled because, as the newspapers reported, all the votes went to 
the People’s Party. The judge contested this point, but then moved to ask what he thinks of the 
republican regime. Atsız rejected this line of questioning, stating that he was here to answer 
questions about racism and Turanism. The prosecutor intervened to state that there were writings 
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on this question in letters taken from Atsız’s house, after which Atsız offered, “My opinion, I am 
a partisan of a true Republic.” The judge responded, “And our present day Republican regime?” 
to which Atsız retorted, “that which you appreciate is not a classic republic. The one requirement 
of an election that is according to a community, meaning a people, is that the representatives are 
freely elected. Next, it is necessary that there is more than one party and that they moderate each 
other. Without these you cannot count today’s regime as having the classic meaning of a 
republic.”455  
 The judge then moved to the contents of the letter referenced by the prosecutor, which 
substantiated the charge of insulting the Turkish nation in the initial indictment. Atsız contested 
this charge by explaining that, “I know that I said the consciousness of the Turkish nation [Türk 
milleti şuurunu] had been lost. But this is not expressed as an insult the Turkish nation, but as an 
abiding sadness [teessürün sevkiyledir].” He then elaborated on two instances that had driven him 
to observe this loss of consciousness. First, he pointed to local screenings of the film Michel 
Strogoff – likely one of the French-produced adaptations of Jules Verne’s 1876 novel, produced 
in either 1926 or 1935. The film, which portrays the Russian imperial response to Tatar uprisings, 
upset Atsız because it “portrayed the rebelling Turkish tribes as barbarous tribes [vahşi kabileler], 
and the Russians who suppressed the rebellion as the representatives of civilization [medeniyet 
mümessili]. And the people applauded this.” Secondly, he recalled his experience teaching at the 
Bosphorus Lycèe where he noticed non-Turkish students on the Eminönü-Bebek tramway hurling 
all manner of disgusting insults at Turkish girls. “In earlier times this would have been met with a 
lynching [linç ile karşılanırdı],” he said,  
When I saw this, that in our country honorable Turkish girls could be called such 
disgusting names by a team of Armenian and Greek street toughs [Ermeni ve Rum 
palikaryalarıyla birlikte] who I would not value more than a dog, it was for the depth to 
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which our nation has fallen that I naturally was sorely disappointed. It is on the part of 
these Turkish children that the national consciousness is being lost. In fact, it was in this 
way, with a deep sadness, that I am able to put together such a sentence. Not to insult this 
nation, but, if it is possible, to awaken a national consciousness inside it.456 
Seemingly satisfied on this point, the judge then returned to the charge of insurrection, 
asking Atsız if he found himself to be part of a movement [hareket] to realize a Turkish union. 
Atsız wavered on this point, saying he was not part of an “active” [fiilî] movement and explaining 
that the extent to which he spoke of a Turkish union in his writing it was only to arouse a feeling 
in the heart of the nation, not to endorse any requisite form or political structure to the union. The 
judge pressed him on the question, asking him what kind of activities he was involved in, which 
Atsız dodged by saying while he mentions a Turkish union many times in his writings, it is only 
as a possibility in the far-off future [istikbalde de olabileceğini]. The judge then asked why Atsız 
wrote his infamous open letter to Prime Minister Saraçoğlu in Orhun. Atsız explained that he saw 
the minister and President İnönü’s speeches as broadly “calling on the individuals of the nation to 
cooperate with the government,” and that “I, as an intellectual citizen, considered this a sincere 
gesture [bunu samimi telakki ettim],” and intended to form a cooperative relationship with the 
government to open attacks against enemies of the fatherland, but, “some communists who are 
spread around in the shadows of important positions [himayelere dayanarak mühim mevkilere 
getirilmiş bulunan komünistleri] opened the attack [on me].” When pressed on what exactly the 
actions of these supposedly secret communists were, Atsız first explained that while Russia is the 
“mortal enemy” [can düşmanı] of Turkey, “Old Russia was an honorable [mert] enemy,” because 
it fought in the open, “but today, Russia succeeds as a dishonorable [namert] enemy. Because it 
seeks to destroy our people from the outside and inside, it is becoming deceitful [kandırarak 
geliyor].” After being prodded to be more specific in this accusation, Atsız insisted that the aim of 
the communists was to infiltrate Turkey’s education system, “They want in a short time to take 
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teachers in their hands and raise up the youth. They did this in France and they destroyed France 
in 25 years.”457  
This response prompted a line of questioning regarding Atsız’s civil suit with Sabahattin 
Ali from earlier in the year, which reveals precisely how these ideological battles were tied up in 
personal grievances between this generation of writers and thinkers. Atsız provided his version of 
the events that resulted in a student demonstration on May 3, 1944 in Ankara, stating that during 
his defense, his lawyer, Hamid Şevket İnce, insisted that the suit filed by Ali against Atsız, “was 
not between two persons, but between two thoughts and ideals,” to which Ali retorted, “Atsız, if 
this suit were to become both a pedestrian liable suit [alelade bir hakaret davası] and a suit over 
ideals, I warn you that it will bring great harm to both you personally and to the country,” which 
in turn provoked the protest that was considered to be the catalyst for the larger legal action 
against the Pan-Turanists. Ali and Atsız had been roommates at Istanbul University, and even 
wrote together in Atsız’s first journal. Another former colleague turned bête noir for Atsız was 
the literature scholar Pertev Naili Boratov, about whom the judge asked his final questions, 
 Judge: Is Pertev Naili of the Turkish race? 
 Atsız: He is a Turk, my sir, and one of the rare Turks among the communists. 
 Judge: I wonder what kind of communist he might be? 
Atsız: This is a strange case sir. I have followed his transformation into a communist step 
by step. At the beginning, Pertev was a nationalist. We published the Atsız journal 
together. Pertev, during his university years, did not have success in his love life. He had 
proposed marriage to a few young girls and all of them rejected him. For this reason, he 
ended up becoming friends with some of the university’s immoral boys and girls; he’d 
take outings with them. In this way, he was not taken in by the bourgeoisie and it was 
amongst the immoral friends he found success in love. For this reason, he remained in 
their influence and felt he was in a superior position from a cultural and intellectual 
perspective. He slid into communism and became the enemy of bourgeois society. 
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With that, Atsız’s questioning ended, reminding us that much of the toxicity of the ideological 
climate in this period of Turkish history was tied up in personal relationships, many of which had 
gone sour over the previous decade.  
 Atsiz’s defense statement doubles as a lengthy defense of his racist ideology. Central to 
his claims, is his assertion that the Turkish state was founded, and had operated on racist 
principles from the beginning. As he had previously done in his open letters to Prime Minister 
Saraçoğlu, Atsız, after delineating the long history of racial separation in the imperial era, he 
invoked key moments in Turkish republican history that justified his cause. First, he explained 
that during the First World War, “The Arabs with the English, and the Armenians with the 
Russians shot us in the back; they cut and chopped Turks into unrecognizable savages.” Later, 
during the War for Independence, he noted that in Western Anatolia, Circassians and Abkhazians 
began movements to form separate states, as well as the Kurds and Zaza’s in Eastern Anatolia. He 
reiterated that the assassination attempt on Atatürk in 1925, which prompted the Law of 
Maintenance of Order and the Independence Tribunals, was prompted by a Kurdish separatist 
movement, and that the prosecutors in those trials were “acting on racism.” He noted the first 
article of the criminal code, “One cannot be tried for an action that the law does not explicitly 
criminalize,” and that since he had not led an action within the army, he was not breaking the law. 
“If it were a crime,” he said, “the societies that have organized themselves over the ages, those 
that only marry within themselves, those who have separate religious traditions and separate 
graveyards practice an active racism, why then has the Jewish racism of the Salonican dönmes 
been criminalized…?” He also repeated Sükrü Saraçoğlu’s speech in parliament that incited his 
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open letters, as well as a widely quoted saying from former Defense Minister Ali Rıza Artunkal, 
which spoke of a, “noble and pure Turkish race.”458  
What the defenses and testimony of Atsız and Togan reveal as the central figures in the 
trials, and representative of the other defendants, is the abiding concern amongst the Pan-
Turanists that they were on trial because of their ideological position. They clearly did not see 
themselves as revolutionaries, despite their putatively irredentist views, but feared that the state 
did not agree, and, at least in the initial decisions by the military court, the state did not. What 
transpired over the following two years, at the end of which all of the Pan-Turkists would be fully 
acquitted, was a contestation within the judicial framework over the appropriateness of the Pan-
Turkist ideology given the current political context. Günay Göksü Özdoğan has noted the odd 
concurrence of the decisions, which were made public and reported in various newspapers as they 
were reached, with the geopolitical direction Turkey was swinging in from the beginning of the 
trials in 1944 – then a still-uncertain time in Turkey’s neutrality, and one in which a pro-German 
position would have been unhelpful – and the final acquittal in 1947 – almost two years after 
Turkey joined the United Nations and less than a year after the first competitive multiparty 
parliamentary elections in the history of the republic.459 What was unavailable to Özdoğan and 
other scholars until very recently include the complete testimonies described above and the report 
prepared in advance of the decisions by the Military Courts of Cassation, which had been in the 
personal archive of Nihal Atsız’s acolyte Hayri Yıldırım and were published in 2015.460 Through 
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this report, and the final two acquittals by the Military Court we can see how the Turkish justice 
system reversed course on Pan-Turanism as an acceptable ideology, and ultimately made the case 
for its constitutionality. 
The four documents published from Hayri Yıldırım’s archive include the “Investigation 
Report of the Military Court of Cassation,” two appeals decisions from the second criminal office 
of the Military Court of Cassation, and the “Military Court’s General Assembly Decision.”461 The 
first of these, and the lengthiest document, describes significant modifications to the findings of 
the original investigations into each of the defendants and was completed on October 16, 1945. I 
will focus here on the modifications concerning Togan and Atsız, whose ideological positions 
most concerned the military courts. 
The investigative report first reviewed the meeting held between various Turanist figures 
on March 7, 1944, in which Zeki Velidi Togan was purported to have formed a secret society 
with the intent to carry out a coup against the government.462 The report found that the purpose of 
the meeting, as evidenced by testimony and by contextual letters between Togan and Reha Oğuz 
Türkkan, was meant to patch up differences between Türkkan and Atsız, and “in hopes of 
forming a tight crowd of all the Turkists around İnönü’s side and bear no other effect…”463 The 
conclusion of this section of the report finds that although Togan and Türkkan appear to have 
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unsuccessfully swayed Atsız to their side, and formed their own “Grey Wolf” group, the March 
1944 letter “was not proof or a sign of the reunification of a secret alliance.”464 In their 
reassessment of the charges, the investigators rationalized the penalties handed down to each of 
the defendants explicitly in terms of the wartime climate. They cited that because Zeki Velidi 
Togan was a university professor at the time he was charged, the initial trial “…showed that he 
personally demonstrated the abuse of the security and faith of the Turkish youth in the Turkish 
Republican government and especially in the case of this last war [The Second World War] 
demonstrated with precision against our governments very strict neutrality…” through his 
participation in a secret society, which is outlawed in the Turkish Criminal Code’s Article 171, 
section 2.465 Likewise, the connection with a secret society and the improper influence over 
students was found justifiable relating to charges against Reha Oğuz Türkkan, Cihat Savaşfer, 
and Nurullah Barıman.466 However, when it came to charges that relate to the Criminal Code’s 
Article 142 – which makes violations of Turkey’s neutrality and attacks against its allies in 
wartime punishable by a minimum fifteen year prison sentence – the report granted the possibility 
of appeal to twelve of the defendants, including Zeki Velidi Togan, on the grounds that the 
propaganda by this group, “did not fulfill the elements of the various ideas of Article 142 and 
further proof was not procured to verify this in the suit’s dossier.”467 This early provision of the 
report foreshadows a focus on the question of racism and ideology throughout both the Military 
Court’s investigation and the requests for appeal by each of the defendants. 
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While much of the appeals process for Togan, Türkkan and the other defendants was 
bound up in charges of forming a secret society, the charges against Nihal Atsız more directly 
related to ideological question of whether racism was an appropriate ideological position in the 
Turkish sphere. Atsız’s main charges had to do with his publications and the instigation of the 
protest on May 3, 1944, which the Military Court believed violated Articles 159 and 161 of the 
Turkish Criminal Code – affronting the government and parliament, and libel “with intent to 
excite public opinion” respectively – and in this way, as we shall see, Atsız’s journey through the 
legal system bore a greater resemblance to that of his ideological rivals, the Sertels.468 The 
investigators delineated that Atsız’s racist outlook meant that he took positions that at least 
hypothetically ran counter to Turkey’s foreign policy aims – such as “handing over the Salonica 
front to the enemy in the Balkan War, or accusing Circassians and Abaz of treason during the 
World War” – and caused him to routinely cast suspicion of members of the Grand National 
Assembly who he believed were not of Turkish blood.469 They went into great detail on Atsız’s 
criticism of the “glorification of Atatürk as a national hero,” including with his novella The Night 
of the Sycophants (Dalkavuklar Gecisi) and various letters and conversations with his co-
defendants defaming Atatürk’s conception of the Grand National Assembly. The report also 
pointed evidence of Atsız’s affinity for Hitler going back to sympathies expressed in Atsız 
Mecmua, as well as books and pamphlets associated with Atsız including titles such as “Hitler 
and National Socialism,” “A Manifestation of Hitlerism in Turkey,” and “Turkish Fascist.”470   
At the same time, they noted that Atsız constructed an ideological front against “negative 
and communist minded professors” such as Istanbul University’s Sadrettin Celal Antel, and that 
in the protests he instigated, he had sought to “make a positive impression on the students… 
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because he wanted them to find that in this country communism was a destructive view…”471 
Likewise, the report mentioned Atsız’s own explanation that the one of the two purposes of his 
journal Orhun was establish a front against communism and that his dispute with Sabahattin Ali 
was instigated by his anti-communist essay “The Devils Inside Us” (İçimizdeki Şeytanlar).472 It 
noted that meetings preparing the protests during the trial with Sabahattin Ali were conducted 
between Atsız’s group and students at Ankara University in order to “take precautions against 
leftist activities, divide tasks, [and] publish journals” and that the protests, though violent, 
featured no slogans or actions against the government, indeed the “Independence March” was 
sung, and chants of “Long Live İnönü,” “Long Live The Turkish Republic,” “Long Live the 
Turkish Nation,” “Long Live Turkish Justices,” “Long Live the Turkish Youth,” and “Damn the 
Communists” were shouted.473  
The tension between these two lines of the investigation – the wariness towards racism 
coupled with a general approval of broadly nationalist and anti-communist activities – sums up 
the quandary in front of the appeals court. It would be difficult to grant appeal without approving 
of both ideologies simultaneously, but the investigators sought some solutions to the riddle. 
Initially, in the analysis of the evidence regarding the May 3rd protests, the investigators suggest 
that the evidence did not satisfy Article 161 of the criminal code, the harsher of the two charges, 
but because of the wartime conditions and the “reckless” (pervasız) nature of the protests in the 
capital city, where there might have been many observers who were representatives of foreign 
governments, it would have been more appropriate for Atsız to have been charged with breaking 
Article 6 of the Criminal Code – which pertains to the endangerment of Turks living abroad. Such 
a suggestion would shift the focus of the crime to purely strategic considerations while punting on 
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the issue of racism’s appropriateness in the public sphere.474 In the initial provisions and 
conclusions by the investigators, they recommended charges be upheld in all cases for Atsız with 
the exception of the charges relating to the May 3rd events, charges relating to his attacks on 
parliamentarians, and undue influence on students as a teacher, were not recommended for 
appeal.475   
The second attempt to square the Pan-Turkist views with the prevailing Turkish 
nationalist vision in the investigative report came from the contribution of the President of the 
Court Martial (Adlî Amir), who offered a summary of his case for approving the appeals request 
that was prepared on April 24, 1945, roughly a month after the appeals process had formally 
begun. Beginning with the President of the Court Martial, and the appeals judges going forward, 
attention shifted slightly from the Criminal Code to questions of the constitutionality of racism. 
Here, the trial of the Pan-Turkists posed a direct challenge Article 88 of the 1924 Turkish 
Constitution, which reads, “In Turkey, from the perspective of citizenship, everyone is a ‘Turk’ 
without distinguishing between race [ırk] or religion.”476 In his summary, the Court Martial 
President pointed to this article, suggesting that its meaning was altered by the recent change to 
Article 2 removing “Islam is the State Religion of Turkey,” and also to a recent discussion in 
parliament that came to the conclusion that “Like any new nation, it is possible to include 
individuals who come from the same race in the Turkish nation. However, Turkishness is a 
community that can accommodate those coming from any root [uruk]” to establish a framework 
for the interface of race and Turkishness, as he wrote, “we cannot specify our nationalism and 
racism outside of these parameters.”477 Taking these points into consideration, the President of the 
Court Martial determined that while “racist propaganda dissents from the principle qualities of 
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our Constitution and as a result violates the third clause of Article 142 of the Turkish Criminal 
Code,” it was not the case that “the actualization of this crime constitutes propaganda on behalf of 
a foreign regime.”478 He argued that the society formed by the racist-Turanists, and the 
organization of the May 3rd protests constituted a protected expression of political opposition 
precisely because there was no explicit proof that any of the involved parties were working on 
behalf of, or advocating for, a foreign regime.479 He further argued that although the protest was 
“not a random gathering” and that he recognized the importance of maintaining order during a 
global political crisis, and that Nihal Atsız had admitted to directing the message of the protest in 
vicious terms against various men of state, especially Education Minister Hasan Ali Yücel, there 
was no agreement in the evidence to meet the standards of Article 161 of the Criminal Code, and 
recommended his acquittal on those grounds.480 In examinations of the cases against Hüseyin 
Namık Orkun, Reha Oğuz Türkkan and other associated with Gök-Börü he also argued that the 
defendants should be acquitted on the basis that their secret society did not directly assail the 
Turkish constitution nor advocate for a foreign government.481 The Court Martial President’s 
recommendations then when to the Martial Law Administration, who ultimately rejected the 
requests for appeals, but agreed that there were inconsistencies in the charges against Atsız and 
Türkkan regarding secret societies and the intent of the May 3rd protests to harm national 
interests, and thus forwarded a recommendation to the tribunal that the trials be re-heard on those 
counts.482  
While much of the report was compiled in April of 1945, it was not submitted to the 
Military Court of Cassation for review until October 16th of that year. A week later, in what must 
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have been a surprise decision to the investigators and lawyers who had prepared the report, the 
four-judge panel handed down a full appeal to the defendants. Their decision affirmed the 
appropriateness of the investigation, noting that the “bad thoughts and intentions of breaking the 
security of the state in directed movements and especially making foreign propaganda against the 
security of the state and the regime” during the state of emergency, but found that the objections 
to the requests for appeal by the defendants to be “completely inappropriate” to the court’s 
purposes.483 While the panel delineated several dozen areas where it concurred with the appeals 
requests included in the previous report, their own justification of the decision came down to four 
principal objections. First, they referenced changes to the Criminal Code’s Article 142 made in 
1936 and 1938 which lowered penalties for this transgression from a maximum of five years 
down to two, and removed the language regarding the criticism of Turkey’s neutrality, placing 
instead attacks “on behalf of a foreign regime” and against “the principal qualities of the state or 
that undermine national pride.” The second objection affirmed that according to Article 88 of the 
Constitution, it is “clearly specified that the differences between religion and race cannot be an 
impediment to the nation” and that the text of the article indicated that “citizenship was found to 
be related to this aspect,” however, in order to bring charges against a movement for violating this 
article, it was necessary to prove that they were “outside the borders and scope of this 
understanding with scientific considerations…” Third, they noted that the secret alliance the 
defendants were charged with had mostly scattered since its formation in 1941, and held the 
opinion that this did not hold up to the standards of the charge. Finally, they referenced the 
specifics of the law enacting Martial Law in certain areas of Turkey starting in 1940, noting that 
the primary activities occurred outside of the regions specified in the Martial Law’s enactment, 
and that the jurisdictional prerogatives of the Martial Law Administration outside of those regions 
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was limited to “operationalized” (eylemsel), “contractual” (sözleşmesel) and “distributional” 
(yayınsal) activities which would have to be under the control of the group. On this last point, the 
tribunal found the charges to be “not acceptable to any degree…”484  On these bases, all the 
defendants were acquitted and ordered to be released from prison. The courtroom saga of the 
racist-Turanists would not finally end there, as the Court Martial President sought to have the 
appeal decision overturned in 1947, but in a brief decision by a two-judge panel in September of 
that year, rejected the request, finding that there was no “absolute legal necessity” to revisit the 
case.485  
The Tan Trial 
 In the wake of the destruction of the Tan offices on December 4, 1945 the government 
proceeded to take several measures to suppress communist and left-leaning opposition voices in 
the Turkish press and in academia, in particular anyone associated with the publication of 
Görüşler who had not vocally denied their participation, as a few key figures in the newly-formed 
Democrat Party had. The most immediate step that the government took was to suspend seven 
professors at Ankara University – Sabahattin Ali, Niyazi Berkes, Pertev Naili Boratov, Mediha 
Berkes, Behice Boran, Adnan Cemgil and Kemal Bilbaşar – from their duties on December 18th. 
These professors had been contributors to Görüşler and Tan for some time, and had formed the 
core group of Yurt ve Dünya. The suspensions followed a memorandum circulated by the 
Minister of Education Hasan Ali Yücel which rebuked, but did not name, professors who violated 
the Law of Officials [Memur Kanunu] and the Press Law [Matbuat Kanunu] which prohibit 
government officials from making political statements and the publications of articles that oppose 
discipline and obedience. A report from the American Embassy mentions also that there was a 
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deep suspicion on the part of the Turkish Secret Police that any academics trained in the United 
States, as Behice Boran, Niyazi and Mediha Berkes were, had been coopted by Soviet agents, 
because, “…Russian agents in America interest themselves more actively in foreign students. The 
main tactic of this endeavor is to benefit from the sense of inferiority which foreign students have 
in a country more civilized than their own.”486 According to Niyazi Berkes, he was called into the 
Education Ministry for questioning along with three or four other professors, where he found that 
“they had prepared a room for us as if we were taking an exam. There were long rows of seats in 
between each of us. We were told not to whisper any secrets to each other!” They were each 
distributed a questionnaire – whether they were similar or different Berkes could not tell, but he 
remembers the questions on his to have made him laugh, and it seemed no one took the exercise 
seriously – and after the investigation, they were each suspended for several months, though they 
appealed the decision and won.487 
 The second, and more consequential action taken by the state was to hand down a series 
of indictments against the owners and editors of Tan alongside those of a more conservative 
newspaper, Yeni Sabah. The first indictment, levelled against Zekeriya Sertel and Halil Lütfü 
Dördüncü of Tan and Ali Rıza oğlu, A. Cemalettin Saraçoğlu and Huseyin oğlu of Yeni Sabah 
came on December 15th and accused them of violating the 27th and 30th Articles of the Press Law 
which prohibit false accusations of criminal activity or corruption against members of parliament 
and printing false news. They would be found guilty and handed down short prison sentences of 
three months, along with a hefty fine of a few thousand liras, but would win on an appeal issued 
March 18, 1946. The second indictment, which would include all of the above parties plus Sabiha 
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Sertel and Cami Baykurt, would carry more severe penalties would result in a second hearing in 
March.488  
 In one point of contrast with the trial of the Pan-Turanists, one of the initial decisions of 
the tribunal ruling on the Sertels’ two trials was that the proceedings would be open to the public, 
on account of the fact that the transgressions of the accused were made in a public manner, in the 
press, rather than in secret.489 As a result there was considerable coverage of the trial and the 
defenses and statements given in the press, and the Sertels were allowed to publish significant 
excerpts of the proceedings later that year. In the first trial, Zekeriya was prosecuted for two 
articles published on November 12 and December 1, 1945 that accused members of parliament of 
corrupt practices. In the first article, entitled “How Does a Citizen Ask for Accountability?” 
Zekeriya sets up a contrast between the Turkish and American government.490 He first described 
the manner in which former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt was obliged to answer an 
uncomfortable question about her finances from a reader of Ladies Home Journal. The question 
asked whether she had made a profit on cotton textiles in the south, and that there was a rumor 
that she was only defending black people in order to make money from that industry.491 Zekeriya 
then pointed out that “Madame Roosevelt was not bothered by this question, it was not 
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considered an affront. On the contrary, every citizen has the right to request information about the 
personal wealth of the President, and so she answered it.”492 He then went on to wonder why the 
Turkish public is uninformed about the sources of wealth amongst its political class, “most of 
them are not the owners of inheritances from their fathers,” and directly compares them with the 
First Lady, asking, “if these people, like Eleanor Roosevelt, were left with a question from a 
citizen, would they be able to give as polite and conscientious a response as she did?”493 He 
followed with a call for laws to be put in place that require bureaucrats and politicians to release 
their financial information, and closes with a reference to the Ottoman-era poet Tevfik Fikret, 
“But if the time comes that the citizens can ask for accountability, we will know ‘how many come 
out pure and sparkling!’”494  
 In a second article, entitled “We Want Accountability in Front of the Nation!”, that was 
published on December 1, 1945, three days prior to the Tan Riot and the same day as the initial 
publication of Görüşler, Zekeriya immediately accused the CHP of surreptitiously providing 
400,000 liras to a group in the Black Sea city of Sivas to publish a newspaper. The practice of the 
party funding a newspaper was in itself inoffensive to Zekeriya Sertel – after all, when he left the 
Press Bureau in 1923 he and his partners were gifted property to house the offices of Cumhuriyet 
from Atatürk himself – but the paper had, from its first days, launched into personal attacks 
against him, asking where he got the money to buy his house in Moda.495 Zekeriya responded to 
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this charge by detailing his repeated openness about the finances and aims of his newspapers, 
“When we asked these friends where they found this 400 thousand liras, we were ready to 
provide an account of our own finances in front of the nation. They preferred not to give their 
accounts and instead stoop to demagogic trickery.” After repeating his own history of his 
participation in the Turkish press, Zekeriya leveled a significant accusation – he states that in 
1938 and 1939 he had launched an investigation into a number of government representatives and 
ministers who had deposited significant sums of money into foreign banks, mainly in 
Switzerland. He claimed that a government commission which was charged with discovering 
foreign agents in Turkey compiled a list of these individuals and provided it to the government, 
but that the government refused to publish it. He closed the article demanding the government 
publish the list, 
Now we have shown our accounts to those that requested them. We are asking that those 
that have in their hands the list of the Swiss organization and those who hold the wealth 
of the entire citizenry be obliged to publish a statement. We want those who yesterday 
were not allowed more than five para to be made clear and accountable in front of the 
nation. Let’s take a look at this accounting, How many come out pure and sparkling.496  
As indicated by the similar closings, the articles were meant to be related to one another. The 
Sertels had been mounting a campaign to expose financial indiscretions by the CHP throughout 
the fall of 1945, and had the printing house not been destroyed, it likely would have continued.  
 The indictment the proceeded from these articles from Istanbul’s Assistant Prosecutor 
Hicabi Dinç first lays out a lengthy, if unsatisfactory, defense of the state against Zekeriya’s 
accusations, but ultimately rests on an argument for limits placed on free speech,  
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The meaning of the grand medium is not for press freedom to be wielded as a weapon 
and to make unfounded accusations from a place of power against the government and 
against the state. Criticism is a precious right in democracy. However, the reality is that 
criticism must be proven over time to constitute an objective analysis.  
Here is where we find the practicable difference between freedom of the press 
and unrestricted freedom of thought. In every democracy, it is this way and so it is in 
ours. Otherwise it will be the responsibility of the newspapers to the masses to verify the 
truth of every conjecture that is written and according to whether the people react 
negatively or positively they might find it more enriching to make propaganda to suit 
those moods, and as their circulation increases accordingly, as it provides benefits and 
they will find that it possible to publish whatever thoughts are desired. The above-
mentioned editorials thus have for a long time, and systemically hid under the mask of 
criticism and it is impossible to say that the spreading of propaganda is a qualification of 
press freedom. A free press’s criticism is reputable when it is distributed within reality.497  
The prosecutor closed his remarks repeating the accusation that Sertel “held the freedom of the 
press like a weapon,” and that this offended the spirit of the Press Law’s Article 30, which would 
carry a sentence of three to six months and a minimum 100 liras fine.498  
 In his defense, Zekeriya sought to directly contest the application of Article 30 to his 
case. He summarized the accusations into three distinct categories that follow the wording of the 
original article, “1 – To attack the personal security (mevdu vazifeler) in a publication; 2 – To, 
without material evidence, create vagueness and doubt about the offended party in writing; 3 – To 
attack the honor and dignity of these parties.” He went on to defend himself against the first 
instance by pointing out he did not name a single individual in his article, and that there was “not 
one line of personal criticism, nor affront, nor triviality,” in his writing, and offers a contrasting 
view on freedom of speech, “A democracy establishes three types of controls that a citizen can 
use to exercise their right to call for accountability; the first is the Parliament; the second is the 
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Press; the third is opposition parties… in countries with a democratic administration the 
Parliament’s rostrum is free; the press is free and opposition is free.”  
Against the second charge, Zekeriya insisted that if asking for a list of war profiteers be 
published by the parliament is a crime, then he was certainly not the first to be guilty and in fact 
no less a person than President İsmet İnönü would be guilty of it, since he insisted in his Youth 
and Sports Day Speech in 1945 that “We will not by any means be involved with the dirt of war 
profiteers that is found in the administration and the seat of power.”499 He also pointed out that 
Prime Minister Saraçoğlu had also admitted in a statement given to newspapers on December 5, 
1945, the day after the Tan Riot, that there had been corruption within the bureaucracy, and that 
“the best remedy is to feed the stomachs of the bureaucrats.” Given these statements, Zekeriya 
wondered why it should be any surprise to the government that rumors and gossip about war 
profiteers and corrupt officials had spread amongst the populace, and that a member of the press 
should request clarity on the issue from state officials. He again appealed to the court’s sense of 
patriotism by insisting that in this situation “I wished to do nothing more than to cleanse the 
regime’s internal enemies and bring about a shiny and clean situation. In any country, this is the 
first goal of any honorable journalist.” If the existence of rumors, fed by the regime, of war 
profiteers was not enough to justify the requests Zekeriya was making, he reiterated the specifics 
of the original reporting – that in 1939 it was discovered that Celal Bayar, who was then Prime 
Minister, was implicated in a corruption scandal with a business operation in Istanbul, prompting 
both his resignation and a fact-finding mission to Europe to produce a list of state officials who 
held money in foreign banks. In fact, the question of this report was, Zekeriya points out, revealed 
in a statement from the Prime Minister on December 7, 1945 to have been discussed in Party 
Group meetings, and that claimed the report Tan was searching for was not found and there was 
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no truth to these rumors. For Zekeriya, the fact that his newspaper prompted this response was 
simply part of doing his service, and he saw no crime in that. Lastly, he again appealed to 
patriotism, and Turkish nationalists’ self-comparison to Europe by pointing out that although 
Turkey did not fight the war, it was equally a victim of war profiteering as many European 
nations, and that since the end of the war Holland, France, Italy, and several Balkan countries 
have enacted laws that demand war profiteers return their wealth to their nations. “Is it then a 
crime for us to invite those who made wealth at the cost of impoverishing our people to be 
accountable in front of the nation?” he asks. Against the final charge Zekeriya asserted that the 
crime of insulting the honor and dignity of an official depends on criminal intent (kasit), but that 
in his writings, “there is no criminal intent, there is defense (müdafaa).” He again reiterates here 
that his writing was equally a response to attacks, indeed subtle claims of war profiteering, made 
against him by the CHP-sponsored newspaper in Sivas, Ülke, against which he claims, “Every 
day, I am ready to provide my entire income account to the nation. If those who ask after my 
accounts are committing a crime, how is it that I am in your presence for committing the 
same?”500 
To close his defense, Zekeriya addressed the conception of press freedom offered by the 
prosecutor. The suggestion by the prosecutor that bounds on speech and press freedom must be 
asserted by the state, and enforced through prosecutions such as this one, deeply disturbed 
Zekeriya Sertel. He saw this accusation as not only an attempt to silence a single critic of the 
regime, but as part of a wider campaign against press freedom that was being affected by the 
state. He asserted that “the goal of the thoughts counted as crimes in my writing is freedom” and 
he proceeded to provide four examples of how his present prosecution was thoroughly out of 
character with the democratic tradition. In the first, he notes that the American President Franklin 
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Roosevelt had, throughout his tenure, and particularly in 1940 had sustained violent attacks from 
some corners of the American press, and “at one point the attacks reached the degree of personal 
assault (şahsı tecavüz), slanderous (iftira), and false allegations (isnat).” Despite the fact that 
these attacks even came from within his own party and suggested he was using his state authority 
to enrich himself, Zekeriya pointed out that, “Roosevelt did not bring a suit against these 
journalists who made false allegations; he did not attempt to shut the mouths of those who 
published this; he did not, and could not, condescend to those journalists who insult the President 
or call him a traitor.” Likewise, in a second example drawn from one of the articles he was being 
prosecuted for, the First Lady did not bring a suit against the person who wrote her a letter 
accusing her corruption in her industrial holdings, nor against the newspaper that published it. As 
a third example, Zekeriya pointed out that Neville Chamberlain was accused of “staining the 
honor, dignity and station of England” after signing the Munich Agreement, since he had 
investments in German manufacturing. Like his American counterparts, Chamberlain did not 
bring a suit against his critics, instead he took the rostrum of the House of Commons and said, “It 
is because of your freedom to speak like this that we are persevering through all of these 
disasters.” Lastly, and most powerfully, Zekeriya brought the court’s attention to the kicker of his 
two articles, “how many come out pure and sparkling,” which was drawn from the Ottoman poet 
Tevfik Fikret – himself a staunch critic of Sultan Abdülhamid II. Zekeriya then explains how his 
present situation compares unfavorably not only to the standard bearers of democracy, but to the 
regime which stood in complete anathema to the values of the Turkish Republic,  
The question asked in my writing, “how many will come out pure and sparkling” are not 
my own words. This was said forty years ago by Tevfik Fikret. At the time that Fikret 
asked this question, Abdülhamid’s tyranny was reigning. That time did not know the 
freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of conscience. One could not speak of 
accountability in front of the nation. In a situation and a time such as this no suit was 
brought against Tevfik Fikret, nor was any legal proceeding, nor was his writing called 
into account for asking this question.  
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 Forty years later, in an era of freedom and democracy, I asked the same question 
and for that I have endured legal proceedings and I am brought before your honor as a 
criminal. Is the Republican administration not to exceed the levels of freedom of 
criticism, speech and thought set by the rule of Adbülhamid’s tyranny? Is this the public 
prosecutor’s understanding of freedom? This is not the truth. 
Zekeriya went on to enumerate the laws, constitutional articles, and statements of the current 
President that protect criticism of the state and freedom of the press. He closed his defense by 
stressing the importance of the judge’s decision, “This suit is a historic case that will determine in 
front of the eyes of the nation and the world if freedom and democracy in this country can still be 
slaughtered or not slaughtered (boğazlanabilip boğazlanamıyacağını) if thought can break its 
chains or not… The decision that you give will not remain in the four walls of this courtroom.”501   
 In the second trial, Zekeriya was joined by his wife Sabiha and Cami Baykurt to defend 
articles they wrote in late August and early September 1945 assessing Turkey’s role in joining the 
United Nations and the possibility of multiparty elections in the coming year. In the indictment, 
Assistant Prosecutor Hicabi Dinç once again accused Zekeriya Sertel of insulting the Grand 
National Assembly by insinuating that its members were incompetent and that the Assembly 
“responded to the base of opposition with a degree of ignorance that was far from humanity and 
with a tyrannical spirit.”502 Sabiha Sertel was accused of the same, and Dinç added that she had 
accused the majority of “using a radio interference machine [parazit makinesi] as a signal to 
silence the opposition and truly departing from political decorum to the point of whistling and 
stomping feet and banging on desks to silence them.”503 Cami Baykurt was accused mainly of 
threatening the personal safety of members of the Assembly’s majority.504 Taken together, Dinç 
argued that “it is understood that while cloaked in the mask of criticism the ideas put forth and the 
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general meaning of the opinions with these publications [the defendants] affronted and 
dishonored the lofty status of the Grand National Assembly and the Republic.”505 
 Even more than the previous trial, the accusations and issues at the center of this trial 
were purely political and ideological. None of the articles mentioned by the prosecution go as far 
as Zekeriya’s previous articles that insinuated corruption on the part of the CHP. Zekeriya’s 
supposedly incriminating article, “Can We Wait for Something from the Government and the 
Assembly?” published August 22, 1945, casted doubt on the prospects for truly fair elections, 
criticized Prime Minister Saraçoğlu’s claim that the Turkish regime’s vitality and democratic 
nature was proved merely by its having escaped entanglement in the war, and called for a revision 
of laws restricting the freedom of speech, particularly Article 50 of the Press Law.506 Sabiha’s 
article, published September 3rd and titled “The Cry of the Consenting”, indeed mentions radio 
interference as the indictment accused, but the offending sentence is clearly a metaphor – the 
article criticizes the Press Law and the power the governing party has to censor dissenting voices, 
which often occurred by disrupting speeches from opposition members on the floor of the 
Assembly.507 Cami Baykurt’s incriminating text took the occasion of the debate over the 
constitution of the United Nations to offer an abstract lesson on “The Historical Role of the 
Intellectual Class.”508 Accordingly, the defense statements reflected the political nature of the 
crimes with which they had been charged.  
 Zekeriya’s defense immediately set the terms of the trial on a political plane, “I am here 
to proclaim pride in my own name. Because this trial is not a trial over a measly insult, it is a trial 
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for the freedom and democracy of the country.” Zekeriya argued that the prosecutor “while 
choosing articles in which I have written in defense of freedom and democracy, had continuously 
worked to surely incriminate me, and whether he wanted to or not, brought me into the place of 
hero in this trial,” and that the chance to defend these values in court represented “the most 
honorable and pleasurable stage of my life.”509 He asserted that his editorial, which followed 
İsmet İnönü’s August 19 speech on Turkey’s signing of the United Nations charter that had called 
for the reform of laws that may be acting as a barrier to democratization, had “taken inspiration 
from these signals from the President, and I was searching for what type of changes to the law 
would be necessary for the progression of democracy in the country.”510 He went on to point out 
that the 159th Article of the Criminal Code, under which he was being charged, pertained only to 
personal insults against members of parliament or the Republican government, and that he made 
no such personal remark in his writings only criticism of the political situation generally. He 
pointed out that the indictment offered a new interpretation of the term “insult” (hakaret), 
meaning an “affront (tahkir), contempt (hor görme), dishonor (tezyif), belittling (küçültme), [or] 
humiliation (aşağılama)” and argued that, “if we understood an insult this way, it will become 
necessary to deny the opposition. Why? Because in a democracy the role of the opposition is to 
use contempt, belittlement, and humiliation while criticizing and mocking [tehzil ederek] the 
majority by any means in any situation.”511 Like in his previous defense, Zekeriya compared his 
present situation to that of the opposition press in western democracies like the United States and 
Great Britain, but, acknowledging that “these are countries that have been living and maturing 
democracy for ages. You can say that they are not examples for us…” he also compared Turkey’s 
progress to Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania, countries that had more recently become independent 
and shared an Ottoman past to one extent or another, and in which, he argued, one could criticize 
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the government to a greater degree despite the fact that each country was under a form of military 
occupation at the present moment.512  
 Beyond the issue of freedom of speech and democratization, Zekeriya also made the case 
that the targeting of Tan writers was blatantly ideological. To prove this, he read a few excerpts 
of articles published by noted liberal journalist Ahmet Emin Yalman in his newspaper Vatan in 
July and August 1945. The articles had assailed the single party system and the selection of 
candidates for the parliamentary elections, saying that because the party approved all of the 
candidates on the ballot in advance, “in truth, it is not an election, it is an appointment” and 
another, penned the same day as the one Zekeriya had been arrested for, suggested that the entire 
parliament should be retired with a pension.513 Zekeriya argued that “the prosecution did not find 
that the degree of belittlement of the Grand National Assembly in the opinion of the people to 
have passed the position of an insult. Because according to the measurements he uses it was not 
possible to find a criminal component.”514 He then quoted a lengthy piece of legislation arguing 
that individual words and sentences cannot be taken out of their original context and given legal 
force.515 Following these lines of argument, he came to the conclusion that the prosecutor could 
not find “the reason for the actions against Tan to take lawful or judicial paths, so it became 
necessary to search for political justifications. To put it another way, this trial is not a judicial 
trial, it can only be a political trial.”516 As to what the political crime the Sertels had committed 
was, Zekeriya had a clear answer:  
The atmosphere of freedom was spreading and as criticism was increasing the People’s 
Party and their government became uncomfortable, they began to be frustrated. Because 
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as the press began to use their freedom and right to criticism, the totalitarian character of 
the government’s mistakes, laws and administration came into the square. 
 However, the government did not close newspapers using the rights that were 
afforded to it by Article 50 of the Press Law. Because in a democratic country, it is a 
beastly thing to close a newspaper as understood by the Americans, who were assured 
that the government would no longer close a newspaper without cause. At the same time, 
we found out that an international commitment had been made that we would observe 
human rights and basic freedoms as condition of entering the United Nations’ society.517 
Zekeriya proceeded to argue that the destruction of Tan press on December 4, 1945 was 
instigated by agents of the People’s Party as a method for dealing with the perceived problem of a 
critical press without skirting the newly evolving democratic norms of the postwar environment. 
He noted that the Party Group, Prime Minister, and Justice Minister had all mentioned the 
possibility of a trial against the Sertels in the wake of the riot, and argued that the reason they 
were being brought to trial under these seemingly flimsy accusations of insulting Parliament was 
because no proof could be found tying them to the Soviet Union.518 In his closing paragraphs, 
Zekeriya plead with the judge, imploring him to recognize that the courts were the last line of 
defense against despotism in his country, “Tan has been closed, the Tan-ists have been 
imprisoned, the newspapers are silenced and the opposition has been frightened. Our only 
consolation and our only hope is that the preservation of the court’s honor and dignity will be 
scrupulously and sensitively found.”519 
 Zekeriya’s impassioned argument against the impartiality of the prosecution’s case, and 
defense of a democratic society was intensified by Sabiha’s defense, which veered at times into a 
stinging mockery of the prosecution’s charges. Before reviewing her article and the charges 
against her, Sabiha admonished the police for “taking me from my house in the middle of the 
night like a thief, like a murderer,” for writing an article that was meant to come to the defense of 
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opposition parliamentarians, namely Fuat Köprülü and a few of his friends, who had their 
speeches drowned out by a jeering crowd in parliament when they had attempted to address 
potential reforms in light of the United Nations accords.520 Then addressing the charges against 
her directly, Sabiha sarcastically admonished the prosecution’s mendacious understanding of her 
writing, 
I am an admirer of the prosecutor’s talent, breadth of intellectual strengths, powerful 
imagination, and interpretive capabilities in this accusation. However, I have happened 
upon a few grammatical errors. Because the counsel for the prosecution’s work has been 
careless, subject, predicate, the object of the simile that is being made have been 
confused. The subject that is being criticized in this writing is not the racket made by the 
representatives, it is the majority representative’s silencing of the opposition 
representatives. In this respect, the racket is not fundamental, power is. The 
representatives’ pounding of their feet to make a racket is thereby similar to radio 
interference. Radio interference is being compared to the racket. In the manner of an 
anecdote, the comparisons written in this writing are a literary comparison. The 
Assembly neither resembles a radio machine nor an interference with the radio.521 
After this rebuke, Sabiha elevated her argument to a defense of a critical press in a multiparty 
democracy. She repeated similar examples of press criticism in the United Kingdom and France, 
and warned of the dangers of criminalizing dissent on the eve of the first proper multiparty 
parliamentary elections in the history of the Turkish Republic, “If the People’s Party counts 
criticism directed towards it as a crime, that means that tomorrow, criticisms of the activities and 
program of the Democrat Party, the National Development Party, or others will also be a 
crime.”522 She recalled a moment in an earlier hearing where she had asked the prosecution 
whether the charges were politically motived, the prosecutor denied that accusation, stating that 
he was acting in the “public interest” (amme menfaatı). Sabiha wondered aloud, “if the prosecutor 
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is acting in the public interest, why did he not see it necessary to bring prosecution against those 
who destroyed Tan Press?”523  
 Sabiha defended her own writing as having made explicit arguments for broader 
democratic reform, “In this writing and in many of my other writings I have defended the 
transition to a true democracy in Turkey, bringing an end to the single party system, choosing 
national representatives with a free election, raising the level of welfare for the people, the 
prevention of graft and profiteering, and likewise any of the people’s worries as being in the 
public interest and the people’s interest.”524 It is clear from her line of argument that she saw her 
statement as a final chance to defend her reputation and career in front of the Turkish people, but 
more importantly, to highlight the precarious point at which democracy in Turkey had arrived. 
Unlike Zekeriya’s more clinical dissection of the charges against them, Sabiha’s defense centered 
on the argument for a free and open multiparty democracy, and the fundamental role that critics 
such as herself played in the health of that democracy. She defended her criticism of the regime 
as productive, “Criticism and debate of the economic, social, and political mistakes of the 
People’s Party and the government are not destructive, their true connotation is constructive,” and 
that she desired changes to laws to make the country “based on more free and democratic 
principles, on the principles of a society that guarantees human rights…”525 She forwarded, in 
broad terms, an argument for the power of criticism and dialecticism in a democratic society, 
“Criticism is not a mask, nor is it a suit of armor that girds and shelters its ideas and intentions… 
While defending a given thesis, the thesis, antithesis, and synthesis come out from this criticism 
and debate, from the collision of ideas. The motor of progress is criticism.”526  Sabiha directly 
compared the criminalization of her criticism to the draconian censorship laws under fascist Italy, 
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Germany and Hungary, and the shielding of those who had wrecked their printing house the 
previous December from criminal charges to the protection afforded fascist protestors by Jean 
Chiappe, the right-wing Prefect of Police in Paris during the 1930s.527  
 Sabiha emphasized the backwards step that their indictment represented, citing President 
İnönü’s May 19, 1944 speech – the same that denounced the racist-Turanists two weeks after 
their arrests – as a “harbinger of the transition to a wider democracy” and noting that this 
commitment had, in her opinion, been partially substantiated by a second speech, at the opening 
of  the Grand National Assembly in September 1945 that mentioned the need to amend Article 50 
of the Press Law and other anti-democratic laws, as well as the signing of the United Nations 
accords. In light of this, “For us to be brought into court for a crime such as this after the signing 
of the United Nations Constitution represents an antinomy.”528 She saw her prosecution as a 
distinct departure from the meaning of Turkey’s signature to the UN accords, which she 
understood, according to a statement she quoted from the American Secretary of State Edward 
Stettinius, as protecting “individual human rights irrespective of differences in race, religion, or 
sex…”529 In her closing, she emphasized to the judge what was at stake in his decision,  
In this historic courtroom, the decision that the high court will give will not only concern 
the relevance of [Turkey’s] international reputation, it will be historic for justice, it will 
be an important decision for the independence of the court. I have mounted a defense of a 
Turkey that is free and democratic as an honorable mission that gives accountability to 
the country. I await a decision from the high court that will realize such an honorable 
mission with the vigorous tranquility of a citizen.530 
Taken together, Sabiha and Zekeriya’s defenses characterized the trial’s political nature, but also 
brought the full tension of Turkey’s precarious transitional status to bear on the court’s decision.  
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 The initial decision found all three parties guilty, but not before completing a similar set 
of linguistic acrobatics to those used to convict the Pan-Turanists. The judge began with what 
seems like an assent to the defense, claiming that in Zekeriya’s article, “even if the words directed 
at the government (hükûmet) are severe, they do not convey the meaning of the words dishonor 
(tezyif) and affront (tahkir)” and that Sabiha’s article, “does not have the character of dishonoring 
or affronting the spiritual personality of the government (hükûmetin manevi şahsiyetini), not in a 
word and sentence and aggregate meaning.”531 Yet, the judge almost immediately turned to parse 
the meaning of the Criminal Code’s Article 159 in a less favorable light, “Nevertheless, according 
to the Turkish Criminal Code’s 159th article, the crimes of dishonoring and affronting the Grand 
National Assembly and the spiritual personality of the government are separate from one another, 
each are individual crimes.”532 
 The judge decided that while some of Zekeriya’s language was ambiguous, one could 
utilize the unsigned caricatures that appeared alongside his columns, and the comparison he made 
in his defense statement between his situation and the situation in Mussolini’s Italy to say that 
given the context, “In this heavy meaning and expression, to say that ‘the base (tabanlar) [of the 
party] should respond’ to the Assembly is an affront to the Assembly.”533 In Sabiha’s case, the 
judge denied her argument that she was criticizing the party, not the parliament on the grounds 
that, “On the date this writing was published, there was essentially no other party in the Assembly 
than the Republican People’s Party.”534 Additionally, he argued Sabiha contradicted herself by 
stating that making noise in an parliament was a fairly ordinary event, but then in imputing that 
the noisemaking had become itself, a tactic of the CHP, she dishonored the Assembly. The judge 
also took time in his decision to address the complaints the Sertels had made regarding the lack of 
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arrests or prosecution stemming from the destruction of their printing house the previous 
December. The judge noted that following changes made to Article 160 of the Criminal Code in 
1938, the powers to bring charges under Article 159 were transferred from the individual 
prosecutors of the republic to the Justice Minister. Because no request for charges was filed in 
relation to that event, the judge was in no place to comment on whether or why charges were not 
brought, out of respect for the formality of the law.535 Ultimately, he found all of the defendants 
guilty, handing down a one year prison sentence each to Zekeriya and Sabiha, and a reduced 
sentence to Baykurt, since he was older than sixty-five, of ten months. The Sertels were also 
assessed with a fine of 2,200 kuruş to cover court fees.536  
 The second trial concluded in March 1946, but the Sertels, Baykurt, and Dördüncü would 
successfully win an appeals decision two months later, on May 14, 1946, just two months before 
the general election. The appeals court unequivocally demolished the reasoning behind the initial 
decision, providing dissections of the reasoning behind each conviction. In acknowledging that 
Zekeriya Sertel’s article’s main purpose was to call for, “the transition to a true democracy in a 
broader sense in the country” after the signing of the United Nations Constitution, the appeals 
court saw that, “the court had decided that these sentences were included in [the meaning] of 
dishonor and affront, but a justification [mucip sebebi] was not shown.”537 In Sabiha’s case, the 
court clearly noted that although it was not mentioned in the article, it had appeared shortly after 
Fuat Köprülü had attempted to convey suggestions for changes to the Press Law and Criminal 
Code that had been articulated by Adnan Menderes, only to be shouted down in the Assembly in 
precisely the manner described by Sabiha Sertel. Additionally, as the court had argued for an 
equation between insulting the Assembly and insulting the Republican People’s Party, the appeals 
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court found that, “While it is true that at the date of the publication there could not be 
representatives of any party in the Assembly other than the Republican People’s Party, it is 
possible to discover that a minority existed that had separated from the party.”538 Ultimately, the 
appeals court granted the defendants’ release from prison and the return of 500 kuruş in 
inappropriate fines.539  
The trials were followed closely by officials representing the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Despite having maintained a close relationship with the Sertels throughout the years, and 
the generally sympathetic tone taken throughout their internal correspondence on the trial, the 
American’s internal view of the initial verdict in the case privileged the draconian Press Law over 
the obvious political nature of the trial. Writing to John Evarts Horner, the Second Secretary of 
the Ankara Embassy, Ali Nur Bozcalı – an employee of the Istanbul Consulate and the most 
trusted interpreter of events in Istanbul in the employ of the American legation – concluded his 
summary of the trial by writing, “Hardly any doubt can prevail on the point that, in view of the 
existing legislation, the decision of the court was a just one… The defense of the Sertels attracted 
considerable attention here, but in view of the political leanings ascribed to them, did not arouse 
much sympathy.”540 This attitude reflects the instrumental approach the Americans took towards 
their partners in the Turkish intelligentsia, and clearly demonstrates that a vague measure of the 
sympathies of the Turkish public took primacy over their own concrete, detailed, and much more 
realistic assessments of the people on which they depended for quality intelligence. For the 
Sertels, this cold and calculated relationship might partly explain why when it came time to leave 
Turkey in 1950 they chose the Soviet Union over the United States, despite their long relationship 
with American culture and society and the fact that their daughter and only grandchildren were 
                                                           
538 Ibid, 127 
539 Ibid, 128 
540 Ali Nur Bozcalı to John Evarts Horner, March 29, 1946. Ankara Embassy General Records 
RG 84 UD 3287 Box 102 
274 
 
living there with their American son-in-law. While Soviet documents were not reviewed for this 
dissertation, the American Embassy also kept track of Soviet publications such as TASS, 
Iszvestia, and Pravda. The Deputy Chief of the Moscow Embassy George Kennan circulated a 
telegram with TASS’ reaction to the Sertel verdict on March 25th which commented on Sabiha’s 
defense as having, “…subjected prosecutors activities to withering criticism [sic] demonstrated 
groundlessness of charges and declared that the trial itself was political trial and indicated 
democracy does not exist in Turkey.”541 Little reaction to this news is recorded in the American 
archives, but it is possible that it might have affected any American decision to intervene, as they 
had done on behalf of the Ankara university professors who were suspended in the wake of the 
December 4, 1945 riot that destroyed the Sertels’ printing press.  
The two trials and appeals cases of the Sertels occupied a transitional space between the 
announcement of the Democrat Party’s formation in late November 1945, and the run up to 
parliamentary elections on July 21, 1946. As such, we can observe some important political 
changes that were occurring in this time of transition that might help explain both the Sertels’ 
acquittal and the troubles they would face as they sought to reclaim their place in Turkey’s public 
sphere. On the domestic front, there are signs that the initial prosecution of the Sertels may have 
been subject to the outlook of Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu, who was widely considered to 
have propelled closer relations with Nazi Germany earlier in the war. In an OWI report filed at 
the American Embassy on December 26, OWI staffer G.H. Damon reported on a one and a half 
hour conversation he had five days earlier aboard a train with Ahmet Emin Yalman, who had 
previously been engaged in what appears to have been a long, contentious conversation with 
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Saraçoğlu.542 Yalman reports that Saraçoğlu was particularly suspicious of Yalman, stating that 
“his type were more dangerous than out-and-out Communists like Sertel and Baykurt because 
Yalman disguises his real nature.”543 Presumably, the “type” referred to here were center-oriented 
liberals who supported the DP, but also defended the Sertels in the wake of the Tan Olayı. The 
accusation of a “disguise” here carries added weight since Yalman, like Sabiha Sertel, came from 
a Sabbatean, or dönme, community in Salonica. However, by the time Zekeriya and Sabiha were 
brought in front of a judge in January 1946, rumors had already begun to swirl that Saraçoğlu was 
likely to be pushed out of office due to his previous affinity for Germany, in favor of a more 
Anglo-American friendly alternative like Education Minister Hasan Ali Yücel or Foreign 
Minister Hasan Saka.544 Ultimately, Saraçoğlu would hang on until after the elections in July, 
stepping down on August 7th in favor of the long time parliamentarian and former Minister of the 
Interior, Recep Peker. Additionally, there were signs some amends were being extended for the 
damage done during the Tan Olayı, as Berrak Bookstore, one of the Russian-owned 
establishments wrecked in the course of the riot, had reopened in January after repairs were 
furnished by an unnamed patron.545 
Conclusion: The Birth of the Cold War Conflict in Turkey 
 The fortunes of both the leftist and Pan-Turkist camp following these trials demonstrates 
the changing ideological grounds on which Turkish politics would operate in the Cold War era. 
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As Jacob Landau characterized the events, even though the period between 1944 and 1947 
witnessed severe repression of Pan Turkist ideas, “the campaign against the movement in general 
served the Pan-Turkist cause admirably, giving Pan-Turkism the extensive free publicity which it 
had long desired,” and that with the final acquittal in 1947, “Pan-Turkism had been vindicated by 
the Courts as neither subversive nor illegal.”546 For aggressive nationalist movements in Turkey, 
these trials would serve as their origin story, the initial instantiation of their grievance with 
opponents amongst the left and with the Kemalists, and, particularly considering the accusations 
of torture, a political narrative of victimhood that can often serve as a seductive element. For the 
Kemalists, as Turkey moved closer and closer to the anti-communist orbit, would learn to first 
legally forgive, then politically tolerate the Pan Turkists as their attention turned towards 
combatting real and perceived Soviet designs on Turkish territory.547 One cannot point to similar 
sorts of redemption in the eyes of the state for the careers of leftists targeted in the Tan trial, and 
other incidents of repression, such as the sacking of leftist professors at Ankara University in 
1947 – many of whom were antagonists of the Turanists, who, perhaps not coincidentally, had 
just been finally acquitted of their charges.  
In his recent biography of Niyazi Berkes, Şakir Dinçşahin characterizes the shifts in 
ideological contestation during and after World War II as one in which, “the ideological conflict 
between ultranationalists and progressives was replaced with an ideological antagonism between 
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the left and the right.”548 What I have shown in this chapter, and in the previous chapter, is one 
example in which a violent spectacle – the Tan Riot – and the legal persecution of regime 
opponents helped bring about this shift. Dinçşahin argues that the contested elections of 1946, 
and what was perceived as a surprising success for the Democrat Party (they won 61 seats in the 
Assembly to the CHP’s 395), prompted an acceleration of repressive measures against freedom of 
the press and academic freedom.549 It is true that the tactics of repression demonstrated in these 
two chapters would be reprised over the remainder of the 1940s – Pan-Turkists would loudly 
accuse the government of torture during the imprisonment of their comrades, anti-communist 
demonstrations against leftist professors at Ankara University would result in criminal charges 
and dismissals for Berkes and other members of his Yürt ve Dünya cohort, and marginally leftist 
publications like Yön (Direction), Gün (Day), and Marko Paşa would be routinely shuttered or 
forced into illicit, underground publication networks. However, one should be careful not to draw 
too sharp a distinction between the conflicts during and after the war in terms of their intellectual 
content, and the state’s preferred strategies of tamping them down. After all, the ideological 
content of the Pan Turkists and the leftists/progressives did not undergo a significant shift that 
one could credit to the end of the war, and neither did the anti-Russian anxieties that drove 
Turkish foreign and domestic policy during the war dissipate as Turkey worked to ensconce itself 
in the Western alliance.  
What did change was the language in which this conflict was expressed. In one way, the 
primary tension of ideological contestation in the single-party era was one between the struggle to 
define a nation, and the struggle to build a democracy. For Kemalists, the goal was to obliterate 
this tension – constructing the nation meant grooming national citizens that would serve as a 
                                                           
548 Şakir Dinçşahin, State and Intellectuals in Turkey: The Life and Times of Niyazi Berkes, 1908-
1988 (New York: Lexington Books, 2015), xvii 
549 Ibid, 77-96 
278 
 
vehicle for political modernization and the transition to democracy. What I have elucidated in this 
dissertation is that opposition to the Kemalist regime largely expressed itself in terms of a 
preference for one or the other project – nation building or democratization. The dawn of the 
Cold War, and the self-conscious transition fostered by the İnönü regime towards greater focus on 
building a democracy, meant that the internal dynamics of ideological contestation – 
fundamentally an internal struggle over what ideas ought to shape Turkish society – were 
reshaped to suit the global context of a struggle between Soviet communism and western 
democracy. While this shift superficially favored increased democratization, the result was an 
intensified focus on the “enemy within” that painted intellectuals and political figures on the left 
who were loyal to the Turkish republican project as fifth columnists and enemies of the state. 
Even as Turkey would slowly open up its electoral democracy to a new, multiparty contest, the 
legal and public dimensions of democracy would constrict expression, and demolish the careers 










CHAPTER SEVEN: “A Turk Named O’Brien”: Bedtime Stories of the Early Turkish 
Republic from the Memoirs of Sevim Sertel O’Brien 
  
Sevim Sertel O’Brien, the eldest daughter of Sabiha and Zekeriya Sertel, was born shortly after 
the close of World War I in Istanbul. She would follow her parents as an infant to America in 
1919 and back to Turkey in 1923 following the close of the War for Independence. Her 
experiences growing up in that period of rapid change, her college education in Missouri, 
courtship and marriage to an American journalist named Frank O’Brien, and her adventures as a 
1950s housewife in Chevy Chase, Maryland are recorded in an unpublished memoir entitled “A 
Turk Named O’Brien.” This collection of more than fifty stories was set down sometime in the 
mid to late 1960s and culled from the stories she would tell her three children, Deniz, Sevim, and 
Atiye (Tia) before bedtime over the course of the late 1940s and into the 1950s. These 
reminiscences, all recorded in O’Brien’s slightly idiosyncratic English, represent a fascinating 
and rare retelling of the history of the single party period and its aftermath through the eyes of a 
child and young adult. The compilation of the memoir in this manner also is in some way an echo 
of Sabiha’s own memoirs, first published in 1969, entitled “Roman Gibi” (“Like a Novel”) and 
dedicated to Deniz, to whom Sabiha wrote, “Now I hear you are performing in a Shakespeare 
play at your theater club. I am not at the stage, I have played such a small role in your life. I will 
tell this story to you and my readers once more, like a fairy tale, like a novel.”550 
The stories are divided roughly in three sections. The stories begin with her return to 
Istanbul in 1923 and the first section covers her experiences with the social and cultural 
revolutions of Mustafa Kemal as well as her parents’ travails as intellectuals that often found 
them at odds with the state. The second section chronicles her return to America for finishing 
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school and her collegiate years at the University of Missouri School of Journalism where she 
meets her eventual husband Frank O’Brien. Following school, the two of them began work as 
journalists first in America and then in Turkey and other parts of Europe and the Middle East 
throughout World War II. The final section describes her experiences after she and her husband 
return to the United States following the war, two children Denis and Sevim in tow, to raise their 
family, and a third child Atiye, largely in the Washington, DC suburb of Chevy Chase, Maryland.  
 What is so fascinating about reading these memoirs in the context of the Sertels’ family 
history, is the rosy perspective that they shed on this period. If one were to read these memoirs in 
a vacuum, unaware of the history of Sevim Sertel O’Brien’s parents, they might read as a 
Kemalist fairy tale of sorts. In particular, the earliest periods where she expresses profound relief 
upon hearing about headscarf reform, or later with the alphabet reform, one gets the sense that her 
own values lined up closely with the Kemalist revolutions. Even her experiences visiting her 
father while he was imprisoned in Sinop are rather bucolic in their description. However, when 
one considers the fact that she deliberately chose to raise her children in America, that her own 
parents were living in exile in Baku while she set down these memoirs, and that she was a regular 
writer for her parents’ opposition newspaper, Tan, throughout the war years, the relationship 
between O’Brien’s own nostalgic remembrances of single-party era Turkey and Kemalist politics 
becomes more complicated. That the memoirs lack the fiery zeal of her parents’ writing is 
perhaps not surprising, but if a reader knew the Sertels only from their newspaper writing in the 
1940s, this nostalgia for Kemalist reform, as well as the close cooperation with Americans, might 
come as a bit of a shock.  
 This chapter seeks to pick apart the feeling of nostalgia weaved throughout O’Brien’s 
memoirs in an effort to better understand the way this leftist family related to the government 
whose sovereignty they vigorously supported, but which had disowned them by the dawn of the 
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multiparty period. I will follow closely from the work of Esra Özyürek, who first articulated the 
concept of “nostalgia for modernity” in the Turkish context, to try and describe the conditions 
that produced a memoir like this and to better understand the style of O’Brien’s writing as a kind 
of “structure of feeling,” to borrow Raymond Williams’ term, rather than as a clean cut product of 
political ideology.551 In some ways, Sevim Sertel O’Brien is precisely the sort of character that 
Özyürek was interested in, loyal to the Turkish republican vision, a supporter of many of the 
basic tenets and articulations of Kemalist nationalism, but the fact of her oft-dislocated childhood, 
and her separation from her “homeland” as an adult make it difficult to characterize her 
articulation of Turkishness as purely typical of nationalist Turks of her era. In many ways, the 
nostalgic elements of O’Brien’s story represent what Svetlana Boym has called a “reflective 
nostalgia” that “allows us to distinguish between national memory that is based on a single plot of 
national identity, and social memory, which consists of collective frameworks that mark but do 
not define the individual memory.”552  
 Another critical context for this chapter is the interesting way it fits in with the genre of 
autobiography and memoir writing in the history of the Turkish republic.553 As detailed in a 
recent article by Doğan Gürpınar, memoirs of political and cultural figures in Turkey have come 
largely in two waves. The first following the Democrat Party’s victory in 1950 featured many so-
called “Unionists” and tacit supporters of the Ottoman ancien regime who found themselves just 
on the outside of the Kemalist center, albeit comfortably so, after the regime consolidated in the 
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mid-1920s. 554 The second wave occurred in the 1990s, and, according to Gürpinar’s 
characterization, focused on cementing an intimate, nostalgic, middle class version of the past by 
focusing on memoirs of cosmopolitan Ottomans of Izmir or Beyoğlu, and by reviving the softer 
side of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.555 This second wave trained its focus on selling to secular, middle 
class women. Sevim Sertel O’Brien was a child to parents of the previous generation, but her 
work here fits very well into the second category insofar as it evokes a personal and intimate 
connection with the early years of Turkish nationalism.  
 While Gürpinar trained his sights mainly on former male politicians and officials, Hülya 
Adak has separately investigated some of the recurrent themes of female autobiographers in the 
early republican period.556 Adak’s incisive analysis demonstrated how many female memoirists 
of the 1920s and 1930s, such as Halide Edib, Sabiha Gökçen or Afet İnan, “excessively promote 
the public self at the expense of narrating the private,” to the point that their own histories are 
often silenced within their own self-narratives in favor of servicing the paternalistic Kemalist 
heroic mythos.557 Even in the case of the most prominent Turkish feminist and suffragette, Halide 
Edib, Adak observes that she “self-infantilizes” her private life – in particular her marriage to her 
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second husband, Adnan Adıvar – and even alienates herself from her largest contribution to the 
cause of the Independence war by idiosyncratically narrating her famous speeches in Sultanahmet 
square in May and June 1919 in the third person.558 Adak then places Sabiha Sertel’s memoir, 
Roman Gibi, in contradistinction to this trend as a woman who aggressively asserted her own 
vision of the Republic that clashed with the official narrative to the point that it often landed her 
in front of a judge or behind bars.559 Sevim Sertel O’Brien’s memoirs in many ways contrasts 
from both examples in that the concern of the manuscript is almost entirely her own private life – 
we hear almost nothing of her public life in Turkey, and very little of it in America – and the 
ways in which it was affected by the changing political and social climate around her, but also in 
that it provides a much less critical view on the Kemalist reforms, and is completely silent about 
Turkish politics after his death in 1938. For this reason, it is necessary to dig into other Sertel 
family documents, memoirs and materials, as well as Sevim’s own journalistic work, to 
investigate what might lie behind these silences and how they might illuminate the memoiristic 
work of some of her more vocal and prominent countrywomen.  
  As much as it is difficult to parse ideology out of O’Brien’s narrative, dealing with the 
history implanted in it, and indeed the history of the text itself, is even trickier. Surely O’Brien’s 
life in between the time she returned with her family to her native country in 1923 and her time 
spent learning how to get on as an American housewife in the 1950s was more turbulent than her 
often-amusing prose suggests. O’Brien’s experiences shuttling back and forth between schools in 
New York, Istanbul, New Jersey and Missouri in the 1920s and 1930s, and running around 
Europe – two small children in tow – with an American reporter for a husband during World War 
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II is represented in the narrative with an appealing attitude of adventure. However, one gets little 
sense of how much more turbulence and distress were swirling around the Sertel family during 
these years from these stories. In fact, Sevim Randall, the eldest surviving child of Sevim 
O’Brien, admitted to me in an interview that she had no idea her grandparents were some sort of 
famous intellectuals, or even that they were journalists, until her younger sister Tia started 
digging into the family history a little over a decade ago.560  
The issue of reception of this text then becomes an important lens through which to 
analyze its production. According to Atiye [Tia] O’Brien, once the text was completed in the 
1960s there was discussion between Sevim and her husband Frank regarding whether they should 
publish it. The manuscript was eventually offered to Alfred A. Knopf, but was rejected for 
reasons that are somewhat unclear.561 Since then, the text has circulated amongst the extended 
Sertel family by Tia O’Brien, and a copy was given to Sevim Sertel’s sister Yıldız, though 
whether she circulated amongst her circles in Europe and Turkey is unknown.562 With this in 
mind, it is clear that the text has, until now, served mainly as a sort of family heirloom, though we 
can be reasonably sure that the idea of publishing the manuscript as a sort of history of the period 
meant for American audiences crossed Sevim’s mind while she composed the text. It is possible, 
given the very political trends in Turkish memoir writing in the 1950s and 1960s, that the 
apparent lack of political immediacy in Sevim’s text, and its nostalgia for a period in Turkish 
history that had only very recently passed, made the narrative an awkward fit in the publishing 
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landscape. The picture it paints of Turkey’s social and political history is finer, and without a 
clear reference to a particular ideological project.563   
“There is no Statue of Liberty in the Istanbul harbor” 
 “A Turk Named O’Brien” begins as the Sertels arrive on a ship in the Istanbul harbor in 
late 1923. Sevim is by her father’s side and expresses a great deal of curiosity about this new 
place, and immediately we are introduced to the figure of Mustafa Kemal, 
 “Baba,” I asked, “Where is the Statue of Liberty?” 
 “There is no Statue of Liberty in the Istanbul harbor, kızım.” 
 “Do we not have liberty then? 
 “Of course, we do, Sevim,” Baba said with great enthusiasm. 
“They have just finished fighting a War of Independence. That is why we are coming 
back to our country, now.” 
“Do they have George Washington?” 
“Yes, his name is Mustafa Kemal Pasha.” 
“George Washington is Mustafa Kemal Pasha?” 
“No no. Kemal Pasha is our hero. He just rescued our country from the enemies that had 
taken it, like George Washington did for America. Tell me, isn’t Istanbul a beautiful 
city?” my father asked enthusiastically. 
“It does not look like New York City,” I said 
“It is prettier, isn’t it?” 
“I guess so. Where is Chrysler Building?”564 
In a few ways, this opening passage sets up the entire memoir’s relationship to Kemalism and 
Turkey more broadly. Throughout the memoir, Turkey and America are set in comparison to one 
                                                           
563 Many memoirs by Sevim’s contemporaries more easily fit into the category of “longing” for 
an open-ended political project, whereas this text is more representative of a private, but still 
somewhat political nostalgia. On the distinction between longing and nostalgia, see Charles S. 
Maier, “The End of Longing? (Notes toward a History of Postwar German National Longing)” in 
Brady, et al eds., The Postwar Transformation of Germany: Democracy, Prosperity, and 
Nationhood (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 271-285. 
564 “A Turk Named O’Brien” Chapter 1 
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another, often in distinct relief rather than in similarity. Here, we can see the simple lesson 
communicated by Zekeriya to Sevim (or perhaps more accurately, from Sevim to her children via 
the voice of her father) that Mustafa Kemal is a heroic, democratic figure on par with George 
Washington, but that Istanbul is hardly a city in the same way as New York. There is a tenuous 
amount of hope placed onto the exchange – according to Zekeriya, Turkey has won liberty, but 
there is no statue to it in the Istanbul harbor, liberty is at once present but incomplete.  
 The explanation of the character of Mustafa Kemal is not left entirely to the figure of 
Zekeriya. In the subsequent chapter, Sevim is awoken early in the morning by the ezan and comes 
upon an unknown elderly woman in the kitchen of her Aunt Fatma’s home. The woman, named 
Salihah, first explains the Muslim prayers to the curious Sevim. Sevim inquires as to what 
Salihah is praying for, “same as everyone else I guess; to thank Allah for being alive and free 
again,” she replies. Sevim initially finds this to be a novel thing to ask for, since she merely 
prayed for material possessions in America. Then Salihah tells the story of her involvement in the 
War of Independence, where she was tasked with covertly transporting ammunition to Turkish 
soldiers at the front while driving an oxcart full of watermelons. Salihah also gives a standard 
Turkish nationalist explanation of why the Ottoman Empire was occupied by foreign powers – 
and “Greece particularly” – which drove Mustafa Kemal to raise an army in Anatolia and drive 
the Greeks “right into the sea in Smyrna where they had first landed.”  While there is very little to 
suggest that Sevim’s family encouraged her to be religious – after all Sabiha’s family was of a 
dönme, or Sabbatean Jewish, background – the syncopation here of Mustafa Kemal’s heroic 
victory and thanks given to Allah demonstrates the manner in which Kemalist secularization 
incorporated religious identity and practice.565 Sevim neatly sums this relationship up in her 
                                                           
565 This formulation of Turkish nationalism and religion in early republican Turkey is a succinct 
example of the sort of laicite described by Hamit Bozarslan in, “La Laicite en Turquie” 
Matérieaux pour la histoire de notre temps, 78 (2005) p. 42-49  
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conclusion to this part of the story by exclaiming, “Allah and Mustafa Kemal Pasha! These two 
names seemed to mean a great deal in Saliha’s life. I was soon to discover that they did in every 
Turk’s life, including mine.”566  
 It is in these early chapters that we see a clear distinction from other memoirs of women 
from this period. Whereas many women personalize their relationship with Mustafa Kemal, and 
insist on including a standard recitation of the national struggle and reforms as part of that 
relationship, Sevim’s depiction forgoes a complete narrative in favor of putting her own personal 
experience in the foreground, allowing the politics to happen off-stage and travel through the 
voices of people she knew intimately.  
Playing House in Sinop 
In early 1926, shortly after the Sheikh Said rebellion and the institution of the Law of 
Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sukun Kanunu), Zekeriya Sertel was apprehended for publishing 
propagandistic articles that displeased the Kemalist establishment. He was sentenced to internal 
exile to the Black Sea town of Sinop. During this period, certainly a trying one for the Sertel 
family, the editorial duties of Zekeriya were handed over to Sabiha and the name of their largest 
publication, Resimli Ay, was temporarily changed to Sevimli Ay – a nod to their daughter who 
spent most of that summer visiting her exiled father. 
 In the memoir, the moment of crisis around Zekeriya’s imprisonment in Sinop is dealt 
with swiftly. Sevim comes downstairs on a Sunday to discover many of the female members of 
her family crowded around Sabiha, who was trying to make sense of the announcement that her 
husband was to be “fortress-bound at Sinop.” As the family stresses over what the meaning of 
this term might be, Sevim consults her younger sister Yıldız as to what all the commotion is 
                                                           
566 “A Turk Named O’Brien” Chapter 2 
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about. The precocious youngster replies, “They are going to put Baba in a fortress, just like the 
princess in the stories. Isn’t that wonderful?” and proceeds to skip blithely away.567 When she 
inquires amongst the adults about the matter, it is revealed that an article published by a talented 
cartoonist, Jevat,568 had angered Ankara and that Zekeriya would be sent to Sinop as punishment. 
As they are explaining this distressing situation, and Sevim is comforted by her grandmother, the 
story is again comically punctuated by the on-the-loose toddler, Yıldız, who manages to pull 
down a clothing rack, causing a commotion. 
 Eventually, Zekeriya’s internal exile in Sinop is presented as serendipitous since it 
provided an opportunity for the young Sevim to spend the summer in a different part of the 
country. The primary theme of Sevim’s time in Sinop is the ways the people of the Black Sea 
behaved differently than the Istanbulites she had become used to – particularly their speech 
patterns. In essence, she uses it as a moment to describe some typically Anatolian folkways that 
have been essentialized as emblematic of Turkish identity and culture since the Kemalist period. 
On the rowboat coming ashore to Sinop, Sevim misses the captain’s order to sit down, and is 
knocked unconscious to the floor by an oncoming wave – she missed the order because she didn’t 
                                                           
567 “A Turk Named O’Brien” Chapter 15. The word they are struggling over in this story is 
almost certainly “kalebentlik” which is a kind of neologism, forging the Turkish “kale” (“castle” 
or “fortress”) with the English “bound”. What it reveals is how unfamiliar the Sertel family was 
with the typical construction of Black Sea fortress-towns, many of which were confined within 
rather old city walls.   
568 “Jevat” in this story is Cevat Şakir, more popularly known as Halikarnas Balıkçısı (The 
Fisherman of Halicarnassus), who was imprisoned with Zekeriya after publishing an article in 
Resimli Ay entitled “Asker kaçakları nasıl asılır” (“How will the military whistleblowers hang?”), 
which was purportedly about a previous stint in prison where he recounted secrets fed to him by 
soldiers he was imprisoned with. The eventual sentence, handed down by the extraordinary 
Independence Tribunals by the infamous “Kel” Ali, was for three years, of which Zekeriya served 
one and a half. Zekeriya, for his part, describes his arrest and trial in rather harrowing terms, but 
recalls “strolling out of the courtroom with our arms swaying” after escaping what he thought 
was a sure death sentence. M. Zekeriya Sertel, Hatırladıklarım, 143-157. Sabiha and Yıldız also 
retell the story of Zekeriya’s arrest and sentencing in their respective memoirs, but Sevim’s is the 
only one to detail the fortress-bound life in Sinop. Sabiha Sertel, Roman Gibi (Can Yayınları 
edition), 98-99, Yıldız Sertel, Annem: Sabiha Sertel Kimdi Neler Yazdı (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi 
Yayınları, 1993) 127-132. 
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understand the dialect. She would quickly befriend two teenaged boys – Aziz and Lutfu – who 
would show her around their prison/summer home. She is introduced first to Lutfu’s mother, who 
she finds “sitting by the window and in front of something. It was not a piano. It was as big as a 
piano but nothing like it.”569 Lutfu’s mother is obviously sitting at a loom weaving a rug in the 
style traditional to many Anatolian villages. Sevim then explains how Lutfu, his mother, and his 
sister Hayriye typify the Anatolian family – the family made their living selling handicrafts and 
by tending a small tobacco plot. During playtime, Sevim notices that they play “house” 
differently in Sinop than in Istanbul – none of them pretend families had fathers, since they had 
all died in the War for Independence.  
 Sevim clearly formed a close connection with the people she met as a child in Sinop, and 
it is the only chapter in the memoir meant to explain Turkish life outside of Istanbul or Ankara. 
Sinop is thus a stand-in for the typically romanticized version of Turkish life, the source of the 
ethnic heritage she wished to pass on to her own children. But the other explicit example of this 
chapter, and one that is perhaps the most dominant theme of the memoir, is Sevim’s adaptability 
to her environment. Throughout the chapter, Sevim is chastised by Aysha Abla for having dirty 
hands – from assisting Hayriye’s family with the tobacco harvest – dirty feet – from running 
around without shoes, like the village kids – and a dirty tongue – since she had managed to pick 
up the Sinop dialect that had confused her at the beginning of her trip. Though her older “sister” 
worries that she will be scorned on her return to Istanbul as a “villager,” Zekeriya is more abiding 
of Sevim’s knack for mimicry, “You will see,” he tells them both, “when Sevim is back in 
Istanbul, it won’t take her long to speak like her friends there. Then she will be imitating them. 
Meanwhile, let us just let her have fun.”570   
                                                           
569 “A Turk Named O’Brien” Chapter 15.  




 At the outset of her young adulthood, Sevim Sertel O’Brien meant to follow in the path 
of her parents and become a journalist. Having graduated from journalism school at the 
University of Missouri, she began sending dispatches and short columns back to her parents 
which were published occasionally in a second or third page column entitled “Gözüme 
Çarpanlar” (“What Caught My Eye”). Very little of her work as a columnist is recorded in “A 
Turk Named O’Brien” but the few instances where it does appear are instructive in understanding 
Sevim’s self-understanding as both an insider and an outsider, both in America and in Turkey.  
 The story behind one of Sevim’s first self-appointed assignments, while she was on 
summer vacation, is told in a humorous set piece on the Orient Express when she was returning to 
Istanbul for a visit in the mid-1930s. While the train was travelling through Yugoslavia, Sevim 
realized that she is sharing the train with the Galatasaray football club. A few of the players, who 
figure she is an American based on her clothing and her Brownie camera, ask her to take their 
picture and an interview ensues. Comically, Sevim notes in the story how she pretended not to 
hear the young boy’s off-color comments – and subsequent pleas for civility in the presence of a 
cute American journalist. When she inquires as to how well the team did on their string of games 
in Yugoslavia, the boys debate in Turkish about whether they should lie and say they won, but 
ultimately admit they were defeated in their three matches. A curious Sevim wonders how this 
could be, since Galatasaray was supposed to be one of the best Turkish clubs, just as one of the 
players falls out of the luggage rack, where he had been sleeping, who exclaims in Turkish, 
“Damn the club management! Putting us eight to a compartment just like pigs, in third class yet. 
My bones ache!” When she inquired about the situation, the boys simply say the player, whose 
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name is Hafiz, is quite athletic and likes to sleep in odd places. “Just as I thought, typically 
Turkish, they were not going to share their troubles or embarrassment with a stranger.”571 
 Another of the players quickly changes the subject by showing Sevim a picture of his 
girlfriend, asking her opinion of her looks. It turns out the girl was someone Sevim was already 
familiar with, though the name is left out of the narrative. She responds, “She is pretty. Are many 
Turkish girls pretty? I understand that they do not wear veils anymore. Is that true?” To which 
Hafiz responds in Turkish, “Thank Allah for that. To flirt with a girl in a veil must be a heck of a 
job!” which is then translated to Sevim as, “We are proud to say that none of our friends wear 
veils. Many of them look and dress just like you do.” After disembarking at Sirkeci, where she 
was met by her parents and Tan’s sports reporter Omar Besim, word got around about around the 
team’s encounter with a young American journalist. By the time the family returned to their 
apartment in Moda, the secret was uncovered and the players began phoning the Sertels to 
apologize for their foul language, begging her not to write anything.572 
 In this set piece, we see how Sevim’s conception of Kemalist reforms is again portrayed 
on the surface in a positive light, as a practical improvement to male-female relations. Such an 
encounter would never have occurred before 1924, the year when train cars and tramways were 
desegregated, and even then, likely not until after Mustafa Kemal’s anti-veiling campaign swung 
into full force a few years later. The set piece also portrays the aspirational aspects of this attitude 
– the Turkish boys clearly have one set of rules when talking amongst themselves, and another 
when talking with foreigners, a form of code switching. The Turkish boys are eager to point out 
                                                           




that Turkish girls are similar to American girls in their beauty and clothing.573 Sevim, for her own 
part, clearly enjoys putting on a type of cultural veil in order to get an honest interview with the 
Galatasaray players – a reverse-echo of the old orientalist trope of European men cross dressing 
as women in order to report on life in the harem. In the end, the story emphasizes not how 
modern Turks had become, but how “typically Turkish” the boys behaved.  
“American Housewife” 
After a number of turbulent years during and after WWII, which saw the Sertel-O’Briens 
and their young family posted up in Cairo and Bucharest during the last years of the war – a 
daughter, Sevim, was born during Easter 1945, mere months after Romania had switched 
allegiances to the Allies following King Michael’s Coup – and following the close of the war, a 
brief spell back in Istanbul, when the family spent two more years in Rome as Frank headed up 
the AP bureau there. Sevim and Frank’s eventual, and permanent, decampment to America came 
at a time when most parts of the Sertel clan saw themselves leaving Turkey for friendlier 
pastures. Sevim, for her part, explains the decision to leave for America in vague terms, 
“Originally, we had planned to live in Turkey. I had told Frank that I simply could not part from 
my beloved city of Istanbul and my people. But, now with the children, things were different. For 
various reasons the answer was America.”574 
Those “various reasons” had to do with the increasingly tight political and financial 
situation the Sertels were finding themselves in by the late 1940s. After the destruction of Tan in 
December 1945, life for leftists in Turkey, particularly those who were accused of “communist” 
activities, became increasingly difficult. To the extent that certain intellectuals like Sabahattin Ali 
                                                           
573 This effort is pretty clearly connected to the campaigns for Turkish beauty queens that had 
kicked off in earnest less than a decade before this exchange occurred. A. Holly Shissler, “Beauty 
is Nothing to be Ashamed of” 
574 “A Turk Named O’Brien” Chapter XX “I Learn about St. Patrick’s Day and To Cook” 
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and Aziz Nesin tried to keep the torch alive with small-run weeklies like Marko Paşa, they would 
find their work censored, or worse, police knocking on their door to drag them to prison for 
printing so-called communist propaganda. Sabiha and Zekeriya managed to escape serious prison 
time, barely, but were left without much income since they had no newspaper to run, and their 
printing house was functionally on its last legs. By 1950, the Sabiha and Zekeriya would leave 
Turkey altogether for the Eastern Bloc, and eventually Baku.  
The final section of Sevim’s memoirs, entitled “American Housewife” covers her 
adjustment to living in 1950s suburban America, first in Kansas City and Philadelphia, then 
settling outside of Washington, DC in Chevy Chase, MD. The stories in this section may have 
been less often told as bedtime stories, since they largely cover periods when Sevim’s own 
children were growing up. Nonetheless, they do offer a fascinating window into the ways in 
which Sevim tried to pass on a Turkish identity to her kids, and how she would exhibit her 
Turkish identity to her new friends, all while attempting to loosely conform to the social 
expectations of being a housewife in a time and place where the idea of the housebound wife and 
mother was becoming a critical building block of American social imagination and cultural 
politics.575 It’s important then to look directly at the symbols Sevim Sertel portrays in this section 
that are supposed to be representative of Turkish national culture – and ask why these particular 
images are chosen. 
One of the early chapters in this final part involves Sevim and her young children coming 
across a parade sponsored by the local Shriner’s organization in Kansas City, where they were 
staying with Frank’s parents after leaving Turkey for good. As she described it, “this parade 
consisted of grown up men all dressed in baggy trousers, colorful vests and red [sic] fezes black 
                                                           
575 While the memoir does not address any of the most familiar hallmarks of this process, such as 
June Cleaver or Betty Friedan, Sevim’s tacit engagement with the social norms represented and 
contested by women all over the country at this time is palpable throughout the text.   
294 
 
tassel and all. They reminded me of the Egyptian palace guards… Could the Egyptian King be in 
town?”576 When she relays this information to her son Denis, he declares, “When I grow up, I will 
be a palace guard and play the drums.” The confusion is clarified later by Frank’s father, who 
surely had a good laugh, but it is worth pointing out how the typical costume of the Shriners 
specifically reminded Sevim of an Egyptian outfit that would otherwise not have been out of 
place in Istanbul, prior to the establishment of the republic. 
 In a later chapter, Sevim details her experience as a volunteer project manager for the 
Experiment in International Living wherein she led a group of Turkish students around 
Washington, DC for a day meeting congressmen and, eventually, President John F. Kennedy. In 
this passage, we see Sevim as the conduit through which a group of flustered Turkish teenagers 
learn about American politics, and in turn, the students become the exemplars of typical Turkish 
behavior. As the students arrive late from their overnight bus coming in from New England, 
Sevim is introduced to them in English as “Mrs. O’Brien.” The grouchy teens begin complaining 
in Turkish about their restless time on the overnight bus when they are shocked that “Mrs. 
O’Brien” is able to turn to them and say in their own language, “I know how you feel. It is your 
first time in a big American city and the Experiment is rushing you, in their desire to provide you 
with the most during the least of time.”577 After that, the students completely froze. As the 
students were informed that Mrs. O’Brien in fact spoke Turkish, Sevim explains to her own 
children that they were embarrassed to have been caught complaining to their host, “this is a 
Turkish characteristic. You simply keep your troubles to yourself. A stranger must not know.”578  
 The chapter unfolds as a lesson in American civics through the experience of Turkish 
students being shuttled about Washington, D.C. on field trips in August 1962 and 1963. In the 
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first trip, the students are introduced to congresswoman Frances Bolton (R-OH), then the longest 
serving woman in Congress, and are treated to a brief audience with President Kennedy in the 
Rose Garden of the White House. Congresswoman Bolton’s visit in the memoir works to 
encourage the female Turkish students, and Sevim’s two daughters, to be involved in politics and 
to demonstrate the relationship between the Congress and the White House – Bolton admitted that 
“when Mr. O’Brien calls me up and tries to influence me, I resent it.”579 This passage of course 
results in a bit of humorous confusion as the students assume “Mr. O’Brien” is Sevim’s husband 
Frank, and not Larry O’Brien, the President’s congressional liaison (and future commissioner of 
the National Basketball Association). Upon meeting President Kennedy, Sevim was clearly 
enraptured, “but what a face!” she wrote, “This was enough for me for a life time. It was the kind 
of face just like Ataturk’s. They did no look alike at all. The President looked just like his 
pictures. But the two men seemed to have the same quality – strength of purpose – in their 
faces.”580 Here Sevim is imparting a lesson about the transformative effect of Kennedy and 
Atatürk as leaders, emphasizing both men’s strength and the intimacy with which she related to 
each of them. 
 The following year, the students had conducted home stays in Indiana and accordingly in 
Washington met with a Congressman from that state, who goes unnamed and is depicted as a bit 
more clueless than the veteran Frances Bolton – at the end of their visit, the representative 
“conveyed his best wishes to Mr. Nehru,” and was duly corrected by one of the students. After a 
meeting with the Undersecretary of Commerce Franklin Roosevelt Jr., the students were shuttled 
over to the Lincoln memorial, which was being prepared for the March for Jobs and Freedom that 
was to take place the following day.  





 The juxtaposition of these stories of 1950s and early 1960s America with those of 1920s 
Turkey invite many comparisons. While the explicit emphasis of the stories is on the contrasts 
between Turkey and the United States, there is also an implicit similarity of the transformations 
occurring in society at large, and in Sevim’s own life. As in 1920s Turkey, gender norms were 
swiftly changing in 1950s America. Sevim’s adoption of the “housewife” motif in this chapter is 
emblematic of what it meant to be “modern” in that time and space in much the same way being a 
western-oriented child celebrating Atatürk’s reforms was in the 1920s.  
Modern Love Stories Across Three Generations  
 Naturally, no set of bedtime stories is complete without a couple tales of romance and 
Sevim Sertel O’Brien’s are no exception. In retelling both the courtship of her parents and her 
own courtship with Frank O’Brien, Sevim Sertel neatly lays out the ways each of their 
relationships were shaped by their time, and also by the expectations set by the previous 
generation. Zekeriya and Sabiha’s courtship is portrayed as one that truly upset the traditional 
social order of Sabiha’s family. In telling the story, Sevim first hears from her grandmother about 
her Aunt Fatma’s betrothal at the age of five and when she asks whether her then-deceased 
grandfather had chosen Zekeriya for Sabiha, she is told that “No… she was nothing like any other 
girl of her age.” Sabiha is depicted as a voracious reader, and is said to have struck up a series of 
corresponding letters with the editor of the local paper – who happened to be Zekeriya. After her 
submission to an essay contest – which she signed under her real name, an unusual practice for 
women writers of the time, and then won – Zekeriya was convinced he’d found the woman he 
wanted to marry. The story of Zekeriya’s visit with Sabiha’s four, clearly enraged brothers and 
her rather bemused mother and sister then follows as Zekeriya explains how he came to the 
conclusion that no other woman would do for him. Aunt Fatma then interjects in the story, “that 
was when I couldn’t believe my ears. He wanted Sabiha, who knew nothing about housekeeping 
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at all, as his wife” to which the grandmother responds, “That is just it Fatma… He was not 
looking for a housekeeper. He wanted a girl who was talented, who could defy tradition in order 
to make a place for herself in the world as she well deserved… It was obvious… that I was 
dealing with an unusual man.”581 
 Since companionate marriage was to become one of the foundational aspects of the 
remaking of gender roles in society during the coming decades – and not just in Turkey – it is in 
this way that Sabiha and Zekeriya are pitched as revolutionaries in their own right.582 Throughout 
the stories, we get almost no idea as to what Sabiha and Zekeriya’s politics were – even stories 
from Zekeriya’s imprisonment are vague about the reasons he’s there – but what we do get is the 
personalization of the revolutionary time period and the very explicit lesson passed down from 
Sabiha’s generation to her grandchildren’s that not only should one love who they please, but that 
one should not be afraid of retribution from one’s own family for doing so. This lesson is driven 
home by the matriarch of the family, Sabiha’s mother, who is accepting of Zekeriya, and in turn, 
very accepting of Sevim’s husband, Frank. In the same chapter, Sevim recounts how she 
informed her own family of her engagement to Frank amidst a series of letters (Sabiha and 
Zekeriya were still residing in Turkey). Since Sabiha was ill at the time, it fell to Sabiha’s 
brothers to inform their mother of Sevim and Frank’s decision. It proceeds: 
 “There is bad news!” he told her.  
 “Is there a death in the family?” she wanted to know. 
 “No.” he assured her. 
 “Sabiha’s illness has not taken a turn for the worse?” 
 “No, Sabiha is alright.” 
 “Is somebody besides Sabiha ill?” 
                                                           
581 Sevim Sertel O’Brien “A Turk Named O’Brien” Chapter 3 “Marriage, Turkish Style”  




 “A big fight, disagreement among you children?” 
 “No, no.” 
 So she asked them. 
 “What then could this bad news be?” 
 “Sevim,” they told her, “is planning to marry a Christian.” 
“Well, well,” said Anneanneh with a sigh of relief. “Is that what is bothering you? Is this 
bad news? Christian or Moslem, Allah created us all. The only thing I ask is that he is a 
good man, and will make our daughter happy.”583 
These values seem to be crucial to what Sevim sought to impart to her children, and while they 
are modernist values that in many ways are emblematic of the Kemalist vision for women in 
society, Sevim takes care to root them in something a bit deeper in the past and more fundamental 
to being Turkish. In a speech delivered at the wedding of her daughter Atiye to (yet another) 
journalist, David Diamond, Sevim sought to connect her daughter’s affectionate partnership to the 
same tradition of modernist, companionate love laid out in these bedtime stories. She begins the 
short speech with an old Turkish proverb, “the pot rolled over and found its cover” (tencere 
yuvarlanmış kapağını bulmuş) to emphasize the random chance involved in finding a “perfect 
match.” Her words of wisdom offered to her daughter and son-in-law invoke both the memory of 
Sevim’s grandmother and her father, and their ability to maintain their happiness despite their 
struggles. Her grandmother remained upbeat throughout battles with various illnesses, her 
father’s problems with the government sent him to prison and left him penniless when he died, 
but he always told her to remember that, “each night is followed by a day.”584   
                                                           
583 Ibid. 
584 Five drafts of this speech exist in Tia O’Brien’s private archive, both in Turkish and in 
English. A note included with the drafts suggests the speech was delivered in both languages, the 
likely final English version describes Zekeriya as “an outspoken newspaper man, they jailed him, 
they burned down his printing house, they left him penniless. But he too was not crushed. He 
continued to enjoy life.” The likely final Turkish version ties the two together more closely, 
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Turkishness as an off-modern costume 
 Combined together, the blending of American and Turkish sensibilities, identities and 
citizenships in this memoir is a unique one in the Turkish case. It is helpful to view Sevim 
O’Brien’s memoirs in light of other experiences of émigré feminism, a term developed by Alena 
Heitlinger and others that addresses the work of feminist writers, scholars, and activists whose 
work is largely conducted in the course of a diasporic experience.585 While the term “feminist” is 
always a tricky one to lay at the feet of women from this generation, it is critical to look at this 
text as one that focuses one woman’s experiences in two different national contexts, where the 
contours of feminism, identity and citizenship differed tremendously. Sevim Sertel O’Brien’s 
memoirs force the experiences of women living through the Kemalist revolution and through the 
conservative, constraining period of America prior to the “sexual revolution” of the 1960s to 
speak to one another in a way that other memoirs of Turkish women with diasporic experiences 
do not. While Halide Edib’s and Selma Ekrem’s memoirs chronicle women’s experiences in 
Turkey and in the United States, this text is unique in its focus on the private role of women in 
both contexts, and its more concretely hybrid nature.586 
By the end of the three volumes of Sevim Sertel’s bedtime stories there are two dominant 
threads that have emerged. The first we might call the Turkish thread, which is meant to knit 
together an image of her Turkish home suitable for her children. It conforms roughly with 
standard versions of modern Turkish experience, since it encompasses the revolutionary character 
of Mustafa Kemal’s rule, the distillation of an “Anatolian” Turkishness, and the connection to 
                                                                                                                                                                              
“matbasını yıkılır. O da anneannem gibi hayatın dadını çıkarım akta devam etti.” (they destroyed 
his printing house. But he, like my grandmother, continued to derive great interest from life.) The 
line “each night is followed by a day” (her gecenin bir gündüzü vardır) is found in all drafts. 
Private Archive, Tia O’Brien, Kentfield, California.  
585 See the introduction and essays in Alena Heitlinger, ed., Émigré Feminism: Transnational 
Perspectives (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999)  
586 In particular, Halide Edib’s Memoirs of Halide Edib and Selma Ekrem’s Turkey Old and New  
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religious and folk traditions as a hallmark of identity. The second thread is the American one, 
introduced directly at the beginning through the Statue of Liberty, and made more colorful in the 
final third. American history and society is always the foil to the Turkish one. The costume of the 
American housewife is one Sevim accepts as her own, but is worn in an intentionally ill-fitting 
manner. Sevim’s Turkishness, which for many Turks who remained in Anatolia would constitute 
the sum total of a modern identity, serves as a way to denote her “off-modern” position in the 
United States, to borrow Svetlana Boym’s term. Her children, who would grow up with these 
stories, understood how their mother did not quite “fit” in American society – for her own 
namesake, her daughter Sevim, this Turkish legacy was a source of anxiety as she tried to fit in 
with the Bobbies and Janes of her idyllic suburban community, for Tia, it has been the impetus 
for a quest to better understand the richer tapestry of her mother’s Turkish background as she’s 
worked to uncover and revive the work and life of her grandparents, Sabiha and Zekeriya. In 
some ways, the construction of Turkish life in Sevim’s memoir is meant to demonstrate to her 
children, who would more easily conform to American life than she, that she herself did have a 
place where she would conform, where she belonged. It could be a way of showing her children 
that their mother was less alien than she seemed, but in reading these stories, particularly those set 
in America, they seem to send a message to her children that they should question the 
conventional logic, be adventurous and to be willing to adapt to new circumstances.  
 It is that message of resourcefulness – the adaptation to the hard times she referenced in 
her speech at Tia’s wedding – that is tied most tightly to the Turkish thread of the narrative, 
Sevim’s ability to adapt, whether by mimicking the Sinop accent or by setting up a bazar in their 
Chevy Chase living room, is rooted in her off-modern sensibility. The comical nature of so many 
of these stories lightly covers over the hardships her family faced throughout the 1920s, 30s and 
40s. The curious joviality of her summer in Sinop obscures the fact that her father was technically 
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imprisoned there, exiled from his wife and work in Istanbul. Their constant travelling in the 
forties does the same for the turbulent and dangerous life of a journalist during a global 
conflagration, and their arrival in America glosses over the tragic reasons she had to leave the 
home she had wanted for herself. The key to coping with this kind of disruption is usually left to 
her own parents and grandparents – particularly Atiye, Sevim’s grandmother, who exemplifies 
the resilience of a traditional lifestyle to modern adaptations more than any other character.    
One gets the sense that by leaving out the more complex political history of her family, 
Sevim O’Brien wanted to craft a more relatable or usable past for her children to help explain 
some of the ways they might have stood out amongst their classmates and friends in their early 
school years. The comic frustration with which the Sevim in these stories deals with her utterly 
revolutionary experience as a school aged child throughout each of the major Kemalist reforms – 
including but not limited to the alphabet and headgear reforms – could have easily been a way for 
her to relate to her daughters’ experiences as the only “Sevim” or “Atiye” in their Chevy Chase 
elementary schools. This is one way in which we might understand these stories not as simple 
representations of the past, but as memories highly conditioned by the times in which they were 
recorded.587 Sevim consistently emphasizes her own innate abilities to adapt to her changing 
environments without losing sight of where and with whom her personal history was rooted. This 
seems to have been a long running issue in the upbringing of the O’Brien children, and the 
younger Sevim in particular who grew up relatively shy and mortified of the attention her name 
drew her in school.588 At bottom the moral of Sevim Sertel O’Brien’s memoir for her children 
                                                           
587 As Andreas Huyssen has pointed out, this is primary nature of the relationship between the 
past and memory, “The past is not simply there in memory, but must be articulated to become 
memory… The temporal status of any act of memory is always the present and not…the past 
itself, even though all memory in some ineradicable sense is dependent on some past event or 
experience.” Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia (New York: Routledge, 
1995) p. 3 
588 Skype interview with Sevim Randall, May 31, 2015. 
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was to demonstrate precisely how to handle a turbulent upbringing, adapt to changing 



















CONCLUSION: 1950 and its Aftermath 
  
…I am not a communist, nor am I an enemy of communism. I am a liberal-minded, neutral 
journalist. I will try to capture events like a photographic machine. I will deal with things neither 
like a faithful communist sees everything as pink, nor like the anti-Soviets who place dark glasses 
on my eyes and see everything as black. Maybe these writings will displease both sides. In reality, 
every time is painful. But to close our own eyes to reality has no result other than to cheat 
ourselves.589 
 
 With those words, Zekeriya Sertel opened his reflections on the time he spent in the 
Soviet Union between 1950-1970. Sertel had been treated harshly by demagogues in Turkey and 
had been painted as a communist ideologue throughout the 1940s, despite the fact that he never 
visited the USSR prior to 1950, had an American son-in-law, and had been educated at Columbia 
University in New York. His progressive and socialist inclinations developed over time, but his 
reflections on the culture shock he felt in the Soviet Union, even in Turkish-speaking Azerbaijan, 
reflect how tied he was to his home country and the profession he had held, indeed the profession 
which he had helped build there. Likewise reflecting from Baku, and struggling in a battle with 
cancer that would end her life in 1968, Sabiha Sertel closed her memoirs on a note of optimism 
and hope for the country that had banished her,  
Today, the freedoms of speech, thought, and assembly are guaranteed under the 
constitution. Workers can form unions; they’ve become familiar with the right to strike. 
Those who struggle alongside the workers can take them by the hand, becoming socially 
conscious, and form their own parties. The youth can stand on the front lines of the 
struggle for democracy in the country. Intellectuals and progressives can struggle against 
the compradors who ally with the American bourgeoisie, against the government that 
represents the bourgeoisie, and against American imperialism. Socialist movements are 
developing. Watching from afar, all this gives this aching heart a great relief.590 
                                                           
589 Zekeriya Sertel, Olduğu Gibi: Rus Biçimi Sosyalizm (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993), p. 15. 
This volume was transliterated by Yıldız Sertel from unpublished Ottoman-script notebooks 
written in Paris in the 1970s.  




The compassion for and commitment to the project of Turkish democracy that the Sertels 
exhibited from exile is also a reflection of the tragedy of the constraints placed on political 
discourse during the run-up to the 1950 elections. This tragedy was, in effect, that in the moment 
when so many intellectuals who genuinely believed in the project of the Turkish Republic, that 
had grown up in it, that had indeed built foundational elements of its political culture, could have 
had the greatest impact – the free formation of new political parties – they found themselves 
ostracized, marginalized, and exiled from the country. The effect being that for the most part, 
many of these mammoth contributions – whether it be the Sertels’ journalism, Nazım Hikmet’s 
poetry, or even Nihal Atsız’s novellas – remained as spectral presences in political movements 
that had to build themselves back up from scratch in the multiparty era. This result is perhaps no 
better exemplified than by the legacy of Nazım Hikmet, who is widely regarded as the greatest 
poet in the contemporary Turkish language despite the fact that the Turkish Communist Party of 
which he was a part is exceedingly marginal.  
In many respects, while this dissertation covers the history of Turkey’s single party era, it 
is meant as a pre-history of the opening of multiparty politics and the formation of the Democrat 
party in 1945, its ultimate electoral success in 1950 and its bloody demise in 1960. The coalition 
of support from secular, elite, urban liberals on the one hand, and rural, conservative voters on the 
other depended in large part on the urban elite’s well-justified fear of oppression by CHP party 
apparatus and the general failure of CHP economic policies to improve conditions in the 
countryside. Yet, as I argue in my chapter on the short-lived Liberal Republican Party, this 
political coalition had its roots even before the Turkish economy went from bad to worse, and 
before crackdowns on intellectuals became rampant, during WWII. What the SCF had that the DP 
did not was the support not only of the liberal-minded urban intellectuals, but the more leftwards 
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opponents of the regime. These figures had a tremendous reach in the public sphere and were an 
important part of loyal but critical left-wing opposition to the Kemalist regime. In many respects, 
the support from these figures kept the SCF, and the Kemalist center before and after, honest. 
This wing of the opposition found themselves the victims of redirected fear of Russian invasion 
during the second world war and as enemies of the state the further the Turkish Republic drifted 
into the orbit of the new American superpower. Many of the intellectuals around which make up 
the Republic of Others found themselves in prison, driven to exile or underground during the 
period of 1945-1950. Following the DP victory in 1950, the effect of this essentially meant that a 
new generation of Turkish oppositionists essentially were left with only a fraction of the audience 
their forebears had commanded.  
Truly assessing the ramifications of the persecution of these figures necessitates 
understanding what role the DP played for the Turkish state. What the DP has always been 
congratulated for – beginning with the ethnographic investigations of the town of Balgat in 
Daniel Lerner’s classic work, The Passing of Traditional Society – is the incorporation of the 
countryside into the modernizing society and economy of the Turkish state. In more ways than 
one, it is easy to see how the success of the DP represented the success of the Kemalist project – 
it not only proved that the system of “tutelary democracy” could successfully produce 
competitive elections, but it also proved that the DP could be even more successful in the 
Kemalist project than the CHP. That the DP was successful whereas the SCF was not might bring 
one to ask whether the DP was meant to be a proper opposition party at all. To follow the line of 
logic that views the Kemalist project as a sort of auto-colonialism, the DP performed the 
necessary function of an incorporative buffer between the populace and the state. Bernard Lewis 
realized and articulated this almost too well in his remarks at Chatham House in the months 
following the DP’s victory, 
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Atatürk had written étatisme into the Turkish constitution. This was not because he was a 
Socialist – far from it. But he did understand and apply one important principle that is of 
some relevance in Asia today: that in a backward oriental country, where foreign capital 
is politically suspect, and where local capitalist enterprise lacks both capital and 
enterprise, only the State can bring to bear the initiative, the resources, the organization, 
and the planning capacity that are needed to raise the standard of living of the country, 
develop her potentialities, and modernize her economy generally. The revolt against 
étatisme in Turkey today is a measure of its success.591 
Having made the move against étatisme by electing a more market-friendly leader in Adnan 
Menderes, Lewis also noted that now was the time to loosen the reigns on political freedoms,  
Perhaps the most urgent change necessary here is an increase in freedom of discussion of 
social and economic conditions and problems. In her exposed position, and with her 
vulnerable economy, it might well be dangerous for Turkey to tolerate a Communist 
party and press. But a closer definition is desirable of the word Communist, which at 
present is defined so widely as to inhibit any serious discussion of social conditions.592 
We see here how even in a period of political efflorescence, the desire to limit political 
discussion, to mark certain ideas out of bounds, remained a central concern of the modernization 
project.  
   What I have striven to demonstrate in this dissertation is not only the tragedy this sort of 
thinking begat to Turkish political culture, but also how the view of modernization theory 
imposed a narrowness on the politics of the Kemalist period that was more suitable to the theory 
than to reality. In the 1920s, a politics of social justice and women’s liberation that would not 
have been out of place in Paris or New York emerged in opposition to the nature and focus of the 
Kemalist reforms, and the shortcomings of their social policies. While the SCF was in many was 
a hapless and awkward political experiment, the institutional and political frameworks for a true 
opposition party were perceptible both in the Istanbul press, and in the offices of the SCF across 
the country. The Kemalist foray into race discourse in the 1930s has left a treacherous legacy, but 
                                                           
591 Bernard Lewis, “Recent Developments in Turkey” International Affairs Vol. 27, No. 3, July 
1951, p. 324 
592 Ibid, 330 
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it also spurred on intense creativity and imagination amongst critics of the regime from all 
corners who expanded the limits of political discourse despite having no clear political outlet for 
it. The final three chapters of the dissertation show, in a sense, the opportunities the regime 
missed to cement the liberal and modernist ideals embedded in the Kemalist project. Nationalist 
feeling was understandably intense – and the sniping across the aisles in parliament and the press 
was vitriolic – by the close of World War II. The fact of the Tan Riot was, in many ways, an 
event that could have easily happened in an otherwise democratic society, but in democratic 
societies with liberal aspirations, the rioting demagogues are usually the ones brought in front of a 
judge, not the owners of the businesses that are wrecked. The trial of the Pan-Turkists ultimately 
forced the state to face the contradictions inherent in a putatively liberal legal framework that has 
enshrined ethnic and racial nationalism in its legal code and constitution – these contradictions 
have arguably not been resolved even to this day. And yet, despite all of that, Sevim Sertel, and 
the rest of the Sertel family, have shown that however false the promise of the DP’s 1950 victory 
may have been, the repressiveness that marked the single party era could not extinguish the 
struggle to advance democracy, nor the commitment to the radical project Mustafa Kemal’s 
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